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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union: Background and Overview  
 
1.1.1 The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law 
 
The key provisions of competition law are set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU): Article 101, which prohibits restrictive agreements, and Article 102, which 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.
1
 The enforcement of competition law is an increasingly 
prominent and important policy area for the European Union. Its role is to ensure that competition 
within the EU’s internal market is neither restricted nor distorted by anticompetitive conduct. For 
the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the terms ‘competition law’ and ‘antitrust’ are used as 
synonyms in this research project. The same applies to ‘collective (redress) actions’ and ‘class 
actions’. 
 





 to detect and bring anticompetitive practices to an end; 
 to punish antitrust infringers, and to deter them and others from breaching the law in the future; 
 to achieve corrective justice through compensation. 
 
These objectives can be achieved through two main models: public and private enforcement. 
 
The first two objectives can be primarily attained by public enforcement. Both detection and 
punishment have been pursued by a multi-layered setting of public enforcers: the European 
Commission at the EU level, and national courts and national competition authorities (NCAs) at the 
national level. The role of the national actors has been significantly increased after the adoption of 
Council Regulation 1/2003.
3
 The key measures included, inter alia, the following: (a) stimulating 
national courts’ activity in the enforcement of EU competition law; (b) decentralising the 
enforcement of EU competition rules; and (c) strengthening the possibility for individuals to seek 
redress before national courts. To that extent, national authorities have been empowered to enforce 
EU antitrust rules alongside the Commission. After more than a decade, the new system can be 
described as a success surpassing expectations; around 85% of all the enforcement decisions are 
taken by NCAs.
4
 Another aim of the joint enforcement model was to move some of the workload to 
                                                 
1
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13. 
2
 On these objectives, see, for example, Assimakis Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised 
Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts (Hart Publishing 2008) 1; Wouter PJ Wils, ‘The Relationship 
between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages’ (2008) 32(1) World Competition 3, 3-18 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296458> accessed 28 October 2018; Christopher Harding and 
Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency (Oxford University 
Press 2003) 229. 
3
 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ L 1/1. 
4
 See European Commission, ‘EU Competition Policy in Action’ (2016) Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 5 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/kd0216250enn.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018. It was 
found that between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2012 there were 1,334 investigations of the NCAs and 646 envisaged 
2 
 
national actors, allowing the European Commission to use its resources on the most serious 
violations, especially hard-core cartels. In comparison with other types of infringements (such as 
abuse of dominance), cartels require much more attention due to their covert nature. Two major 
amendments have led to the rise of anti-cartel enforcement in recent years. First, the amount of fines 
imposed on convicted cartels has rapidly increased after the adoption of the 2006 Guidelines on 
antitrust fines.
5
 Second, the 2006 Leniency Notice has enhanced the rate of cartel detection.
6
 After 
more than 10 years of combined efforts by the EU and its member states, it can be said that public 
enforcement has reached maturity in fighting antitrust violations.  
 
The main tool for achieving the objective of compensation appears to be private enforcement, and 
more specifically private actions for damages. However, even if many attempts have been made to 
facilitate private enforcement, it remains underdeveloped across the EU. Private enforcement was 
largely expected to grow to a well-functioning and well-developed system after the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003.
7
 However, the number of damages actions did not increase. During the same 
period, the objective to facilitate antitrust damages actions was reinforced by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). In its decision in Courage v. Crehan,
8
 the Court asserted that the full 
effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU would be put at risk if individuals were not allowed to 
claim damages caused by competition law violations.
9
 Furthermore, actions for damages can 
contribute to the maintenance of effective competition in the EU.
10
 The ruling in Courage was 
subsequently clarified in Manfredi,
11
 where the CJEU noted that a claim for compensation should 
be allowed when there is a causal link between the harm suffered and the anticompetitive conduct.
12
 
Following the CJEU rulings, the Commission aimed at identifying key barriers to the further 
promotion of antitrust damages actions in its policy proposals in the Green Paper
13
 and the White 
Paper.
14
 Both documents identified problems needing to be addressed; however, private 
enforcement in the EU has remained underdeveloped in compensating antitrust victims, especially 
if they suffered low value harm (typically consumers) or if they were indirect purchasers. 
Nevertheless, the EU expects that the failure in compensating victims will be remedied by the 
adoption of the Directive on damages actions.
15
 Its main objective is to ensure that any victim who 
has suffered harm caused by antitrust infringement can effectively exercise the right to claim full 
                                                                                                                                                                  
final decisions. For further discussion, see Wouter PJ Wils, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective’ (2013) 
4(4) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 293, 295-296. 
5
 Commission, ‘Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003’ 
[2006] OJ C210/2.  
6
 Commission, ‘Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases’ [2006] OJ C298/17. 
7
 Assimakis Komninos, ‘Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?’ (2006) 3(1) The 
Competition Law Review 5, 7; Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules and Beyond: Reflections on the Utility and Feasibility of Stimulating Private Enforcement through 
Legislative Action’ (2007) 44(2) Common Market Law Review 431, 434.   
8
 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297. 
9
 ibid para. 26.  
10
 ibid para. 27.  
11
 Joined Cases C-295/04 to 298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others 
[2006] ECR I-6619. 
12
 ibid para. 61. 
13
 Commission, ‘Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ COM (2005) 672 final. 
14
 Commission, ‘White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ COM (2008) 165 final. 
15
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 





 In order to ensure the achievement of full compensation, both direct and indirect 
purchasers have the right to claim compensation.
17
 With regard to mass harm situations, the 
European Commission published the horizontal Recommendation that sets out a series of common, 
non-binding principles for collective redress mechanisms across all legal fields.
18
 The latter 
package, consisting of the Directive and the Recommendation, is hereafter called the EU private 
antitrust reform.  
 
According to the European Commission, public and private enforcement are complementary 
mechanisms for ensuring the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
19
 Public 
enforcement is aimed at prevention, detection and deterrence of violations, while private 
enforcement is designed to compensate victims. Moreover, the European Commission indicated that 
private enforcement by means of damages actions may complement public enforcement, but should 
not replace or jeopardise it.
20
 The majority of antitrust commentators see the ideal antitrust 
enforcement combining both public and private enforcement.
21
 However, determining the optimal 
interplay between both models is very difficult, as strengthening private enforcement inevitably 
jeopardises the functioning of public enforcement, such as the leniency programme.    
 
1.1.2 Public Enforcement: The Real Enforcement Mode of Antitrust Enforcement  
 
The fundamental objective of EU antitrust enforcement is to prevent the distortion of competition 
within the internal market, thus ensuring that companies compete on equal terms in different EU 
countries. Moreover, it should reduce prices and improve quality, which is primarily beneficial to 
consumers. This research project is in agreement with commentators who argue that antitrust 
enforcement is primarily achieved by deterrence and prevention.
22
 The underlying logic is that it is 
better to prevent and discourage anticompetitive behaviour than trying to remedy all the negative 
effects caused by infringements post hoc. From an economic perspective, the objective of any 
enforcement action is also strongly related to deterrence.
23
 Maximal societal benefit is achieved 
when potential wrongdoers are prevented from engaging in anticompetitive behaviour. But if the 
competition law violation has occurred, the negative impacts of the harm can be remedied through 
the objective of compensation, at least in theory. Here, the injured parties perform the main role: 
they can bring damages actions in order to obtain full compensation for loss incurred. If considering 
antitrust violations more broadly, they can be as well characterised as torts. The importance of torts 
                                                 
16
 ibid arts. 1, 3.  
17
 ibid art. 14. 
18
 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective redress mechanisms in the 
Member States for injunctions against and claims on damages caused by violations of EU rights COM(2013) 3539/3. 
19
 Commission Staff Working Document Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Damages actions for breach of 
the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM (2013) 404 final, para. 29.   
20
 White Paper (n 14) sec. 1.3. 
21
 See, for example, Komninos (n 2) 9; Spencer W Waller, ‘Towards a Constructive Public-Private Partnership to 
Enforce Competition Law’ (2006) 29(6) World Competition 367, 367; Clifford A Jones, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement 
in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check’ (2004) 27(1) World Competition 13, 13.    
22
 Wouter PJ Wils, ‘Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?’ (2003) 26(3) World Competition 
473, 481; Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 2001) 266. 
23
 See, for example, Sonja E Keske, ‘Group Litigation in European Competition Law: A Law and Economics 
Perspective’ (2009) Erasmus University Rotterdam, 22 
<https://repub.eur.nl/pub/17790/Sonja%20Keske%20Thesis[lr].pdf> accessed 22 October 2018.  
4 
 
in the EU competition law has especially increased after the adoption of the Directive on antitrust 
damages.
24
 The main role of damages in torts is to put the claimant in the position that the violation 
has not taken place. When looking to torts from a broader perspective, some say that deterrence as 
well can be regarded as one of the functions of tort law.
25
 Others go even further claiming that 
compensation should not be seen as a goal of tort law, but rather an instrument to achieve better 
prevention.
26
 However, the latter approach is primarily related to the law and economic analysis of 
accident law.
27
 The purpose of damages in (accident) tort law is not to compensate victims, but to 
give the incentives for potential injurers to avoid the accident, which causes harm to victims. In 
contrast, the EU's antitrust enforcement is framed in a way that detection and prevention of 
violations is primarily achieved by public enforcement.   
 
First, public enforcement has a number of investigative and sanctioning powers to bring antitrust 
violations to an end. To start with, competition authorities have the power to conduct dawn raids at 
the premises of businesses, aiming to find out violations of the competition law, such as cartels.
28
 
Furthermore, antitrust authorities are empowered to request information from undertakings, 
regardless if they are suspected of infringing the competition rules or not.
29
 Special attention 
requires a leniency program for detecting disguised cartels and for obtaining evidence that would 
prove their harm and effects. Under this program, cartel participants can be granted either total 
immunity or a reduction from administrative fines in case they self-report to competition 
authorities.
30
 As such, the leniency program has the ability to destabilise cartels by creating 
suspicion and distrust among them.
31
 It obviously has a strong deterrent effect on both existing and 
future cartels. Administrative fines are employed as another tool for creating prevention and 
deterrence. Fines can be imposed on all types of antitrust violations, including cartel and non-cartel 
violations. According to the European Commission, the imposition of fines not only punishes the 
undertakings involved (specific deterrence), but also deters other persons from engaging in or 
continuing behaviour contrary to competition rules (general deterrence).
32
 In fact, the magnitude of 
                                                 
24
 See, for example, Okeoghene Odudu and Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Interface of EU and National Tort Law: 
Competition Law', in Paula Giliker (ed), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law’ (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017).  
25
 For further discussion, see Mark A Geistfeld, ‘The Coherence of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort Law’ 
(2013) 61 New York University Law and Economics Working Papers 383 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1350&context=nyu_lewp> accessed 22 October 2018; Zenon 
Zabinski and Bernard S Black, ‘The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Reform’ (2013) 
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 13-09 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2161362> 
accessed 22 October 2018.  
26
 Michael Faure, ‘Economic Optimization of Tort Law’, in Helmut Koziol (ed.) The Aims of Tort Law: Chinese and 
European Perspectives (Jan Sramek Verlag KG 2017) 80-81. 
27
 For further discussion, see Steven Shavel, Economic Analysis of Accident Law’ (2002) Harvard Law School, 
Discussion Paper No. 396 <http://www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/LTF_MA_24338.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018. 
28
 Dawn raids of the European Commission are defined in Article 20 of the Regulation 1/2003. The legal basis to 
undertake inspections in member states depend on a case-by-case basis. For example, in Portugal inspections are 
enshrined in Article 18(1)c of the Portuguese Competition Act (Law 19/20123, of 8 May), while in Poland the 
inspections are set in Articles 105a-105l of the Polish Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer 
Protection. 
29
 Pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has the power to require undertakings  and  associations  
of  undertakings  to  provide  it  with  all  necessary  information. Information can be requested by letter (Article 18(2)) 
or by decision (Art. 18(3)). The legal rules on collecting information in member states are embedded in national laws.  
30
 At the EU level, the leniency program is regulated under the Notice on Immunity from Fines (n 6). In member states, 
each jurisdiction has own rules, but based on the EU Notice. 
31
 Florian Smuda, ‘Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law’ (2012) ZEW Discussion Paper 
No. 12-050, 18 <http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12050.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018. 
32
 For the discussion on both types of deterrence, see European Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines 
imposed pursuant to Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C 210/2, para. 4. 
5 
 
the recent European Commission’s fines shows their potential to contribute to both specific and 
general deterrence: for example, truck producers were fined 3.8 billion euros for participation in a 
cartel under Article 101 TFEU
33
, and Google 2.4 billion euros for abusing its market dominance 
under Article 102 TFEU.
34
 Fines are significantly lower in member states, but they may also bring 




Second, public enforcement constitutes a systematic approach to the enforcement of competition 
law. Fines are imposed pursuant to an agreed set of methods. The basic amount is calculated as a 
percentage of the value of the sales connected with the infringement, multiplied by the number of 
years the infringement has been taking place.
36
 The amount can be lowered if there are mitigating 
factors, or it can be raised if there are aggravating conditions. The main rule is that the fine cannot 
exceed 10% of the infringing company's total turnover in the preceding business year.
37
 A leniency 
program also functions according to a strictly defined system. Only an immunity applicant receives 
a 100% fine reduction. In order to obtain total immunity, a company must be the first one to inform 
the Commission of an undetected cartel and must also fully cooperate throughout the procedure by 
providing all the evidence in its possession.
38
 Other companies can apply for a reduction of the fine 
if they provide evidence that gives "significant added value".
39
 The first company to meet these 
conditions is granted 30-50% reduction, the second 20-30% and subsequent companies up to 20% 
reduction.  
 
On this point, it should be stressed that the European Commission regards administrative (public) 
fines as an appropriate and effective deterrence mechanism.
40
 At first blush, the EU has a basis for 
this reasoning. As mentioned before, cartel prosecution has achieved a lot of success: the leniency 
policy has significantly increased the number of cartel decisions, while the amount of fines imposed 
on wrongdoers has increased substantially during the last years, reaching unprecedented highs.
41
 
However, despite the improved level of enforcement activities, EU fine levels have been criticized 
for being too low to achieve optimal deterrence.
42
 There is a counterargument that the 
                                                 
33
 Trucks (Case COMP/39824) Commission Decision of 19 July 2016 [2017] OJ C 108/6. The European Commission 
has found that five companies (MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco, and DAF) were involved in a cartel and hence 
has imposed a record fine of 2.9 billion euros. On 27 September 2017, the Commission fined Scania for more than 880 
million euros for its participation in the same trucks cartel. On the contrary to other companies, Scania decided not to 
settle with the Commission. Therefore, the European Commission continued the proceedings under the standard cartel 
procedure.  
34
 Google Search (Shopping) (CASE AT.39740) Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 [2017] C(2017) 4444 final. 
35
 In France, for instance, the NCA imposed a record fine of 534 million euros on three mobile operators for a price-
fixing conspiracy. See the Decision of 30 November 2005, Counseil de la Concurrence (Competition Council), No. 05-
D-65. In Lithuania, the NCA gave a fine of 36 million euros to the world's largest gas producer Gazprom for abusing its 
dominant position in the Lithuanian market. See GAZPROM, Decision of 10 June 2014 of the Competition Council, No. 
2S-3/2014. 
36
 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines (n 5) paras. 9-35.  
37
 ibid.  
38
 Notice on Immunity from Fines (n 6) para. 12.  
39
 ibid.   
40
 See, for example, Alexander Italianer, ‘Fighting Cartels in Europe and the US: Different Systems, Common Goals’ 
(Annual Conference of the International Bar Association, Boston, 9 October 2013), 4. 
41
 European Commission, ‘Cartel Statistics’ <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf> accessed 
13 October 2018. For example, during the last 4 years (2014-2017), the European Commission imposed fines totalling 6 
billion euros.  
42
 Mario Mariniello, ‘Do European Fines Deter Price Fixing?’ (2013) 4 Bruegel Policy Review, 2-4; Smuda (n 31) 18-
21; Marie L Allain, Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean P Ponssard, ‘Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and 
6 
 
Commission's fining policy to a large extent fulfils the standards of the optimal deterrence theory.
43
 
According to this theory, the optimal level of deterrence is achieved when the enforcement tools are 
able to impose a penalty, equivalent to (at least) the violation’s anticipated ‘net harm to others’
44
, 
divided by the probability of detection and proof of the infringement.
45
 In other words, the imposed 
penalty needs to outweigh the financial benefits of antitrust violation. However, even though 
antitrust fines have reached very high levels, it should be agreed with critics that optimal deterrence 
has not yet been achieved. The best indication of suboptimal enforcement is the degree of 
recidivism. For instance, seven years after the revised 2006 fining guidelines, there were at least 15 
recidivists in 10 cases.
46
 Furthermore, many large and small cartels have been discovered in recent 
years, suggesting that public enforcement fails to fully deter wrongdoers.
47
 On the one hand, the 
facilitated number of detected and convicted cartels may show the increasing competence of public 
authorities in enforcing competition rules. On the other hand, it is questionable whether leniency is 
the best criteria for assessing the effectiveness of public enforcement and its deterrence effect. 
Under this program, whistle-blowers come forward on a voluntary basis and provide crucial 
information to competition authorities for conducting further investigation. Some studies find that 
only up to around 30% of cartels are detected, at best.
48
 However, it is equally true that no one can 
precisely estimate how many cartels remain undetected.  
 
Despite its shortcomings, public enforcement seems to be the primary enforcement mechanism of 
EU competition law. Under the current private enforcement mechanism, damages actions do not 
seem to be well suited to contribute to deterrence. This is notably due to the following limitations: 
 
 Private enforcement lacks investigative powers; 
 Incentive to sue depends on private interest to litigate; 
 Private actors bring low risk cases, typically following a decision of the public enforcer; 
 Access to documents (especially if they are related to leniency and settlement) is limited; 
 Many private actions (especially collective ones) are determined to be settled for low 
awards. 
 
All these points will be debated in the dissertation. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Evidence from the European Union’ (2013) CIRANO 2013s-24, 17-20 
<https://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2013s-24.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018. 
43
 John M Connor and Douglas J Miller, ‘Determinants of EC Antitrust Fines for Members of Global Cartels’ (2013) 
32-34 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229358> accessed 22 October 2018.   
44
 The ‘net harm to others’ encompasses cartel overcharges and the allocative inefficiency. See John M Connor and 
Robert H Lande, ‘Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays’ (2012) 34 Cardozo Law Review 427, 455. 
45
 See, for example, William M Landes, ‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago 
Law Review 652, 656, 666-668.  
46
 Italianer (n 40) 4. See also Damien Geradin and Katarzyna Sadrak, ‘The EU Competition Law Fining System: A 
Quantitative Review of the Commission Decisions between 2000 and 2017’ (2017) TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2017-
018, 9-10 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958317> accessed 3 September 2018.  
47
 For example, in March 2017 the European Union and German antitrust authorities started investigating potential 
German auto industry cartel involving VW, Audi, Porsche, Mercedes and BMW. Daimler was the whistle-blower under 
the EU's leniency program. Following the 10 percent of a firm's revenue rule, German car manufactures may face the 
fine of around 50 billion euros, should the violation was proved. In Lithuania, for example, the largest ever cartel was 
recently detected between two companies. See UAB Mantinga, UAB Maxima, Decision 4 December 2014 of the 
Competition Council, No. 2S-14/2014.  
48
 It is calculated that only up to 33% of cartel infringements are detected in the European Union. See Smuda (n 31) 19; 
Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, ‘Les Amendes Contre les Cartels: La Commission Europe´enne 
en Fait-elle Trop? (2009) 4 Concurrences 41, 41-43. From the US experience, see Connor and Lande (n 44) 486-490. 
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1.1.3 Private Enforcement: The Current and the Potential Role in the Competition Law System  
 
The primary function of private enforcement is compensatory, at least in the EU context. The main 
objective of the Directive on damages actions is to ensure that any victim can effectively exercise 
the right to claim full compensation. This objective demands to achieve at least three goals. First, 
both direct and indirect purchasers have the right to claim compensation. Second, victims have the 
right to claim compensation for actual losses, loss of profit, plus the payment of interest. Third, the 
achievement of full compensation should not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of 
punitive, multiple or other damages.
49
 As regards deterrence, its potential effect is mentioned 
neither in the recitals nor in the Directive on damages actions itself. Back in 2008, the European 
Commission claimed that improving compensatory justice will ‘inherently also produce beneficial 
effects in terms of deterrence of future infringements and greater compliance with EC antitrust 
rules.’
50
 It would be surprising if the Directive would deny the potential of damages actions to 
contribute to deterrence as a side effect.  
 
There is no agreement among commentators on the scope of private enforcement; they disagree on 
whether damages actions has or should have direct, indirect, or no impact on deterrence.  
 
As regards direct effect, some scholars argue that antitrust damages actions supplement deterrence 
by adding punitive components.
51
 Hüschelrath and Peyer assume a deterrence objective of private 
antitrust enforcement, because courts enhance deterrence through any enforcement action.
52
 
Another view is that private enforcement lays a solid foundation for optimal sanctioning.
53
 
However, this approach is typically backed up by antitrust professionals from the United States, 
where private enforcement serves both the objectives of compensation and deterrence.
54
 When both 
goals overlap, the Supreme Court seems to prioritise deterrence over compensation.
55
 One of the 
reasons for a more deterrence-based approach has been the impact of the Chicago School.
56
 One of 
the arguments is that the achievement of compensation is very complicated, because it is very hard 
                                                 
49
 Directive (n 15) art. 3 
50
 White Paper (n 14) sec. 1.2.  
51
 For further discussion on the deterrent effect of damages actions, see Ernst J Mestmäcker, ‘The EC Commission’s 
Modernization of Competition Policy: A Challenge to the Community’s Constitutional Order’ (2000) 1(3) European 
Business Organization Law Review 401, 422; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, Text, Cases, and 
Materials, (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2004) 1192;  Jonathan B Baker, ‘Private Information and the Deterrent 
Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies’ (1988) 4(2) The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 385.   
52
 Kai Hüschelrath and Sebastian Peyer, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – A Differentiated 
Approach’ (2013) Centre for European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 13-029, 6 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2278839> accessed 22 October 2018. The authors argue that the 
compensatory mechanism only relates to the narrow side of private actions, which encompasses mainly damages. This 
approach ignores other type of cases of private enforcement brought to the courts. It follows that court actions 
contribute to the deterrence effect of all enforcement actions.  
53
 For further dicussion on optimal sanctioning through private antitrust actions, see William Breit and Kenneth Elzinga, 
‘Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning’ (1985) 28 Journal of Law and Economics 405; William M Landes, 
‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’ (1983) 50 University of Chicago Law Review 652. 
54
 This view has been supported by the Supreme Court. See, for example, Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov.’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 
314 (1978).  
55
 See, for example, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The interaction between compensation and 
deterrence is discussed in Chapter 3.   
56
 The so-called Chicago School started to influence antitrust case law in the late 1970s, when some Chicago School 
scholars were appointed to federal courts. For a discussion, see Hannah L Buxbaum, ‘Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal Deterrence and Social Costs’, in Basedow (ed.) Private 
Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Kluwer Law International 2007) 43-46; Warren F Schwartz, ‘An Overview of the 
Economics of Antitrust Enforcement’ (1980) 68 Georgia Law Journal 1075, 1086.  
8 
 
to identify and compensate victims. Therefore, deterrence should be the actual objective of private 
enforcement. To sum up, private enforcement in the US is an alternative to, rather than a 
supplement to public enforcement in deterring antitrust infringers. Indeed, this is not the approach 
that European counterparts are seeking for.   
 
With regard to indirect effect, damages actions are considered to primarily provide compensation, 
but deterrence can be viewed as a welcome side-effect of damages actions.
57
 To a similar extent, 
some argue that private actions produce deterrence as a beneficial side effect.
58
 In that regard, 
private actions for damages can be seen as a positive social instrument, enhancing the probability of 
detection and raising the expected cost of infringements.
59
 In other words, damages actions that 
function effectively may also extend the deterrence effect of competition law.  
 
The critics of private enforcement criticise its impact on deterrence and enforcement from at least 
two perspectives. First, in the Pfleiderer case the Advocate General Mazák stressed that the role of 
private actions for damages is of far less importance than that of public enforcement in ensuring 
compliance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
60
 Therefore, because of the limited and reduced role 
of private enforcement, Mazák hesitated to label damages actions as one of the element of the 
enforcement mechanism. After the adoption of the Directive on damages actions, Mazák’s opinion 
remains applicable, because the Directive preserves strong public enforcement by imposing various 
limitations on damages claims. Second, Wils argues that public enforcement is better designed and 
equipped to deter antitrust violations than private enforcement.
61
 First, public enforcement has more 
effective investigative and sanctioning powers than private enforcement. Second, private parties are 
incentivised by private motives which typically deviate from the general interest. Third, private 
enforcement is costlier than public enforcement due to the allocation and determination of damages 
and court proceedings involved. Wils does not even see private enforcement as having a 
complementary function to public enforcement, as deterrence can if needed be simply enhanced by 
raising public fines rather than facilitating antitrust damages actions.
62
 Wils’ approach has attracted 
both criticism and support. On the one hand, Jones claims that Wils’ approach is more applicable 
when a policy choice needs to be made between either solely public enforcement or solely private 
enforcement.
63
 On the other hand, Marcos and Graells state that antitrust harm can be so widespread 
                                                 
57
 Philipp Fabbio, Private Actions for Damages, Loyola University 
<https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/antitrust/pdfs/publications/newsviews/fabbio.pdf> accessed 22 October 
2018. 
58
 Jeroen S Kortmann and Christoforus RA Swaak, ‘The EC White Paper on Antitrust Damage Actions: Why the 
Member States Are (Right to be) Less than Enthusiastic’ (2009) 30(7) European Competition Law Review 340, 341. 
59
 Paolisa Nebbia, ‘Damages Actions for the Infringement of EC Competition Law: Compensation or Deterrence?’ 
(2008) 33(1) European Law Review 23, 26.  
60
 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt (C-360/09) [2011], Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 16 
December 2010. para. 40. In 2010, Mazák, prior to the adoption of the Directive on damages actions, asserted that the 
Commission and national competition authorities had much more powers than damages actions in ensuring compliance 
with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. However, after the adoption of the Directive, not much has changed, as the role of 
damages actions remains significantly reduced: private enforcement is dependent on public enforcement, damages 
multipliers have been prohibited, leniency statements are unavailable to victims, and the Directive contains no 
provisions on collective redress actions.  
61
 Wils (n 22) 11. 
62
 ibid 16. 
63
 Clifford A Jones, ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check’ (2004) 27(1) 
World Competition 13, 19. 
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that identifying victims becomes very difficult, especially if they are indirect purchasers.
64
 In other 
words, damages actions are ill suited to compensate all type of victims.  
 
This paper takes the approach that damages actions—even the compensation-oriented—can 
contribute to deterrence and enforcement, but a more wide-ranging and independent role needs to 
be ensured. Obviously, this goal cannot be achieved under the current EU private enforcement 
mechanism, as the Directive on damages actions does not include provisions on collective redress 
actions. The logic behind is that by effectively aggregating claims (especially the ones that 
otherwise would remain unheard), collective actions would not only increase the level of 
compensation, but may also contribute to deterrence thought the enlarged group of claimants.  
  
1.1.4 The Interaction between Antitrust Collective Actions in the European Union and the United 
States  
 
In June 2013, the European Commission published the horizontal Recommendation that sets out a 
series of common, non-binding principles for collective redress mechanisms across all legal fields.
65
 
On the one hand, the Recommendation seeks to facilitate access to justice and enable compensation 
in mass harm situations. On the other hand, it aims to prevent litigation abuses through appropriate 
safeguards: by avoiding contingency fee agreements and opt-out schemes, and by imposing strict 
limitations on third-party funding as well as on actions brought by representatives. Together, these 
safeguards should act as a protection mechanism against the perceived litigation abuses that have 
occurred in US class actions.  
 
In June 2013, it was decided that the implementation of the Recommendation will be assessed by 26 
July 2017, and further legislative measures will be proposed if found necessary. With delay, the 
European Commission assessed the practical implementation of the Recommendation by issuing the 
Report on 26 January 2018.
66
 The findings of the Report have been included in the subsequent 
legislative package “New Deal for Consumers”, which aims at increasing the possibilities for 
consumers to defend their rights. On 11 April 2018, the European Commission published two 
proposals for the directives: 
 
 Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules67; 
and 




                                                 
64
 Francisco Marcos and Alberto Sánchez Graells, ‘Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonizing Tort Law through the Back Door?’ (2008) InDret, 8-9 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371050> accessed 21 October 2018.  
65
 Recommendation (n 18). 
66
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union law (2013/396/EU) COM(2018) 40 final. 
67
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 
April 1993, Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules COM(2018) 185/3.  
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The Commission did not publish a proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages nor included 
specific antitrust provisions in the above-mentioned proposals. The expectations were high, as the 
2013 Recommendation was published together with the draft of the Directive on damages actions, 
showing a particular interest (at least at that time) to enhance the possibilities for victims to claim 
damages for harm resulting from infringements of competition law. 
 
While the EU is evaluating ways to facilitate damages actions, private enforcement has always 
played the important role in the US antitrust enforcement mechanism. As mentioned before, the US 
system aims to achieve the objectives of compensation as well as deterrence, but the latter 
predominates when both intersect. When the American class action rule emerged, it became one of 
the most important methods of deterrence. In marked contrast with the EU, the class action 
mechanism is very liberal, allowing for private attorneys to enforce antitrust rules aggressively 
through the so-called private attorney general mechanism. This device combines a set of measures 
that are aimed at facilitating deterrence: treble damages, contingency fees, opt-out schemes, broad 
discovery rules, joint and several liability, and the one-way-fee shifting. When combined, these 
remedies ensure that the expected compensation outweighs the risks involved in complex antitrust 
actions. However, class action lawsuits remain highly controversial to this day. On the one hand, 
critics argue that class actions force defendants to settle cases lacking merit.
69
 Furthermore, class 
actions largely fail in compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. On the other hand, the 
proponents of class actions assert that there is no reliable empirical evidence proving the supposed 




Despite the opposing views in the US, the European Commission (as well other EU institutions) has 
seen American-style class actions only from a negative perspective, having a high potential of 
abusive litigation. As such, the Commission encourages member states to incorporate robust 
safeguards against abusive litigation.
71
 One view may be that the Commission is right in seeking to 
preserve its legal traditions and those of its member states. Another view may be that the 
Commission is too careful without objective justification. To sum up, the research pays particular 
attention to these contrasting approaches. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH APPROACH: PHD DISSERTATION CONSISTING OF ARTICLES 
 
This PhD dissertation is based on ‘a collection of separate scientific treatises’ under Article 13 of 
the Leiden University PhD Regulations. The thesis consists of 6 articles, which were published in 
peer reviewed legal journals. These articles are further regarded as chapters in the PhD dissertation. 
Table 1 below overviews the originality of the chapters. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
68
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on representative actions for the protection of 
the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC COM(2018) 184 final. 
69
 See, for example, John T Rosch, ‘Designing a Private Remedies System for Antitrust Cases-Lessons Learned from 
the U.S. Experience’ (2011) Remarks before the 16th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 10; Jonathan 
M Landers, ‘Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure 
Dilemma’ (1974) 47 Southern California Law Review 842, 843. 
70
 See, for example, Joshua P Davis and Robert H Lande, ‘Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private 
Antitrust Enforcement’ (2013) 48 Georgia Law Review 1, 39. 
71
 Recommendation (n 18). The Commission rejects opt-out schemes, contingency fees and any type of the damage 




Table 1. An overview of the published articles of the PhD dissertation  
Chapter Title (Year) Journal publication Citation standards 
1. General Introduction — OSCOLA 
2. 
Obstacles in European Competition Law 
Enforcement: A Potential Solution from 
Collective Redress 
(2014) 7(1) European Journal of Legal 
Studies 125 
European University Institute 
3. 
The Potential of Antitrust Collective 
Litigation in 2017: Beyond the 
Recommendation and the Directive 
(2017) 4 European Journal of 




The Impact of Contingency Fees on 
Collective Antitrust Actions: Experiments 
from Lithuania and Poland 
(2016) 41(3-4) Review of Central and 




The Effectiveness of Private Enforcement 
and Class Actions to Secure Antitrust 
Enforcement 
(2017) 62(3) The Antitrust Bulletin 603 Bluebook 
6. 
The Effectiveness of Antitrust Collective 
Litigation in the European Union: A 
Study of the Principle of Full 
Compensation 
(2018) 49 (1) International Review of 




A More Forceful Collective Redress 
Schemes in EU Competition Law: What 
is the Potential for Achieving Full 
Compensation? 
(2017) 18 (4) European Journal of Law 
Reform 451 
Eleven Journals 
8. General Conclusion — OSCOLA 
 
This format was chosen because it provides a greater insight into the research that examines the 
long-awaited private antitrust reform. Publishing an article in an academic journal entails three 
benefits: first, the preparation of a draft meeting the criteria for publication in peer-reviewed legal 
journals demands a versatile research and more thorough planning; second, the draft generates very 
useful and insightful comments from peer reviewers; third, the publication receives reactions from 
the readers. When combined, these advantages give the opportunity to identify controversial 
measures, and to provide unbiased and valid research. 
 
Despite the positive aspects, the drawbacks should be outlined as well. The main issue is that this 
approach raises some deviations and inaccuracies among the chapters. To start with, each chapter 
was written as a part of the dissertation, aiming to contribute to answering the main research 
question. At the same time, every chapter should be seen as a separate piece, which went through a 
different publication process. First, every draft was submitted to the legal journal corresponding 
with the research objectives of that draft. Second, a peer review process for journal publication 
asked to make amendments that would comply with journal’s objectives and priorities. Third, each 
journal asked to comply with its publication standards: citation, style, punctuation and consistency. 
The outcome is that various procedures for publication undermined the consistency among chapters, 
especially when the chapter was subject to a double peer review. 
 
It should be stressed that a PhD consisting of only peer-reviewed articles is a complex type of 
dissertation consisting of different pieces, albeit of the same subject. According to Article 13 of 
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Leiden University’s PhD Regulations, a dissertation consisting of articles “should demonstrate a 
connection in terms of content between the different parts” and “should include an introductory 
chapter or a conclusion in which this connection is explained.” This may be possible for example 
when only a few of the articles are published in peer-reviewed journals, while other parts of the 
dissertation are not. Indeed, the inclusion of only an introductory chapter or a conclusion is 
insufficient in case a PhD consists of only peer-reviewed articles, because it would consist of 
different pieces of the same topic instead of a cohesive whole. In order to harmonise the 
dissertation, all chapters include the common changes in their introduction. More specifically, the 
introduction includes the common sections: A. Research question and scope; B. Methodology and 
limitations; C. Overview of the research material; D. Structure. The common sections on 
methodology and research question are of particular importance. As regards methodology, it 
includes a careful assessment of the application of the comparative research method. It allows 
defining the general research approach that outlines the common methods and principles applied 
throughout the dissertation, consisting of six articles published in different journals. Moreover, it 
reflects how different approaches of comparative method are combined throughout the research. As 
regards a section on research sub-questions, some questions have already been raised in original 
articles, while in others it is a logical consequence of a debate in original introduction and abstract. 
In other words, this section consolidates what has already been said in original versions. Overall, 
the research sub-questions help to better assess each chapter’s contribution to the main research 
question, and what elements chapters do share. It also reveals any exceptional features in each of 
them. In each conclusion of a chapter the substance remains, just the text is changed and 
restructured. This helps to show more directly the answer to the research sub-question and its 
contribution to the thesis’ research question. The section on the research material compliments 
others by identifying crucial material for research, but also its shortcomings. This comprehensive 
way of showing a connection between the chapters may be criticised as excessive. However, again, 
this PhD consists only of peer-reviewed articles. The decision has been that a detailed explanation 
of methodology and research questions will demonstrate the needed connection between the 
chapters. This approach is the best considering the circumstances, since this type of dissertation has 
no perfect approach in ensuring connection among chapters as it evolves through different 
publication procedures.  
 
It should be stressed that private antitrust enforcement has developed further after each publication. 
Moreover, additional material has been found in the later stage of the dissertation. In order to show 
the latest picture of private enforcement and collective actions, the final version of the dissertation 
includes amendments in the main text. On this basis, chapters 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 are amended. These 
amendments are summarised in the appendix, and the common changes in introduction and 
conclusion are not shown there. Chapter 4 does not include the appendix, because no amendments 
are made in the main text. The clarification needs to be made that the main text is amended, aiming 
to provide additional information, and no changes are made regarding the context of the published 
articles. Finally, all chapters maintain the original citation standards of the published articles, but a 
common layout is used throughout the dissertation in order to facilitate reading.  
 
To conclude, it should be noted that the PhD-candidate was granted the EU Fulbright Schuman 
scholarship for conducting research at Stanford University and the University of Michigan during 
the academic year 2015-2016. The research was jointly financed by the US State Department and 
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the Directorate-General for Education and Culture of the European Commission. All chapters, 
except for Chapter 2, are based on the study performed in the United States. 
 
1.3 SCOPE AND RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
Private antitrust enforcement can be defined from two of its meanings: broad and narrow.
72
 On the 
broad side, private enforcement includes all actions related to private enforcement, such as damages 
actions, injunctive relief or defensive actions. On the narrow side, private enforcement is only 
attributed to damages actions. As regards collective redress, the European Commission takes a 
wider approach: victims are entitled to claim compensation or to seek injunctive relief.
73
 However, 
considering that compensation is the leading goal of the Directive on damages actions, this thesis 
primary analyses collective redress mechanism from a compensatory perspective. The scope of the 
study encompasses three types of antitrust collective (redress) actions: 
 
 A representative collective action; 
 A party-initiated collective/class action; 
 A class/collective settlement based on an opt-out system. 
 
Another type of claims’ aggregation model—Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)—is not considered as 
a traditional collective action mechanism. Under this model, SPV purchases several claims and 
bring them together to the court, albeit the purchase typically encompasses claims generating high 
financial value. Therefore, SPV is not the aggregation model related to the traditional collective 
litigation that seeks to aggregate all types of victims, including the ones who suffered low value 
harm. Nevertheless, the analysis of SPV is valuable for comparing different claims' aggregation 
models.  
 
In general, collective redress schemes appear to be one of the main, if not the main tool for 
contributing to achieving full compensation: to enable anyone who has suffered harm caused by an 
infringement of competition law to effectively exercise the right to claim and obtain full 
compensation.
74
 By aggregating multiple claims, collective action mechanism allows tackling 
common legal, factual and economic issues together. In turn, it creates economies of scale by 
allowing victims to share the costs of litigation. Without doubt, collective actions are of particular 
importance in antitrust violations, where the harm is often widespread among vulnerable victims: 
direct purchasers who suffered low harm and indirect purchasers who incurred loss down the supply 
chain. It is highly unlikely that these victims would bring claims individually, because they are 
financially unprofitable. Therefore, collective actions appear to be the only tool allowing for 
vulnerable victims to defend their rights in courts.  
 
However, the extent to which full compensation is enhanced depends on how collective actions are 
designed and incorporated in antitrust enforcement scheme. In order to find the best mechanism for 
the EU, different policy options are compared in the dissertation:  
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 Aggregation model of victims: opt-in vs. opt-out 
 Type of damages: single damages vs. damage multipliers 
 Financing model: hourly fees vs. contingency fees 
 Representation model: representative (public) organisations vs. private attorneys  
 Level of disclosure: no access to leniency and settlements submissions vs. access to such 
documents  
 
These options lie between two extremes. On the one hand, a more careful approach including 
measures such as opt-in and/or single damages may prevent abusive litigation, but may 
simultaneously distort the achievement of full compensation. On the other hand, a more forceful 
approach, including opt-out schemes and/or contingency fees, may increase effectiveness in 
compensating victims but also may attract the perceived litigation abuses of US class actions: 
unmeritorious suits, blackmail settlements and overpayment of class counsels. These approaches are 
contrasted and their potential impact on full compensation is analysed. As regards abusive 
litigation, this phenomenon is discussed only as much as it is needed for analysing the scope of full 
compensation. 
 
Another point requiring clarification is that this dissertation perceives collective actions primarily 
providing compensation and not creating deterrence. Therefore, it is not in favour of the US class 
action mechanism, which seeks to deter wrongdoers by imposing punitive damages. The American 
mechanism is rather seen providing valuable lessons on how effective deterrence-based class 
actions can be in fulfilling the objectives of compensation. Moreover, this research does not support 
the view that antitrust collective actions can only serve the compensatory function. Instead, it is 
regarded that effective collective redress mechanisms have a possibility to contribute, as a side 
effect, to deterrence. Simply put, the idea is that if more victims are compensated (especially when 
their claims would not be otherwise litigated), the cost of the violation is increased for infringers. 
Apart from the United States, the project analyses the experiences in the European Union member 
states, particularly where antitrust collective actions have been brought for compensating victims, or 
at least have a high potential for being so. If EU-style collective actions produce deterrence effects 
to greater or lesser degree, the contribution to the overall framework of competition law 
enforcement can also be determined. Therefore, not only the impact of antitrust collective actions 
on compensating victims is assessed, but also the potential of these actions in reducing the 
shortcomings of public enforcement, namely low detection rates and insufficient fines.   
 
To sum up, the principal purpose of the dissertation is to assess the impact of antitrust collective 
actions (in any form possible in the EU context) on full compensation. Specifically, the focus is on 
the ability of collective actions to aggregate and compensate vulnerable victims. An additional but 
secondary objective is to assess whether these actions—apart from their compensatory function—









To summarise, the question at the heart of this PhD dissertation is as follows: 
 
Can collective redress actions contribute to achieving the objective of full compensation as stated in 
the EU Directive on antitrust damages actions? If so, which mechanism(s) would be the most 
effective from a theoretical and practical perspective to facilitate full compensation, and can these 
mechanism(s), as a side effect, contribute to deterrence?  
 
This question entails examining the compensatory effectiveness of different collective action 
mechanisms. By doing this, the research seeks to complete three objectives. The first is to assess 
whether available EU-style collective actions are effective in achieving full compensation. The 
second is to suggest how the EU law on collective redress could be improved for a better 
achievement of full compensation. For this purpose, two private antitrust enforcement models are 
juxtaposed: the deterrence-based in the United States and the compensation-oriented in the 
European Union. A selected comparative analysis allows designing more forceful collective action 
mechanism(s) that would be possible in EU competition law, at least in theory. In turn, the potential 
of these mechanism(s) in compensating victims is discussed. The third is to analyse the likelihood 
of these mechanism(s), as well as of the available EU-style collective redress schemes, to contribute 
to deterrence as a side-effect.  
 
The dissertation includes 6 sub-research questions (one per chapter) in order to harmonise the text 
and to reinforce the findings for answering the dissertation’s research question. As mentioned 
before, the research sub-questions consolidates what has already been published in original articles; 
either these questions were already raised or that they are a logical outcome of a discussion in 
introduction and abstract. The sub-research questions are the following. 
 
1. Does the enforcement of EU competition law fulfil its objectives of compensation and 
deterrence? If not, which provisions of collective actions, existing in various forms in 
different states, and which EU's legislative instruments would better contribute to achieving 
these objectives?   
 
This question encompasses several aspects in Chapter 2. First, it reviews the existing shortcomings 
and obstacles in competition law enforcement in the European Union. As regards public 
enforcement, deterrence is assessed by analysing the effectiveness of leniency policy and 
administrative (public) fines. With regard to private enforcement, it analyses the common obstacles 
in private antitrust litigation that apply to EU member states. Second, this Chapter explores the 
preliminary options on how to design the EU policy for increasing the chances to bring successful 
collective actions.  
 
2. How well do antitrust class actions in the United States fulfil compensation objectives and 
to what extent can they facilitate deterrence?  
 
The analysis of the American system in Chapter 3 gives a better response to the main research 
question. Even though deterrence is not the primary objective of the EU private antitrust reform, an 
assessment of the US system is crucial for evaluating the potential of collective actions in 
contributing to antitrust enforcement through increased deterrence. Moreover, Chapter 3 gives an 
overview on how effective deterrence-based US class actions—being much more forceful than EU 
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compensation-oriented actions—are in compensating victims. The effectiveness of compensation is 
assessed by examining the predominant controversies: (1) class members obtain little or no 
compensation; (2) the compensation mechanism is framed to (largely) overpay attorneys; (3) class 
actions do not compensate the real victims. The discussion on deterrence emphasises one major 
controversy: class actions giving little or no weight to deterrence. The optimal deterrence theory is 
applied to assess the role of class actions in deterring wrongdoers. The combined results provide a 
background for further analysis on how effective EU-style collective actions can be in 
compensating victims under the principle of full compensation.    
 
3. What lessons can be learned from Lithuania and Poland about the impact of contingency 
fees on achieving compensatory effectiveness in antitrust collective actions? 
 
This question is debated in Chapter 4. When compared with other EU member states, Lithuania and 
Poland appear to be the most suitable examples for assessing the potential impact of contingency 
fees on compensating victims. First, both countries have granted a relatively active role to the group 
lawyer in comparison with the few other EU countries where attorneys are allowed to be part of 
collective litigation. Second, among these states, Lithuania and Poland permit contingency fees with 
the least restrictions.  
 
4. What impact has the Recommendation on collective redress brought on the member states’ 
policy on collective redress, and what effect could its provisions have if the 
Recommendation ever takes a binding form? How do EU-style provisions on collective 
redress interact with US class actions? 
 
By addressing this question, Chapter 5 critically analyses the proposed European Commission’s 
approach on collective redress. It debates whether this approach, focusing on the US system and its 
perceived problems, is the most suitable for seeking effectiveness in compensating victims. The 
discussion is elaborated by analysing insights from the pro-active EU member states, which 
disregard some provisions of the Commission’s approach and instead allow US-style measures in 
some fashion.  
 
5. To what extent can the EU private antitrust reform achieve the objective of full 
compensation? What is the impact of antitrust collective litigation on full compensation, and 
what is the role (if any) of US-style deterrence-based measures in this respect?  
 
In Chapter 6, the following steps are taken to answer this question. First, it examines the impact of 
the indirect purchasers' rule on full compensation. Second, it analyses how the key provisions of the 
EU private antitrust reform interact with full compensation and public enforcement. Third, it 
scrutinises the necessity of US deterrence-based measures in the EU’s compensation-oriented 
system. 
 
6. To what extent can the best possible collective redress mechanism in EU competition law, 
combining the deterrence-based tools, achieve the objective of full compensation, and what 




Chapter 7, considering the failure of available EU-style collective actions to contribute to achieving 
full compensation, explores three forceful but hypothetical mechanisms that include different type 
of deterrence-based remedies. The main purpose is to evaluate their effectiveness for facilitating the 
objective of full compensation. After assessing them, Chapter 7 designs the best possible 
mechanism that is within the limits of full compensation as well as within the legal traditions (at 
least in some member states). Subsequently, this mechanism is examined from two perspectives: 
one regards its impact on full compensation; another considers its likelihood of facilitating 
deterrence through an enhanced compensatory mechanism.  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS 
 
It follows from the above that the study takes a comparative legal research approach.
75
 It has been 
chosen for the following reasons. First, antitrust collective actions have been rare in EU member 
states. Therefore, by limiting the analysis to one jurisdiction (even to the most advanced one), the 
impact of collective actions on full compensation is unlikely to be properly assessed. Second, by 
comparing different legal systems, a more insightful assessment can be made about the 
shortcomings of private enforcement, and what the role collective actions can play in solving them. 
Third, comparative law helps to improve the technicality of law.
76
 In comparison with other legal 
research methods, comparative law is the best suited to define the ‘better’ elements of collective 
actions, needed for answering the research question.  
 
This research examines collective action schemes in France, Lithuania, Poland, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. One of the reasons for choosing these jurisdictions was 
the linguistic abilities of the author. Another reason was author’s legal and cultural background. 
Coincidentally, the chosen countries are arguably the best suited to draw valuable lessons about 
antitrust collective actions. France and the UK are jurisdictions that have failed to aggregate claims 
on an opt-in basis. Furthermore, the UK has recently introduced opt-out collective actions and, as a 
result, two important claims have been brought to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The 
Netherlands is a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction for having an opt-out settlement procedure and 
favourable rules on the ‘loser pays’ principle. Both the UK and the Netherlands allow third-party 
funding. Lithuania and Poland allow a group advocate signing a contingency-fee agreement in 
collective actions. Furthermore, Lithuania is included for being the jurisdiction of the author’s 
primary legal training. Finally, the US has by far the most experienced collective action mechanism 
in the world. Its analysis allows providing many lessons on how effective class actions can be in 
compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. In conclusion, the relevance of the legal culture of 
EU member states in examining the antitrust perspective should be emphasised. Indeed, the trends 
in the civil procedure may be applied in shaping collective litigation. However, the cultural aspect 
has not been examined in any detail for the countries dealt with. The inclusion of this aspect would 
be too broad in the context of this dissertation, as an efficient and effective analysis would demand 
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comparing the long-standing legal culture in old EU member states with the legal culture in newer 
member states. The research is more specific – it examines the specific elements of collective 
redress (such as, opt-out/opt-in aggregation mechanisms, contingency fees or double damages) that 
may shape the future of collective litigation at the EU level. These elements are highly untested in 
the EU’s litigation context, and some of them are considered against legal traditions in member 
states.    
 
Overall, the selection of countries may seem too broad, potentially hindering the research.
77
 
However, the choice of legal systems is influenced by the main research question. Each jurisdiction 
is analysed and compared with others to the extent needed to address the research objectives. 
Moreover, by conducting a comparative analysis between the EU and the US, the thesis aims to 
provide suggestions on how the EU law on collective redress could be improved for fulfilling the 
standards of full compensation, if there is such a need at all. More specifically, the comparison is 
made at are three levels: 1) EU member states 2) the European Commission's approach 3) US. 
Therefore, a cross-level research demands a comprehensive form of comparative method.  
 
First, the research takes a functionalist comparative approach. Functionalism in comparative law 
relies on the following premises: 1) legal systems face similar legal problems; 2) different legal 
solutions are taken to solve these problems in different countries; 3) legal systems achieve similar 
(or even the same) results, despite diverging legal paths.
78
 In other words, the functional approach 
looks at common legal problems and diverging ways they are dealt within the compared legal 
systems. The functional analysis in this thesis is twofold. On the narrow side, the project looks at 
common problems of private antitrust enforcement in the European Union, and its member states. 
The major aim is to develop a critical understanding of why victims remain uncompensated, and 
how (and whether at all) this issue has been dealt with collective actions in different EU states. On 
the broad side, the comparative analysis juxtaposes the compensation problem in the EU and the 
US. The assumption is made that the failure to effectively compensate victims is similar at the end, 
even though the US has a more forceful private enforcement mechanism than the EU. Another 
problem in common is that antitrust violation generates a widespread harm (often down the supply 
chain), and reaching end-consumers is a complicated task. The risk inherent in this comparison is 
that applying an American legal approach to solving similar problems in the EU context may not 
work, because both systems differ in terms of rationale, design, and stated goals. Furthermore, 
despite sharing some commonalities, the American class action system faces additional problems 
that are not reported in the EU context: blackmail settlements and overpayment of class counsels. 
Another viewpoint is that the problems related to private antitrust enforcement are not the same 
throughout the EU member states. For example, the ability to receive compensation largely depends 
on whether victims are located in a country with favourable rules on private antitrust litigation or 
not. It is clear that functional comparative approach alone is insufficient to fully address the 
research question; it needs to be complemented with other comparative approaches.   
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Second, a structurally comparative approach is used in the research. According to some scholars, 
the structural approach is part of the functional approach.
79
 Others present the structural method as 
an alternative to the functional one.
80
 The latter approach is taken by this thesis, because both 
methods are seen as independent from each other. Structuralism gives a broad insight into 
comparative law, because it compares the structures of legal systems and even legal families. The 
structure can be classified by comparing a collection of components or one specific criterion within 
the totality of each legal system. As regards antitrust collective actions, the decisive condition for 
categorising the totality, as well as a structure, is the direction of these actions: whether they are 
deterrence-based or compensation-based. 
 
Third, the study applies the comparative analytical approach. This approach distinguishes different 
elements within the compared legal systems in order to assess the interactions between them. 
Therefore, it is subject to the precision of details. In this dissertation, the analytical approach is used 
to isolate and compare different elements of private enforcement, and of collective actions 
especially, and to assess their potential contribution to the achievement of full compensation. 
 
Fourth, the research, where necessary, compares available empirical data, mostly quantitative 
sources. It focuses on data that can construct a contextual knowledge base for answering research 
questions. Quantitative comparison, for instance, is used to overview whether administrative 
(public) fines are sufficient to deter wrongdoers, and hence to give recommendations on whether 
public enforcement needs to be strengthened. Furthermore, a quantitative comparison is applied 
when evaluating the predominant controversies in US antitrust class actions. Although the 
quantitative study provides data that is descriptive, it may be limited for at least two reasons: first, it 
may focus on testing rather than generating the hypothesis (so-called the confirmation bias); second, 
the data provided may be too abstract to apply in specific situations.
81
 Another weakness is that 
different quantitative studies may produce different (sometimes even contradictory) results on the 
same subject. Despite its limitations, the quantitative approach can be viewed as scientifically 
objective and rational, thereby facilitating the overall discussion.  
 
These approaches of comparative law are applied directly or indirectly in all chapters of the thesis, 
with the exception of the comparison of empirical data.
82
 Indeed, the combination of the functional, 
structural and analytical methods is desirable when the comparison is made at different levels
83
, and 
in this thesis it is a three-level comparison. The research approach in each chapter is chosen on its 
research aims. Chapter 2 primarily utilises the functional method, especially when analysing the 
common obstacles of public and private enforcement of EU competition law. A comprehensive 
comparison of available empirical data is performed in Chapter 3 in order to assess the effectiveness 
of US antitrust class actions in compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. The analytical 
approach is taken in Chapter 4, in particular when analysing the relationships between the different 
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elements of contingency fees in Lithuania and Poland. In Chapter 5, there are two prevailing 
methods of comparative law: structural and analytical. The former compares the EU’s 
compensation-oriented collective redress scheme (based on a careful approach) with the US 
deterrence-based class actions (based on a forceful approach). The latter isolates US-style collective 
actions elements in the EU member states in order to assess the interplay between them and with the 
European Commission's approach. Chapter 6 primarily combines structural and analytical 
approaches. As regards the structural approach, it compares a set of components that characterise 
the EU’s compensation-based and US deterrence-based private antitrust enforcement schemes. The 
analytical approach is twofold: first, it isolates the main elements of the EU private antitrust reform; 
second, it distinguishes the respective private antitrust elements within the EU and US systems. 
Chapter 7 primarily applies functional and analytical approaches. The former focuses on the 
solutions taken by the EU member states, and on the solutions that they could potentially take. The 
latter defines the elements that would be applicable for the EU’s best possible antitrust collective 
redress mechanism.  
 
Obviously the research methodology outlined is not perfect and does face some pitfalls, including, 
inter alia:  
 
First, combining various comparative law approaches creates incoherence between chapters. 
Second, some comparative assessments leave no choice but to rely on assumptions or common 
sense.
84
 Third, the author’s legal training, knowledge of languages and cultural background are the 
main reasons for selecting the discussed countries. Fourth, comparative lawyers may intentionally 




These drawbacks may undermine the conclusions made by the research project. However, no 
methodology is without its limitations. A positive point is that diversity in comparative law has the 
advantage of broadening the horizons of research techniques. Of course, variety does not remove 
the significant limitation of: the lack of practice of antitrust collective actions in EU member states. 
In fact, a comprehensive comparative analysis demands practical insights.
86
 Despite a lack of 
practices, the thesis comparatively applies the EU experiences in the context of the US class action 
mechanism, which has longstanding practice in the field. The question of how to compare two 
inherently different collective litigation cultures arises: the US being deterrence-oriented and more 
forceful one, with the EU being the compensation-based and more cautious one. The answer is that 
this analysis would never be ideal. However, comparative legal research, like any other legal 
method, is well suited to make proposals, and in the context of this thesis to provide suggestions on 
how the EU law on collective redress could be improved for ensuring more effective compensation.  
 
For future (academic) discussions, it is useful to present the hypothetical framework for the main 
points of departure for legal analysis when (if ever) there will be more practical examples leading to 
actual compensation awards to vulnerable victims in the EU. It will be interesting to follow the 
most pro-active states, such as the Netherlands and the UK. Hopefully, the UK’s approach on 
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private antitrust enforcement will stay the same regardless of Brexit. If antitrust collective redress 
became the norm rather than the exception (hopefully also in other countries than the ones 
mentioned above), the comparative legal method, especially analytical and functional approaches, 
may be applied. In the first place, the elements that determine the outcomes of collective actions 
should be compared: a) the effectiveness of the principle of full compensation, especially what 
proportional compensation victims receive; b) the effectiveness of an aggregation model to collect 
victims (both direct and indirect) and inform about their rights. If only one country was active in the 
field (for example, the Netherlands), doctrinal legal research method could be applied. The 
development of antitrust collective actions could be examined as well as how they have been 
applied through case law. However, a purely doctrinal research should be met with scepticism as it 
is questionable whether any EU jurisdiction will have a high number of case law (at least in the near 
future) that would be sufficient for a comprehensive doctrinal research on antitrust collective 
redress.  
 
In the end, it should be explained why the law and economics assessment has not been 
systematically applied in the thesis. As mentioned, the construction of the methodology is guided by 
the research question. Its main objective is to assess the potential of antitrust collective actions, in 
any possible form, to contribute to achieving full compensation in the EU. Indeed, competition law 
and economics are more associated with other aims, which are further explained. 
 
First, private antitrust enforcement and collective action instruments can be examined from a 
perspective of deterrence and competition law enforcement.
87
 One option regards the role of private 
enforcement in ensuring optimal sanctioning (punishment) and optimal competition law 
enforcement.
88
 A similar approach is applied when law and economics literature deals with tort 
issues. As discussed in Section 1.1.2, the goal of damages in (accident) tort law is to ensure optimal 
precaution. Another option considers a study on enhancing the predictability and accuracy of 
antitrust enforcement. It aims to achieve three objectives: a) decreasing the likelihood of 
enforcement errors; b) providing a background to businesses for predicting the outcomes of law 
enforcement; c) to inform about the negative effects of over-facilitated enforcement of competition 
law.
89
 From these perspectives, the systematic application of law and economics in examining full 
compensation would be excessive, because deterrence and enforcement are regarded as secondary 
objectives of the thesis.  
 
Second, competition law and economics analyse different market structures and why these 
structures work or do not work. One of the most popular debates concerns perfect competition. The 
theoretical model aims to determine the economic equilibrium – a model in which the demand and 
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 Perfect competition is typically contrasted with monopoly. From a law 
and economics perspective, the impact of monopoly power on profit-maximising and prices are 
discussed.
91
 To sum up, this approach has little relevance for the thesis’ discussion on compensation 
effectiveness, as it scrutinises the functioning of different market structures.    
 
Third, economics in competition law deals with the so-called welfare standard: total welfare versus 
consumer welfare.
92
 The total welfare is a broad approach that seeks to maximise the aggregate 
value of the consumer and producer surplus. However, there is a possibility that consumer welfare 
decreases, because the profits (surplus) of producers outweigh this decrease, resulting in a positive 
total welfare.
93
 As regards consumer welfare, it is a narrow approach that aims at maximising 
consumer surplus, but prevents producers from receiving offsetting gains. The comparison between 
total welfare and consumer welfare is often associated with merger control
94
, analysis that is not 
part of this thesis. Consumer welfare appears to be one of the most important goals of EU 
competition policy.
95
 However, the issue is that the definition of consumer welfare has not been 
much developed by the European Commission; its scope is unknown. In economic terms, consumer 
surplus occurs when the price that consumers actually pay for goods or services is less than the 
price they are willing or able to pay. Consumer welfare in law and economics is undoubtedly an 
interesting topic. However, this analysis is excessive in the context of this thesis, as it goes beyond 
its objectives, examining various policy measures for improving antitrust collective actions. 
 
Fourth, law and economics in tort law deals with the principle of full compensation, yet to a limited 
extent.
96
 The criterion for analysing full compensation is based on the rule of negligence (or 
carelessness), taking into account the pre-tort position of the victim. However, the application of the 
rule of negligence in antitrust cases is quite irrelevant, as a large majority of violations are 
conducted intentionally by wrongdoers (for examples, cartels). Therefore, it has no added value for 
the thesis.    
 
To conclude, the most widespread approaches of (competition) law and economics have been 
presented; however, none of them are directly related to the objectives of the thesis. Nevertheless, 
some elements of law and economics are included in the thesis for a more insightful discussion. 
First, the deterrence effect of EU administrative (public) fines is assessed by evaluating the 
quantitative findings of the law and economics. Second, the optimal deterrence theory is applied in 
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measuring the role of US class actions in deterring infringers. The economic perspective gives a 
broader picture of how (if at all) compensatory collective actions can facilitate antitrust 
enforcement. To sum up, law and economics is used as much as is needed for answering the 
research question; a systematic application of law and economics would be excessive and could 
jeopardise the coherence of the comparative method, which examines the impact of full 
compensation on antitrust collective actions.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
 
The dissertation is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 explores the initial options for designing 
collective redress schemes for the removal of obstacles to the enforcement of competition law. 
Chapter 3 examines how well US antitrust class actions led by private attorney generals fulfil 
compensation objectives, and to what extent they can enhance deterrence. In Chapter 4, the EU and 
US systems are analysed through the lens of Lithuania and Poland; two EU member states where 
antitrust lawyers are allowed to act as private investors through contingency fees in collective 
actions. In Chapter 5, the effectiveness of collective actions is examined under two circumstances: 
one when relying on the proposed principles of the Recommendation; another when relying on the 
experiences of those EU member states not fully following the guidelines of the European 
Commission. Chapter 6 scrutinises the rationale of full compensation and investigates the 
importance of deterrence-based remedies in the EU’s compensation-oriented system. Chapter 7 
examines whether the EU’s best possible collective redress mechanism is able to fully compensate 
victims of antitrust infringement, and whether it can bring positive effects on deterrence. The thesis 




















































2 OBSTACLES IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: A 





The primary focus of this Chapter is to review the main obstacles in competition law enforcement in 
the European Union and to investigate how the development of collective redress could effectively 
facilitate enforcement of EU competition law. Arguably, antitrust enforcement remains sub-optimal 
due to the insufficient deterrent effect of EU antitrust fines and obstacles facing victims of 
competition law infringements in bringing damages actions. Central to my work, therefore, is the 
belief that collective actions constitute an attractive vehicle to solve, or at least diminish, the 
inefficiencies of antitrust enforcement. The Chapter explores some options as to how to design 
collective redress mechanisms in order to influence the ability to bring successful collective claims. 
This would, in turn, consider the advantages of opt-out collective actions in tackling the issues 
related to low participation rates, lack of funding and sub-optimal deterrence. From this 
perspective, the Chapter moves on to propose collective actions as a potential remedy to facilitate 
access to justice, to deal with a wide range of legal and economic issues and to mitigate 




European competition law is primarily enforced by public authorities – the European Commission 
at the EU level, and courts and competition authorities (NCAs) at the national level. However, 
private enforcement is gaining popularity in Europe. Increased importance attributed to a more 
favourable legal regime of private enforcement has created more incentives for the European 
Commission to facilitate damages actions by removing perceived obstacles for victims of 
anticompetitive conduct. And yet, the discovery of the merits of private antitrust enforcement has 
culminated in the European Commission eventually concluding a package on private damages 
actions in antitrust cases in June 2013. The most important milestone was reached on 26 November 
2014 when the EU adopted a Directive on antitrust damages actions
1
 for breaches of EU 
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competition law in order to facilitate damages actions in the national courts of the EU’s Member 
States. The Directive seeks to ensure that victims of antitrust infringements can obtain 
compensation and to optimise the interaction between public and private enforcement of EU 
competition rules while at the same ensuring the protection of investigation tools, such as passing 
on, access to evidence and discovery rules, interaction with leniency. Surprisingly, the collective 
redress mechanism is not envisaged by this Directive. With a view to remedy this situation, the 
European Commission published a Recommendation on collective redress
2
 in relation to 
establishing a European horizontal framework for collective redress mechanisms. It is clear, 
however, that the Recommendation is not very helpful, particularly given that it does not incentivize 
Member States to take actions in practice. Indeed, the future of collective litigation depends on to 
what extent local legislators are willing to provide effectives tools for collective redress procedures. 
In turn, truly effective compensation directly depends on whether collective redress schemes 
provide sufficient opportunities for ordinary consumers to aggregate claims, especially for the ones 
who suffered low value harm.  
 
A. Research question and scope 
 
The research question of this Chapter is as follows: 
 
Does the enforcement of EU competition law fulfil its objectives of compensation and deterrence? If 
not, which provisions of collective actions, existing in various forms in different states, and which 
EU's legislative instruments would better contribute to achieving these objectives?   
 
The following steps are taken to address this question. In the first place, this Chapter overviews the 
existing obstacles and shortcomings in competition law enforcement. As regards public 
enforcement, the deterrence effect of EU antitrust fines is assessed by taking into account the 
current statistics of the European Commission, as well as the findings of law and economics 
literature.
3
 With regard to private antitrust enforcement, it looks at whether private parties are well 
equipped to bring damages claims by analysing the common obstacles to private enforcement that 
exist in EU Member States. Indeed, examination in this Chapter gives a preliminary indication 
about the role that collective redress actions can serve in antitrust enforcement.  
 
As regards its scope, Chapter 2 is introductory and sets the background for a more detailed 
assessment in the subsequent chapters. It should be stressed that Chapter 2 progressed and was 
finished during a specific time period: after the European Commission adopted the draft Directive 
on damages actions (June 2013), which was accompanied by the Recommendation on collective 
redress, but prior to the final adoption of the Directive by the European Council (November 2014). 
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Therefore, it does not analyse the impact of collective actions on full compensation. Instead, it 
discusses whether collective actions can serve as a potential remedy to solve, or at least diminish 
the inefficiencies in the enforcement of competition law.   
 
B. Methodology and limitations 
 
In this Chapter, the prevailing research method is functional comparative. Functionalism, for its 
part, focuses on the following points. First, the research regards that private antitrust enforcement is 
underdeveloped in EU Member States. More specifically, it relies on the idea that damages actions 
are not functional in all countries - they largely fail to compensate victims of antitrust violations. 
Second, collective redress mechanism is seen as one of the main, if not the main tool to mitigate the 
issue of compensation. The solutions that Member States have taken to enhance collective actions 
are overviewed. Third, based on the preceding analysis, it compares the functionality of two claim 
aggregation models: opt-in and opt-out.   
 
The comparison of empirical data and analytical approach are used as additional research tools in 
this Chapter. As regards the former, the available quantitative sources are analysed to assess 
whether EU antitrust fines are sufficient to deter wrongdoers. With regard to the latter, it isolates 
different elements of collective actions in EU Member States, and assesses their potential role in 
framing effective collective redress schemes. In this regard, Chapter 2 overviews the appropriate 
model for aggregating claims (opt-in vs. opt-out). Other elements relating to the financing model 
(contingency or conditional fees) and to the representation model (public authorities or private 
organisations) are as well examined, but to a lesser degree. In addition, Chapter 2 examines the 
legislative framework for antitrust collective redress by including three comparative studies: a) 
horizontal versus sector-specific approach; b) directive versus regulation; c) dual versus single legal 
basis. The Directive on damages actions is used as a benchmark for proposing a possible legislative 
instrument in antitrust collective redress, as it has been the only binding instrument in the EU 
private antitrust reform until now.  
 
However, there are some limitations. Important shortcoming is that the study examines only on two 
practical examples (in France and the UK) regarding opt-in antitrust collective actions, yet this is 
because of a lack of opt-in antitrust collective action in the EU context. Furthermore, the EU's opt-
out collective actions are discussed only from a theoretical point of view. This is because the 
original paper has evolved during the time when there was almost no practice in the EU Member 
States. This research gap is addressed in the following chapters where a comprehensive analysis is 
provided, analysing opt-out experiences both in the EU and the US. As regards the potential 
legislative instrument for antitrust collective redress, the reliance on the Directive on damages 
actions is risky, as the outcomes of this tool are still unknown.  
 
C. Overview of the research material 
 
The sources include general literature on enforcement of competition law (public and private) and 
collective actions. The analysis of private enforcement, and related collective actions, is inspired by 
and builds on the reflections of Camilleri, Van den Bergh and Visscher. Works by Buccirossi, 
Carpagnano, Leskinen and Abele also guided the discussion. Regarding the criticism that EU 
antitrust fines are insufficient in deterring wrongdoers, the most useful publications are those of 
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Mariniello, Smuda, Boyer and Kotchoni, and Allain. Connor and Miller’s work is presented as a 
counterargument to critics. Regarding the case law, only two opt-in cases are discussed: Mobile 
Cartel in France and Replica Football Shirts in the UK. The pioneer CJEU’s case of private 
enforcement (Courage) is not discussed in this Chapter, and the subsequent case (Manfredi) is 
analysed only as regards punitive damages. Both rulings are extensively examined in the subsequent 




This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of major obstacles and 
shortcomings in competition law enforcement. Section 3 determines the added value of collective 
redress for improving private damages claims. Furthermore, it suggests that EU-style collective 
redress should be formed on an opt-out basis or at least on a hybrid of opt-out/opt-in, while the pure 
opt-in measure should be avoided. Section 4 intends to demonstrate that collective redress is a 
potential remedy to mitigate deficiencies of competition law enforcement. The Chapter ends with a 
short conclusion summarizing key insights.  
 
2.2 THE EXISTING OBSTACLES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
This section provides an overview of the major obstacles of two enforcement models of competition 
law: on the one hand, public enforcement principally aimed at deterrence, and, on the other hand, 
private enforcement principally aimed at compensation. By drawing arguments from the current 
statistics from the European Commission and from the empirical results of law and economics, it is 
possible to identify first an insufficient deterrent effect of EU antitrust fines and to argue that these 
fines should be complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular with more 
effective and more forceful approach to private claims for damages. From this perspective, this 
Chapter develops a better understanding of the reasons why private individuals are not well 
equipped to bring claims for damages. 
 
2.2.1 Public Enforcement 
 
In the European Union, the leniency program and the imposition of fines and are the principal 
means of increasing effectiveness of cartel prosecution and deterring infringers from engaging in 
anticompetitive behaviour. For those companies involved in a cartel—and who self-report and hand 
over evidence—the leniency policy offers either total immunity from fines, or a reduction of the 
fines which the Commission would otherwise impose on them. The current EU leniency policy is 
set out in the 2006 Leniency Notice
4
 and continues the work of the successful 2002 Leniency 
Notice; both of these replaced their less successful predecessor from 1996. This is notably because 
the 2002 Leniency Notice facilitated conditions for full immunity from fines and set out to grant 
automatic immunity from fines for the first reporting cartel, while the 2006 Notice introduced the 
discretionary marker system. After more than a decade, it can be observed that the leniency 
program has increased the detection rate and deterrence: a large majority of all detected cartels are 
because of leniency. Wils, for example, found that out of 23 European Commission cartel decisions 
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29 
 
with fines during 2011-2015, immunity was granted under the EU leniency program in 21 cases 
(around 90%).
5
 Carmeliet is less optimistic and estimates that almost 60% of cartel infringements 
are discovered by the European Commission and the NCA’s.
6
 It does not change the fact that 
leniency policy is the key tool for detection of cartels and arising deterrence. Despite the success, it 
does not mean that leniency is very effective. Some findings estimate that the detection rate of 
cartels can be up to 33% in the EU,
7
 but it is most likely lower in practice. For example, Mariniello 
argues that 15% is the highest possible detection rate of cartels.
8
 Relying on these findings, it can be 
stated that public enforcement faces significant obstacles in enforcing EU competition law. 
However, the truth is that there is a lack of estimations about the rates of cartel detection and the 
above-mentioned findings are based mainly on older studies. Therefore, one should be careful when 
drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of public enforcement, because there is no conclusive 
data about the detection rates. Regardless of what the actual rates are, it can be argued that the 
detection mechanism is far from optimal. This reasoning further illustrated through the prism of 
fines. 
 
The fines guidelines were introduced by the European Commission in June 2006.
9
 The major factor 
which concerns the deterrent effect of the fines imposed by the Commission is to set the fine based 
on firm’s annual sales and the duration of its alleged participation in the cartel. Under this 
mechanism, the Commission indicates that the maximum fine can only amount to up to 10% of the 
infringing undertaking’s worldwide turnover of the preceding business year. 
 
At the same time, useful insights regarding the deterrence may be derived from the current statistics 
of the European Commission. There is evidence that the amount of fines imposed on convicted 
cartels has dramatically increased in the recent years. For example, from 1990 up until March 2014, 
the European Commission imposed fines totalling 22.02 billion euros on companies engaged in 
cartel violation within the European Economic Area.
10
 The total amount of fines imposed on 
convicted cartels rose from 832 million euros over the period 1990 - 1999 to 12.8 billion euros over 
the period 2000 – 2009. The increasing trend in fining policy is also evident in the last 4-year period 
(2014 – 2017) during which the European Commission fined of the total amount of 7.7 billion 
euros. Even at their unprecedented high level, the insufficient deterrent effect of the EU antitrust 
fines should be observed. During the last decade, the number of discovered cartels is increasing 
tremendously without any indication of slowing down. This is demonstrated by the fact that 
recently imposed fines are based on the new fine guidelines, which concern the aim for higher fines 
and thus deterrence. To make the discussion more fruitful, it should be observed that 9 of the top 10 
fines (until 2014) were issued during 2007-2013. As regards the 10% threshold, it must be borne in 
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mind that this legal maximum was attained in 4 large cases out of 13 during 2003-2013.
11
 The 
resulting problem is that the fines calculated by the Commission had to be reduced. 
 
Furthermore, a majority of law and economics literature estimates fine levels to be structurally 
below the adequate level to achieve optimal fine.
12
 Key parameters for calculating the deterrent 
effect of current fines are therefore the price increase (cartel overcharge) compared with the 
maximum possible fine. Relying on the results estimated by Smuda (given the upper limits of fine 
and probability of detection), the expected fine can sum up to a maximum of 11.46% of affected 
sales per year in comparison with a mean of overcharge rate of 21.9%.
13
 Under the estimated 
results, the overcharge rate is higher than the maximum possible fine; also, it demonstrates that the 
gain from collusion outweighs expected punishments. Furthermore, Connor finds a mean of 
overcharge rate of 50.4% for very successful cartels (so-called ‘Connor database’). To that extent, 
Boyer and Kotchoni amended the Connor database in order to determine more accurate results, 
whereby the estimation was reduced up to 45.5%.
14
 In both scenarios, however, cartels are not 
deterred from the collusion even if the probability rate would be 100%.
15
 Other estimations found 
that in the period between 2001-2012 cartels caused 18.4 billion euros worth of harm to the 
European Economy, which seems extremely low in comparison with €209 billion of the total 
affected EEA sales.
16
 Despite a variety of calculations showing the sub-optimal effect of EU 
administrative (public) fines, Connor and Miller claim that the EU guidelines on the method of 
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setting fines ‘generally follow the precepts of the optimal deterrence theory.’
17
 According to the 
authors, even though the elasticity of the expected fine is around 0.32 (the optimal number would be 
1), fines are also related to 4 proxies that affect the probability of antitrust detection of cartels, and 
thereby suggesting that the Commission’s fining policy corresponds fairly well with the principles 
of optimal deterrence. To a similar extent, the European Commission considers EU competition 
fines as an effective mechanism of deterrence.
18
 However, the Commission admits that 
administrative fines alone cannot fully deter wrongdoers. 
 
Simply put, sub-optimal deterrence could be remedied by increasing the size of competition fines. 
However, it is very difficult to implement this in practice, because the Commission’s fining policy 
restricts the fine up to 10% of undertakings turnover. Therefore, the current fining policy should be 
complemented with other measures to enhance deterrence. In fact, a more effective private 
enforcement should be considered. This may include a rule similar to the US’ trebling of antitrust 
damages under the Clayton Act
19
, or opt-out collective redress mechanisms. Before delving into the 
details of these alternatives, it is both necessary and instructive to review the existing obstacles in 
private antitrust enforcement.  
 
2.2.2 Private Enforcement 
 
The Commission estimates that only 25% of the final cartel and antitrust prohibition decisions taken 
by the Commission in the period 2006-2012 were followed by private damages actions.
20
 Moreover, 
far from reaching all victims, the majority of these actions were brought by large companies or 
public entities whereas SMEs and consumers normally did not engage in legal actions for reparation 
of their harm. It can thus be stressed that the lack of effective compensation has created a 
considerable cost for the European consumers and businesses. Simple estimates that the cost of 
ineffective right to damages (so called ‘foregone compensation’) for consumers and SMEs from 
hard-core cartels between 2006 and 2012 was in the range of 25 - 69 billion euros.
21 
 
To enable a better understanding of the shortcomings of private enforcement, this discussion would 
reveal reasons why private parties are not well equipped to bring claims. There are indeed three 
main obstacles facing victims of competition law infringements in bringing damages actions: (i) 
cost and (legal) uncertainty, (ii) complexity of causality, and (iii) disclosure rules. Each of these 
factors will be discussed in turn.  
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First, it is generally assumed that private individuals will only commence legal actions if they 
expect a positive cost-benefit ratio. With respect to antitrust damages claims, it is easy to recognize 
that private parties face large legal costs to start and develop their case, thereby legal proceedings 
often exceed the expenses of their claims, creating the so-called ‘rational apathy’ problem. Further 
complicating the picture, in the European Union there is a predominant ‘loser pays’ principle.
22
 A 
crucial issue, in this respect, is that the judge applies the ‘loser pays’ principle on a case-by-case 
basis, meaning that the final decision is less predictable for the claimants. If the claim is 
unsuccessful, individual claimants face significant exposure to the other side’s costs.
23
 Furthermore, 
private parties stand isolated against large companies because large and powerful companies have 
better legal support, resources and broader investigative powers. From this perspective, it should be 
observed that in less developed and smaller countries, for example in the Eastern Europe, business 
relations are more formal, meaning that private parties might be afraid to start a lawsuit against 
powerful firms because of potential retaliation. As regards consumers, they are often unaware that 
they are being, or have been, harmed by hard-core cartels (price-fixing, quantity limits or bid 
rigging). Even if consumers are aware of the infringement, the harm caused by price-fixing cases, 
for example, often produce scattered and low-value damage to a multitude of consumers. As a 
consequence, only few of them can afford taking a legal action since the expected benefits outweigh 
the expected costs. 
 
Typically, antitrust damages actions are brought after the enforcement decision taken by 
competition authorities.
24
 In these so-called follow-on actions for damages plaintiffs free-ride on the 
efforts of public enforcers. It means that claimants can rely on the findings of the public enforcer as 
proof of violation to establish liability in their action. Such an advantage encourages private parties 
to wait until a public decision is made by a competition authority.
25
 In other words, private follow-
on actions are largely dependant on how active public enforcement is. These actions should bring 
some benefits to deterrence, as they increase the costs of violation when they are litigated 
successfully against wrongdoers. However, given that follow-on actions have little or no impact on 
detection, deterrence can be facilitated only minimally. Stand-alone actions for damages are another 
type of claims, which are brought without a prior finding of antitrust violation. In these actions, it is 
up to the claimant to prove that the infringement has indeed taken place; a task which can 
sometimes be very complicated.
26
 Stand-alone claims can contribute to deterrence by raising the 
number of detected violations that, if successful, can increase the cost of violation to infringers by 
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The second characteristic feature of typical private antitrust cases is the fact-intensiveness and 
confrontation with complex causality assessments, both legal and economic. The principal purpose 
is to prove the causality between the antitrust infringement and the harm suffered by the claimant. 
The burden of proof typically lies with the claimant, who has to demonstrate that the infringing 
conduct has resulted in the damage claimed. This is a daunting task, particularly given that a 
majority of the Member States require proving causation with near certainty (99.9% probability).
28
 
This burden is even more complicated, given the fact that claimants stand isolated against antitrust 
violators who generally are much more aware of the infringement. Even if damages actions were 
followed-on by a previous public antitrust decision, claimants still need to adduce clear evidence of 
causation and loss to recover damages.
29
 Another issue that concerns assessing causation is the ‘but-
for’ test. The test examines the hypothetical scenario if the infringement of Article 101 or 102 
TFEU had not occurred: the assessment of the position of the injured party with the position in 
which this party would have been but for antitrust infringement (often referred as ‘counterfactual 
scenario’). Developing an actual counterfactual scenario requires evaluation of how the market 
evolved without the antitrust infringement. Estimation has to rely on a number of determinants: (i) 
market context; (ii) type of harm; and (iii) types of claimants. Conducting such an analysis requires 
a thorough understanding of economic variables (such as prices, sales volumes, profits, costs or 
market shares). This is certainly not an easy task, given the fact that the results rely on many 
assumptions.
30
 Furthermore, the analysis of causation is an essential element for the quantification 
of actions for damages. Claimants often face difficulties in quantifying precisely the harm caused 
by the infringement of the competition law as a result of numerous factors, such as evidentiary 
obstacles, lack of access to information or robust estimation of damage.
31
 Furthermore, legal 
provisions for proving damages and causality are too general to be directly applicable to a private 
antitrust case.
32
 A separate standing issue is that the claimants are put off by the complex economic 
analysis; something which is a significant burden for private parties. The economics and financial 
literature has developed a wide array of methods and models for quantifying damages. For example, 
in the OXERA study prepared for the European Commission, the methods and models are classified 
into three broad groups: comparator-based, financial-performance-based, and market-structure-
based.
33
 For these reasons, it is argued that the whole causation procedure requires more resources 
and expenses to elaborate legal proceedings than is expected.  
                                                 
27
 Laborde (n 24), 2. Until 2017, out of 98 cartel damages claims, 71 were cases following the decisions of NCAs, 23 
following the decisions of the European Commission, and only 4 were stand-alone actions. 
28
 HA Abele, GE Kodek, GK Schaefer, ‘Proving Causation in Private Antitrust Cases’ (2013) 7 J of Competition Law 
& Economics 4, 848-49. 
29
 See for example, case Enrol Coal Services Ltd v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 2. 
30
 See for example, Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-
203. The Court assessed the hypothetical scenario: ‘the loss of earnings is the result not of a simple mathematical 
calculation but of an evaluation and assessment of complex economic data. The Court is thus called upon to evaluate 
economic activities which are of a largely hypothetical nature. Like a national court, it therefore has a broad discretion 
as to both the figures and the statistical data to be chosen and also, above all, as to the way in which they are to be used 
to calculate and evaluate the damage’, para 79. 
31
 I Lianos, D Geradin, Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforcement and Procedure (Edward Elgar Pub 
2013), 255. 
32
 Abele, Kodek and Schaefer (n 28), 853. 
33
 Oxera, Quantifying Antitrust Damages, Study Prepared for the European Commission, December 2009 




The third characteristic concerns issues related with disclosure rules. As a general rule, much of key 
evidence is often held exclusively by the allegedly infringing undertakings, making it difficult for a 
claimant (if aware of the evidence at all) to obtain disclosure of documents. These materials are 
crucial in successful antitrust damages actions in which infringing conduct tends to be secretive. 
From the domestic perspective, the rules on disclosure vary between States making it difficult to 
assess whether and under what conditions the State is willing to give access to documents. In civil 
law countries (such as Germany, Lithuania or Austria) the rules on disclosure provides only limited 
access for the plaintiffs to the internal information of the defendants. Contrary to current shift in 
civil law countries, the disclosure rules in English courts have rigorous disclosure regimes in place, 
yet it requires parties to disclose documents that may help for claimants to prove the alleged 
overcharge they paid. 
 
In order to mitigate these deficiencies of private enforcement, the EU eventually adopted the 
Directive on antitrust damages actions in November 2014. One of the most important developments 
was an attempt to protect the discovery of cartel material.
34
 First, legislators agreed that absolute 
protection from disclosure should be granted for immunity and leniency statements and settlement 
submissions (the so-called ‘black list’). Second, the information contained in the file of a national 
competition authority shall only be available when the investigations have been concluded (the so-
called ‘grey list’). Third, other documents are available at any time (the so-called ‘white list’). On 
the one hand, the Directive has brought clarity as to which evidence is available in cartels 
proceedings. On the other hand, the crucial material of cartels (leniency statements and settlement 
submissions) is unavailable. Therefore, the EU clearly demonstrates that the priority is to safeguard 
the leniency policy, while private actions are in an inferior position.  
 
To conclude, as already pinpointed at in the introduction, from the perspective of consumer 
protection it is rather disappointing that the adopted Directive’s text does not include any provisions 
on collective redress. In the area of antitrust where illegal behaviour may generate scattered and 
low-value loss to a number of consumers and where the individual proceedings may not be 
proportionate, the added value of a binding approach on collective redress would be a significant 
event. 
 
2.2.3 Tort Remedies and Deterrence in European Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
An effective private antitrust enforcement mechanism can complement public enforcement. The 
underlying logic is that if more private actions are brought and thus more victims are compensated, 
the cost of the infringement is increased for violators. As regards the costs of litigation, private 
actions force wrongdoers not only to pay the amount of damages, but also the case-related costs: 
attorneys and experts fees, and administrative expenses. Indeed, when public enforcement is 
combined with effective private enforcement, the aggregate mechanism may serve as a firm 
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deterrent against antitrust infringers. It is also clear that preventing anticompetitive conduct is the 
best way to ensure the welfare of consumers, competitors and other market participants. Even if we 
assume that the EU has developed ‘a perfect private enforcement system, such a system cannot 
restore all the social benefits that stem from well-functioning competitive markets and that are lost 
when competition is lessened or distorted’.
35
 To sum up, if an infringement has taken place, a well-
functioning private enforcement mechanism can facilitate the achievement of compensation, but it 
is unlikely that the situation which existed before a violation would be fully restored.  
  
The European Commission considers private enforcement to be part of the overall antitrust 
enforcement scheme. In that regard, public and private enforcement are complementary 
mechanisms for ensuring effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: while public 
enforcement is aimed at prevention, detection and deterrence of violations, private enforcement is 
designed to compensate victims.
36
 Given that both instruments are regarded equally important (but 
pursuing different objectives) in enforcing EU competition law, a very broad role is given to 
damages actions—being tort remedies—in the enforcement mechanism. Commentators observe few 
concerns in this respect. First, private antitrust enforcement (i.e. a remedy in tort) is not well suited 
to ‘play such a unprecedented strategic role’ in achieving antitrust goals.
37
 It is because a right to 
compensation demands compensating any victim down the supply chain, including end-consumers. 
Second, regulating tort actions traditionally remains the domain of domestic jurisdictions. However, 
national tort actions have proved to be ineffective in antitrust enforcement. Basedow observes, in 
this respect, that ‘the remedies provided by private law have turned out to be insufficient or even 
totally inadequate for the protection of competition.’
38
 Third, Advocate General Mazák in his 
opinion in the Pfleiderer case asserted that the role of private actions for damages is of far less 
importance than that of public enforcement in ensuring compliance with Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. Therefore, he hesitated to label damages actions as enforcement as such.
39
 Mazák’s opinion 
remains relevant nowadays, as the Directive on damages actions preserves strong public 
enforcement by introducing strong limitations on damages actions, such as no access to leniency 
documents, no damages multipliers or no collective actions.  
 
In order to achieve the effectiveness of private enforcement, there is a need to relax damage claims, 
especially as regards rules on standing, funding, discovery and proving causality. However, the 
borders of the compensation principle, which seeks to prevent overcompensation, should never be 
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 Otherwise, this mechanism may infringe the fundamental principle of unjust enrichment 
of civil law. 
 
One option may include a rule similar to the US’ trebling of damages for infringements of antitrust 
law under the Clayton Act.
41
 Under this system, the successful plaintiffs are able to recover 
compensatory damages as much as three times of actual damages. As such, both deterrence and 
compensation functions are effectively pursued. It seems clear that awarding civil plaintiffs treble 
damages is a fuel for more active litigation in the EU. On this point it ought to be recalled that 
private damage action is an economic activity for which funding is crucial to success or failure of 
any proceedings. Because of the predominance of the ‘loser pays’ principle in the Member States, 
feasible alternatives are required so as to incentivise private parties to start a claim. If successful 
claimants are able to recover compensatory damages as much as three times of actual damages, it 
definitely acts as an incentive to start a private claim. Furthermore, punitive damages are of 
particular importance in collective actions, where the total costs for bringing collective damages 
actions can be extremely high because of the complexity of legal and economic assessments in such 





Regarding these factors it should be recalled that the European Commission also previously 
attempted to introduce double damages (a form of punitive damages) for horizontal cartels in the 
2005 Green Paper on damages, but it was severely criticized by the Member States and was no 
longer included as a proposal in the 2008 White Paper. As a matter of EU jurisprudence, the CJEU 
acknowledged that the imposition of punitive damages in response to harm caused by antitrust 
violations would not be contrary to European public order. In Manfredi, the Court allowed punitive 
damages in competition law, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
respected and unjust enrichment is prevented.
43
 Despite the positions taken by the Court, punitive 
damages still seem to be an alien concept to the legislators of the EU. First and foremost, punitive 
damages are in conflict with the fundamental principle of damages actions in the EU; that is to 
compensate for injury actually suffered.
44
 Second, punitive damages are also not in line with the 
general principles of Civil Law in the Member States, which prevent any unjust enrichment.
45
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Third, the award of punitive damages breaches the fundamental principle of ne bis in idem.
46
 
Finally, in the United States where punitive damages are a motivating power in private 
enforcement, damages actions are intended to at least partly substitute for public enforcement 
actions while in the EU there is a clear distinction between the roles public and private enforcement. 
Public enforcement serves the punitive objective-function. This function is pursued through the 
imposition of fines, which punish the infringers and deter them from breaching the law in the future. 
Conversely, private enforcement and more specifically damages actions primarily serve the 
objective of compensation, while deterrence can only be seen as a welcome side-effect.  
 
However, the legislators of the EU should also consider the fact that punitive damages (such as 
double damages) do not necessarily lead to overcompensation of victims. After all, there are many 
additional costs to the case (administrative, expertise, etc.) that may consume a large portion of the 
recovery, thereby leaving low awards to victims. This is probably one of the reasons as to why the 
CJEU in Manfredi leaves discretion for the Member States to decide on the issue. The experiences 
in France and Germany have shown that both states leave space for punitive damages, even though 
they are generally considered to be against public order. According to the French Court de 
Cassation, punitive damages are not per se contrary to public policy.
47
 To the same extent, the 
German Federal Court of Justice generally considers punitive damages against public policy, but 







In formulating the concept of antitrust enforcement, it has been observed that current fine levels are 
sub-optimal to ensure deterrence. A logical implication of this remark would seem to be that since 
private antitrust actions for damages constitute the tort remedies and given that the recovery of 
punitive damages is problematic in the EU, the unified model of collective redress is the most 
realistic alternative for a more forceful and effective approach of private enforcement. Another 
problem concerns procedural and legal obstacles due to which private parties are not well equipped 
to enforce their rights. From this perspective, it seems that collective redress is also a potential 
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2.3 COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POTENTIAL VEHICLE TO 
MITIGATE OBSTACLES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
 
This section aims to provide arguments as to why collective redress is an attractive alternative to 
solve, or at least diminish, the inefficiencies of antitrust enforcement. First, it explains the particular 
milestones that affect the ability to bring successful collective claim. Furthermore, it aims to 
provide an initial characterization of the ability of collective claims to act as an incentive for 
deterrence. Finally, it demonstrates that collective redress is a potential remedy to mitigate 
deficiencies of private antitrust enforcement by individual parties. 
 
2.3.1 Legal Design of Collective Redress Mechanisms 
 
From the European standpoint, the last few years have seen rapid developments in the area of 
collective redress in the Member States. Currently, at least twenty two states have had their own 
collective redress schemes.
49
 However, even where it is available, the implemented systems have 
not been very successful because the number of collective actions is very low. Based on the results 
provided by the Lear Study,
50
 in 2012 there have been collective redress cases for antitrust 
infringements in only eight countries while the trial stage has been reached in Austria, Spain, 
France, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. It emerges clearly that the ability to bring a 
successful collective claim depends on the type of collective actions introduced, particularly 
whether it provides sufficient incentives to bring collective action and possibilities for funding.  
 
The first and foremost feature in antitrust regards how precisely claimants need to be identified for 
an action before the court: on an opt-in or an opt-out basis. Most of the countries have adopted opt-
in mechanisms which require explicit consent from the victims to join the action. The major reason 
that inspired the Member States to choose an opt-in model is that there are advantages of limiting 
the risk of unmeritorious actions. Furthermore, an opt-in measure respects an individual right to be 
part of the litigation or not (so-called ‘party disposition principle’), whereby this measure is under 
the Article 6 of the ECHR. However, few countries (the UK, Portugal, Denmark and the 
Netherlands) have adopted ‘opt-out’ measure, whereby victims are deemed included in the action 
unless someone declares himself or herself not to be involved. A second feature concerns legal 
standing for the entities that might be allowed to start a collective action.
51
 In some countries group 
actions can be commenced by public authorities, for instance in Finland (Ombudsman) and 
Hungary (Hungarian Competition Authority), whilst in other jurisdictions, such as France, Sweden 
and Greece, representation is provided by national private organizations, such as consumer 
associations. Other countries have legal standing for a combination of a mixed approach: private 
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organizations and harmed persons (Bulgaria, Italy, and Spain), public authorities and associations. 
A third option involves funding of legal costs that may affect the ability and the incentives of 
claimants to initiate collective actions. A potential solution concerns the availability of contingency 
and conditional fees. This mechanism represents the American solution to the funding problem. 
Under this mechanism, the necessary means of funding are well ensured because client pays 
contingent fees to a lawyer only if there is a favourable result. However, it is equally true that 
contingency fees bring incentives for unmeritorious claims. Despite this fact, contingency fees have 
increased its popularity, utilized in some fashion in around half of Member States (even if not in a 
pure US version) and now form permit arrangements between some claimants and their lawyers on 
the basis of some form of success fee.
52
 England and Wales, for instance, have adopted conditional 
fee arrangements under which lawyers can obtain a success fee in addition to the initial legal fee, 
which is usually around 25-50% of an awarded judgment if they win.
53
 Lawyers do not get anything 
if they lose and only get a normal fee indexed on the hourly billing plus a success fee which cannot 
exceed the normal fee. These conditional fees are linked to an ‘after-the-event insurance’, which 
would pay the adversarial party’s costs in the event of losing the case. Another solution includes 
third-party funding (a company, bank or hedge fund), which could pay all or a part of the expenses 
of an action in exchange to retain a share of successful claims.
54
 In England and Wales, external 
financial options are being offered by diverse investors. In 2012, there were ten active dedicated 
TPLF investors operating in the United Kingdom, with three additional investors, Juridica, Burford, 
and IMF, making occasional investments. Most funders operating in the UK are relatively new, 




2.3.2 Assessment: Opt-In vs Opt-Out 
 
The European Commission recommends that collective redress in the EU should be based on the 
opt-in model, while the opt-out should be ‘justified by reasons of sound administration of justice’.
56
 
According to the Commission, the opt-in measure should be preferred because it: 
 
 limits the risk of abusive litigation and unmeritorious claims;  
 preserves the principle of party disposition; and 
 ensures that the judgment will not bind other potentially qualified claimants who did 
not join 
 
On the other hand, the opt-in measure tends to result in a low participation rate because the victims 
must express their wish to join the collective action, thus requiring them to spend time and money 
to start and develop the case. As such, it is unlikely that all victims will participate in collective 
action under the opt-in measure; as such, the compensatory objective is not achieved effectively. 
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Several cases in national jurisdictions regarding the experiences of consumer organisations clearly 
indicate that opt-in collective actions are practically unworkable. Taking the example of the UK, the 
Replica Football Shirts case
57
 demonstrates the reluctance of consumers to take part in opt-in 
proceedings. The consumer association (Which?) brought an action in the collective interest of 
consumers who overpaid for football shirts due to a price-fixing cartel. Despite its efforts, Which? 
managed to collect claims for only 600 consumers, which was considered a very low proportion of 
victims who suffered harm by the anti-competitive behaviour. After this failure, Which? announced 
they would not take part in collective actions in the future if it is based on the opt-in measure. In 
France, the finding of a price-fixing agreement among three mobile operators (Orange France, SFR, 
and Bouygues Telecom) had a potentially negative impact on 20 million consumers.
58
 However, 
consumer association UFC Que Choisir only managed to collect claims for 12,350 consumers. 
Hence, in countries where consumer associations have standing to bring damages claims, an opt-in 
model seems to be inappropriate to ensure sufficient participation rate for victims, in particular for 
cases involving multiple claims of low value (such as the harm caused by price fixing). In addition, 
in large-scale cartel agreements it is impossible in practice to get the consent of all harmed 
consumers, in particular when consumers cannot be easily identified. Due to low participation rate, 
consumer organizations pose a considerable obstacle of limited financial resources, thus limiting 
themselves to bringing damages actions due to uncertain financial perspective.  
 
In such circumstances, this Chapter argues that opt-out collective actions are better suited to tackle 
the issues related with low participation rates, lack of funding and sub-optimal deterrence. In the 
first place, an opt-out scheme generally ensures that the group of claimants will be sufficiently large 
since the action is brought on behalf of the whole group, unless someone declares not to be 
involved. Taking the example of the US, an average opt-out rate is very low (less than 0.2%) in 
consumer class actions, since in any case these claims cannot be litigated individually.
59
 In other 
words, opt-out collective actions increase access to justice, in particular for consumers involved in 
multiple claims of low value. It must be added, however, that the ones who are likely to opt-out are 
individual entities or the individuals who have suffered significant harm.
60
 As such, an opt-out 
model seems to be a more realistic alternative to ensure the action for damages financially viable 
due to a larger group of claimant. 
 
Furthermore, the preference given to opt-out schemes is likely to score better in terms of deterrence. 
As it is clear, the deterrence of collective redress depends on the size of the group of victims. If only 
a limited number of victims joined the proceedings, the deterrence will remain sub-optimal. Since 
the group of victims is larger under the opt-out measure, the size of the sanction expected under an 
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opt-out system will be larger than under an opt-in system. As such, collective redress actions, based 
on an opt-out measure, can more effectively influence the potential companies’ willingness to 
violate competition rules in the future. But if a company has already become part of a cartel, it can 
influence their tactics and negotiations as well as the amounts to be obtained in a settled action.
61
 
Whatever approach is taken giving the right to consumer associations to claim damages on behalf of 
end-consumers gives impetus for the substantial deterrent effect. The potential cartelist will know 
that he might face private actions from consumers and the expected cost of the infringement will 
increase, and this combination of factors might act as an incentive for cartelists to contemplate 
twice before violating the competition rules. For further discussion on how opt-out collective 
actions may improve public enforcement, see Chapter 3 (especially sections 3.4.2 and 3.5). For the 
criticism regarding their deterrence value, see Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.1). 
 
Despite the positive aspects, opt-out proceedings also have two potential disadvantages. First, this 
measure might jeopardize the right of access to the courts under Article 6 of the European 
Convention for Human Rights (ECHR).
62
 Second, the opt-out measure may increase the number of 
unmeritorious claims. For these reasons, the introduction of an EU-style collective redress 
mechanism could also be combined with the flexible hybrid of the opt-in/opt-out systems. The 
inspiration might be drawn from the examples of the UK and from the Danish model. The new 
Consumer Right Act
63
 extended the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in the 
UK. First and foremost, the CAT has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a collective action 
should proceed on an opt-out or opt-in basis.
64
 Second, the CAT is permitted to authorize a person 
or entity to commence collective actions regardless of being a public or a specified body. However, 
opt-out collective actions are not permitted to be brought by law firms. Another innovative 
provision is that the Act established a collective settlement procedure in the CAT which encourages 
settlements.
65
 If the settlement is reached, it has a binding effect on consumers, unless they opt-out. 
Besides the UK, another inspirational example of an opt-out class action system includes the one in 
Denmark. Opt-in group actions can be brought either by individual claimants, by any representative 
organization or by the Consumer Ombudsman. However, the judge may be granted, on a case-by-
case basis, the discretion as to whether the opt-out model is necessary to guarantee that a significant 
proportion of injured parties are compensated for the damages suffered.
66
 The Danish rules 
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Competition Act 1998 so as to provide space for opt-out collective proceedings, as well as continuing to provide for 
opt-in collective proceedings.  
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 The function of a collective settlement regime is to introduce a procedure for infringements of competition law, 
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 The Danish Administration of Justice Act (2007). For further discussion, see E Werlauff, Class Actions in Denmark, 
(2009) 622 Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science 202. Opt-out class actions are only 
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prescribe that only a public authority (the Consumer Ombudsman) can take opt-out cases to court.
67
 
In the light of these statements, it can be argued that the EU-style collective redress could be formed 
on the opt-out basis or at least on the hybrid of opt-out/opt-in, while the pure opt-in measure should 
be avoided. 
 
2.3.3  Legal Framework for Collective Redress in Antitrust 
 
Bearing in mind the diversity of national antitrust rules, collective actions (regardless they are opt-
out or opt-in) should apply at national level that follow the same basic principles throughout the 
EU, taking into account the legal traditions of the Member States and safeguarding against abuse. 
Contrary to a horizontal Recommendation on collective redress, this Chapter argues that a sector-
specific measure should be considered for adopting collective redress in antitrust. A sector-specific 
measure ensures better uniformity among the Member States in relation to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. The critical idea underlying the horizontal instrument is that it requires specific sector-
specific implementation for antitrust litigation, such as legal standing and aggregation of different 
victims, as well as alignment with the provisions adopted in the Directive on damages actions, such 
as disclosure to evidence, full compensation and indirect purchasers. Moreover, when the horizontal 
instrument is implemented, it may lead to discrepancies among Member States. For further 
discussion on discrepancies, see Chapter 5 (sections 5.3.1 and 5.5). Finally, the experiences in 
Member States show that the sectoral approach prevails in the European Union, while competition 
law and consumer law are the most common fields for sectoral approach on collective redress.
68
 In 
order for the legislative measure not to be too restricted, competition law could be included in a 
larger sectoral approach, which would encompass violations that generate small but widespread 
harm, such as consumer protection. 
 
As regards legal instrument, a directive seems to be a more suitable tool for a sector-specific 
initiative in EU competition law rather than a regulation. A sector-specific mechanism laid down in 
a directive would better comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and it would 
be more respectful for national procedural autonomy. A directive, furthermore, would be a flexible 
instrument for introducing a minimum standard and avoiding intervention in domestic provisions. 
This is of particular importance for the functioning of damages actions, ensuring common minimum 
guarantees all across the EU while leaving to the Member States the choice of the most appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                                  
permitted as an exception to the main rule stipulated in Section 254 e, subs. 5 of The Administration of Justice Act: 1) 
the constituent claims must be so small that they are unlikely to be brought as individual actions because the risk or cost 
of litigation is disproportionate to the size of the individual claims; 2) the court must deem an opt-in structure to be unfit 
for the action at hand. If the conditions are met, then the Administration of Justice Act Section 254 e, subsection 8 
grants the possibility of using the opt-out mechanism. The legislative history indicates that the number of opt-out cases 
was expected to be very limited, and practice to date in Denmark has also shown this prediction to be correct. The major 
case, against Bank Trelleborg Sagerne 356/2010 og 28/2011 (online version in Danish is available here: 
http://www.domstol.dk/hojesteret/nyheder/Afgorelser/Pages/DomibankTrelleborg-gruppesgsmlet.aspx) failed in the 
Supreme Court after several years. It was thus emphasized that it must be clear that the claims would not otherwise be 
pursued, and they must be of modest size, as noted, less than 2,000 kroner.
 
67
 Cf. Section 28(1) of the Marketing Practices Act, under which, if a majority of consumers have the same claim for 
compensation in connection with a breach of the Marketing Practices Act, the consumer ombudsman can, on request, 
group the claims under one. Section 28(2) provides that the ombudsman can be appointed group representative in a 
class action lawsuit (cf. Ch. 23a of the Administration of Justice Act). 
68
 R. Amaro, Collective Redress in the Member States of the European Union, Study for the European Parliament's 
Committee on Legal Affairs, October 2018, 21-22 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120613ATT46782/20120613ATT46782EN.pdf> 
accessed 8 February 2019. In 10 countries discussed, 7 have sectoral approach, while 3 have a horizontal one.  
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tools to do so.
69
 Furthermore, given the fact that collective redress is a highly debatable and 
sensitive topic at the EU and national level, a regulation seems one step too far, because it might 
interfere with domestic systems. However, the study commissioned by the European Parliament 
supports the adoption of a “hybrid Regulation”, such as the General Data Protection Regulation.
70
 It 
is claimed that this approach would allow defining the common rules throughout the EU, but still 
leaving “a margin of appreciation” to Member States. However, the study also notes that most 
Member States support a Directive, because it leaves more flexibility to Member States. The ones 
which favour a Regulation are in agreement that this instrument should have a limited extent of 
optionality.
71
 This Chapter supports a Directive. A “hybrid Regulation” seems too untested for 
putting inherently different violations under the same approach, for example, competition versus 
employment or labour.  
 
As regards the legal basis, the Article 103 TFEU appears to be the most suitable Treaty provision 
with the CJEU case law in antitrust, which requires that every legislative act should be based on one 
single legal basis.
72
 The CJEU ruled that dual legal bases can be only used in exceptional 
circumstances.
73
 Quite surprisingly, this exception has been used in the Directive on damages 
actions, which rests on dual legal bases, combining Articles 103 TFEU and 114 TFEU. It was 
justified on the basis that there is a need to balance uneven enforcement of the right to 
compensation for infringements of competition law in the Member States.
74
 In can be also noted 
that the EU sought to include the internal market aspect in the EU private antitrust reform, and thus 
to increase consumer involvement.
75
 Logically, the Directive on antitrust collective redress, if it 
would ever become reality, should also keep the same legislative framework. As a result, it would 




Another possibility is amending the damages Directive by including provisions on collective redress 
schemes. This alternative should be welcomed for keeping the same legislative tool for antitrust 
damages reform. However, when considering the implementation process of the damages Directive, 
it is highly unlikely that this amendment could see the light of day in the near future: 
 
1. The deadline for implementing the provisions of the Directive was 27 December 2016, but it 
took more time for most Member States to incorporate into national schemes. Empirical 
study found that only 10 Member States informed the European Commission of their full 
transposition of the Directive by 20 February 2017, while Bulgaria and Greece implemented 
the Directive in early 2018, and Portugal was the last implementing in June 2018.
77
 This 
study analysed four Member States: two "old" ones (Belgium and Luxembourg) and two 
"newer" ones (Latvia and Lithuania). It was found that the reason for delays (at least in 
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 See for instance, Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council [2012] ECR I-0000 
74
 Directive (n 1), rec. 8. 
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 See, for instance, Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights [2004] OJ L 157, rec. 3. There, it is clarified that the enforcement aspect of 
IP rights is ‘paramount for the success in internal market’.  
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 Directive (n 1), rec. 8. 
77
 J Malinauskaite and C Cauffman, 'The Transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive in the Small Member States 
of the EU—A Comparative Perspective' (2018) 9 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 8, 496.  
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countries studied, such as Latvia) was the need for a "robust transposition" into national 
schemes. Considering significant delays in the implementation process, the consensus for 
amending the Directive is unlikely to be achieved among Member States in the near future, 
especially given that many countries will need some time to get acquainted with the new 
litigation tool. 
2. The Directive will require ex post evaluation before getting any type of amendment. 
However, such an evaluation cannot be foreseen soon without some practice in the field. 
 
It is true that a sector-specific Directive on collective redress would be criticised as loudly as a 
possible amendment in the Directive on damages actions. But it can be argued that it would be 
easier to set minimum standards that are appropriate for Member States in a separate legislative act 
than amending the current Directive. This is because the current Directive is primarily concentrating 
on the protection of public enforcement (leniency in particular), also emphasis is on specific issues, 
such as, limitation rules and joint liability. However, there are no specific provisions on collective 
redress, meaning that it would require robust interventions into the Directive on damages actions. 
Indeed, a new directive on collective redress would be more opened for flexibility as it would start 
from a new page.  
 
2.4 COLLECTIVE REDRESS AS A POTENTIAL REMEDY TO MITIGATE DEFICIENCIES 
OF EU COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
In the following section, it is demonstrated that collective redress is a potential remedy to mitigate 
some deficiencies of competition law enforcement. At least three interrelated objectives can be 
facilitated: i) access to justice; ii) proving causation; and iii) insufficient public enforcement of EU 
competition law.  
 
First, the availability of collective actions in national legal systems may facilitate access to justice 
by creating measures which simplify and help access to the courts. Collective actions would ensure 
a fundamental right for victims, namely in that legal representation is provided for a group of 
victims in order to ensure equality of arms.
78
 This is notable because of the potential to reduce the 
organisational costs and to handle the financial risks attached to private litigation. The costs of the 
lawsuit decrease because the financial risk is spread over a group of injured persons participating in 
the collective procedure. It means that plaintiffs no longer run the risk of having to bear extensive 
costs of the lawsuit. Furthermore, the probability of winning the case increases since multiple 
plaintiffs have larger financial means to pay for experienced and highly competent lawyers in the 
relevant fields of law, while individual consumers may not be able to afford on representatives with 





Second, collective redress provides an attractive ability to bundle multiple individual claims and 
thus to gain efficiencies by tackling common legal, factual and economic issues collectively (and 
giving the claimants more clout against the defendants). For example, when a consumer association 
files a claim on behalf of its members, it might reverse the insurmountable burden of proof from the 
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79




plaintiff to their own hands.
80
 It is clear that consumer associations have larger financial means to 
start and develop antitrust cases, for example, to cover legal fees and potential expert fees. 
Furthermore, the availability of representative actions could greatly solve, or at least diminish, 
information asymmetry, meaning that plaintiffs are in a better position to provide proof with 
sufficiently high probability. Therefore, representative action may have the informational 
advantages of the applicable laws in comparison with individual consumers, such that designated 
bodies are able to assess better whether certain behaviour of firms constitutes an infringement.
81
 In 
addition, it is argued that public entities may facilitate the analysis of the but-for test. In order to 
conduct such an analysis, the claimant has to have thorough understanding of the relationship 
between prices and their determinants, including the potential impact of the antitrust violation.
82
 It 
is clear that the complexity of methods and models for assessing the but-for test might be too 
complicated for private parties, especially for consumers. As such, collective actions are attractive 
alternative to determine the real damage value. 
 
Third, collective redress is a potential tool to mitigate dysfunctional compensatory mechanisms of 
EU competition law. It should be observed that public authorities alone are not able to enforce 
competition law effectively because they lack resources and competence to secure compensations 
for victims. As mentioned before, truly effective compensation by the way of private enforcement is 
limited, because private parties face significant obstacles in bringing damages actions. In such 
circumstances, the collective redress mechanism seems a useful aid to antitrust enforcement through 
creating the enlarged group of enforcers able to claim their rights granted under EU law. Moreover, 
if a common collective redress mechanism is established, then it has to increase the part played by 
national competition authorities and national courts in implementing EU and national competition 
law while guaranteeing its effective and uniform application. In addition, the common collective 
redress would facilitate cross-border antitrust enforcement cooperation between national courts and 
national competition authorities (for example, through the European Competition Network). Indeed, 
the common collective redress would bring much needed facilitation to access to justice and 
consumer protection across the EU. The potential possibility is illustrated in Table 1 below: 
 
If all factors in Table 1 were combined, victims or representative organizations would have more 
incentives to invest in antitrust collective actions for increased possibilities of: 1) a larger group; 2) 
enforcing judgements from other Member States; 3) sharing best practices; and 4) taking ‘free rides’ 
on the efforts of others. Consequently, it will enhance the consumer protection against antitrust 
violators across borders, since consumer bodies and national enforcement authorities would be 
based upon judicial cooperation between different Member States.
83
 If such a system were to be 
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Table 1. The impact of common collective redress on access to justice and consumer protection 
Measure Potential facilitation 
 
A better exercise of their right across 
borders 
 
 Victims located in one Member State can seek collective redress in another country. 
 Victims are able to pool their efforts to litigate collectively, where the infringement 
caused harm across borders. 
 There is a less need for ‘forum shopping’. 
 
Expanded possibilities for follow-on 
actions 
 
Victims or representative organizations can take a ‘free ride’ on the efforts of public 
actors from their own and other Member States (national courts and national competition 
authorities). 
  
Better information sharing 
 Designated entities for bringing collective actions (either public or private) would 
be in closer cooperation across the EU. 
 Cooperation may be achieved through allocation of the cases and exchanging 
information about the on-going or potential collective actions. 
 
Finally, it should be stressed that the European Commission and national competition authorities 
may have significant impact on follow-on collective actions in the way they formulate their 
decisions. The key factor for a successful collective action is the availability of evidence. According 
to Articles 5-6 of the Directive on damages actions, national courts have to decide on the disclosure 
of the facts and evidence pleaded by claimants, yet evidence should be defined as precisely and 
narrowly as possible for a court to approve the proportionality of the disclosure. Therefore, the 
quality of decisions made by competition authorities is decisive for a claimant in defining the key 
components of disclosure. It follows that clear and effective disclosure allows for a better 
assessment of the real harm caused to victims and how this harm can be quantified. These factors 
are crucial for a national court in deciding whether to approve class certification or not. For further 
discussion on class certification, see Chapter 5 (especially Section 5.4.2), analysing the reasons for 
the first two unsuccessful opt-out antitrust collective actions in the UK. To sum up, the competition 
authorities stand at the beginning of collective litigation, in a way that the precision and quality of 
their decisions may be pivotal for claimants in deciding whether to bring antitrust collective actions 
or not. 
 
Another factor that may influence the final outcome of antitrust collective actions is the DG 
Competition's programme of training national judges, which is part of the EU's Justice Programme 
2014-2020. In 2016, the Study on judges’ training needs in the field of European competition law 
identified 6 training profiles and 2 apply to private enforcement: 1) specialised judges dealing with 
private enforcement; 2) non-specialised judges dealing with private enforcement.
84
 More 
specifically, it was identified that the focus of judicial training should be on providing updates on 
relevant case law, exchanging experiences among judges, and dealing with specific provisions such 
as the quantification of damages.
85
 A new training program was launched by the Academy of 
European Law dedicated to the Directive of damages actions. Its goal is to provide an overview 
about the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the relevant secondary legislation. The 
positive aspect of training programs is that they contribute to a coherent application of competition 
rules among different states. Judges also share best practice. However, (informal) discussions 
among judges may inspire some judges located in less developed countries regarding private 
enforcement to apply the practices of more experienced countries, which may not necessary work. 
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This may lead to misinterpretation of local antitrust rules. As regards collective redress, the 'copy-
paste' option is unlikely to work. For example, it is quite complicated to apply opt-out practices in 
countries where opt-in schemes are predominant, or where collective actions are led by public 




The research question of this Chapter was the following: 
 
Does the enforcement of EU competition law fulfil its objectives of compensation and deterrence? If 
not, which provisions of collective actions, existing in various forms in different states, and which 
EU's legislative instruments would better contribute to achieving these objectives?   
 
When addressing this question, it was found that both public enforcement (principally aimed at 
deterrence) and private enforcement (principally aimed at compensation) fail to a large extent to 
achieve their objectives. It was also determined that collective redress actions have a potential to 
serve as a remedy to reduce the shortcomings of antitrust enforcement. On this basis, the following 
findings were made.  
 
1) The EU’s public antitrust enforcement is sub-optimal: the cartel detection mechanism does 
not seem very effective and antitrust fines are insufficient to fully deter wrongdoers. 
 
The leniency policy has significantly increased the detection rates of cartels, but a large majority of 
cartels remain undetected. Some estimation finds that at least 2 out of 3 cartels remain undetected. 
However, these findings should be received with great caution, as there is a lack of studies on cartel 
detection rates and the available ones are grounded mostly on older estimations. As regards fines, 
they seem to be insufficient to ensure optimal deterrence even at their unprecedented high levels. 
First, the high number of discovered cartels and increasing fines show that existing fining policy 
may not be enough to persuade cartelists to abide the law. Second, the law and economics literature 
estimates that the gain from collusion by far outweighs the expected punishment. Considering these 
shortcomings, the current fine levels should be complemented with other measures to enhance 
deterrence. In this Chapter, private enforcement was regarded as an attractive option.     
 
2) Private enforcement is largely underdeveloped in compensating victims. 
 
The right to claim damages was very ineffective in the period 2006-2012: a large majority of 
victims (especially if they were SMEs and consumers) did not engage in legal actions for reparation 
of their harm. As such, the cost of ineffective right to damages was in the range of 25 - 69 billion 
euros between 2006 and 2012. From this perspective, three common obstacles facing victims of 
competition law infringements in the EU Member States were observed: (i) cost and (legal) 
uncertainty; (ii) complexity of causality; and (iii) disclosure rules.  
 
3) Collective actions can contribute to achieving the objectives of antitrust enforcement, but 




An effective collective redress can contribute to solving the shortcomings of public and private 
enforcement, yet its effectiveness depends on the type of mechanism introduced. One of, if not the 
most important feature in antitrust regards how claimants are aggregated for collective actions: on 
an opt-in or opt-out basis. It was found that opt-in collective actions are in practice unworkable in 
France and the UK. In such circumstances, opt-out collective actions are better suited to tackle the 
issues related with low participation rates, lack of funding and sub-optimal deterrence. However, 
opt-out proceedings may jeopardise the right of access to the courts under Article 6 of the ECHR, 
and may increase the number of unmeritorious claims. Despite the potential drawbacks, the EU-
style collective redress should be based primarily on the opt-out basis or at least on the hybrid of 
opt-out/opt-in, while the pure opt-in measure should be avoided.  
 
Furthermore, as regards the deficiencies of private enforcement, it was demonstrated that collective 
actions in national legal systems may therefore facilitate access to justice by creating measures 
which simplify and help access to courts. Furthermore, collective redress provides an attractive 
vehicle to deal with a wide range of legal and economic methods for proving causation. For 
example, when a consumer association files a claim on behalf of its members, it might reverse the 
insurmountable burden of proof from the plaintiff to their own hands. Finally, collective redress is a 
potential tool to facilitate enforcement by public authorities. This is remarkably because the 
collective redress mechanism may create an enlarged group of enforcers able to claim their rights 




























2.6 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS 
 
Page Description of amendment Explanation 
29 
Additional discussion on the 
effectiveness of leniency policy. 
The amendment better explains the effectiveness of public enforcement. 
Additional references are added, numbered 5-8.  
29 
Accompanying data on cartel statistics. The information is provided for 2014-2017, while in original paper the relevant data 
was until March 2014. 
30-31 
Additional discussion on the 
effectiveness of EU administrative 
(public) fines. 
The approach of Connor and Miller is presented as a counterargument to critics that 
claim that current fines are below the adequate level to achieve optimal deterrence. 
In addition, the approach of the European Commission on fines is presented. 
Additional references are added, numbered 17-18. 
32-33 
Additional discussion on stand-alone 
and follow-on actions.  
It gives a more insightful picture about the shortcomings of private enforcement. 
Additional references are added, numbered 24-27.   
34 
Additional discussion on the disclosure 
rules in the Directive on damages 
actions.   
This was not included in the published article, as it was concluded prior to the final 
adoption of the Directive (November 2014). Therefore, there was no intention to 
provide an overview on disclosure.  
It also seeks to show that private antitrust reform primarily seeks not to jeopardise 
public enforcement (primary leniency), while the victims’ right to claim 
compensation is a goal of secondary importance. 
Additional reference is added, numbered 34.  
35-36 
Additional clarification on the 
relationship between effective 
compensatory private actions and 
deterrence.  
Clarification helps to better explain the importance of damages claims in antitrust 
enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, it shows that private enforcement, being a 
tort remedy, is given a very broad power in the enforcement mechanism.  
Additional references are added, numbered 36, 39-40. 
37 
Additional explanation on the role of 
punitive damages in the EU context. 
 
This idea has arisen after the additional Manfredi case review. The amendment 
provides a clarification that punitive damages do not necessarily over-compensate 
victims. Furthermore, additional discussion is added on the German Federal Court of 
Justice and the French Court de Cassation decisions regarding punitive damages. 
Additional references are added, numbered 47-48.  
40 
Clarification that individual companies 
cannot be inherently equated to 
consumers in collective actions.  
Highlights the different (financial) interests at stake.  
Additional reference is added, numbered 60. 
  
42 
Additional clarification on the EU’s 
sector-specific legal instrument.  
New publication by the European Parliament was found, which overviews the 
adoption and of implementation of collective redress.  
Additional reference is added, numbered 68. 
43 
Overview of the European Parliament’s 
proposal for the legislative tool on 
collective redress. 
The European Parliament published a new study on collective redress in October 
2018, which gives additional flavour to the discussion in the dissertation.  
Additional references are added, numbered 70-71.  
43 
Discussion on the legal basis for the 
potential Directive on collective 
redress. 
A discussion on dual legal bases better reflects the EU position on making damages 
claims more coherent across the EU.  
Additional references are added, numbered 73-76. 
43-44 
Proposal is suggested for amending the 
current Directive on damages actions 
for including collective actions.  
On the basis of the European Parliament's study, the amendment explores the 
possibility of collective redress in amending the Directive on damages actions.  
Additional reference is added, numbered 77. 
46 
Additional discussion on the positive 
effects of the common EU’s collective 
redress.  
It gives an overview on the potential outcomes for access to justice and consumer 
protection. Explanation is provided in Table 1. 
46 
Discussion on the potential impact of 
the European Commission and national 
competition authorities in affecting the 
potential of collective redress. 
It gives a more insightful picture about the roots of follow-on collective actions. 
46-47 
Discussion on the impact of the DG 
Competition's programme of training 
national judges. 
It gives a more insightful picture about the process of judges’ training and a 
potential impact on decision-making. 









































3 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND CLASS 






The US system has relied heavily on antitrust class actions as a means of ensuring compensation 
and deterrence. Although this tool seems sensible in theory, the reality is that it remains highly 
controversial. On the one hand, commentators argue that class actions force defendants to settle 
cases lacking merit. Even if a settlement agreement is assumed to have a merit, class actions are 
accused of doing a poor job in compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. On the other hand, 
the proponents of class actions claim that there is no reliable empirical evidence proving that class 
action schemes caused negative effects on antitrust litigation. The public debate about the 
effectiveness of class actions illustrates the controversial nature of American class actions fairly 
well. Therefore, using comparative insights from the predominant controversies, this Chapter will 
determine how well antitrust class actions fulfil compensation objectives, and to what extent they 
can facilitate deterrence. 
 




Private litigation has always played a major role in the antitrust enforcement of the United States. 
Even though private enforcement was meant to only complement public enforcement, in reality 
private claims far outstrip governmental actions. Private remedies are aimed at achieving either 
compensation or deterrence goals. When the American class action mechanism emerged, it became 
a very potent fixture to bridge the gap between both objectives. A primary purpose of the class 
action device is to enable large groups of victim to aggregate their claims and hence to claim 
damages or to seek injunctive relief as a result of the alleged violation. Throughout the development 
of these sorts of proceedings, the Supreme Court has given a broad remedial function for class 
actions to assure that the antitrust objectives are achieved. Yet the approach has recently changed in 
Twombly.
1
 There, it was alleged that antitrust class actions can incentivize defendants to settle cases 
that lack merit.
2
 Some critics characterize this phenomenon as a ‘blackmail settlement.’
3
 Despite the 
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Court’s criticism, some commentators argue that the decision has no merit itself: it relies on the 
‘unsupported opinion of another appellate court judge’ and no empirical study was performed.
4
 The 
public debate between these opposing views well illustrates the controversial nature of private 
antitrust enforcement in the United States. Ironically, even if the phenomenon of blackmail 
settlement would be assumed to have no ground, a series of additional controversies underlie the 
understanding on class actions, both in compensating class members and deterring the wrongdoers.  
 
A. Research question and scope 
 
The research question of this Chapter is as follows:  
 
How well do antitrust class actions in the United States fulfil compensation objectives and to what 
extent can they facilitate deterrence?  
 
The following steps are taken to address this question. The principal purpose is to assess the 
effectiveness of antitrust class actions in achieving antitrust enforcement in the United States. Using 
comparative insights from the predominant controversies, it examines the effectiveness of 
compensation and deterrence. The debate over compensation focuses on three major controversies: 
1) class members obtaining little or no compensation; 2) the compensation mechanism being 
framed to (largely) overpay attorneys; 3) class actions failing to compensate the real victims. The 
discussion on deterrence analyses one major controversy: that class actions give little or no weight 
to deterrence. To give an additional nuance to the debate between critics and proponents, the 
optimal deterrence theory is applied to assess the role of class actions in deterring infringers.  
 
As regards the scope, Chapter 3 does not analyse the EU approach, contrary to other chapters. 
Instead, it examines the US deterrence-based private antitrust enforcement mechanism, and more 
specifically antitrust class actions. Even if deterrence is not the primary goal of the EU’s private 
antitrust mechanism, the analysis of the American mechanism is essential for two reasons. First, the 
US system—being much more forceful than EU-style collective actions and having much more 
experience in the field—gives a better response about the effectiveness of class actions in 
compensating victims. Second, it gives an overview about the potential of collective actions in 
contributing to antitrust enforcement through increased deterrence.  
 
B. Methodology and limitations 
 
In the first place, Chapter 3 performs a comparison of the empirical data, mainly quantitative 
sources. This approach was chosen with the expectation that the US class action system—counting 
more than 50 years of experience—will provide comprehensive data about the effectiveness of 
antitrust class actions. This expectation has been reinforced by the fact that legal empirical analysis 
has deeper roots in the US than in the EU.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842, 843 (1974) 
(asserting that plaintiffs' attorneys are using class actions to "blackmail" businesses). 
4
 See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement, 
48 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 67 (2013) (noting that the Court in Twombly cites Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as 
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989)).  
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The comparison of quantitative sources is best suited in testing and validating the controversies 
mentioned above. It provides statistical analysis which helps to measure patterns of antitrust 
collective actions, for example what compensation on average class members receive. Therefore, by 
evaluating the comparative insights of quantitative data, the first part of the Chapter aims to assess 
the effectiveness of class actions in achieving compensation objectives. The second part deals with 
the impact of antitrust class actions on deterrence. The analytical approach is used as additional tool 
to analyse the contrasting views of critics and proponents of class actions and to assess the impact 
of different measures of class actions on deterrence. It also includes the evaluation of law and 
economics standards, such as the probability of detection and the probability of conviction.      
 
Some limitations should be noted. In theory, the quantitative study is limited for at least two 
reasons: first, the hypothesis testing may not fully assess the generation of the phenomenon; second, 
the data provided may be too abstract to apply in specific situations.
5
 In this Chapter, the following 
shortcomings have been encountered. Even if the US has a longstanding practice of class actions, 
surprisingly just a few empirical studies have been conducted, and they provide a mere handful data 
about the compensatory effectiveness of antitrust class actions. This Chapter also associates the 
compensatory effectiveness with attorneys’ compensation; in particular whether they are paid 
proportionally in the context of class recovery. On the one hand, empirical studies provide 
important data about class attorneys’ total compensation in antitrust class actions. On the other 
hand, these studies provide limited and inaccurate data regarding the case-related costs of private 
attorney general and how often cases lead to a successful outcome. The latter information would 
allow estimating the actual ratio between attorney’s risks and awards. Furthermore, the cy pres 
award (another form of compensation) is considered as an important element in assessing the 
compensatory effectiveness. However, only one relevant study has been found, which gives only a 
preliminary benchmark about the number of fraudulent cy pres distributions in antitrust settlements. 
As regards the assessment of deterrence, there are two main limitations. First, there is no reliable 
data for precisely defining the impact of antitrust class actions on the probability of detection. 
Second, there is no reliable data about the certification rates of class actions. More precise 
information would allow evaluating the role of antitrust class actions in the context of optimal 
deterrence.  
 
Considering these limitations, there is no possibility to draw evidence-based conclusions about the 
compensatory effectiveness of US antitrust class actions. Nevertheless, the available material is 
sufficient for determining the existing patterns about the effectiveness of class actions. It may sound 
bold to say, but the conclusions made in this Chapter are unlikely to change, even if more precise 
and reliable data was available for antitrust cases. As will be shown, antitrust class actions are by 
their nature determined to produce much lower effects on compensating victims and deterring 
wrongdoers than is envisaged. 
 
C. Overview of research material 
 
At the outset, it should be underlined that this research was performed at Stanford University and 
the University of Michigan under the EU Fulbright Schuman scholarship during the academic year 
                                                 
5
 Robert B Johnson, and Larry B Christensen, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Approaches 
(4th edn, SAGE Publications, 2010) 429. 
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of 2015-2016. The research material was chosen on the basis of recommendations from hosting 
supervisors prof. Deborah Hensler and prof. Daniel Crane, as well as from respective US scholars 
and practitioners in the research field. The research databases of hosting universities were of great 
value as they provided material that cannot be found in European libraries. In order to make 
analysis as broad as possible, additional material has been added during the revision of this Chapter. 
Even if an attempt to include every available literature has been made, surely some is missing. The 
experience in the US has taught that a comprehensive analysis about American (antitrust) class 
actions cannot be performed during a research stay of a few months. This is especially true for an 
EU academic/lawyer coming from the continental/civil law system. Nevertheless, it was sufficient 
to get insights for answering the research question in the PhD dissertation.  
 
To sum up, Chapter 3 focuses on examining the contrasting views between the proponents and 
critics of class actions. As regards the positive side, the most prominent works are of Davis and 
Lande. With regard to the critical side, the publications of Cavanagh and Crane are of particular 
relevance. Other mutually opposing works are published by Gramlich, Hensler, Fitzpatrick, Gilbert, 
Pace and Rubenstein. The non-academic works Mayer Brown LLP and Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau are also important. As regards the analysis of deterrence, the contrasting views 
are primarily compared with Davis and Lande on the one side, and Crane on the other. Works by 
Rubenstein, Schwartz, Ulen and Connor also guides the discussion. Furthermore, a lot of effort has 
been made to include all relevant court decisions, but some case-law may be missing due to a very 
extensive practice in the field. The most important decisions for framing the background of private 
antitrust enforcement (and class actions) are the following: Pfizer v. Government of India, Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil, Coleman v Cannon Oil, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. Additionally, for a comparative 
perspective, the most important decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada are analyzed to assess 




The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 1 discusses the rationale for private enforcement 
and class actions in antitrust enforcement. Section 2 examines three key controversies underlying 
the compensation objective in small-stakes antitrust class actions. Section 3 considers the impact of 
class actions on deterring the wrongdoers (‘rational actors’) by applying the standards of optimal 
deterrence theory.  
 
3.2 THE RATIONALE FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND CLASS ACTIONS IN 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
 
The US policy of promoting competition is based on the Sherman Act of 1890
6
 and the Clayton Act 
of 1914.
7
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any agreement in restraint of trade, while Section 
2 forbids monopolistic behavior.
8
 The Clayton Act is far more detailed than the Sherman Act, 
expanding the provisions on price discrimination, exclusive dealings, and the ability for individuals 
to sue for damages.
9
 At the Federal level, the US Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) and the Federal 
                                                 
6
 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890). 
7
 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1914). 
8
 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. 
9
 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 15.  
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Trade Commission (‘FTC’) have the authority to enforce antitrust laws. On the private side, US 
antitrust law permits enforcement by victims of antitrust infringements. In enacting the antitrust 
laws, private enforcement was meant to supplement public enforcement, which lacks sufficient 
resources to detect and prosecute antitrust violations. However, private claims have become much 
more prominent and far outpace government claims. Over 90 percent of antitrust litigation was filed 
by private plaintiffs between 1975 and 2004.
10
 More recently, in 2013, it was indicated that 98 
percent of antitrust cases in federal courts were private actions.
11
 In fact, private enforcement has 
become so powerful that private enforcers indeed fill in gaps of public enforcement of low detection 
and sub-optimal fines.  
 
3.2.1 Two Interrelated Goals of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Compensation and Deterrence 
 
The US Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the private right of action under the antitrust laws 
serves two purposes: compensation and deterrence.
12
 As regards the first objective, the enactment of 
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts appreciated the compensation role of private claims. In order to 
facilitate the objective of compensation, federal antitrust law authorizes the award of automatic 
treble damages.
13
 In fact, treble damages are the main tool to provide compensation to antitrust 
victims.
14
 However, considering the complexities in compensating antitrust victims, treble damages 
are considered to provide only ‘rough justice’ to sufferers.
15
 Indeed, an overcharge can be so 
widespread that the estimation of actual harm may be an insurmountable burden.  
 
Another viewpoint holds that private suits are necessary to deter potential wrongdoers.
16
 This 
concept is based on the idea that public authorities have insufficient time and resources to prosecute 
all the unlawful conduct and hence private litigators can secure additional layer of antitrust 
enforcement. Trebling ensures that infringers internalize the sufficient cost of the harm caused by 
anti-competitive behavior. In that regard, the Supreme Court noted that the ‘treble-damages 
provision wielded by the private litigant is a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement scheme’, 
                                                 
10
 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.41 (Antitrust Cases filed in U.S. District Courts, By type of 
case 1975-2004) (Aug. 01, 2016), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412004.pdf. 
11
 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of 
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During 12-month Period Ending March 31, 2012 and 2013,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics-2013.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 
2018) (indicating that out of 776 antitrust cases in federal courts 762 were private actions).   
12
 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov.’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (stating that “[the Clayton Act] has two purposes: 
to deter violator and deprive them of ‘fruits of their illegality’, and “to compensate victims of antitrust violators for their 
injuries.”) (citations omitted); Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575-76 (1982) (asserting 
that "treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating victims").  
13
 51 Cong. Ch. 647, Jul 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, part 7 (1890). The private right of action provision was slightly modified 
in 1914 in Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 63 Cong. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 73, part 4 (1914).  
14
 See, e.g. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (noting that treble damages "would provide 
ample compensation to victims of antitrust violations."). For further discussion, see, e.g. Steven C. Salop & Lawrence. 
J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1001, 1051 (1986). 
15
 Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 
629, 632 (2010) (citing Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 
115, 118 (1993)). Cavanagh provides a monopolization example where the difficulties occurred in reconstructing the 
“but for” test in the case LePage's, Inc. v. 3M Co., 324 F.3d 141, 164-66 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.denied, 542 U.S. 
953 (2004)).  
16
 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S 465, 472 (1982). On this point see, e.g. Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, Report and Recommendations, 246-247 (2007), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
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because the fear of treble damages creates ‘a crucial deterrent to potential violators.’
17
 Moreover 
and most importantly, when trebling is combined with contingency fees, the attorney’s incentive to 
sue is raised to a maximum: there is a guarantee that he or she will reap a large award if the case is 
won or settled. In addition, the one-way-fee-shifting rule and broad discovery rules ensure a 
plaintiff-friendly climate. Together, these measures provide the necessary incentives for private 
attorneys to invest time and money in prosecuting lengthy, complicated, and expensive antitrust 
suits (the so-called ‘private attorney general’).  
 
In case of a conflict between the antitrust goals, the Supreme Court seems to prioritize deterrence 
over compensation.
18
 One of the notable case was Pfizer v. Government of India
19
, in which the 
Court ruled that consumers benefited from the ‘maximum deterrent effect’ if trebling was applied to 
all infringers.
20
 The other case is Hawaii v. Standard Oil
21
 where the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Congress’ incentive of trebling encourages potential private litigants to serve as ‘private attorneys 
general.’
22
 To sum up, the American system can justify the failures of compensation (for example, 
undercompensation of class members), given that the primary objective is to deter wrongdoers.    
  
3.2.2 The Role of Class Actions in Antitrust Enforcement 
 
In the United States, private actions can be brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs under Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class action rule allows to consolidate multiple claims 
of victims who allegedly suffered harm from the alleged violation. Throughout the history, the 
antitrust enforcement mechanism has relied on antitrust class actions as means of securing 
compensation and deterrence. The US Supreme Court held that allowing these claims to proceed 
collectively enhanced ‘the efficacy of private actions, by permitting citizens to combine their 
limited resources and to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.’
23
 Indeed, the consolidation is 
very effective when antitrust infringement causes scattered harm among a large number of injured 
parties. In turn, it facilitates economies of scale in relation to the savings in litigation and court 
administrative costs.
24
 The actual benefits of class actions can emerge from two different types of 
claims.   
 
First, there are classes with positive value claims (‘positive expected value claims’). In such groups, 
the potential award outweighs the anticipated expenses of litigation even if the plaintiff leads the 
case on his own. But with larger financial means, the class can litigate in a more efficacious way by 
employing more competent lawyers than victims would be able to do in individual cases. Therefore, 
the probability of winning the case increases exponentially. The aggregation is likely to also be 
beneficial for the defendants, where there might be a series of individual claims alleging the same 
                                                 
17
 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985) (citations omitted). 
18
 The priority of deterrence was stressed in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See, e.g. Barak D. 
Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 
81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 69, 90 (2007); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 
1445, 1452 (1985). 
19
 434 U.S. 308 (1977). 
20
 Id. at 315. 
21
 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
22
 Id. at 262.    
23
 Id. at 266. 
24
 See, e.g. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. 284, 295-297 (1985). 
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injuries. From a practical point of view, the defendant has an easier time in organizing the defense 
and investing in winning the sole case.  
 
Second, there is a situation where the plaintiffs suffered harm but the cost of litigation exceeds the 
expected recovery (‘negative expected value claims’). Therefore, these claims would not normally 
lead to litigation if not pursued by class actions. According to the US Supreme Court, class action 
litigation allows for low value claims to be heard.
25
 In addition, class actions may be the only 
possibility to aggregate claims of small worth, especially when suing the wrongdoer individually 
would not be ‘economically rational.’
26
 In the end, class action litigation can be beneficial both for 
class members and for private litigators, who perform under a contingency fee agreement. An 
illustrative example: 
 
Suppose that potential antirust victims suffered an average harm of $100 due to a 
price-fixing cartel. The resulting individual claims are economically worthwhile, 
because litigation costs would most likely exceed the expected award from positive 
judgment. But if there were 1 million class members, in theory the expected 
recovery could be up to $300 million after trebling. Thus, the lawsuit would have 
significant financial strength. If we consider that contingency fees range between 
20 and 33 per cent, there is great interest for an attorney to invest in the litigation, 
since his potential compensation can result in tens of millions.  
 
This example would be very attractive for private litigants if the cartel was discovered by public 
enforcers. Therefore, plaintiffs can ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of government actors and use their 
findings in a subsequent private litigation. According to Chieua, the most popular antitrust class 




Although class action litigation allows for aggregating lawsuits that would otherwise be financially 
infeasible, the negative expected value claims remain highly controversial to this day. The main 
criticism is centered on the fact that very few cases go to trial, because defendants are pressed to 
settle cases lacking merit. 
 
3.2.3 The Major Criticism of US Class Actions 
 
Arguably, the certification is an essential part of the class action lawsuit. For the case to proceed as 
a class action, four threshold requirements must be met under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy.
28
 A court must 
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 Blue Shield of Virginia v McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). 
26
 Coleman v Cannon Oil, 141 F.R.D. 516, 520 (1992).  
27
 See Tiffany Chieua, Class Actions in the European Union?: Importing Lessons Learned from the United States’ 
Experience into European Community Competition Law, 18 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 123, 137 (2010). 
28
 According to the Rule 23(a), all class actions have to fulfil the following requirements. First, the class is so numerous 
that joinder of class members is impracticable. Second, there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Third, 
the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class. Fourth, the class representatives will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  
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also find at least one of the criteria listed under Rule 23(b).
29
 The settlements generally fall into 
three basic categories: 
  
 Automatic distribution settlements. Damage awards are automatically distributed to class 
members who do not exercise their right to opt out. Under this settlement category, class 
members are not required to submit claim forms so as to receive award. In order to proceed 
with this model, the entire class should be precisely identified. The awards are typically mailed 
to each of them. However, a substantial number of class members may not cash their checks.
30
 
Therefore, undistributed funds can be distributed via cy pres process (discussed below), or in 
rare cases returned to the defendant. The attorney receives a fee that is proportionally 
calculated on the total value of the settlement, regardless of how many victims actually 
received damages.  
 Claims‐made settlements. This scheme is utilized when there is no reliable data to list the 
identities of victims. As such, class members are required submit a valid claim in order to 
obtain award. Typically, the total payout to the class will be smaller than in an automatic 
payment settlement and thus depends on how many class members submitted claim forms. 
Indeed, there is a possibility that in some cases (for example, when submitting claim form is 
cumbersome) only few members will receive compensation. Despite this unsuccessful 
outcome, the attorney receives a percentage based on the potential value of the settlement, 
regardless of how many victims submitted a valid claim form. This may lead to an ironical 
situation: the attorney’s fee can exceed the actual payout to the class.
31
 Uncollected funds are 
rare (only when issued checks are not cashed) and the surplus is either distributed to a cy pres 
entity or back to the defendant.  
 Cy pres settlements. There is no direct compensation to class members, but an award is made to 
a charitable organization whose activities are as closely as possible related with the antitrust 
victims. In order to avoid abusive cy pres distributions, the cy pres relief has become closely 
scrutinized by courts.
32
     
 
Despite settlements being faster means of solving antitrust disputes, they are criticized for a variety 
of reasons. If the certification is formally approved by the court, it is well established practice that 
the vast majority of cases are settled.
33
 Roughly estimated, less than 1% of certified private cartel 
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 In addition to the Rule 23(a), the district court must determine one of the findings under the Rule 23 (b). First, 
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 See, e.g. Wystan M. Ackerman, Class Action Settlement Structures, Meeting of Federation of Defense & Corporate 
Counsel, 4 (March 2 - March 9, 2013), http://www.thefederation.org/documents/13.Class%20Action-Structures.pdf 
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 Id. at 8.  
32
 See, e.g. Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 689–90 (7th Cir.2013); In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 
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 See, e.g. Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 97, 102 (2015) ((citing Thomas 
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cases lead to a final court decision
34
, while around 99% are settled. The critical understanding of 
class actions was summarized by the former commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, who 
considered antitrust class action suits ‘almost as scandalous as the price-fixing cartels that are 
generally at issue ... [the plaintiffs' lawyers] stand to win almost regardless of the merits of the 
case.’
35
 Similarly, Crane argues that antitrust class actions can be easily brought, but the defense 
expenses can be significant, and hence to force defendants to pay for settlement to get rid of the 
case.
36
 In other words, the fear of ultimate loss, resulting in huge financial loss and reputational 
damage, might press the defendant to settle a class action wholly lacking in merit rather than to 
proceed to trial with unpredictable jury verdict. Indeed, the combination of measures may 
incentivize private attorney general to bring lawsuits lacking merit. If third-party funding—the 
financing of lawsuits by entities other than parties or their legal representatives—is utilized in class 
actions, Hensler refers to three assumptions, raised by the corporate community that may ‘produce a 
flood of frivolous class actions’: first, the defendants are forced to settle frivolous class claims 
because of the in terrorem effect; second, the jurisprudence allows easy access to courts for 
frivolous class actions; third, litigation funders will favor frivolous actions.
37
 It can be argued that 
the same fears apply when legal representatives act as private investors through contingency fees, 
i.e. a predominant financing model in class actions. After all, there is little or no difference as 
regards financial incentives when a third party funder finances the antitrust class action lawsuit or a 
private attorney general. Three factors tend to strengthen this claim.  
 
First, in contrast to the ‘American rule’ where each party bears its own litigation, US federal 
antitrust law entitles the prevailing plaintiff to recover not only treble damages, but also to obtain 
attorney's fees as part of his costs of suit.
38
 This provision is often referred to as ‘one-way fee 
shifting’, because defendants have no right to attorneys' fees. The purpose of such a scheme is to 
encourage the class counsel to invest in private actions (especially for impecunious victims), while 
the interests of defendants are not the primary objective (even if they are found innocent). For the 
defendant, the only way to recoup his legal expenses is if the plaintiff was sanctioned under the 
inappropriate use of Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which regards frivolous or 
improper pleadings.
39
 However, the fact-intensive nature of antitrust actions highly complicates the 
task of discovering the violation under Rule 11.
40
 If the case is settled, the one-way fee shifting is 
usually removed in settlement negotiations. In addition, if the class action is dismissed (for 
example, in a pre-trial stage) or if the plaintiff loses the claim, each party bears its own litigation 
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 John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single 
Damages, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1997, 2001 (2015). 
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 John T. Rosch, Fed. Trade Comm'n Comm’r, Remarks to the Antitrust Monetization Commission, 9-10 (June 8, 
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costs. It therefore means that defendants would never be recompensed for frivolous lawsuits 
brought by plaintiffs.   
 
Second, discovery rules are designed disadvantageously to the defendants due to asymmetric 
discovery costs. As a general rule, the parties are entitled to request a broad range of the discovery 
material from the opposing party that would reveal the admissible evidence.
41
 The discovery rules 
require a responding party to bear the costs of the other side’s requests. The issue of concern is that 
plaintiffs are able to propound extremely broad and burdensome requests without the fear of 
retaliation from the other side.
42
 This is notable because a defendant (for example, a big 
corporation) routinely holds a broad latitude of documents and items (hard copies, electronic 
information, transactions and etc.), which might be geographically dispersed and dating back a 
decade or even more. A wide-ranging discovery usually also involves a significant amount of 
interrogatories and depositions, thereby creating a substantial financial burden on the defendant.
43
 
In addition, the defendant receiving a broad discovery request will be forced to pay close attention 
to the details of every element, as the disclosure material needs to be produced in a consistent and 
organized form.
44
 In contrast with the defendant, the lead plaintiff(s) have a relatively small number 
of responsive discovery material, because the resulting harm of a class member is usually of low 
value. As a consequence, the related evidence can be collected and produced with little burden or 
expense. Another concern for the defendant is that plaintiffs might benefit from a tangible discovery 
(both fact and expert) even prior to class certification briefing.
45
 If the case is prolonged, the 
defendant should take into consideration that the discovery costs increase in relation with the 
increase of time lags. Yet, it should be stressed that there is a possibility for a portion or all of the 
discovery costs to be shifted to the plaintiff if the requests are unduly burdensome for the 
defendant.
46
 However, in reality the defensive counterclaim is very complicated. The judge often 
struggles to screen frivolous discovery requests, because the plaintiff has the ability to structure an 
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 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the disclosure for oral and written depositions (Rule 28–32), 
interrogatories (Rule 33), production of documents and electronically stored information (Rule 34), and requests for 
admission (Rule 36). 
42
 See, e.g. Boeynaems v. LA Fitness International, LLC 285 F.R.D. 331, 334–35, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (stating that 
plaintiffs had “very few documents” in comparison with the defendant’s “millions of documents and millions of items 
of electronically stored information”). 
43
 For example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a), a party may serve on any other party up to 25 written 
interrogatories. The responses should be submitted within 30 days after service (Rule 33(b)(4)). 
44
 Wagener, supra note 40, at 1895 (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) that obliges the documents to be produced “as 
they are kept in the usual course of business”).   
45
 See, e.g. Robert E. Bloch & Joseph R. Baker, Legal and Practical Considerations Influencing Whether and When to 
Opt Out of a Class Action, 6 (2012), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/40fdd8df-11a0-46f6-8406-
700ac93bc21b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/933b5357-d218-4c4d-b53d-79f275f39f1f/12278.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2018) 
46
 See e.g. Boeynaems v. LA Fitness International, LLC 285 F.R.D. 331, 334–35, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (noting that 
“discovery burdens should not force either party to succumb to a settlement that is based on the costs of litigation rather 
than the merits of the case”). Eventually, the Court warranted a cost shifting under Rule 26; thus, the parties had to 
share discovery costs incurred prior to class certification. Another example of discovery cost-sharing is Schweinfurth v. 
Motorola, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82772 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008). 
47
 Wagener, supra note 40, at 1897 (also referring to Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. 
Rev. 635, 638-39 (1989)). 
61 
 
Third, defendants may encounter the joint and several liability for the aggregated (treble) damages 
caused by all violators, with no right to contribution from co-violators.
48
 If for example the claim is 
brought against 5 co-violators, and if 4 of them settle, the unsettled violator is potentially subject to 
the combined damages of the violation (damages of 5 conspirators multiplied by 3). Indeed, this 
situation incentivizes each co-violator to settle as early as possible to avoid the situation when all 
co-infringers have already settled and hence the final co-violator remains responsible for the 




The skeptical view of class actions has been confirmed by judicial decisions as well. Throughout 
the history of antitrust case-law, the Supreme Court has given a broad function for class actions to 
secure the antitrust objectives. However, this attitude has changed in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly.
50
 The Court asserted that class actions can force defendants to settle cases lacking merit.
51
 
Furthermore, it was ruled that the judicial system lacks confidence in screening meritless cases.
52
 A 
few years before Twombly, in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko
53
, 




Despite the Court’s skepticism, Davis and Lande argue that the Twombly decision has no merit in 
itself, because there was no empirical study conducted.
55
 The Court made a modification for 
pleading standard (without any reasonable ground) that conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.
56
 To facilitate support for class actions, Davis and Lande performed two studies of 
recent large and significant antitrust class action cases, combining 40 cases in the first study
57
 and 
20 additional cases in the second one.
58
 According to the results of the combined 60 cases, the fear 
of a blackmail settlement was considered as unjustified alert: a large majority of cases have merit. 
The main assessment relies on a test of a probability of success: the amount of over $50 million was 
considered above the nuisance value of a frivolous case.
59
 It was found that the recovery was more 
than $100 million in 60% of cases, while in only a few cases led to significantly less than $50 
million, and the smallest was $30 million. Furthermore, 88% of the cases studied received at least 
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one validation that the plaintiffs’ case was meritorious.
60
 Moreover, a federal judge approved all the 
discussed settlements as fair, reasonable, and adequate.
61
 In order to reinforce the results, Davis and 
Lande point to cases where class attorneys earned praise from judges and therefore were awarded 
significant amounts in damages.
62
 To a similar extent, Hensler argues that the in terrorem effect—
when frivolous class action forces defendants to settle—lacks empirical proof, and if there is any 
impact, its magnitude is likely minimal.
63
 She criticizes corporate lobbyists for disregarding the 
empirical data by the RAND institute and the Federal Judicial Center estimating that only around 
12% of class actions against insurers resulted in class-wide remedies, and that 13% of all class 
complaints in federal courts led to a class certification and settlement. Hensler further supports her 
claim based on the following points. First, the attorney in American Express v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant stated that only 20% of ‘putative class actions are certified.’
64
 Second, the potential of 
frivolous actions is significantly diminished, because the Supreme Court has increased the 
requirements for proving certification.
65
 It is important to stress that Hensler does not distinguish 
estimations for antitrust collective actions, which are the most relevant for a discussion in this 
Chapter. Nevertheless, there is no reason why the above-mentioned reasoning should be somewhat 
different for antitrust cases. History has shown that courts in antitrust cases apply equal (if not 




The public debate between these opposing views well characterizes the controversial nature of class 
actions in the United States. Ironically, even if a settlement agreement is assumed to have a merit, a 
series of additional controversies are claimed to occur in class actions: both in compensating 
victims/class members and deterring violators. The purpose of the following study is to determine 
how well antitrust class actions fulfill compensation objectives and to what extent they can facilitate 
deterrence of antitrust enforcement.  
 
3.3 A CONTROVERSY OF COMPENSATION IN SMALL-STAKES CLASS ACTIONS: A 
PERSPECTIVE OF ANTITRUST  
 
Private antitrust litigation, and especially class actions, is facing broad criticism for failing to fulfill 
its compensatory goal. First, victims receive little or no compensation from class action lawsuits, 
but the plaintiff bar is overpaid.
67
 When victims do receive compensation, the distribution of the 
settlement fund can be financially worthwhile, because the administrative costs may consume the 
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 In addition, the class members usually recover only worthless coupons, or their 
award is distributed to unrelated charities.
69
 As a counterclaim, the proponents of class actions 
assert that most criticism has been based on anecdotal evidence.
70
 In order to contribute to the 
debate, this Chapter will assess the main controversies. The major criticisms that have been stated 
about private (class action) antitrust enforcement can be classified into three categories.  
 
3.3.1 Class Members Obtain Little or No Compensation 
 
According to the critical approach, there is no need to present empirical evidence of the failure of 
the compensation goal; it is predetermined that antitrust class actions generate little or no 
compensation to class members.
71
 One of the major issues is that indirect purchasers are prohibited 
from recovering antitrust damages at the federal level.
72
 By prohibiting these actions, the Court 
prevents a majority of financial victims from receiving compensation. The overcharge usually 
causes harm at different levels of distribution chain. The further down the chain, the smaller the 
harm is and thus there are less incentives to litigate individually. Therefore, it is programmed that 
many victims will be uncompensated, especially if they are end consumers.  
 
Indirect purchasers, however, may recover damages in some state law actions.
73
 But, it is highly 
debatable whether indirect purchasers have the ability to bring a lawsuit as financial victims. The 
potential problems can be well illustrated through the Canadian example. In 2013, the trilogy of 
Supreme Court’s (SCC) decisions in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corporation
74
, Sun-Rype 
Products Ltd v Archer Daniels Midland Company
75
, and Infineon Technologies AG c Option 
Consommateurs
76
 ultimately affirmed the right of indirect purchasers to claim damages. Despite the 
new ability to proceed with class actions, indirect purchasers still face difficulties in proving their 
harm at the merits stage. An actual example of the complexity for indirect purchasers is underlined 
in Sun-Rype, where the SCC denied the certification of a class action, since there was no evidence 
that the indirect purchasers could self-identify. The claim alleged that the defendants engaged in a 
price fixing violation of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sold to direct purchasers, and that some of 
the overcharge was passed on to indirect purchasers, including end consumers.
77
 The Court asserted 
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that direct purchasers had used HFCS interchangeably and indistinguishably with liquid sugar, thus 
making it impossible to define which product was eventually sold to indirect purchasing 
consumers.
78
 It was concluded that the evidentiary standard was too high, because an ‘identifiable 
class cannot be established for the indirect purchasers.’
79
 The Canadian example clearly 
demonstrates that identifying and compensating indirect purchasers of an antitrust overcharge might 
be very complicated, if not impossible at times. 
 
Even if the real economic victims may be identified, the individual recoveries are usually so small 
that the administrative costs tend to consume the individual recovery.
80
 An illustrative example is 
the Augmentin settlement of indirect purchasers that yielded $7.134 million and, as a consequence, 
sent notices to 800,000 potential injured consumers of the anti-depressant drug Remeron.
81
 
However, only 65,000 submitted proofs of claim, resulting in an average payout of $109. Given that 
this number amounts to only 8% of all potential members, the remaining victims, like 92% of the 
effected consumers ‘absorbed their losses.’
82
 Another example is the El Paso settlement of indirect 
purchasers, who consisted of 13 million California consumers and 3,000 businesses, in total 
generating the $1.4 billion value of the settlement.
83
 Due to the substantial administrative costs, the 
individual distribution was financially unfeasible. As a result, it was decided to provide gas rate 
reductions in California in the upcoming two decades.
84
 The most criticized part of the effectiveness 
of distribution was that the range of consumers changed dramatically from the time of the 




Coupon settlements have been used as another undesirable scenario that fails to provide meaningful 
compensation to class members. The criticism has stemmed primarily from the fact that the 
redemption rates are very low. For example, in In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust 
Litigation,
86
 the claim rate was only 0.54%, while the actual redemption was even lower.
87
 In 
Perish v. Intel Corp.
88
, 500,000 coupons offering a $50 discount on microprocessors generated only 
150 coupons for class members. Low coupon redemption rates are notable because the redemption 
process imposes many restrictions, so that very few coupons can ever be redeemed. The best 
illustration was in In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation,
89
 where the class action 
claimed a price fixing conspiracy. The settlement provided $50 million in cash and $408 million 
was granted in travel coupons. The usage of coupons, however, had many limitations. First, class 
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members could not sell coupons to brokers or others willing to purchase them. In addition, tickets 
purchased with other promotions were excluded.
90
 Second, the coupons were excluded during the 
blackout periods, such as Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year’s. Given such restrictions in 




As a counter-claim, the proponents assert that class actions usually result in substantial 
compensation to class members.
92
 For example, the Paxil and the Relafen settlements are taken as 
examples of producing significant recoveries for the class members.
93
 As regards the claims of 
indirect purchasers, empirical analysis suggests that the administration costs amount to only 4.1%.
94
 
Moreover, if an abuse occurs it is mainly the fault of the judges, who should carefully exercise their 
control. Another interesting point is that individuals may not receive compensation not because of 
large attorney’s fees, but because of inertia.
95
 Neither critics nor proponents have provided 
sufficient empirical evidence that compensation issues are (un-)common or (a-)typical. Yet there 
have been some attempts to estimate the actual recoveries in small-value class actions.  
 
A. An overview of empirical data on compensation in small-stake class actions 
 
So far the existing empirical data builds up to a contrasting view on whether class action litigation 
and settlements provide meaningful compensation to victims. The discussion below summarizes the 
findings of the empirical studies in small-stakes settlements.
96
 But it is aimed to crystalize the 
numbers that are applicable to antitrust cases. The results (summarized in Table 1) can be placed in 
three categories: showing (1) negative; (2) both positive and negative and (3) positive outcomes.  
 
The studies tend to differentiate (directly or indirectly) between settlements with automatic 
distribution and those with claims‐made settlement proceeds. Based on these studies, a distinction 
should also be made between the ‘claiming rate’ and the ‘compensation rate.’ The claiming rate 
(CLr) considers the number of class members who file claim forms to receive payments. The 
compensation rate (Cr) addresses when class members receive some kind of compensation, and 
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Table 1. Small-stake cases compensation data (1986–2015) 
Negative-Sided Study 
Name of the study Type of rate 









12 antitrust cases 
(10 of them were 
consumer cases) 
1) The average redemption rate was 26.3%. 
2) In 10 consumer cases the mean redemption rate was 13.1%. 
Mayer-Brown 
Study 
Claiming rate 6 (different areas) 
Claiming rates were the following: 0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 
9.66%, and 12%, and 98.72%. 




(clam rates are available 
in 105 cases) 
 
 
The unweighted average claims rate was 21%, and the median 









settlements (out of 6) 
1) 35% out of 4 million class members received an average 
payment of $5. 










1st Part: 6 (out of 31 
settlements on the federal 
docket). 
2nd Part: 9 (out of 57 





1st Part: In 4 ‘automatic’ distribution settlements, the 
compensation fractions ranged from 72% (of 7,400 class 
members with an average payout $35) to 99.5% (of 200 class 
members with an average payout of $2,000). In 2 ‘claims made’ 
settlements, the claiming rates ranged from 20% (of 3,500 class 
members; average payout $1,000) to 4% (of 1 million class 
members; payout of software worth $20). 
2nd Part: 3 settlements had rates between 1% and 5%, four cases 






and recovery rates 
15 (disputes on bank 
overdraft fees) 
An average compensation rate is 55% (in 13 automatic 
distribution settlements) and 5% (in 2 claim-form settlements). 
An average recovery rate is 38% (available only on 13 




This category critically overviews the effectiveness of compensation distribution to class members. 
The data demonstrates that small-stake class actions fail to deliver sufficient compensation to class 
members. The first study was led by Gramlich in 1986 (‘Gramlich Study’).
97
 He studied 20 antitrust 
settlements where class members had been paid in coupons, but only in 12 cases was he able to 
redeem information from the settlement administrators and the parties. He found an average 
redemption rate of 26.3%. In 10 settlement cases the plaintiffs were consumers and the average 
redemption rate was only 13.1%.
98
 The study did not report whether settlements were distributed 
automatically, or with claims‐made proceeds.  
 
The second study was done in 2013 by the law firm Mayer Brown (at the request of the US 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform).
99
 The results should be approached with caution, because 
each law firm has an interest in protecting its own and its clients’ interests. Coincidence or not, but 
the claiming rates are far lower than in other studies. Mayer Brown conducted a study of 148 
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putative class action lawsuits filed in or removed to federal court in 2009, forty of which ended in 
settlements. Of these forty settlements, the authors found data on distribution (claiming) rates in 6 
of them: 0.000006%, 0.33%, 1.5%, 9.66%, and 12%, and 98.72% respectively. The ‘astonishing 
98.72%’, however, is not representative for small-stakes class actions because it involved the 
ERISA litigation with an average payout exceeding $2.5 million.
100
 The final conclusion of the 
study was that most class actions are dismissed, and those that settle typically provide few, if any, 
benefits to absent class members.
101
 The authors, however, did not provide any valuable 
information on the average payout of these settlements, except for the ERISA litigation. 
 
The last study was done by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (‘CFPB 2015 Study’).
102
 The 
Bureau searched for consumer class action settlements involving financial products between 2008 
and 2012. Out of 419 settlements detected on the Federal court sheet dockets, the claiming rates 
could only be found in 105 settlements.
103
 The analysis estimated that 11 million class members 
received $1.1 billion in compensation over the 2008-2012 period.
104
 In addition, the study reported 
that an average claiming rate was 21%.
105
 Despite being the most comprehensive study so far, it has 
been strongly criticized for failing to abide its own stated methodology and for obscuring evidence 
of huge variation in claims rates across different case categories.
106
 Furthermore, the Report was 
accused of presenting a ‘rosy picture’, because 21% seems highly unlikely in large class actions 
where consumers have to fill out forms to obtain award; rather it likely has to be lower than 5%.
107
 
One of the reasons for the lack of clarity of the CFPB study is that the reported rates are reflected in 




This category reflects neutral results, whereas small-stake class actions can both provide 
proportionally sufficient and insufficient recoveries to class members. In 1999, prof. Hensler and 
her co-authors (‘Hensler study’) conducted a study where 6 class action settlements provided 
valuable information on compensation, yet only 2 of them were regarding small-stakes 
settlements.
108
 In the first settlement, only 35% (out of 4 million) received compensation with an 
average payout of $5. In the second one, over 90% of 60,000 class members received compensation 
with an average payout of $134.
109
 However, it is unclear what proportion of the harm victims 
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The second study was undertaken by Pace and Rubenstein (‘Pace-Rubenstein Study’).
111
 The study 
searched for distribution rates in federal docket databases and found available information in 6 
cases.
112
 In 4 cases, where the monetary awards were distributed automatically, the 
compensation/fraction rate ranged from 65% (of 4,800 class members with an average payout of 
$35) to 99.5% (of 200 class members with an average payout of $2,000).
113
 In two ‘claims made’ 
settlements, the rates were far lower than in automatic distribution cases: 20% (of 3,500 class 
members; average payout of $1,000) and 4% (of 1 million class members; average payout of $30 in 
the form of software).
114
 The second part of their project sought to determine distribution data from 
settlement administration companies. Although 57 class actions were identified, relevant 
information was detected only in 9 cases.
115
 3 settlements had rates below 5% (two of which were 
below 1%), 3 cases had claiming rates between 20% and 40%, one at 35% (with around one million 
class members), 2 cases were above 50%, one at 65% (with 431 class members receiving an 
average award of $5,000), and one at 82% (with 350 class members receiving an average award of 
$2,600).
116
 It was concluded that claiming rates tend to be far lower in cases involving large classes, 
with the sole exception of 35% in a case of one million class members.
117
 The Pace-Rubenstein 





According to this category, class members receive actual compensation with high proportional 
value. The only study that falls into this category was performed by Fitzpatrick and Gilbert 
(‘Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study’).
118
 The authors analyzed 15 class action settlements against the largest 
banks in the United States.
119
 In these cases, the number of class members ranged from 28,000 to 
almost 14 million, with a mean of 2.1 million. The settlement funds ranged from $2.2 million to 
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Court for the Southern District of Florida (626 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (J.P.M.L. 2009). Other 2 settlements derived from 
related federal lawsuits that were not part of MDL 2036 ((Trombley v. Nat’l City Bank, F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2011); 
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$410 million, with an average payout of $63 million.
120
 Out of 15, 13 settlements were 
automatically distributed and two of them were claim-form settlements. In these 13 cases, around 
55% of class members realized compensation.
121
 Contrary to other studies, the authors sought to 
provide data on the recovery rates; that is, the money delivered to class members in light of 
damages suffered by the class. Accordingly, the average recovery rate was 38% (of all the 
settlements), and 42% if two incidentally low recovery rates were not included.
122
 Notably, the 
compensation rates were very low in the claim-form settlements: 1.76% and 7.39% respectively. It 
remains unclear, however, whether the chosen type of class actions (MDL 2036) are the most 
representative consumer class actions, and especially in the case of antitrust, as they regard the 
issues of debit card transactions.  
 
B. The compensation effectiveness: A study of antitrust 
 
It appears that this empirical data covers a large majority studies that deal with consumer class 
actions. Given that there are at least 300 class actions in federal courts alone every year
123
, or 
thousands of class actions both in federal and state courts
124
, it is incomprehensible that so few 
studies have been performed to appreciate the issue. Indeed, there is no possibility to draw 
evidenced-based conclusions, but the above data nevertheless provides valuable insights into the 
effectiveness of compensation. In what follows, the antitrust litigation cannot be juxtaposed with 
some categories of small-stake class actions. In some studies, small-stake class actions were 
considered even if only few hundreds of victims were included in the class and the recoveries were 
very high (see Mayer-Brown and Pace-Rubenstein studies). For example, the law and economics 
literature estimates that the average duration of a cartel is around 8 years.
125
 In the case of antitrust 
monopolization, the wrongdoer (typically a large corporation) engages in anticompetitive conduct, 
and by using its widespread market power harms a significant amount of consumers.
126
 Therefore, a 
typical small-value antitrust class action should meet the following criteria: 
 
 The number of potential class members should start from thousands (1,000-9,999), but more 
likely from tens and hundreds of thousands (10,000 – 999,999) or even millions in some 
disputes; 
 The average individual damage in antitrust class actions should be a small-stake, and thus range 
between low (100$-300$) or very low (1$-100$) estimations;  
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Following this approach, the next point to address is what the compensatory success would mean in 
such class actions. Given the fact that a large majority of class actions are settled, the successful 
distribution should cover one of the following points (‘success presumption’): 
 
(1) The actual compensation rate (ACr) is over 40% in automatic distribution settlements. 
The following proportion was determined after assessing the feasible sums available to 
class members. These amounts can be estimated when potential costs (administrative 
costs, attorney’s fees and the costs related to inertia) are deducted from the actual 
settlement award. First, it should be acknowledged that many cases are settled for 
amounts closer to actual damages (award < 100%) rather than treble damages.
127
 This is 
confirmed by an empirical study of Connor and Lande, which found that 80% of cartel 
cases generate less than single damages to victims and around 20% antitrust settlements 
produce initial (or more) damages in settlements.
128
 Out of 71 cases studied, victims 
recovered less than 1% of damages in 4 cases and less than 10% in 12 cases. Only in 7 
cases (10%) victims recovered more than double damages. The average recovery ratio 
was only 66%.
129
 However, this study does not estimate what actual compensation 
victims receive after deducting attorneys’ fees, administrative costs and other case-
related expenses; only the total case recovery. According to the optimistic empirical 
study, administrative costs range only between 0.03% and 9.25%.
130
 An average 
contingency fees range between 11% and 33%.
131
 The perceived costs of inertia include 
some unpredictable determinants (such as market changes, inflation and etc.), yet it 
would be fair to reserve the proportion of the settlement fund in a range between 5%-
15%.
132
 Even though antitrust cases are rarely settled for higher than actual damages, the 
pursued compensation goal should aim for at least actual damages (award = 100%). 
Otherwise the compensation model is highly distorted and unjustifiable. Combining the 
upper limits of the estimates, the realistic effectiveness rate would be calculated under 
the following equation: 100% – 9.25% – 33.3% - 15% = 42.5%. Under this approach, at 
least 40% of combined damages should be available to class members, or roughly that 4 
out of 10 class members should be able to recover the actual harm. 
(2) The claiming rate is over 25% in claims-made settlements. This is a different category 
because claims-made settlements estimate the number of class members who file claim 
forms to receive award. Therefore, claims-made settlements reflect the initiative rate that 
cannot be very high due the following reasons: (1) the preparation of claim form is 
burdensome and complicated, sometimes requiring notarization
133
; (2) some class 
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members lost their proof of the purchase or forgot about the purchase. Thus, many class 
members have a lack of interest in preparing complicated claim forms for small awards, 
or they are simply unable to do so in practice. There is no well-grounded method to 
ascertain a compensatory success in such settlements. However, some useful insights 
may be derived from the Gramlich study that calculated redemption rates in coupon 
settlements. Although the report does not provide comprehensive material to set the 
success presumption, it is the only research study of claim rates in antitrust settlements. 
It was found that an average redemption rate is 26.3%.
134
 In consumer cases, the average 
redemption rate was 13.1%. However, as previously, this Chapter takes into account the 
highest possible (realistic) amounts, even though estimates in consumer cases are lower. 
For the purpose of this analysis, it is instructive to set the lowest rate of 25% for the 
compensation success in claims-made settlements. There is no claim that this approach 
is ideal, but seemingly there is no alternative approach to define the success rate in 
antitrust claims-made settlements. After all, it would be difficult to declare the 
compensatory award as successful if the compensation is provided to less than 25% of 
victims.  
 
The above-mentioned empirical studies estimated the compensation rates concerning how many 
members receive compensation (at least some kind), except for the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study. After 
filtering irrelevant settlements for a typical antitrust settlement (either the payout is very high or the 
class size is very small), applicable compensation rates can be detected in 4 settlements, and in the 
Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study, encompassing 13 settlements. The first two were found in the Hensler 
study: 35% (of 4 million class members; average payout of $5) and over 90% (of 60,000 class 
members; average payout of $134). The other two were established in the Pace-Rubenstein Study: 
65% (of 4,800 class members; average payout of $35) and 35% (of over one million class members; 
the average payout is not defined). No part of the study sought to investigate actual compensation 
rates (Acr), i.e. how these payouts fared in comparison to the entire settlement fund. However, it is 
clear that compensation rates of 35% automatically fail to pass the presumption test, while the 65% 
rate is also unlikely to ensure actual compensation for 40% of class members. This can be explained 
by relying on the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study that calculated both the compensation and recovery rates. 
The study found that the compensation rate is on average 59%, while the mean recovery rate is 
43%.
135
 As a consequence, the results fail to pass the success presumption test, since the Acr is 
around 24% on average.
136
 Even the highest combined value of Acr (65% compensation rate and 
57% recovery rate) fails to pass the success presumption test with the result of 39%.
137
 The 90% 
compensation rate found in the Hensler study seems to be the only settlement result that could 
potentially fulfill the success test, since it is more realistic that 40% of class members would obtain 
actual compensation for harm suffered. However, the 90% is obviously an outlier rate. According to 
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Accordingly, ACr=0.6475×0.5692 = 0.386 (≈39%).   
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some authors, the rates tend to get much lower where the case involves thousands of members and 
the mean award is low.
138
 As mentioned before, large classes are very typical in antitrust cases.  
 
From a broader perspective, the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study sends a message to critics that some 
consumer class actions are not so ineffective: in fact, they do bring benefits to class members. The 
study is nevertheless primarily useful in small-stakes class actions relating to the disputes of 
overdraft bank fees, whereas the harm and the extent of that harm can be precisely identified via 
electronic services. But the same method is difficult to apply in antitrust cases where the 
‘comfortable’ electronic format is rare. Notably, antitrust offenses are sophisticated frauds that 
make the quantification of overcharge very complicated even in the simplest cartel infringements.
139
 
In order to calculate an overcharge, economists should quantify the difference between the actual 
and the counterfactual scenario. Sometimes, there is no reliable data to precisely identify victims of 
overcharge. Thus, the automatic distribution of settlement fund is unattainable in practice. As a 
result, claims-made settlements are the second (and the last) option to directly compensate antitrust 
victims. However, the comparative empirical results show that the success test fails in this category 
as well. None of the studies found results that pass the success presumption, with one outlier in the 
Pace-Rubenstein study.
140
 When settlements use claim forms, the representative rates range 
between 1% and 15%. Even in the Fitzpatrick-Gilbert study, where two claim forms settlements 
were analyzed in the context of overdraft fees, the results were only 7.39% and 1.76%. The next 
result to the success presumption is the CFPB study (21%), yet it was criticized for the claiming rate 
being too high.
141
 Needless to say, the extremely low claim rates in the Mayer-Brown study 
(0.000006% and 0.33%) seem to be possible in claim-form settlements. In fact, the rates can be very 
low when class members receive indirect notice about the possibilities to submit claim form, for 
example via media advertisements.
142
 Also, the rates can be negligible when obtaining the modest 
award requires producing years-old bills, notarization or mailing via postal services.
143
 To sum up, 
claim-form settlements are principally framed to undercompensate class members. 
 
The conclusion is that antitrust class actions fail to pass the test of success presumption. Even more 
disappointingly, the applicable rates are far away from the required proportions to achieve the 
compensation objective. Indeed, the compensation goal fails due to the complex nature of antitrust 
overcharge. First, it creates many difficulties in identifying and compensating class members. 
Second, administrating the case and distributing damages requires significant expenses. Third, 
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 Pace & Rubenstein, supra note 111, at 32 (noting that “[t]he cases with the highest claiming rates had very small 
class sizes (a few hundred class members), while those with the smallest distribution rates tended to have class sizes of 
several hundred thousand class members”).  
139
 Patrick L. Anderson et al., Damages in Antitrust Cases, AEG Working Paper 2007-2 (noting that the overcharge in 
the simplest price-fixing violations “is not listed on the invoices nor shown on the accounting income statement.” The 
author also stresses that an “overcharge” is typical in price-fixing cases and monopolization, while “loss profit” is usual 
in predatory pricing, resale price maintenance and refusal to deal) (last visited Aug. 4, 2018), 
http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/portals/0/upload/doc2066.pdf. 
140
 Id. at 32. The only case with large class (with around million class members) had more than a tiny distribution rate, 
i.e. 35%. The authors accept that this is an exception because the smallest distribution rates typically should “have class 
sizes of several hundred thousand class members.”  
141
 Johnston & Zywicki, supra note 106, at 43.  
142
 Alison Frankel, A Smoking Gun in Debate Over Consumer Class Actions?, Reuters (2014) (stating that the median 
claims rate for cases in the claims administrator (KCC) analysis was only 0.23%) (Aug. 4, 2018) 
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settlement awards are usually very low and typically lower than actual damages. In such 
circumstances, antitrust class actions are programmed to provide very low proportional 
compensation to an insignificant number of victims.    
 
3.3.2 The Compensation Mechanism is Framed to (Largely) Overpay Attorneys  
 
The previous discussion has demonstrated that antitrust class actions fail to accomplish the stated 
goal of compensation for class members. This, too, might suggest that the remuneration of the class 
counsel should be adjusted accordingly. However, the practice is different.  
 
Judges have a great deal of discretion in how they set fee awards in class action cases. Under Rule 
23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judges determine a reasonable fee that should be 
awarded to class counsel. Courts typically choose between two methods. One is the percentage-of-
the-settlement method, according to which the judge bases the attorney’s fee on the size of the 
settlement. The other is the lodestar approach, as a result of which the court calculates attorney’s 
reasonable fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked for the case by a reasonable 
hourly fee.
144
 Throughout the years, the percentage-of-the-settlement approach (also referred as a 
‘contingency fee agreement’) has been dominant over the lodestar method.
145
 Indeed, the 
percentage method brings legal certainty and transparency. According to the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, this method ‘align(s) the interests of plaintiffs and their attorneys more fully by 
allowing the latter to share in both the upside and downside risk of litigation.’
146
 On the contrary, 
critics assert that the percentage method can yield outsized compensation to the lawyers who bring 
class actions.
147
 It should be stressed that the Ninth Circuit adopted a presumption that 25% is the 
proper fee percentage in class action cases.
148
 If we assume that the fee award is 25% on average, a 
contingency fee of $2.5 million in a settlement of $10 million does not seem so significant. But if 
the settlement award is in the hundreds of millions, the counsel can obtain very significant 
compensation. To that extent, the district court vividly explained that it would be ‘generally not 150 
times more difficult to program, try and settle a $150 million case than [it would be] to try a $1 
million case’
149
. In fact, the increase in the value of settlement depends directly on the size of the 
class rather than on the quality of counsel’s legal services. Another concern is that few, if any class 
members have an appreciable incentive to monitor the behavior of the class counsel, because the 
harm is of low value. Furthermore, class counsel takes all litigation risks when he or she sign a 
contingency fee agreement. Thus, the lawyer is empowered to negotiate the terms of the settlement 
and to set own fees. It can be argued that there is no feasible mechanism to monitor attorney’s 
compensation, unless the judge determines the fees to be excessive and rejects the settlement as 
unfair. However, they are often satisfied with the agreed settlement, because they clear complex 
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antitrust class actions from the docket. But what does the empirical data tell about the real values 
that go to the plaintiff bar rather than class members? 
 
A. An overview of empirical data on attorney’s fees in antitrust cases  
 
Like in compensation effectiveness to class members, there is a lack of empirical data on the 
attorney’s fees. To my knowledge, there are three studies that provide handful points regarding 
attorneys’ fees in antitrust cases (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. An overview of mean attorneys’ fees 
Name of the 
study 




$1<$100 million – 28.3% (16 cases) 
$100-$500 million – 29.6% (9 cases) 
>$500 million – 11.1% (5 cases) 
 
$1<$100 million – 19.1 
$100-$500 million – 56.5 





(688 in total) 





(689 in total) 
25% (no specific separation) $15.1 
 
The first case is a study of Lande-Davis that was able to ascertain the attorney’s fee percentage in 
30 cases.
150
 Accordingly, in cases involving recoveries lower than $100 million, the courts awarded 
class counsel a percentage of the recovery that was between 30% and 33.3%, with two incidental 
exceptions generating 15% and 7%. For the recoveries between $100 million and $500 million, the 
awards ranged between 20% and 33.3%, with a mean of 29.5%. In cases over $500 million, the 
court awarded a much smaller percentage of the total settlement value, with a mean 11.1%.
151
 The 
study did not provide the actual average recoveries by attorneys. But this average can be easily 
calculated, as all data necessary to make simple mathematical calculations is available. Thus, the 
mean actual recoveries are the following (respectively by the category): $19.1 million, $56.5 
million and $183.3 million.   
 
The second study was done by Fitzpatrick, who calculated the attorney’s fees for all 2006-2007 
federal class settlements.
152
 He claimed that (only) 15% of the settlement amount (or $5 billion out 
of $33 billion) went to the plaintiff bar in fees and expenses. But the figure for antitrust class 
actions is different. First, the mean fees were much larger during the same period, with an average 
of 25%.
153
 Second, antitrust attorneys are the best compensated among other subject areas, with a 
mean of $15.1 million per case. Even in securities cases–by far the most common class actions–the 
mean is $13.1 million, while lawyers in other fields obtain much lower compensation, varying from 
$0.11 million to $2.26 million.
154
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The third study of Eisenberg-Miller collected data from class action settlements in both state and 
federal courts, found from court opinions published in the Westlaw and Lexis databases between 
1993 and 2008.
155
 The study, in essence, demonstrates similar results to the Fitzpatrick study. 
Eisenberg and Miller found that the amount of recovery was 22% in antitrust cases. According to 
the study, the antitrust attorneys were second best paid ($21.02 million) after the torts ($30.15 
million).
156
     
 
B. The evaluation of attorney’s fees: risk and reward 
 
The results suggest that antitrust class counsels are one of the most if not the most well paid 
practitioners among all legal fields. No study has yet managed to draw a line between over and 
underpayment of attorneys. The above-mentioned data debates for the percentage of the total 
settlement. However, the inaccuracies of the percentage method are well illustrated in the 
Visa/MasterCard case
157
, where the class counsel received around $250 million in recovery, but the 
fee percentage was only 6.5. Even though this is one of the largest antitrust cases in history, it does 
not change the fact that large cases are fixed to overcompensate the class counsel. Consequently, 
this Chapter argues that the counsel’s compensation should be assessed under two key criteria: (1) 
how much attorneys spend; and (2) how much they obtain.    
 
The existing empirical data does not provide the information needed to evaluate the total plaintiff’s 
costs in antitrust class actions. Finding this information is probably hindered due to confidentiality 
restraints encompassing the relationship between the attorney and the client. However, this does not 
mean that the potential costs cannot be observed. First, in In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation 
the Court approved the attorney’s total litigation expenses to the amount of $2.2 million, including 
the attorney’s fees, expert fees and administration costs.
158
 Second, defense attorneys report that 
average total costs for antitrust defendants typically range between $5 million and $10 million (even 
more in some cases).
159
 As mentioned before, the plaintiff’s expenses are much lower than the 
defendants’ (largely due to broad discovery). Based on these observations, the following study will 
take into account the threshold of $5 million, which seem to fairly reflect the maximum size of 
plaintiff’s costs; larger amounts would equal the defendant’s expenses.   
 
It should first be observed that engaging in class action litigation is a risky step that demands 
significant investment, both in terms of resources and time. Indeed, not every action is successful. 
No information is supplied about how often attorneys lose. However, the plaintiff bar usually reaps 
significant awards. In fact, it is very complicated to define the appropriate risk-to-reward ratio. One 
option would be to set a cap that prevents attorneys from receiving too much compensation, but, at 
the same time, this cap represents the counsel’s quality and ability to litigate antitrust case that 
involves substantial risk. The suggestion would be to limit the award that would be three times 
higher than the attorney’s costs. The idea arises from the antitrust rule of automatic trebling, which 
permits tripling the amount of the actual damages. To the same extent, the plaintiff’s counsel would 
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be entitled to three times the costs he spent on litigation. It would allow a balance between risk and 
award: if the case is won, the class counsel may invest in two subsequent cases of the same 
magnitude. Therefore, a balance between costs and award would equal the ratio of 1:3, which could 
be regarded as a fair compensation presumption. For example, if the court approves the case costs 
of $2 million, the plaintiff’s lawyer could receive $6 million.  
 
However, the current remuneration scheme fails to pass the compensation test. First of all, it should 
be observed that contingency fee payments on average range between $15 million and $75 
million.
160
 If the upper threshold of plaintiff’s expenditure ($5 million) is applied, the goal of fair 
compensation can be potentially fulfilled in the Eisenberg-Miller study ($5 million: $15 million). 
Yet it can occur only in exceptional cases, given that defense costs of $5 million are atypical. In the 
other two studies, the compensation ratios range from 1:4 to 1:15. Considering these results, it 
appears undeniable that the remuneration scheme is created to overpay attorneys. It is beyond the 
compensation rationale, because, as discussed before, class members are highly undercompensated. 
To sum up, it would be wrong to say that attorneys are largely overpaid, especially when they take 
cases that others are afraid of, but an element of overpayment can be identified. 
 
3.3.3 Class Actions do not Compensate the Real Victims 
 
When the settlement fund is distributed to the class members, either automatically or upon 
submission of claim forms, then victims receive compensation through a direct payment. However, 
there is a realistic possibility that settlement funds can be non-distributable or unclaimed by victims. 
First, a number of absent class members may not be able to be located, and a further distribution of 
award is impossible.
161
 Second, even when their identities are known, it might be financially 
unfeasible to distribute awards to class members, because the case costs outweigh the individual 
awards.
162
 Third, even where direct payments are feasible, absent class members may fail to submit 
claim forms.
163
   
 
Concerns surrounding these problems led US courts to introduce the cy pres mechanism that is used 
to compensate victims indirectly. Under this scheme, the unclaimed awards are disbursed to cy pres 
recipients (usually to a charity) whose activities relate ‘as near as possible’ to the interests of absent 
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 While this solution sounds laudable in theory, the cy pres remedy is subject to 
much criticism in practice.   
 
The first criticism is that cy pres distribution fails to serve the interests of the absent class members: 
the courts approve the distribution of unclaimed funds to cy pres recipients that bear little 
relationship with class members who were directly injured by the violation.
165
 For example, in In re 
Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation
166
 a class action suit was brought by NASCAR fans 
alleging the price-fixing infringement by vendors of merchandise sold at NASCAR races. The court 
approved a cy pres distribution to 9 charitable organizations, including the Lawyers Foundation of 
Georgia and the American Red Cross, which had no tangible relationship with the absent class 
members.
167
 In another antitrust case concerning a price-fixing conspiracy in the modeling industry, 
the district court approved a cy pres distribution to charities with a focus on women’s issues, yet 
only around 60% of the class members were women.
168
   
 
The second criticism is that cy pres distributions create a conflict of interest between the class 
counsel and the absent class members. The class counsel's fee is typically calculated as a percentage 
of the entire class award
169
, so he or she will be paid the same regardless of whether the funds go to 
class members or to a cy pres charity. All the problems encountered are best illustrated in a widely 
publicized cy pres distribution in In re Baby Products Antitrust Litigation.
170
 The district court 
approved the settlement of the claims for $35.5 million, under which the class members, who 
submitted a valid proof of purchase, would receive 20% of the actual purchase price, and the ones 
who did not would receive only 5 dollars.
171
 The settlement agreement was appealed, because it 
turned out that most class members failed to submit proof of purchase and therefore would receive 5 
dollars each (generating approximately $3 million), while around $14 million would be paid for 
attorney’s fees and approximately $18.5 million was reserved for cy pres recipients.
172
 In turn, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's decision. More specifically, the Court 
confirmed the issue of the potential for conflict between the counsel and class members in cy pres 
distributions: 
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1. ‘Cy pres distributions also present a potential conflict of interest between class counsel and 
their clients because the inclusion of a cy pres distribution may increase a settlement fund, and 
with it attorneys' fees, without increasing the direct benefit to the class.’
173
 
2. ‘[T]he current distribution of settlement funds arguably overcompensates class counsel at the 




Thus, Baby Products is the best illustration of how the cy pres distribution can bring great rewards 
to the class counsel, but many class members remain largely undercompensated. Another 
undesirable class action settlement chosen by critics (although not concerning antitrust) is Lane v. 
Facebook Inc
175
, in which class members received no compensation at all. The lawyers representing 
the class received about $3 million and $6.5 million of the funds were reserved for cy pres 
recipient(s).
176
 There was no effort made to pay even a portion of the settlement fund to the absent 
class members. The most noteworthy criticism this decision attracted was that the cy pres award 
went to set up a new charity (‘Digital Trust Foundation’).
177
 Ironically enough, Facebook's Director 
of Public Policy was one of three directors who ran the Foundation, and Facebook's attorney, 
together with class counsel, made up the Board of Legal Advisors. The settlement was affirmed by 
the Ninth Circuit, but not without controversy. Another anecdotal example is Diamond Chemical 
Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, B. V.
178
, in which the court approved a cy pres award to create the 
Center for Competition Law at the George Washington Law School. The proposal was made by 
class counsel, an alumnus of the law school, who was later nominated by the Law School as a result 




These cases clearly demonstrate that abusive cy pres awards occur in practice. However, critics 
routinely point to cases that attracted much reproach, but they remain silent as to whether frivolous 
cy pres awards occur in a high proportion of cases and whether they are typical. Thus, the 
proponents of class actions correctly note that if the figure is only true in 5% of the cases, the critics 
are overstating the issue.
180
 This controversy can be assessed by establishing the presumption of 
failure, yet this approach requires reliance on some assumptions. First, it should be accepted that cy 
pres distributions would never be ideal. Second, fraudulent cy pres awards should be prevented 
from occurring more often than in incidental cases. Therefore, it seems feasible to establish a 20% 
failure cap (out of ten, more than two cy pres settlements are frivolous). While the one-tenth 
proportional failure seems to be the norm under the non-enforcement of unjust laws, another one-
tenth can be justified due to the complexity in relating the nature of antitrust infringement to the 
activities of the cy pres charity. To sum up, the abusive cy pres awards are confirmed under two 
conditions: first, the cy pres entity is created solely for the benefit of the class counsel rather than 
for the benefit of class members; second, the money is distributed to a charity that is unrelated to 
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the injured class members. Under such circumstances, the criticism is confirmed if one or another or 
both abuses occur in more than 20% antitrust cy pres cases.   
 
In order to assess the controversy, the study of Redish and two others (‘Redish study’) should be 
discussed further.
181
 The study found that federal courts granted or approved cy pres settlements in 
35 cases between 2001 and 2008, and that 16 settlements can be regarded as faux class actions.
182
 
Under these type of distributions, the cy pres measure is primarily used for the benefit of the class 
counsel rather than the absent claimants. Under such circumstances, there is no intention to 
compensate the absent class members. However, it is not defined whether there is a direct 
correlation with the unrelated cy pres entity, yet it does not change the fact that attorneys were 
overpaid in 16 (45%) cy pres settlements at the expense of the class. Under the failure test, the 
abuse numbers should be even higher. In some cases, the class counsel may be not 
overcompensated, but settlement funds may be distributed to unrelated charities.  
 
However, there is no possibility to draw definite evidence-based conclusions from this study alone. 
It does gives a preliminary benchmark that at least one fourth (4 cases out of 16) of fraudulent 
distributions relates to antitrust settlements between 2001 and 2008: In re Airline Comm'n Antitrust 
Litig
183
; In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig;
184
 In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised 
Price Antitrust Litigation
185
; Diamond Chemical Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, B. V.
186
 However, as 
far as I am aware, prior empirical studies (including the Redish study) have not examined how 
many antitrust cy pres settlements there were between 2001 and 2008. Such analysis would allow 
for a comparison of the overall numbers with fraudulent actions. Despite the absence of key data, it 
can be argued that there is a high potential for frivolous actions to occur in more than 20% of 
antitrust cases. This is notable because antitrust distributions cover the largest portion of announced 
frivolous settlements, showing that a wide nature of antitrust overcharge is predetermined to attract 




For the purposes of this analysis, the presumptions of success and failure have been presented. 
Following this approach, each criticism has been approved to a greater or lesser degree, and they are 
broadly consistent with each other. First, applying the 40% success presumption of the actual 
compensation rate in automatic distribution cases, it was determined that antitrust class actions 
largely fail to provide actual compensation for at least 40% of class members. In claims made 
settlements, the 25% success presumption also failed, because the mean rates range between 1% 
and 15%. Second, the compensation mechanism is programmed to overpay antitrust class counsel. 
After the assessment of the risk-to-reward ratio, it was found that attorneys obtain 
disproportionately high rewards. However, large overpayments were denied due the high risk ratio. 
Third, among all subject areas the frivolous cy pres distributions are most often announced in 
antitrust cases. It therefore means that there is a high possibility that frivolous actions occur in more 
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than 20% of cases. To sum up, the compensation goal in antitrust collective litigation fails to a large 
extent.  
 
3.4 A CONTROVERSY OF DETERRENCE  
 
Even if it may sound paradoxical, the failure of the compensatory objective can be justified. Those 
who believe in economic efficiency argue that the real goal of small-stakes class actions is to 
maximize deterrence.
187
 The class action device furthers deterrence by aggregating small claims 
that are too little to pursue individually. If the suit aggregates claims that might not have otherwise 
been brought, the infringer is confronted with the ensured collective litigation and hence with the 
increased magnitude of the liability. This, in turn, forces defendants to internalize more of the 
negative effects caused by the anti-competitive behavior, thereby pushing deterrence closer to the 
optimal level. Furthermore, where a large number of victims are automatically included in the class, 
the collective action alerts the society about the real value of the harm that is actually caused by the 
wrongdoer. Finally, by aggregating small-stakes claims, the class can ‘exploit the same scale 




The same rationale applies to the cy pres remedy, whereas absent class members usually receive no 
direct benefit from settlements. By distributing the funds to charities, the courts ignore the objective 
of compensating direct victims. Indeed, the principal purpose is to punish the wrongdoer and 
therefore to facilitate the deterrence objective: ‘[t]here is no indirect benefit to the class from the 
defendant's giving the money to someone else. In such a case the ‘cy pres' remedy ... is purely 
putative.’
189
 Put more generally, cy pres relief is desirable to force the internalization of illegal 
gains from the violation.  
 
Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of class action litigation as a means of strengthening 
the deterrence of US antitrust rules.
190
 It is simply considered as an insufficient device to achieve 
deterrence. If this conclusion is true, and given the failure of the compensation, class actions would 
benefit only the plaintiff bar and thus would be hard to justify. The proponents of class actions, 
again, deny the critics’ assertions. In order to appreciate the controversy, the effectiveness of 
deterrence is further discussed by weighing both sides in the class action wars. A comparative 
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Table 3. A comparative overview of deterrence debate points 
 Components of debate 
Low deterrence value 
(Critical approach) 
High deterrence value 
(Proponents’ approach) 
Class certification 
The complicated certification procedure 






Most cases settle – the deterrence value is 
low 
Settlement agreements held defendants liable for 
approximately $34 to $36 billion. In the same cases, 
the DOJ imposed fines of only around $11 billion. 
Treble damages 
 
Treble damages are typically removed in the 
negotiate process of settlements 
 
The rule of joint and several liability force 
defendants to appreciate the amount of settlement 




The relationship between 
public and private 
enforcement 
 
Private cartel litigation is mostly followed 
by public enforcement. Thus, there is no 
deterrence value in private enforcement. 
 
Around half of the alleged cartel infringements are 
initiated by private attorney generals. 
 
The behavior of cartel 
managers 
Corporate managers are not deterred by 
private litigation, because the time lag 
between the beginning of anticompetitive 
behavior and the judgment is too long. 
This period ranges between 5 and 10 years 
in an ordinary case, and it lasts over 5 years 
in settlements. 
 
The most important criteria are the time lags 
between each cartel decision until the judgment. 
The data suggests a lag of between 3 and 4 years. 
The effects on stock prices 
The filing of a public enforcement action 
lawsuit reduces a defendant’s share by 6%, 
while bringing a private lawsuit drops it by 
only 0.6%. 
 
The total 6.6% stock drop is mainly related with the 
ensured follow-on litigation following the public 
enforcement action. 
 
3.4.1 Low deterrence value 
 
The core element of the class action lawsuit is the seeking of class certification. Due to the 
defendants’ aggressive defense, antitrust class actions may reach the certification stage and be 
denied on the basis of failing to meet the requirements under Rule 23. Most importantly, the courts 
utilize strict evidentiary standards for the class certification in antitrust cases. In the In Re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litigation
191
, the 3rd Circuit established that the class certification requires 
‘rigorous analysis’ of factual and legal evidence.
192
 This examination extends to assessing the 
testimony of both defendant’s and plaintiffs’ experts.
193
 In addition, the standards for meeting the 
requirements under Rule 23 must be met by a ‘preponderance’ of evidence, rather than by a mere 
‘threshold showing’.
194
 Therefore, there is high chance that defendants may succeed in opposing the 
class certification. In such case, the class action rule serves no use. As mentioned before, if a court 
certifies a class action, the large majority of class action lawsuits are settled; very few certified class 
actions proceed to trial. Consequently, treble damages are typically removed from the negotiation 
process and, after all, defendants admit no liability for having violated antitrust laws. From this 
issue flows another concern; that the private attorney general mechanism is not the right tool to 
facilitate deterrence. Lawyers make huge investments in antitrust cases and are thus the ones who 
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decide when and whether to settle the case.
195
 The individual damages caused by antitrust 
wrongdoers are typically very small, so few if any class members have an incentive to monitor the 
settlement negotiations. As a consequence, defendants are satisfied to ‘buy off’ the attorney in 
exchange for a favorable settlement agreement.
196
 The opposite may also be true that the class 
counsel may coerce defendants to go into settlements out of fear, regardless of whether the claim 
has merit or not.
197
 Thus, the settled class action lawsuits undercut the deterrence of class litigation. 
From a cartel perspective, a majority of class actions follow successful government actions.
198
 
Consequently, private attorneys use the efforts of public enforcers for their own benefit, for 
example, by reducing their own costs in expensive fact discovery proceedings.
199
 According to this 
view, private actions are unable to cure public shortcomings like, for example, a low detection rate.   
 
Another critical argument is that corporate managers (who should be foremost affected) are not 
deterred by private litigation. First, the time period between the beginnings of anticompetitive 
behavior until the judgment is considered the important deterrence criteria against corporate 
managers. In a typical antitrust case, the period may last from at least 5 years to more than 10 
years.
200
 It is highly unlikely that corporate managers and mid-level executives will still hold their 
positions at the time of the judgement.
201
 In case of settlement cases, the early deterrent impact is 
also improbable, because, even if the day of judgement is speeded up, the average time from the 
planning of anticompetitive conduct to any settlement payout is still more than 5 years.
202
 Second, 
corporate managers are unlikely to internalize the wrongdoing immediately after launching the 
antitrust claim. As mentioned before, empirical studies showed that government antitrust actions 
reduce the share value by 6% on average, and filling a private lawsuit by around 0.6%.
203
 Thus, ‘[a] 
half-percent drop in market capitalization’ is highly unlikely to cause negative impacts on corporate 
managers.
204




                                                 
195
 See, e.g. Kirkpatrick v JC Bradford & Co, 827 F2d 718, 727 (11th
 
Cir. 1987) (noting that class counsel is the main 
actor in the litigation, while the lead plaintiff is put in a passive position. In addition, class counsel is more skilled 
professionally to succeed in the certification stage).  
196
 Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 Emory L.J. 
399, 421 (2014). 
197
 See, e.g. Joanna C. Schwartz, The Cost of Suing Business, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 15-19, 10-12 
(2015), at 20-25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2589208 (last visited Aug. 2, 2018); Thomas S. 
Ulen, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Class Action Litigation, 32 Eur J Law Econ, 195-196, 201-202 
(2011).  
198
 See e.g., Tiffany Chieua, Class Actions in The European Union?: Importing Lessons Learned from the United 
States’ Experience into European Community Competition Law, 18 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 123, 137 (2010) 
(stating that “majority of antitrust class actions are price fixing cases that typically follow a successful case brought by 
the DOJ or the FTC through public enforcement mechanisms” (citing Spencer Weber Waller, The United States 
Experience with Competition Class Action Certification: A Comment, 3 Canadian Class Action Review, 210)). 
199
 See, e.g. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” is – and Why it Matters, 57 Vand. L. 
Review 6, 2150 (2006) (citing John C. Coffee “No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 435-436 (1981)).  
200
 Crane, supra note 68, at 691-92 (referring to Federal Court Management Statistics under which the average time 
from filing of the case to trial has steadily increased from around 18.5 months in 1996 to 24.6 months in 2007).  
201
 Id. at 693. 
202
 Id. at 696. 
203
 Id. at 695 (citing Kenneth D. Garbade et al., Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An Aggregate and 
Cross-Sectional Analysis, 64 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 686, 686-71 (1982); John M. Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Effect of 
Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm, 85 J. Am. Econ. Rev. 436, 437 (1995)).  
204
 Id. at 695.  
83 
 
3.4.2 High deterrence value 
 
While significant obstacles exist, proponents of class actions continue to claim that private antitrust 
enforcement provides meaningful deterrence. First and foremost, the supporters criticize theory-
based assessments, which are more anecdotal than empirically based.
205
 The counterargument is 
supported by the empirical analysis. A comprehensive study on 40 successful antitrust class actions 
found that private recoveries are substantial enough to have significant deterrence power.
206
 
Although the study attracted widespread attention on both sides of the Atlantic
207
, it was also the 
subject of much criticism.
208
 In order to reinforce the results, the authors performed a supplemental 
study of 20 antitrust cases.
209
 After the assessment of the total recoveries in 60 private cases through 
1990-2011, the authors made the powerful claim that private antitrust enforcement probably deters 
more than the anti-cartel program of the DOJ Antitrust Division.
210
 In a comparative context, it was 
found that victims received substantial compensation ranging from $33.8 billion to $35.8 billion, 
which is far higher than the combined DOJ criminal sanctions (corporate fines, individual fines, and 
criminal fines) totaling $11.7 billion
211
, or $15.4 billion if the deterrent value of a prison sentence is 
increased.
212
 Another study of over 100 international cartels prosecuted between 1990 and 2008 
found similar results: a total of $29 billion in announced private settlements, and $7.6 billion for 
international cartel fines collected by the DOJ.
213
 Contradicting to the critics’ claim that class action 
litigation is usually preceded by government actions, the study revealed that out of 60 cases, 24 
were not preceded by public enforcement and a further 12 had a different background than 
government actions.
214
 Furthermore, in the first study, only 10 of 40 private cases were follow-ons 
to DOJ enforcement efforts, and 16 were discovered by private parties.
215
 This figure, as authors 
observed, is consistent with another study, which found that only 20% of private cases were follow-
on cases.
216
 It may suggest that private enforcement precedes public enforcement as well. 
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Therefore, the threat of private enforcement might even coerce wrongdoers to confess to the DOJ 
through the leniency program.
217
      
 
Furthermore, the proponents assert that critics misrepresent the actual time lags. The most important 
determinant is the time from the latest cartel manager’s decision to continue cartel until judgement. 
To that extent, the data suggests that the applicable range is less than four years.
218
 From the 
perspective of the defendant's stock value, it is asserted that private antitrust actions have a far 
higher impact than is originally envisaged. Although the filing of private antitrust lawsuits reduces 
the value of defendant’s shares on average by 0.6%, the total 6.6% stock drop is mainly associated 
with the inevitable private litigation following the government action.
219
 This is notable because the 
anticipated private sanctions are four times as costly as sanctions from public enforcers. There is 
also a claim that an average stock drop of 0.6% is surprisingly high, given that government action is 
typically followed by private litigation.
220
   
  
3.5 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DETERRENCE: A STUDY OF OPTIMAL DETERRENCE 
 
There is no common standard of how to estimate the impact of small-stakes antitrust class actions 
on deterrence. This phenomenon is interpreted differently by both sides. Critics argue that the 
complicated certification procedure and the successive inevitable settlement diminish any 
deterrence value of class actions. Proponents customize the criteria of significant financial value of 
settlements. To give an additional flavor to this debate, the impact of class actions upon the 
standards known to the optimal deterrence theory is further examined. However, before going to 
this analysis, the formula proposed by Simard on estimating the deterrent value of small-stakes 
class actions (or negative-value claims) should be presented.
221
 According to the author, the 
following equation characterizes the deterrent impact of class actions for damages: 
 
ELCA * PCA + ECCA ≥ ICA 
 
ELCA stands for the expected aggregate loss to the class; PCA represents the probability of being 
held liable for the harm caused to the class; ECCA stands for the expected costs in defending against 
the class actions lawsuit; ICA represents the potential investment in safeguarding the harm to the 
class.   
 
This equation is useful in defining the standards of deterrence in small-stakes class actions. 
However, Simard applies this formula to all types of class actions, without any emphasis on 
antitrust. In fact, antitrust violations are unique and cannot be easily compared with other violations 
(such as contract or labor suits), because they typically generate a widespread overcharge (often 
across different supply chains) to victims. Antitrust scholars have developed the optimal deterrence 
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theory with a reason. Under this theory, the total amount of the sanctions should be equal to the 
infringement’s anticipated ‘net harm to others’
222
, divided by the multiplication of probability of 
detection and proof of the infringement.
223
 The representative equation of the optimal deterrence 
theory is the following: 
 
        Net harms to others   
Optimal deterrence (sanction)      =            ----------------------------------------------------------------  
           (Probability of detection × Probability of conviction) 
 
In this Chapter, a theory of optimal deterrence (sanction) is primarily examined from the 
perspective of cartel violations. The generally accepted view is that cartel managers behave as 
rational actors who conduct a cost-benefit analysis to see the magnitude of a likely penalty and the 
probability of being detected.
224
 Optimal deterrence is considered to be achieved when the imposed 
penalty outweighs the expected benefits of antitrust violation. However, the achievement of optimal 
deterrence would not mean that there will be no cartel violations. Still, the possibility remains that 
some infringers would engage in cartel violations, even if total fines were raised to the highest 
possible level. Violators will always take into account that detecting cartels and proving their harm 
is very complex due to their covert nature. Nevertheless, it is clear that optimal sanction would 
reduce cartel agreements to a minimum.     
 
In order to define the optimal sanction, the appropriate multiplier should be set, which would define 
the threshold for optimal deterrence. First of all, it should be recalled that this paper applies the 
most optimistic empirical data that is available. Following this logic, the most optimistic combined 
proportion for detecting and successfully prosecuting cartels should be applied in the context of 
optimal deterrence theory. In short, the best possible multiplier would be up to 1/3.
225
 This 
proportion comes from the fact that potentially up to 33% of all cartels (under the most optimistic 
scenario) are detected.
226
 However, it does not mean all detected cartels lead to successful 
conviction. But, again, this paper is optimistic and presumes that the most optimistic combined rate 
of detection and subsequent successful conviction is up to 33%, which corresponds to the multiplier 
of <1/3. When applying this multiplier in the equation of optimal deterrence, the optimal penalty is 
equal to (at least) three times the ‘net harm to others’. If this Chapter applied less optimistic rates, 
for example up 20% (<1/5) or up to 10% (<1/10), the optimal penalty would be equal to (at least) 
five or ten times the ‘net harm to others’. Even if lower multipliers are seemingly more realistic in 
practice, as 33% is an outlier rate, this Chapter applies the highest possible percentage to make the 
outcome more feasible. To sum up, at least three times the ‘net harm to others’ would correspond 
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fairly well with optimal deterrence. In other words, if the sanction equal to three times of ‘net harm 
to others’ was achieved, it would be to a large extent in line with optimal deterrence.   
 
Under the antitrust model, there are at least three interrelated components that enhance deterrence: 
corporate fines, personal fines and damages claims. Regardless of these components being different 
in nature, Davis and Lande consider that they can be converted into and compared in dollars. 
Accordingly, one year of prison corresponds to $6 million and a year of house arrest to $3 million 
of corporate liability.
227
 Therefore, relying on this estimation, all three components can be 
converted in the same value and applied in calculating optimal deterrence. However, it is highly 
debatable whether a year of prison can be converted in financial value (in any form). What is clear 
is that despite the risk of being punished through the different layers of the enforcement mechanism, 
there is no indication that the optimal deterrence has been achieved.
228
 This is reinforced by the fact 
that wrongdoers ‘tend to be recidivists.’
229
 The major question for this study is whether antitrust 
collective litigation pushes deterrence closer to an optimal level. Another important question is how 
corporations respond to the threat of litigation from small-stakes class actions. Indeed, the 
magnitude of the increase in deterrence depends upon the likelihood of antitrust class actions 
increasing the probability of cartel detection and conviction. Another factor is estimating how the 
total damages of class action lawsuits may correspond with the ‘net harm to others’. Each of the 
elements will be discussed in turn. 
 
To start with, it should be stressed that class actions that follow after government actions have little 
or no effect on detection. By contrast, stand-alone actions have much higher impact on the 
probability of detection, and the consequent deterrence. According to the studies of Connor and 
Lande-Davis mentioned above, a large share (40%-50%) of private antitrust actions are stand-alone 
lawsuits, while follow-on cases are only around 20%-30%. Relying on this data, it can be claimed 
that class action lawsuits have a potential of substituting actions of public enforcers. However, 
another study by Connor and Lande found that out of 71 cartel damages cases from 1990 to 2014, 
42 suits were follow-on damages actions (36 after U.S. government convictions and 6 after 
European antitrust authorities’ decisions) and 29 non-follow-on damages suits.
230
 However, it is not 
entirely clear whether all non-follow-on damages claims were stand-alone actions. What is clear 
from the data is that at least 60% of cartel damages claims are follow-ons. The study also concludes 
that the mean Recovery Ratio (size of antitrust settlements relative to damages) is higher in follow-
on suits (81.2%) than in the non-follow-on cases (54.8%). These findings confirm what has been 
obvious for many years: stand-alone cartel actions are less attractive for private attorney generals. 
Smarter it is to wait until competition authorities issue their decision, because cartel cases are 
covert, requiring more investigation and financial capacities to prove the violation than for example 
monopolization cases. As it will be discussed later, public authorities are also better suited to deal 
with cartel cases. To sum up, private antitrust claims have a potential to substitute public 
enforcement in non-cartel cases, while this is highly unlikely when it comes to cartel violations. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that only around 10% of potential class actions that are on 
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the radar of law firms are brought to the courts.
231
 Therefore, private attorneys usually take low risk 
cases, while a majority of cases remain unprosecuted. This is not to deny the reality that public 
enforcers also take low-risk cases, as many cartels are detected and prosecuted after the leniency 
program. But this mechanism is the main concern for rational infringers that cartel violations may 
be detected. There is always a potential that a whistleblower (a co-infringer) will report violations to 
antitrust authorities. In addition, public enforcers have the enforcement resources that private 
enforcers lack: grand juries, lawyers specialized in cartel enforcement, and the support of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
232
 It then follows that government actors are able to create a 
considerable threat at the time when rational actors perform their cost-benefit analysis. Notably, the 
personal sanctions (criminal fines and jail sentences) against cartel managers foremost depend on 
how active the DOJ criminal enforcement is. The recent findings show some interesting trends in 
criminal enforcement. In 2017, the Antitrust Division of DOJ sentenced 30 individuals to prison – 
the highest number since 2012, while 9 criminal cases went to trial – a record number in the modern 
history of criminal antitrust enforcement.
233
 This is surprising considering that there were 
decreasing trends before 2017.
234
 On the one hand, it may suggest that current criminal penalties 
under-deter. On the other hand, it may show the maturity of public enforcement in prosecuting 
antitrust violations. In turn, it leads to increased fear of wrongdoers, i.e. facilitated deterrence. It is 
hard to assess the reality, as it remains unknown how many cartels remain undetected and whether 
this number is increasing or decreasing each year. Despite that, the truth is that effectiveness of 
public enforcement is the most important element affecting rational actors’ behavior and stand-
alone actions of private enforcers have little impact. However, this reasoning is partly against the 
empirical study by Simard, who asked every corporate counsel of Fortune 500 companies to rate his 
ability to anticipate the class action. For third generation small-stakes class actions, almost 90% of 
general counsels asserted that they had “moderate” or “high” ability to foresee that their company 
will be sued.
235
 However, corporate counsels anticipate their liability less frequently for first and 
second generation small-stakes class actions under the same determinants, respectively 25% and 
65%.
236
 However, these findings should not be directly applied in the context of antitrust optimal 
deterrence theory. First, Simard in her questionnaire focuses on all types of class actions. Second, 
the results are subject to some errors as observed by the author.
237
 Third, it is unclear from the study 
                                                 
231
 Steven E. Fineman, Guest Lecture Complex Litigation Course, Stanford University (October 2015). The antitrust 
cases are potentially brought even less frequently.  
232
 Bill Baer, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States, Conference Paper, remarks prepared for 
delivery to European Competition Forum 2014, Brussels, February 11, 2014, 2, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517756/download (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).  
233
 The United States Department of Justice, Doing Hard Time: The Antitrust Division Sets Records in Number of 
Individuals Sentenced and in Number of Criminal Trials, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-
update-spring-2018/doing-hard-time-antitrust-division-sets-records-number-individuals-sentenced-and-number-criminal 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019). 
234
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Sanctions in Antitrust Cases, Global Forum on 
Competition (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-other-international-
competition-fora/sanctions_united_states.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). The following number of executives was 
sentenced: 45 (2012), 28 (2013), 21 (2014), 12 (2015). 
235
 Simard, supra note 221, at 26. According to the author, third generation small-stakes class actions has a basis for 
legal and factual support developed in previous litigation and the available information is the most comprehensive. 
236
 Id. at 24-26. First generation small-stakes class actions include unexplored legal theories and/or unproven factual 
scenarios. Second generation small-stakes class actions include legal theories and factual scenarios that have been 
previously argued in other cases but have not been definitively resolved.  
237
 Id. at 21. (for example, stressing that “all Respondents are vulnerable to class action suits, they have an incentive to 
downplay the validity of this costly regulatory device”). 
88 
 
how general counsels foresee their liability under stand-alone and follow-on antitrust actions for 
damages.  
 
With regard to the probability of conviction, it mainly relates to the possibility of class actions to be 
certified. Even if the lawsuit is brought, its chances to survive the certification stage are far from 
good. In that regard, the RAND Institute estimated that only 14% of the state and federal class 
actions against insurers were certified.
238
 This proportion is likely to be similar, or even lower in 
antitrust class actions. This is notable because judges have become more reluctant to certify these 
actions during the last years.
239
 But if the class action is certified, the probability of conviction is 
100% or very close to that proportion, since the vast majority of class actions is settled. The Federal 





Another point regards the impact of class actions on the ‘net harm to others’. The standard 
calculation of the ‘net harm to others’ encompasses not only cartel overcharges, but also the 
allocative inefficiency.
241
 At least two elements may be included in this context: the expected cost 
of litigation and actual damages. As regards the first element, the expected costs to oppose class 
certification, or lead the case after the certification may be valued in millions (largely due to 
expensive discovery procedures). According to the empirical data, the average time to settlement is 
around 3.3 years.
242
 It might demand very high litigation expenses, with the possibility to consume 
up to $10 million or more out of the defendant’s pocket.
243
 If a class is certified, the following step 
is to estimate the award of settlement. Even if trebled damages are typically waived in the 
settlement agreement, it is wrong to assume that the potential value of trebling is excluded in the 
settlement negotiation process. At its core, automatic trebling creates a good bargaining position for 
the plaintiff. The further assessment of deterrence weighs the components in Table 3 by assessing a 
rational actor’s position.   
 
Certification: Given the complicated nature of certification, it is the primary element that rational 
agents weigh when conducting a cost-benefit analysis. Another point is to assess the judges’ 
reluctance to proceed with certain types of antitrust litigation. Only then may the rational agents 
assess the potential risks from settlement.    
 
Settlement: Rational players must have forethought to the probability of conviction being almost 
100% when the case is certified, because they will seek settlement, i.e. a lenient form of conviction. 
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In turn, settled actions have a larger potential to internalize the damages caused due to far higher 
awards than government actions.  
 
Trebling: Trebling is very important when negotiating terms of the settlement. However, the impact 
on the magnitude of a likely penalty is significantly reduced due to the fact that cases usually settle 
for amounts that are more close to actual damages than treble damages. Connor and Lande 
estimated that only around 20% of cartel settlements during 1990-2014 produced initial (or more) 
damages in settlements, while other cases generated less than single damages.
244
 An even more 
disappointing factor is that the average recovery ratio was only 66%.
245
 Indeed, there is little 
probability that rational actors calculate their illegal behavior on the basis of the potential value of 
trebling, because it is rarely applied in practice.  
 
Liability: Defendants admit wrongdoing in settlements, but they usually admit no liability (moral or 
legal). Thus, there is no effect on a rational actors’ behavior when they assess the costs and benefits 
of the infringement. In some cases, for example in cy pres settlements, the defendants may receive 
positive public response due to the significant ‘donation’ to charities.
246
   
 
The relationship between two enforcement modes: Both enforcement methods take the less risky 
cases that have a relatively large chance of success. Yet, public enforcement, with its wide 
investigation tools, is better suited to detect wrongdoings than private enforcement. At the same 
time, private enforcement (especially class action lawsuits) is a more effective tool to increase the 
significance of liability when the case is certified.  
 
Cartel managers: The managers foremost engage in a personal cost/benefit analysis of the 
probability of facing criminal or monetary sanctions. The data suggests that around 69% of 
individuals are convicted in DOJ proceedings.
247
 Furthermore, there is an existing fear that some 
corporations might prefer prison sentences for their own executives rather than giving significant 
payouts in private litigation. Thus, the time lags of infringements are not so valuable under optimal 
deterrence theory, because a criminal conviction can follow the manager even if he or she no longer 
holds the same position in the corporation. 
 
Stock prices: The total 6.6% drop in share value is an aggregate of both enforcement modes. The 
simple model suggests that stock prices are driven by expectations
248
, thereby suggesting that the 
anticipated private litigation may have immediate effects on deterrence. In this respect, it must be 
borne in mind that the actual drop of share value by filing a private suit should be higher than 0.6%, 
but there is no reliable method to determine the exact impact (proportions) on stock prices.  
 
Based on these conclusions, one could argue that class action litigation extends the deterrence 
objective through the prism of optimal deterrence. It is probably true that government actors have 
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more tools and resources than private litigators to increase the probability of detection. However, it 
is equally true that private litigation is more efficient in increasing the magnitude of a monetary 
penalty. This is because a class action lawsuit has the ability to aggregate the negative expected 
value claims, sometimes totaling in millions of class members. Even if these claims are low 
individually, the anticipated aggregate value may push the wrongdoer to internalize the cost of the 
harm caused closer to the optimal level. In fact, it is hard to imagine other tool that could impose 
the same high monetary value.  
 
Hence, it undeniably appears that achieving optimal deterrence would fail if private litigation, and 
class actions especially, were not included in the scheme together with the other two indispensable 
elements of deterrence: corporate fines and personal fines. Despite having a high potential to extend 
the monetary liability, class action litigation faces crucial obstacles. First, the complicated 
certification procedure reduces the probability of conviction. If the class is certified, the case is 
typically settled for amounts closer to actual damages rather than treble damages. As shown before, 
low settlement values provide low proportional recovery to an insignificant number of victims, 
meaning that wrongdoers internalize a low cost for the harm caused. As a consequence, class action 
litigation is not so efficient in increasing the level of the ‘net harm to others’ as it may seem from 
the first blush.  
 
When compared with other two elements, class actions only serve a secondary function in 
achieving the objective of optimal deterrence. The crucial point is that government enforcement 
deters rational offenders even before they engage in anticompetitive conduct, while private 
remedies are rather assessed when the investigation is started or the action is brought to the court. 
This is because damages actions are subject to many restrictions, while public enforcement is 
reinforced by the possibilities of employing extensive investigatory tools. In addition, criminal 
prosecution of cartel managers primarily depends on how effective public enforcement is. Thus, it is 
perhaps overly optimistic to claim that ‘private antitrust enforcement probably deters more anti-
competitive conduct than the US Department of Justice’s anti-cartel program’
249
. For private 
remedies to serve a better deterrent function, and potentially the equal deterrent function as public 
enforcement, some amendments are needed. In order to increase the rate of detection, private 
enforcers should be provided with additional incentives. One option may be that public enforcers 
would provide investigatory support when a stand-alone action is brought. Another option is to 
allow a more lenient approach in certifying antitrust class actions.
250
 In order to increase the total 
fine of collective litigation, the settlement awards may be capped for higher than actual award (for 
example, requiring to settle for double damages). Hence, it may force the wrongdoer to internalize 
the higher cost of the harm caused.  
 
However, this hypothetical scenario cannot be implemented in practice. First, state investigatory 
powers will need to support private actions financially and in terms of resources. There is no 
reasonable justification for this amendment, since government enforcers lack resources for 
prosecuting all potential actions of their own. Second, a robust policy on certification has become a 
central safeguard against abusive litigation. Hence, relaxing certification may exacerbate ‘blackmail 
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settlement’. Third, capping settlement would jeopardize the free will of the parties to decide on the 
final outcome of the case.  
 
Even if we suppose that this hypothetical scenario was implemented, it would not ensure optimal 
deterrence. One issue is that there the combined rate of detection and prosecution (the multiplier) 
will be enhanced, but this increase should be minimal, and not a ‘game changer’. First, there is no 
guarantee that each class will be certified and that each case will collect sufficient evidence for 
proving damages. Second, capped settlements may have dissuasive effects for plaintiffs, since 
defendants may be more reluctant to settle in some cases, either before or after certification. This is 
because the ultimate damages may not differ much from treble damages, for example, if double 
damages were set. In fact, capped settlements may reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to sue in cases 
where early settlements would not be predicted. Another point is that capped settlements would not 
ensure the penalty, which would correspond to the required level of fines: around triple net harm to 
others. Under the most optimistic scenario, it can be assumed that double damages will be awarded 
to class members. After the deduction of case-related costs (contingency fees, administrative and 
expert fees), there is a possibility that class members will receive high proportional awards, or even 
full awards in some cases. However, this level is far away from the optimal deterrence, which 
would require to award at least three times of ‘net harm to others’. Therefore, the element of under-
deterrence should be observed. This statement is contrary to the critics who claim that class actions 
deter too much.
251
 One of the most popular views is that the plaintiff-friendly class action 
mechanism, especially the possibility of treble damages, incentivizes private attorneys to bring too 
many class action suits (both meritorious and not) that lead to over-deterrence, resulting from over-
enforcement.
252
 However, it was already shown that treble damages are in practice lower than single 
damages. Instead, this paper relies on the approach that over-deterrence would occur if one of the 
conditions was met: first, the sanction is set at too high a level; second, the enforcement activities, 
which defines the levels of the probability of detection and conviction, is excessive.
253
 Indeed, the 
analysis has clearly shown that none of the conditions are fulfilled by class actions.  
 
In conclusion, it should be stressed that the debate over optimal deterrence theory mainly regards 
cartel infringements. However, it does not mean that the private attorney general serves the same 
deterrent effects in other type of infringements, for example in case of monopolization. The fact that 
at least 90 percent of all federal antitrust cases are private actions is of crucial importance. It 
therefore suggests that private attorneys general bring much needed deterrence to antitrust 
enforcement, especially when public enforcers have neither the time nor the resources to prosecute 
all anticompetitive conduct. However, another viewpoint is that the effectiveness of cartel 
prosecution is the most important determinant factor in assessing the deterrence model. Indeed, 
hard-core cartels require much more attention due to their covert nature. If the probability of 
detection is low, such a system cannot be considered to provide much deterrence. To sum up, the 
effective anti-cartel deterrence system should be a function of three equal components acting 
together – competition authorities’ fines, private (class action) damages claims and personal fines. 
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Under the current scheme, however, the private antitrust remedies are framed to serve only a 




The research question of this Chapter was the following: 
 
How well do antitrust class actions in the United States fulfil compensation objectives and to what 
extent can they facilitate deterrence?  
 
When addressing this question, it was found that antitrust class actions have not been as effective as 
theory predicts them to be. Building on this, the following findings were made.  
 
1) The compensation goal in antitrust collective litigation fails to a large extent 
 
This Chapter presented the success and failure presumptions of compensation. By applying the 
actual compensation rate of 40% in automatic distribution settlements and a 25% claiming rate in 
claims-made settlements, it was found that antitrust class actions fail to pass the defined threshold in 
small-stakes class actions. The class action device is determined to provide very low proportional 
compensation to a low number of victims due to the unique nature of antitrust litigation: widespread 
overcharge, high administrative fees, expensive counterfactual assessments and low settlement 
awards. Attorneys’ overpayment has also been confirmed. Despite of class members remaining 
largely undercompensated, the class counsel usually reaps significant rewards without any 
connection to the (lack of) success of the distribution. It was argued that amounts higher than three 
times that of the expenditure costs can be already considered as overpayment. Consequently, the 
empirical data proved that the class counsel typically receives higher proportional compensation, 
which sometimes can even be tens of times higher compensation than the expenditure. In order to 
appreciate the cy pres controversy, the 20% failure presumption has been set; that is, if more than 
two out of ten cy pres settlements are frivolous. Because of the limited data available, there was no 
attempt to draw definite conclusions. It was found that dubious cy pres distributions most often 
occur in antitrust cases, suggesting that a majority of antitrust distributions attract dubious actions.  
 
2) Antitrust collective actions, in any form, produce small impacts on the objective of 
deterrence  
 
This Chapter assessed the impact of antitrust class action on deterrence through the elements of the 
optimal deterrence theory: probability of detection, probability of conviction and ‘net harms to 
others’. It was found that the fulfilment of optimal deterrence requires three equal components 
acting together: corporate fines, personal sanction and damages actions. When compared with two 
other elements, the current scheme allows for private enforcement to serve only a secondary 
function.  
 
It was determined that the DOJ enforcement has more effect on the probability of detection, but the 
class action litigation may score higher points in maximizing the monetary penalty. However, the 
full effect of deterrence is diminished due to the following factors. First, the courts are reluctant to 
certify antitrust class actions. Second, cases are settled for amounts closer to or around the actual 
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damages rather than treble damages. Third, class members receive less than actual damages, 
meaning that infringers internalize only low costs from the harm caused. Due to these obstacles, 
class action litigation does not deter rational actors during or before the antitrust violation; it has an 
effect only when the investigation is started. 
 
However, even if private remedies were enhanced by additional support from public enforcers, by 
relaxing rules on certification and by capping settlements for higher than actual awards, optimal 
deterrence would not be achieved. It is highly questionable whether attorneys would bring more 
cases under the proposed model, as capping settlements may bring dissuasive effective for 
attorneys’ incentives to sue. Therefore, the proportion of detecting and convicting cartels would 
remain similar, as in the current mechanism. Another viewpoint is that capped settlements would 
potentially ensure full award to class members, but this value is much lower than the optimal 



































3.7 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS 
 
Page Description of amendment Explanation 
51 
Amendment in the title of the Chapter, 
adding "the United States".  
It gives more clarification about the structure of the dissertation. 
59 
Additional data on the rates of class 
certification. 
This important data was overlooked in the published article.  
Additional reference is added, numbered 34. 
59 
Additional discussion on the meaning 
of abusive litigation, based on the 
Hensler’s study. 
It gives a more insightful picture about abusive litigation if a class action lawsuit is 
funded by third party funders.  
Additional reference is added, numbered 37. 
61 
Additional discussion on the joint and 
several liability.  
The discussion on the joint and several liability—deterrence-based measure—better 
explains the potential of abusive litigation. 
Additional references are added, numbered 48-49.  
62 
Hensler’s view in favor of class actions 
is added.  
Hensler gives a more insightful picture, as she supports the view that abusive 
litigation has less fear than perceived.  
For the amendment, additional references are added, numbered 63-66.  
69 
Additional statistics on the number of 
class actions both in federal and state 
courts. 
This data gives a more comprehensive view about the actual numbers of class 
actions. 
Additional reference is added, numbered 124. 
70 
Additional data on the real value of 
treble damages after a settlement, based 
on the empirical study of Connor and 
Lande. 
It gives more comprehensive data about the effectiveness of class actions in 
compensating victims.  
Additional references are added, numbered 128-129. 
84 
Simard’s formula estimating the 
deterrent value of small-stakes class 
actions is presented. 
It gives a more insightful view about the standards of deterrence in small-stakes 
class actions.  
Additional reference is added, numbered 221. 
85 
Explanation on optimal deterrence 
theory and its determinants. 
Clarification helps to better determine the scope and boundaries of optimal 
deterrence. 
Additional references are added, numbered 225-226.   
86 
The approach of Davis and Lande is 
presented regarding the comparison of 
corporate fines, personal fines and 
damages claims in the form of US 
dollars. 
It gives a more insightful picture about the standards of deterrence. 
Additional reference is added, numbered 227. 
86 
The possibility of class action lawsuits 
to substitute the actions of public 
enforcers is additionally discussed. 
The findings of Connor and Lande give a more insightful view about the 
relationship between stand-alone and follow-on class actions. In addition, it provides 
important data regarding the recovery ratio (size of antitrust settlements relative to 
damages). 
Additional reference is added, numbered 230. 
87 
Additional data by the DOJ regarding 
the trends in criminal enforcement. 
This data gives more insightful picture about the increased public enforcement, 
which helps to overview the activities of the Antitrust Division of DOJ. 
Additional references are added, numbered 233-234.     
87 
Additional empirical data on corporate 
counsel’s ability to anticipate the class 
action. 
The findings by Simard tell that corporate counsel can foresee class actions, and this 
potentially adds to deterrence. This is in contrast with the thesis author’s view that 
“the strength of public enforcement is the most important element affecting rational 
actors’ behavior and stand-alone actions of private enforcers have little impact”. 
Therefore, Simard's view gives a more insightful picture to a general discussion in 
the dissertation. 
Additional references are added, numbered 235-237. 
88 
Additional figures on the rates of 
certification and settlements.  
Additional data by the RAND institute and the Federal Judicial Center.  
Additional references are added, numbered 238-240. 
89 
Additional findings on the effectiveness 
of trebling. 
It gives a more insightful analysis about the average recovery rates. 
Additional references are added, numbered 244-245. 
91 
Additional discussion on over-
deterrence. 
This was involved as the published article missed this important assessment. 








4 THE IMPACT OF CONTINGENCY FEES ON COLLECTIVE ANTITRUST 





Contingency-fee agreements are one—if not the only—tool that can be used to ensure that small-
stakes collective antitrust actions are heard, yet they are subject to strong resistance from the 
European Commission. There is a concern that contingency fees could lead to abuses of the system 
or conflicts of interest, as has been seen in the United States. Contrary to the Commission's 
approach, two proactive member states—Lithuania and Poland—have introduced the possibility of 
using contingency fees in group litigation in order to facilitate group actions. Despite having a lot 
of potential, this Chapter will demonstrate that the introduction alone of contingency fees will not 
facilitate the compensation objective that is embedded in the Directive on damages actions. In 
addition, it will show that the safeguard policy against frivolous litigation is sufficient to limit the 
possibilities for litigation abuses, but it is ineffective for monitoring the individual behaviour of 
group representatives. 
 




Throughout history, class-action litigation has been a widespread phenomenon in the United States. 
After many struggles and political debates, this form of collective litigation is now slowly finding 
its own way into the European Union as well. Some member states have made changes in their 
national legal systems so that citizens and companies can collectively enforce their rights granted 
under the law. Furthermore, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on collective 
redress
1
 (which could prescribe a form of class actions) aimed at facilitating access to justice, while 
also proposing procedural safeguards to avoid incentives to abuse collective-redress systems.
2
 
According to the Commission, an example of such detrimental effects can be found in the US class-
action system, which contains a ‘toxic cocktail’ of contingency fees, punitive damages, opt-out 
                                                 
*
 This material was peer-reviewed and published by BRILL in Žygimantas Juška, “The Impact of Contingency Fees on 
Collective Antitrust Actions: Experiments from Lithuania and Poland” (2016) 41 (3-4) Review of Central and Eastern 
European Law 368.  
This Chapter is a revised version of the original published article. It includes the amendments in the introduction and 
conclusion to maintain the common approach of the PhD thesis. As regards the introduction, it includes additional 
sections: A. Research question and scope; B. Methodology and limitations; C. Overview of research material; D. 
Structure. With regard to the conclusion, it is amended to answer the research question of the Chapter. Reference no 5 is 
added in order to give a more insightful picture on the methodology. Furthermore, the words “article” and “paper” have 
been changed with “Chapter”, also “EU policy” changed to the “European Commission's approach”. In addition, the 
numbering of sections has been changed in accordance with the common structure of the PhD dissertation. It should be 
stressed that the revised Chapter maintains the original journal standards: citation, style, punctuation and consistency. 
Moreover, the Section on the American system was moved out in order to avoid repetition with Chapter 3.     
1
 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective-redress mechanisms in the 
Member States for injunctions against and claims on damages caused by violations of EU rights, C(2013) 3539/3, 11 
June 2013. 
2
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”, 
C(2013) 401/2. According to the Communication, collective actions “must not attract abusive litigation or have effects 
detrimental to respondents regardless of the results of the proceedings. The European approach to collective redress 
must thus give proper thought to preventing these negative effects and devising adequate safeguards against them.”  
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schemes, and broad discovery rules.
3
 By choosing a careful approach, the Commission has limited 
the financial viability of collective litigation, in particular in cases involving multiple claims of low 
value.
4
 Contrary to the current Commission's approach, and with the intention of facilitating group 
actions, two proactive member states—Lithuania and Poland—have introduced group litigation 
procedures by importing some elements of the American ‘toxic cocktail’, in particular that a group 
advocate is allowed to sign a contingency-fee agreement with clients. Furthermore, a group member 
is allowed to perform the role of group representative.  
 
Central to this work is the belief that valuable lessons can be learned in the area of competition law, 
where individual damages caused by wrongdoers are typically very small. This harm is often so 
small that the expected benefits outweigh the expected litigation costs. Therefore, the allowance for 
lawyers to act as private litigators through contingency fees is one of the most effective tools for 
making collective actions viable. Despite having a lot of potential to facilitate compensatory 
effectiveness, there is a concern that contingency fees could lead to abuses of the system or to 
conflicts of interest. This is notable because the individual harm is typically so small that few, if 
any, class members have an appreciable incentive to monitor the behaviour of the lead plaintiff and 
class counsel.    
 
A. Research question and scope 
 
What lessons can be learned from Lithuania and Poland about the impact of contingency fees on 
achieving compensatory effectiveness in antitrust collective actions?  
 
The following steps are taken to address this question. Lithuanian and Polish group actions are 
presented, and both are compared with the European Commission's approach on collective redress 
and American class actions. Furthermore, the impact of contingency fees on compensation 
effectiveness in Lithuanian and Polish antitrust collective actions is discussed. By assessing the 
existing safeguards in both countries, the Chapter overviews their effectiveness to prevent abusive 
litigation, if collective actions are brought under contingency fees.    
 
As regards the scope, Chapter 4 mainly analyses the impact of contingency fees on compensatory 
effectiveness in small-stakes collective antitrust actions. Lithuania and Poland are chosen as 
working examples because the group advocate is given a broad role in comparison with the few 
other EU member states where contingency fees are allowed in collective litigation. Furthermore, 
both states serve as a good basis for comparative analysis, because both are post-socialist countries 
that share a similar litigation culture and economic standards. To sum up, Chapter 4 aims to assess 
whether the availability of contingency fees has incentivized attorneys to bring antitrust collective 
actions. If not, it seeks to identify the reasons for this failure, and what potential these fees may 
have in the EU perspective.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g. European Commission, “Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress—Questions and Answers”, 
MEMO/08/741, para. 9, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-741_en.htm>.  
4
 See, e.g. Christopher Hodges, “Collective Redress: A Breakthrough or a Damp Sqibb?”, 37 Journal of Consumer 
Policy (2014), 67-89, at 83-84; Zygimantas Juska, “The Future of Collective Antitrust Redress: Is Something New 
Under the Sun?”, 8(1) Global Competition Litigation Review (2015), 14-24, at 18-23. 
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B. Methodology and limitations 
 
In this Chapter, the analytical comparative approach is predominant. It is used to examine the 
relationships between the different elements of group actions in Lithuania and Poland. The main 
focus is on contingency fees and thereon the following elements: a) the relationship between the 
group representative (a member of the group or public entity) and the group advocate (acting as a 
private investor through contingency fees); b) the effectiveness of the existing safeguards against 
abusive litigation (“loser-pays” principle and the rules of professional ethics). Other elements that 
are compared include, inter alia, the following: a) identification before the court; b) the role of the 
courts; c) certification criteria. 
 
The main limitation is that there have been no antitrust collective actions brought under contingency 
fees in either country. Therefore, the legislation and theory are primarily compared, not the practice. 
Indeed, such a limited comparative analysis can only be applied for states that are not at the core of 
comparative research.
5
 This is indeed the case as regards the comparison between Lithuania and 
Poland, as neither country can considered as the most plaintiff-friendly for bringing collective 
actions, especially when compared with the Netherlands and the UK, where an opt-out collective 
action model is permitted. The analysis of Lithuania and Polish systems gives a preliminary view on 
whether contingency fees should be allowed in the EU context.   
 
C. Overview of research material 
 
The primary sources include the related legislation on group actions and contingency fees in the 
analysed countries. As regards Lithuania, the legislative basis is enshrined in the Civil Code and the 
Civil Procedure Code. With regard to Poland, the Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Multi-party 
Proceedings is foremost taken into consideration. Regarding the analysis of the Lithuanian group 
actions, the useful publications are of Moisejevas, Montvydienė, Grigienė and Čerka. Concerning 
the Polish mechanism, important works have been published by Gomulka, Piszcz, Jaworski and 
Radzimierski. Particular emphasis is also put on the case law in surrounding fields:  private antitrust 
enforcement cases, group actions and claims where contingency fees have been used in other fields 




The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents two EU compensatory collective-
redress schemes: the recently introduced scheme in Lithuania and the regime in Poland, which has 
been in place since 2010. Section 3 analyses the impact of contingency fees on compensation 
effectiveness. Finally, the last section provides an overview of the value of procedural safeguards 
for preventing abusive litigation in Lithuania and Poland.  
 
 
                                                 
5




4.2 COLLECTIVE ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN LITHUANIA AND POLAND: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
Four years have passed since the adoption of the EU Directive on antitrust damages actions,
6
 which 
is aimed at alleviating the burden of proof resting on the party to prove the damage suffered, as well 
as at optimizing the interaction between public and private enforcement of EU competition rules. 
On the one hand, it is expected that the Directive will alleviate the party that has suffered a loss of 
the burden of proof; on the other hand, no collective-redress mechanism is envisaged by this 
Directive. Instead, only a non-binding recommendation was proposed. However, even before the 
EU initiative on damages actions, some member states had already introduced measures for private 
claims. In order to make collective antitrust actions feasible, several proactive countries introduced 
American-style remedies.  
 
The most prominent examples are the Dutch and the UK jurisdictions, which allow opt-out 
collective actions in some fashion. In the Netherlands, where collective settlement procedures can 
be based on an opt-out basis, a special vehicle called Equilib brought a collective action on behalf 
of all victims throughout Europe.
7
 In the UK, two opt-out antitrust collective actions have been 
brought, yet both have failed to pass certification test.
8
 For further discussion, see Chapter 5 
(Section 5.4.2). 
 
Albeit largely overlooked in the academic literature, Lithuania and Poland offer valuable lessons for 
the European doctrine of private antitrust enforcement. These countries were chosen as working 
examples because they have specific elements in place that both distinguish them from other 
member states and are also closer to the US system. In the following discussion, each of these two 
jurisdictions will be briefly presented, and both will be compared with American class actions.    
 
Private antitrust actions, while recognized in Lithuania, have been relatively rare so far, and have 
not attracted a lot of litigation.
9
 One of the reasons for this lack of development might be that, 
before 2015, there was no effective legislation for collective-action damages; however, group 
actions were de jure possible under existing laws.
10
 With a view to remedying this situation, 
                                                 
6
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349.  
7
 The first case was brought against KLM, Air France, and Martinair. See Claims Funding International plc press 
release (30 September 2010). The second case was brought against KLM, Air France, and Martinair. See Amsterdam 
District Court, 7 January 2015 (C/13/561169 / HA ZA 14-283). 
8
 See respectively Dorothy Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd [2017] CAT 9 and Walter Hugh Merricks v 
Mastercard Inc [2017] CAT 16. 
9
 From 2000 to the summer of 2015, the NCA investigated 47 cases of restrictive agreements (under Art.5 of the 
Competition Law, LoC). The number of cases brought concerning the abuse of dominance (Art.7 of the LoC) is much 
lower than the number of cases involving infringements under Article 5 of the LoC. Although the NCA has adopted a 
number of infringement decisions, follow-on actions are rare. To my knowledge, there have been only six private 
antitrust cases brought by plaintiffs involving infringements. None of private enforcement actions were initiated by 
consumers (rather by competitors). For further discussion of the development of private enforcement in Lithuania, see 
Raimundas Moisejevas, “Development of Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania”, 8(11) Yearbook of 
Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (2015), 35-51; Ramūnas Audzevičius, Žygimantas Juška, and Vytautas Saladis, 
“Lithuania”, in Ilene Knable Gotts (ed.), Private Competition Enforcement Review (London, Law Business Research 
Ltd., 2015, 8th ed.).  
10
 According to Art.49(6) (withdrawn as of 1 January 2015) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a group action could be 
brought in case it was necessary to protect the public interest. See, e.g. Case No. 2-492/2009 (2009), where the 
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Lithuania adopted amendments to its Code of Civil Procedure that entered into force on 1 January 
2015.
11
 These amendments make it possible for individuals to bring collective-action lawsuits 
across different fields of law, including competition law.  
 
In Poland, private enforcement of competition law has been recognized since the early 1990s, a 
decade before the EU doctrine was introduced.
12
 However, there were no more than 10 private 
antitrust cases during the period from 1999 through 2012.
13
 One of the most important steps 
towards the facilitation of private enforcement (especially for consumers) was taken when a 
collective-actions procedure was introduced by the Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Multi-party 




Because of national developments in group actions and the fact that the Directive on damages 
actions has come into force, there is potential that there will be collective antitrust litigation in both 
countries. Presumably, more active litigation can be expected because both countries introduced 
more relaxed financing opportunities for group actions than other EU member states. In order to 
better understand the nature of Lithuanian and Polish-style group actions, the main features are 
highlighted below in Table 1 through the prism of the EU policy on collective redress and US class 
actions. For a thorough discussion of the US deterrence-based mechanism, see Chapter 3.  
 
Table 1 shows that both Lithuania and Poland followed some recommendations from the EU. Most 
importantly, collective claims should be pursued on an opt-in basis, which requires explicit consent 
from victims to join an action. Furthermore, with respect to the reimbursement of legal costs, group 
actions are based on the ‘loser pays’ principle, according to which the party that loses a collective 
action should reimburse the legal costs of the winning party.
15
 There is another facet of Table 1 that 
bears immediate mention: contrary to the current Commission's approach, both schemes resemble 




                                                                                                                                                                  
Lithuanian Court of Appeal ruled that the rights granted under Art.49(6) could not be realized because there was no 
mechanism for the implementation of group actions. 
11
 The major amendment is found in Art.441
1




 Judgment of the Polish Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, 5 Wokanda (1994). The Polish 
Antimonopoly Court held that “the lack of a public interest violation does not mean that an individual injured by the 
illegal behavior of a certain undertaking may not protect its fundamental rights. There is no obstacle in enforcing such 
rights before the court.” The translation of the above-mentioned judgment was taken from Maciej Gac, “Poland: Private 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law – Unfulfilled Dream?”, 3 Concurrences (2015), 217-222, at 219.  
13
 Between 1999 and 2012, there were no more than 10 private enforcement cases in Poland. For further discussion, see 
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka, “Comparative Competition Law Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in the EU 
1999-2012”, Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, University of Warsaw, 1-19, available at 
<http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/final/Poland%20report.pdf>  
14
 Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń w postępowaniu grupowym (17 December 2009) No.7, item 44. (hereinafter “The 
Act on Pursuing Claims in Group Proceedings.] The importance of collective actions has been actively discussed by 
leading Polish scholars. See, e.g. Tomasz Jaworski and Patrick Radzimierski, “Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń w 
postępowaniu grupowym. Komentarz”, Warszawa (2010), 4; Małgorzata Sieradzka, “Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń w 
postępowaniu grupowym. Komentarz”, Warszawa (2010), 15-16 
15
 Taking the example of Lithuania, legal costs include state costs and attorneys’ fees. The court allocates legal costs 
between the parties on a pro rata basis on the basis of a separate decision. Advocate fees are calculated on a statutory 
basis, so the winning side can rarely expect to be fully reimbursed. See, e.g. Ramūnas Audzevičius and Vytautas 






Table 1. A comparative analysis between Lithuanian-Polish group actions, the EU collective redress policy and US class actions 
Measure Lithuanian approach Polish approach EU approach 
Explanation in the context of 








1) Contingency fees are 
available; 
2) Third-party financing 
is possible, but there 
is no practice of 
third-party financing 
in Lithuania; 




The same rules apply as in 
Lithuania 
1) Contingency fees 
should not be 
permitted 
2) Third-party funding is 
subject to strict 
conditions 
3) The ‘loser pays’ 
principle, which is 
dominant in civil 
disputes, should also 
apply in collective-
redress actions. 
The crucial difference is that 
the ‘loser pays’ principle is 
dominant in Lithuania and 
Poland, while each party bears 
its own costs in the United 
States.  
Identification 
before the court 
An opt-in measure is 
predominant. There is no 
exception for an opt-out 
measure. 
The same rules apply as in 
Lithuania  
Collective-redress systems 
should, as a general rule, be 
based on the opt-in principle 
Class actions are based on 
opt-out schemes. 
The role of the 
courts 
The role of the judge is 
relatively active:  
1) The court may 
propose changing the 
group’s 
representative and/or 
the advocate if he/she 
thinks that they are 
not properly 
representing the 
interests of the 
group;  
2) The court may invite 
other members of the 
group to justify their 
claim without the 
participation of a 
group representative;  
3) The court approves 
all collective-action 
settlements; 
4) The court must 
consider whether the 
claim could pass the 
certification test. 
   
 
The role of the judge is 
relatively active:  
1) The judge decides 
on the admissibility 




2) The judge verifies 
claims and ensures 
that unfounded 
claims are 
eliminated at an 
early stage; 
3) The judge controls 
the proceedings 
(e.g. orders the 
publication of 
information on the 
group’s claim, 
issues a decision on 
the formation of the 
group, renders a 
ruling or approves 
the settlement);  
4) The judge has an 
influence on the 
cost of the 
The central role should be given 
to the judge, who should 
effectively manage the case and 
be vigilant against any possible 
abuses. 
The judge plays an essentially 
active role in complex 
litigation cases: 
1) Active role in the 
pretrial stages of the 
case; 
2) The judge must 
review and approve 
the settlement;   
3) Administrative 
function (for example, 
reviewing awards for 
attorneys’ fees); 
4) US courts have the 
right to adopt general 
rules of civil 
procedure17 
                                                 
16
 The Act is limited exclusively to claims involving consumer law, product liability, and tort liability (Art.1(2)). 
Problems arise with respect to class-action certification where some class members have suffered infringements of 
personal interests and others of a non-personal nature. In the famous class action involving the collapse of the 
International Trade Hall in Katowice, the District Court of Warsaw refused to certify the class since the collapse caused 
deaths and personal injuries (Decision of 8 April 2011, II C 121/11). The Court held that the action was inadmissible 
because class members are only allowed to bring non-personal claims, excluding personal injury or death.  
17
 Each US state is authorized to determine its own rules of civil procedure, although most states have adopted rules 
based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g. Randy J. Kozel, “Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine”, 67(2) 




(decides on a 
guaranty deposit, 
decides on the 




The representative of a 
group may be:  
1) A member or 
members of the 
group; 
2) An association; 
3) A labor union. 
 
The group has to be 
represented by an advocate. 
The representative of a group 
may be: 
1) A member or 
members of the 
group; 




The group has to be 
represented by an advocate. 
In terms of standing, the 
European Commission 
recommends two types of 
collective redress mechanisms:     
 
1) Group actions 
brought jointly by 
natural and legal 
persons who claim to 
have suffered harm; 
2) Representative 
actions. 
The representative of a group 
may only be a member or 
members of the class. The 
court that certifies a class 
must appoint class counsel 
(based on Rule 23(g) of the 






A class action may be 
brought if the following 
conditions are fulfilled:  
 
1) Group actions are 
based on identical or 
similar facts;  
2) Collective action is a 
more economical, 
more effective, and 
more appropriate 




3) A pre-court dispute 
resolution procedure 
took place;  
4) The group has an 
appropriate group 
representative.  
A class action may be brought 
if the following conditions are 
fulfilled: 
 
1) The claim is 
brought before a 
civil court; the 
claim covers at least 
10 persons (natural 
or legal); 
2) Members of the 
group are of a 
similar type and are 
based on the same 
or similar factual 
basis;  
3) The claim concerns 
protection of 
consumers, product 
liability, or a delict 
(illicit act);  
4) The claim concerns 
material injury 
suffered by the 





The European Commission has 
not proposed any rules on 
certification. Yet, the court 
should play a crucial role in 
approving or denying the class 
certification.  
Certification in the US is more 
detailed and more complex. 
Rule 23(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure sets 
forth four threshold 
requirements for class 
certification:  
 
1) The class is so 
numerous (at least 
75 people) that the 




2) There are questions 
of law or fact 
common to the class 
(commonality);  
3) The claims or 
defenses of the class 
representatives are 
typical of those of 
the class (typicality);  




the interests of the 
class (adequacy). 
   
(1) The representative of a group can be a member of the group. The representative must in 
turn be represented by an attorney (the so-called group advocate).   
(2) Lawyers are allowed to agree on a contingency fee (no-win-no-fee arrangements). 
 
                                                 
18
 There is an important advantage of claims initiated by consumer ombudsmen. Once a claim is brought by a consumer 
advocate, the costs of bringing the claim do not have to be incurred, unlike in the case of a group claim brought by a 
member of a group.  
103 
 
In this respect, one must bear in mind that both countries share a combination of elements that differ 
from other EU member states. First, a member of a group is allowed to submit a group action, while 
the collective-redress schemes adopted by various EU member states mostly limit standing to public 
organizations.
19
 Second, professional representation by private attorneys is mandatory, and lawyers 
are encouraged to perform as litigation funders via contingency fees. In contrast, contingency 
agreements for legal fees are prohibited or severely restricted in most states, as they can strengthen 
incentives for frivolous litigation.
20
 Even if the usage of contingency fees is allowed in some 
circumstances, these countries imposed restrictions in the event of collective actions.
21
 Compared 
with other countries, lawyers in Lithuania and Poland are granted a relatively active role, and 
contingency fees are permitted in collective actions with the least restrictions. Despite the 
similarities, both countries have their own safeguards against abusive litigation. In Lithuania, the 
contingency fee is determined on a case-by-case basis. However, under Article 50 of the Law on 
Advocacy, payments to lawyers may not violate the rules of professional ethics.
22
 This means that 
the amount of an attorney’s fee must correspond to the complexity of the case, the attorney’s 
experience and expertise, the financial status of the client, as well as other circumstances that might 
be relevant to the particular situation. Poland leaves even less discretion on contingency fees: the 
upper limit of contingency fees is 20 percent.
23
 It is important to note that capping arrangements for 
contingency fees are exceptionally allowed for group claims, while in general they are considered 
contrary to the rules of Polish civil procedure and legal ethics.
24
 The explanation for such a 
dramatic change is not in line with the Commission's approach. The authors of the Act were afraid 
that very few lawyers would be interested in taking on collective-action cases, so they tried to 
attract professional litigators to engage in complex group actions and to take over, or at least to 
reduce, the costs for injured individuals via contingency fees.
25
 To conclude, it should be stressed 
                                                 
19
 See, e.g. Manning Gilbert Warren III, “The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export to the European 
Union”, 37(3) Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2012), 1075-1114, at 1089. In general, the standing is provided 
to governmental authorities (e.g. Finland), consumer associations (e.g. Greece, France, Sweden), and to other specified 
organizations (e.g. Portugal).  
20
 The best example regarding restrictions on contingency fees is illustrated by the German Lawyers’ Remuneration Act 
2008 (Art.4a(1)), which allows contingency fees only in cases where the claimant would otherwise not be able to 
enforce his rights because of his financial situation. To the same extent, contingency fees are allowed in group actions 
in Sweden, but under the condition that access to justice is otherwise denied. However, contingency fees are very rarely 
allowed in practice.  
21
 For example, the UK relaxed their rules on opt-out collective actions, and while contingency-fee arrangements are 
permitted for damages actions brought by individuals, they are not permissible in the context of collective actions. 
However, conditional fee arrangements are permitted in collective actions. For further discussion, see Barry J. Rodger, 
“The Consumer Rights Act 2015 and Collective Redress for Competition Law Infringements in the UK: A Class Act?”, 
3(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (2015), 258-286.  
22
 “Lietuvos Respublikos Advokatūros Įstatymas” with subsequent amendments (18 March 2004) No.IX-2066, 
Valstybės žinios (2004) No.50-1632 (hereinafter the “Lithuanian Law on the Bar”), available at <https://www.e-
tar.lt/portal/lt/legalAct/TAR.9F4371AB03A3>. 
23
 Article 5 provides that “[t]he agreement regulating the remuneration of the legal representative may determine the 
remuneration proportionally to the amount awarded in favor of the claimant, but not beyond 20% of the said amount.”  
24
 According to different scholars, it was possible to conclude contingency-fee agreements even before the entry into 
force of the Law on Group Litigation (on the basis of Art.353(1) of Polish Civil Code, Contractual Freedom of Choice), 
but this was seen by lawyers and their associations as being contrary to the rules of ethics (the codes of ethics of 
advocates and legal advisers, respectively, did not allow the conclusion of such agreements).  
25
 See the explanatory notes to the draft of the Act (11 August 2016), available at 
<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc6.nsf/opisy/1829.htm>. Later, the following observations were expressed by advocates and 
legal advisers in the Polish Bar.  
First, advocates argued that contingency-fee agreements might be allowed only as a measure providing for 
supplementary remuneration (basic remuneration must be set as a fixed amount independent of the result of the case).  
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that both countries are a good source of comparison because both are post-socialist states that share 
a similar litigation culture and economic standards. An even more important factor is that even 
though they introduced some limits on contingency fees, lawyers are granted a relatively active role 
compared with other EU countries where attorneys are involved in collective actions.  
 
4.3 CONTINGENCY FEES IN LITHUANIA AND POLAND: A STUDY OF 
COMPENSATION EFFECTIVENESS IN COLLECTIVE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 
 
Contrary to the United States, the EU policy on competition law does not shape private enforcement 
in the form of deterrence; rather, it can only be seen as a side effect. The primary objective is to 
ensure that any antitrust victim (natural or legal person) can effectively exercise the right to claim 
full compensation for harm suffered.
26
 This means that victims have the right to compensation for 
actual losses, loss of profit, plus the payment of interest. In order to ensure the achievement of the 
principle of full compensation, both direct and indirect purchasers have the right to require full 
compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law.
27
   
 
Both of the countries discussed follow the EU’s approach to the principle of full compensation. 
Contrary to the Commission's approach, however, the achievement of compensation is reinforced 
by the mandatory legal representation in group actions. The main idea behind this is likely that 
private litigators are (foremost) considered those with sufficient expertise and funding to litigate 
complex and expensive collective actions, such as antitrust. The simple logic is that the active 
involvement of group advocates would mean more actions brought before the courts and thus more 
victims compensated for the harm caused by violators. One of the major ways to incentivize 
attorneys to deal with collective litigation is to allow them to reap sufficient awards that outweigh 
the risks. In fact, contingency-fee agreements are one of the most attractive options for achieving 
this goal. As mentioned above, Polish legislators stressed that contingency fees are a very important 
factor in determining whether group actions will be brought before a court or not. However, the 
incentive to utilize such a reimbursement model depends on many factors, such as if the case 
generates significant financial value. If the aggregate value is substantial, there is a very good 
chance that an action will be brought and victims will be compensated. Therefore, the following 
discussion will assess the impact of contingency fees (in their current form) on the compensation 
objective in the discussed states.  
 
To start with, the goal of receiving compensation is significantly diminished in Lithuania and 
Poland due to the fact that opt-in schemes have been introduced. During the early attempts at 
collective-redress actions in EU member states, there were two major failures in the UK and France 
that clearly demonstrate that very few antitrust victims join an action when affirmative steps are 
required by potential group members.
28
 These examples have become a source of concern that an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Second, legal advisers accept a more liberal approach: changes were introduced to the Legal Advisers Code of Ethics. 
Article 36(3) of the Legal Advisers Code of Ethics, which entered into force on 1 July 2015, allows for the legal 
exception in case of a contingency-fee agreement. 
26
 Directive 2014/104/EU, op.cit note 6, Arts.1 and 3. 
27
 Ibid., Article 12.  
28
 In the UK, the consumer association Which? brought a claim as a result of a cartel that artificially fixed the price of 
replica football kits. Ten businesses, including Manchester United and Umbro, were hit with fines totalling £18.6 
million. The resulting collective action was based on the following decisions: OFT decision of 1 August 2003 
No.CA98/06/2003; Allsports Limited, JJB Sports plc v. Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17; Umbro Holdings Ltd, 
Manchester United plc, Allsports Limited, JJB Sports plc  v. Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 22; and JJB Sports plc 
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opt-in measure is not the right solution for collective antitrust litigation. This is probably one of the 
main reasons why opt-in collective antitrust actions are extremely unpopular in the EU member 
states. Despite the ineffectiveness of this approach, some level of compensation can be achieved, 
but it depends on whether rational actors are provided with sufficient incentives to sue. As indicated 
in Table 1, collective actions in Lithuania and Poland can be brought by public actors or members 
of a group that is represented by a group advocate. Before delving into a discussion of the 
effectiveness of contingency fees in each country, it is necessary to briefly overview the 
possibilities for public entities to lead collective antitrust actions. 
 
In Lithuania, group actions may be brought by an association or labor union, but in the case of 
antitrust group actions, only an association may have standing to bring a claim. The law provides 
that the requirements expressed in group proceedings must arise from activities directly related to 
an entity.
29
 It is important to stress that associations (e.g. consumer associations) are very limited in 
terms of their ability to finance litigation due to their very small budgets.
30
 This issue is even more 
pronounced in antitrust litigation, where the total costs of bringing collective actions can be 
extremely high because of the complexity of legal and economic assessments.
31
 Thus, a poorly 
financed consumer association would face the insurmountable burden of both proving causation and 
organizing a group in an antitrust collective action. In Poland, the consumer ombudsman, as 
specified by legislation, can act as a representative organization in group actions.
32
 Despite the fact 
that the Polish consumer ombudsman represents a larger population and logically should generate a 
large budget, the prospect of having sufficient financial capacity to bring costly antitrust actions is 
blurry at best. The consumer ombudsman is understaffed, with only a small number of paid 
employees. In fact, a lot of its activities are conducted by volunteers.
33
 In such circumstances, it 
seems highly unlikely that the consumer ombudsman would invest in expensive collective antitrust 
litigation.  
 
The above discussion suggests that public standing cannot be considered a tool for facilitating the 
objective of receiving compensation. A broader discussion on the ineffectiveness of public standing 
is beyond the scope of this Chapter, the aim of which is rather to assess the possibility of a group 





                                                                                                                                                                  
v Office of Fair Trading [2006] Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1318. Which? managed to collect claims from only 
approximately 130 consumers, even though the price-fixing cartel affected around 2 million victims. 
    In France, after the Competition Council decision (Counseil de la concurrence, Decision No.05-D-65 of 30 
November 2005), the consumer organization UFC-Que Choisir brought a collective antitrust claim on an opt-in basis. 
Despite an extensive information campaign, UFC-Que Choisir managed to collect claims from only 12,350 consumers, 
although the case, which involved a price-fixing agreement among three mobile operators, had potentially impacted 20 




, Code of Civil Procedure. 
30
 For example, the Lithuanian Consumer Institute has only four paid positions.  
31
 Charlotte Leskinen, “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, 8(1) The Competition Law 
Review (2011), 87-121, at 95. 
32
 The Act on Pursuing Claims in Group Proceedings, Art.4(2). 
33
 See, e.g. Breda Kutin, “Consumer Movement in Central and Eastern Europe”, 2 Consumatori, Dirittei Mercato 




4.3.1 An Overview of Contingency Fees in Lithuania 
 
So far, there has been no practice regarding group antitrust actions in Lithuania.
34
 This is probably 
the case because collective-redress actions have been available only since 2015. This, too, might 
suggest that contingency fees have no immediate effect on antitrust group litigation. Indeed, there 
are reasons to believe that contingency fees would continue to have little or no effect for group 
litigation in the near future. Practice has shown that advancing private antitrust actions based 
specifically on contingency fees have been unpopular during the existence of this compensation 
model. The first private antitrust claim was brought in 2003,
35
 while contingency fees have been 
permissible in damages actions for breach of competition law since 2004.
36
 Therefore, despite a 
private antitrust remedy being available for more than a decade, to the best of my knowledge, there 
has been no private antitrust action brought under the contingency-fee agreement.
37
 This can be 
partly explained by the fact that private enforcement has been rather underdeveloped compared with 
public enforcement actions: only five private antitrust cases have been brought before the courts so 
far, and all them concerned issues between large corporations.
38
 However, even if the EU Directive 
on damages actions will increase the number of damages claims, the author is skeptical about the 
prospects of litigation in group actions. If a case is conducted on an hourly-fee basis, the group 
representative would probably face too high a financial burden to reimburse group advocates in 
costly antitrust actions. Contingency fees are also an unattractive option for lawyers because the 
financial benefit is minimal (or even negative) if only a small number of victims join the action 
under an opt-in measure.
39
 In addition, competition-law actions are very complex, requiring 
extensive economic analysis that often leads to significant cost exposure. Before taking action, 
lawyers should assume the risk of losing any money invested, the risk of being required to 
                                                 
34
 To my knowledge, a final court decision was issued in only one case. A municipality in the Ukmergė District of 
Lithuania brought a claim on behalf of some 7,000 heat consumers, alleging that the heat-sector lessors were selling 
heat energy for a higher price than the lessors were committed to purchasing by public tender. However, the Court of 
Appeal of Lithuania dismissed the claim, asserting that the plaintiffs failed to comply with pre-court dispute-resolution 
procedures (Art.137 of the Code of Civil Procedure). See Ukmergės rajono savivaldybė v. UAB “Energijos taupymo 
centras” bei UAB “Miesto energija”, Decision of 10 July May 2015 of the Court of Appeals of Lithuania, civil case 
No.e2-816-157/2015. For further discussion, see Žygimantas Juška, “Class Actions in Lithuania”, Global Class Actions 
Exchange, Country Reports (2016), available at <http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/category/authors/žygimantas-
juška>.   
35
 On 2 January 2003, a private damages claim was brought by UAB Šiaulių Tara against AB Stumbras. This action 
arose half a year after the adoption of the Decision of the Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania of 30 May 
2002 No.6/b.  
36
 Lithuanian Law on the Bar, op.cit. note 22, Article 50.  
37
 To the best of my knowledge, the following cases have been brought before the Lithuanian courts: UAB Šiaulių Tara 
v. AB Stumbras Decision of 26 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals of Lithuania, civil case No.2A-41/2006.; LUAB 
Klevo lapas v. AB Orlen Lietuva, Decision of 17 May 2010 of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, civil case No.3K-3-
207/2010; AB flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines v. Air Baltic Corporation A/S and Airport Riga. Decision of the Court of 
Appeals of Lithuania of 31 December 2008, civil case No.2-949/2008; AB Orlen Lietuva v. the Competition Council of 
the Republic of Lithuania; UAB Naftos grupė v. AB Klaipėdos nafta, Decision of the Court of Appeals of Lithuania of 
17 June 2014, civil case No.2A-606/2014. None of the case reported that the contingency agreement was made between 
an advocate and the client. 
38
 For further discussion of private antitrust enforcement cases in Lithuania, see R. Moisejevas, “Development of 
Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania”, 8(11) Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (2015), 35-
51.  
39
 In the above-mentioned French mobile cartel case (No.05-D-65), the value of the claim was EUR 800,000, while the 
litigation expenses amounted to EUR 500,000. For further discussion of the case statistics, see U.F.C. – QUE CHOISIR 
de RENNES, “Consultation de la Commission Europenne sur les Recours Collectifs Contribution de L UFC-CHOISIR” 




compensate the defendants for their litigation costs if the case is lost (under the ‘loser pays’ 
principle), as well as not receiving any reimbursement from class members. 
 
4.3.2 An Overview of Contingency Fees in Poland 
 
In Poland, the picture may seem somewhat different, but only at first glance. There were around 
170 collective actions brought during the period 2010-2015.
40
 Initially, the state (central or local 
authorities, the state social security scheme, or state hospitals) was the main defendant. Many 
actions failed to satisfy the certification criteria and were dismissed, thus preventing individuals 
from protecting their rights in court. It should be stressed that advancing antitrust group claims is 
very unpopular. There has been only one group action in Poland regarding competition protection. 
However, this was not a traditional antitrust action under Articles 101-102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union or the equivalent Polish provisions; rather, it was an unfair-
competition action concerning misleading advertising. In 2010, a group of 35 insurance 
intermediaries filed a collective-action lawsuit against the LINK4 insurance company under the 
Law on Combating Unfair Competition. The group plaintiff alleged that unfair advertising 
encouraged clients to come directly to the insurer. As a result, the violation reduced the total 
number of the claimants’ customers by around 5.7 percent. In order to resolve the dispute, the Court 
appointed a mediator in February 2013, but no agreement was reached.
41
 Then, on 12 July 2013, the 
Regional Court in Warsaw issued a decision rejecting the admissibility of the lawsuit.
42
 The basis 
for the rejection was that: (1) in the Court’s opinion, it was a lawsuit aimed at protecting personal 
rights, and such lawsuits are barred by Article 1(2) in fine of the Act of 17 December 2009 on the 
pursuit of claims in group proceedings; (2) in the case, the Court considered the issues of fact to be 
neither common nor similar across the group, whereas the Act of 17 December 2009 on the pursuit 
of claims in group proceedings applies only to proceedings in which claims of a single type arising 
from common or similar issues of fact are pursued by a group (Article 1(1) of the Act).  
 
Regarding contingency fees, there was a promising start. A contingency-fee arrangement was 
concluded in one of the first collective actions brought in Poland, where flood victims in the 
Sandomierz area brought damages actions against the public authorities.
43
 A law firm representing 
17 class members making a combined claim of PLN 9.31 million (around EUR 2.16 million) in 
damages. However, the contingency-fee agreement became unfeasible when the representatives 
faced the issue of certification. Therefore, they decided to change their claim to declaratory relief 
only. As a result, their contingency-fee arrangement was revoked and a new up-front fee was agreed 
                                                 
40
 See the website Informator Statystyczny Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, available at <http://isws.ms.gov.pl/pl/baza-
statystyczna/opracowania-wieloletnie/>, which provides Polish statistics related to the administration of justice.  
41
 According to Article 7 of the Act of 17 December 2009 on the pursuit of claims in group proceedings, at each stage of 
the case the court may refer the parties to mediation. 
42
 Case No.XVI GC 595/11, Judgment of the Regional Court in Warsaw, 16th Commercial Division of 12 July 2013. 
For further analysis of this judgment, see Anna Piszcz, “Czy nieuczciwą konkurencję można zwalczać tylko 
indywidualnie? Postanowienie Sądu Okręgowego w Warszawie z 12 lipca 2013 r., XVI GC 595/11, Link4”, 4(4) 
Kwartalnik Antymonopolowy i Regulacyjny (2015), 142-144, available at: 
<http://ikar.wz.uw.edu.pl/numery/27/pdf/142.pdf>. 
43
 Case No.I C 1419/10, First Civil Division, Regional Court in Krakow. At present, the group proceedings are in the 
third stage, i.e. a content-related examination of the legitimacy of the claims. For further discussion, see Kubas Kos 




upon. As far as I am aware, this is the only impact that contingency fees have had on group actions 
in Poland, i.e. a country of almost 40 million inhabitants. 
 
It is also true that the expectations for collective consumer actions should not be high. To start with, 
it should be recalled that in more than 20 years fewer than 10 private antitrust actions were brought 
before the courts. However, the very low number of private actions is not the major source of 
concern. More importantly, no actions have been initiated by consumers, and none of the actions 
taken so far exercised the right to compensation for harm suffered.
44
 Even though the EU Directive 
on damages will facilitate possibilities for private antitrust actions, the prospects for collective 
consumer actions are not good. In fact, the Directive does not change much in the litigation 
landscape, as there would be no rules on collective-redress actions. And the ones proposed in the 
Recommendation significantly diminish the compensatory effectiveness of collective redress. 
Therefore, consumer ombudsmen will remain too weak financially to bring antitrust claims. And 
most importantly, there are no incentives for private litigators to proceed on an hourly-fee basis or 
to utilize contingency-fee agreements. The latter reimbursement model (under favorable conditions) 
is a major tool, if not the only tool, for financing collective actions when legal costs exceed the 
expenses of individual claims. As in Lithuania, however, contingency fees appear to be too risky an 
investment because of the very low opt-in rates. Also, losing a case could result in significant costs 
to be paid on behalf of the other party.  
 
The practice in Lithuania and Poland demonstrates that the introduction of contingency fees alone 
has not facilitated the objective of ensuring the payment of compensation. It can be acknowledged 
that this goal will fail if group actions are formed on an opt-in basis. The major disincentive is the 
small size of groups, which results in little financial benefit (which can sometimes even be 
negative) in successful cases. In fact, when the group is small, there is no incentive for lawyers to 
invest in complex antitrust cases, even though US-style contingency fees are in place. Regrettably, 
the EU Directive on damages actions is not framed in such a way as to mitigate the risks related to 
traditional opt-in antitrust claims.  
 
To conclude, while no antitrust collective actions have been brought on the basis of contingency 
fees, the available theory is insufficient to assess how a contingency fee agreement works in both 
countries. For a discussion in the US, see Chapter 3 (especially Section 3.3.2).   
 
4.4 THE POTENTIAL OF CONTINGENCY FEES TO ABUSE LITIGATION 
 
The impact of contingency fees on the effectiveness of ensuring compensation was discussed above, 
but compensation success also depends on two other indirect factors. First, the intent of collective 
actions should be to defend people who have genuinely incurred financial damage. Second, private 
litigators should reap a reward that is proportional to the efforts made. According to the European 
Commission, contingency-fee-based actions are one of the main causes of these negative outcomes 
in the EU’s litigation culture.
45
 At least in the US litigation landscape, it is believed that 
contingency fees allow attorneys to have a significant degree of autonomy to conduct litigation: 
picking their client, defining the parameters of the class, and proposing the amount of compensation 
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 See Gac, op.cit. note 12, 219.   
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 There is no reliable mechanism to monitor the activities of the class counsel. If EU 
member states allow contingency fees on an exceptional basis, they have to incorporate safeguards 




According to the European Commission, abusive litigation occurs ‘when [collective action] is 
intentionally targeted against law-abiding businesses in order to cause reputational damage or to 
inflict an undue financial burden on them … Law-abiding defendants may be prone to settle the 
case only in order to prevent or minimize possible damage.’
48
 From this wording, it can be 
acknowledged that the main concern is that collective actions may force defendants to settle even 
meritless cases, a phenomenon that the critics of US class actions have characterized as a ‘blackmail 
settlement’.
49
 While this fear is questionable in the EU context,
50
 it is important that the EU also be 
aware of other type of abuses. One of the risks is that lawyers can set their fees in such a way so as 
to maximize their own financial reward while minimizing the recovery for the group. Another risk 
is that any funds left over from the award may be distributed in an abusive manner. In the US, for 
example, it is typical that undistributed funds are distributed to a cy pres charity whose activities are 
closely related to the antitrust violation. However, this distribution model has attracted a lot of 
criticism because cy pres awards can go to unrelated charities.
51
 In order to facilitate a discussion 
among scholars, this Chapter will discuss the safeguard policies in both Lithuania and Poland 
against any type of abusive litigation. But what can be learned from these countries about frivolous 
litigation when there is no practice of collective antitrust actions, and especially when they are 
based on contingency-fee agreements? Given the absence of this data, it is impossible to draw 
definite evidenced-based conclusions. The focus, however, is on providing a preliminary study of 
the effectiveness of national safeguards to prevent abusive litigation.  
 
First, we should provide an overview of the major safeguards that are in place both countries. To 
begin with, an opt-in scheme acts as a central safeguard against abusive litigation. In opt-in 
collective actions, group members are identified, and those who opt to take part often have more 
interest in the proceedings, given that they voluntarily opted in to the action. Second, the ‘loser-
pays’ principle is equally important as a deterrence mechanism. The group advocate should assume 
the risk of compensating the defendant’s litigation costs if the case is lost. Third, the national rules 
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 See, e.g. Kirkpatrick v. JC Bradford & Co, 827 F2d 718 (11th
 
Cir. 1987) at 727. However, there have been some 
exceptions throughout history, e.g. Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp. 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999). The principal of Lazy Oil, 
an oil producer named Bennie G. Landers, disagreed with the settlement and moved to have the class counsel 
disqualified.  
47
 Recommendation, op.cit. note 1, para. 30.  
48
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”, 
C(2013) 401/2.  
49
 See, e.g. Jonathan M. Landers, “Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the 
Substance-Procedure Dilemma”, 47 Southern California Law Review (1974), 842-890, at 843.  
50
 Usually, a “blackmail settlement” in the US occurs when an aggregate value of a collective claim is so high that the 
defendants choose to settle regardless of whether the claim has merit or not rather than to continue a case with an 
unpredictable outcome. Furthermore, discovery entails massive costs for the defendants, while the claimant enjoys a 
favorable one-way fee-shifting rule. On the contrary, there are no grounds for blackmailing the defendants in the EU. 
Even though some states allow opt-out collective actions, damage multipliers are prohibited in all states. In addition, the 
limited discovery rules are combined with the ‘loser pays’ principle.  
51
 See, e.g. Cecily C. Shiel, “A New Generation of Class Action Cy Pres Remedies: Lessons from Washington State”, 
90(2) Washington Law Review (2015), 943-991 <https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-
law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1467/90WLR0943.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>; Jay Tidmarsh, “Cy Pres and the 
Optimal Class Action”, 82(3) George Washington Law Review (2014), 767-797.  
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on disciplinary liability are a good solution to determine the safeguard policy. In fact, these 
measures demand particular attention and thus are discussed below.   
 
The Lithuanian rules on professional ethics provide a sound basis for preventing abusive litigation. 
Under the law, any party that brings an unfounded claim or acts against a fair and timely trial 
resolution may be obliged to reimburse the other party’s costs and losses.
52
 In addition, a fine of up 
to EUR 5,800 may be imposed for the above-mentioned actions. Second, the Court of Honor 
(Advokatų garbės teismas) has enough discretion to deal with frivolous litigation arising from 
contingency fees and other related matters. For example, the Court may impose disciplinary liability 
for any conduct on the part of an advocate that is contrary to the law or professional ethics.
53
 The 
main issue, however, is that the Court of Honor may use these powers only if there is a complaint 
(mostly after the end of proceedings) from the potential victim. Indeed, the clients in an action may 
simply be unaware that their attorney acted in violation of ethical rules. Even though the Court 
rarely acts in case of an unfair contingency-fee agreement, there is a notable example that serves as 
a possible deterrent for potential wrongdoers to comply with the rules on professional ethics. 
 
In a case concerning neonatal burn injuries against a hospital, an advocate and the plaintiff signed a 
contingency-fee agreement that the lawyers’ fees would be 50 percent of the sum awarded.
54
 Soon 
after the case was won, with an award of LTL 500,000 (around EUR 150,000) in damages, the 
plaintiffs brought a complaint before the Court of Honor, accusing their advocate of unfair and 
corrupt conduct. After conducting an assessment, the Court ruled that the lawyers acted in violation 
of the legal requirements and that their actions were incompatible with the principles of professional 
ethics.
55
 More specifically, the Court held the following:  
 
 A contingency fee of 50 percent was agreed upon without regard to the relevant 
circumstances of civil proceedings and was thus deemed to be too high; 
 The lawyers did not adequately inform their clients about the property rights of children under 
Article 3(188) of the Civil Code; 
 The lawyers unlawfully used deposited client awards to pay their fees. 
 
Due to the above-mentioned significant violations of professional ethics, the Court of Honor 
imposed the most severe punishment possible by removing the advocate and his assistant from the 
bar. 
 
Disciplinary liability can also be considered an important safeguard in Poland.
56
 In addition, 
potential abuses are also effectively prevented by the introduction of a 20 percent cap on 
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 Article 95, Code of Civil Procedure.  
53
 Disciplinary penalties are as follows: 1) admonition; 2) reprimand; 3) public reprimand; 4) removal from the bar. 
54
 This claim was filed after the ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in L. Z., M. Z., V. Z., G. Z. v. VšĮ 
Marijampolės ligoninė, No.3K-7-255/2005.  
55
 The decision of 24 February 2006 of the Court of Honor, Case No.10. For further assessment of the case, see Ingrida 
Montvydienė, “Pacta de quota litis, kaip alternatyva valstybės garantuojamai teisinei pagalbai užtikrinti civilinėse 
bylose”, 7(109) Jurisprudencija (2008), 85-91, at 88; Jurgita Grigienė and Paulius Čerka, “Advokato Atlyginimo, 
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 Ustawa “Prawo o adwokaturze” with subsequent amendments (26 May 1982), Dziennik Ustaw (hereinafter “Dz.U.”) 
(1982) No.16 item 124, Arts. 80-95, available at <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19820160124>; 
Ustawa “o radcach prawnych” with subsequent amendments (6 July 1982), Dz.U. (1982) No.19 item 145, Arts. 65-74, 
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contingency fees. The provision that allows the defendant to request that the claimant make a 
deposit (20 percent of the value of the claim) so as to secure the costs of litigation can be considered 
an additional safeguard. Accordingly, a security deposit can be regarded as a sort of counterbalance 
to contingency fees and a mechanism introduced in order to protect the financial interests of the 
defendant. In most cases, however, the court does not grant such a deposit.  
 
When combined, all of the above-mentioned safeguards in both countries would appear to keep the 
possibility of litigation abuse at a minimum. However, even though the safeguard policy would 
make rational abusers think twice before engaging in unprofessional conduct, the scheme is not 
ideal. Indeed, there is no reliable mechanism to monitor the activities of group representatives: the 
lead plaintiff and the group advocate. For example, the US mechanism used for the distribution of 
damages in successful cases has been very difficult to inspect. Also, no one can ensure that national 
judges in EU member states will take a closer look at attorneys’ activities especially when a case is 
expected to be settled. Judges are typically interested in ending antitrust actions (which are typically 
complex) as soon as possible. A potential solution would be to establish a body that would be 
vested with the powers to monitor the group’s lawyer and the group’s representative in collective 
actions, as well as to verify the distribution of damages. Notably, Lithuania’s Court of Honor may 
not be able to perform such a role, as it usually uses its powers only if it receives a complaint 
(mostly after the end of proceedings). A special (independent) body needs to be established that 
could operate throughout an entire case. One proposal is to appoint a committee on a case-by-case 
basis that would consist of different high-ranking professionals: academics, advocates, judges, etc. 
Indeed, this would ensure a much better monitoring mechanism. 
 
To conclude, it should be stressed that the strict safeguard policy in both countries limits the 
financial viability of collective actions even if US-style contingency fees are introduced. This is 
especially true since groups are formed by allowing potential members to opt in. It remains 
questionable whether the combination of opt-out actions and contingency fees would increase the 
chances of abuse. On the one hand, the ‘loser pays’ principle would still act as the central safeguard 
against any possible misconduct on the part of group representatives. In addition, the US legal 
system has been accused of having overly broad discovery rules, allowing for the plaintiffs to 
request any type of evidence, but, at the same time, propounding extremely expensive and 
burdensome requests for the defendant. Also, it has been suggested that trebling of damages could 
generate such significant value in class actions that it would compel defendants to settle the lawsuits 
whether they have merit or not. In the EU, however, treble damages and broad discovery rules are 
limited in member states. On the other hand, there are obvious implications involving increased 
opportunities to abuse litigation in opt-out actions. A much larger group of victims would be 
involved in such litigation, thereby leading to cases with much greater financial value. Very few of 
these victims would have incentives or means to monitor the lead plaintiff and the group attorney or 
their strategic choices. Therefore, the most difficult question is whether EU collective-action 
schemes could be customized to handle uncontrolled opt-out actions. This is no easy task, 
particularly given that the US has not been able to resolve this issue for decades. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to predict if contingency fees combined with opt-out schemes would 
                                                                                                                                                                  
available at <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19820190145>. Possible disciplinary penalties include the 
following: 1) admonition; 2) reprimand; 3) fine; 4) suspension from practicing the profession for a period from three 
months to five years; 5) removal from the bar. 
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lead to any sort of abuse, especially if the schemes rejected treble damages and broad discovery 




The research question of this Chapter was the following: 
 
What lessons can be learned from Lithuania and Poland about the impact of contingency fees on 
achieving compensatory effectiveness in antitrust collective actions?  
 
When addressing this question, it was found that contingency fees have attracted a great deal of 
controversy in US class actions. On the one hand, contingency fees allow for small-stakes class 
actions to be heard at all. On the other hand, such a reimbursement model is considered one of the 
most important factors in raising the problem of abusive litigation in the American system. In the 
EU context, and more specifically in Lithuania and Poland, the following findings were made about 
contingency fees. 
 
1. Contingency fees alone have so far had no impact on the increase in antitrust collective 
litigation 
 
There have been no antitrust collective actions brought on the basis of contingency fees in Lithuania 
and Poland. Even more concerning factor is that no antitrust collective actions have been brought. 
The absence of an impact in Lithuania can be explained due to the recent introduction of group 
actions, but the same explanation cannot be applied in Poland, where collective-redress schemes 
have been in place since 2010. The primary reason for ineffectiveness of contingency fees is the 
availability of only an opt-in group aggregation model. An opt-in measure results in too low an 
aggregate financial value, which discourage lawyers' investment in complex and costly antitrust 
collective actions.  
 
2. The national safeguards against abusive litigation appear to reduce the possibility of 
litigation abuse at a minimum 
 
The most typical American litigation abuse (blackmail settlement) is highly unlikely to occur in 
Lithuania and Poland, because contingency fees alone cannot generate a high aggregate value 
(without opt-out schemes and treble damages) that would force defendants settle regardless of 
whether the claim has merit or not.  However, the prevention policy is ineffective in monitoring the 
individual behaviour of group representatives. Lithuanian experience with contingency fees has 
shown that lawyers can set their fees in such a way so as to maximize their own financial reward 
while minimizing the recovery for the group. Another risk is that any funds left over from the award 
may be distributed in an abusive manner. As a possible solution, an ad hoc committee of 
professionals that would monitor group representatives was proposed. 
 
3. The combination of contingency fees and opt-out schemes has a potential for increasing the 
standards of the compensation objective, but there are obvious implications for increased 




It remains to be seen if there is also potential to combine contingency fees with opt-out schemes, 
without attracting litigation abuses. The most challenging task is how to monitor the plaintiffs’ 
representative and the group’s lawyer when a case is brought under a contingency-fee agreement. 
This necessitates further thought that might indeed be very uncomfortable for lawmakers, although 
rather interesting for an academic discussion. One could argue that an effectively regulated control 
mechanism could start a whole new chapter in the EU’s litigation culture. But there are still many 
steps that have to be taken to build up enough trust to convince the EU and its member states of 
this. However, the long-standing practice in the United States provides an opportunity for closer 
consideration of the opportunities for more forceful litigation approach in the EU context that would 




























































5 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE 





The European Commission assessed the implementation of the 2013 Recommendation on collective 
redress, yet with a delay. On the one hand, it should be welcomed that the Commission remains 
ambitious regarding an EU-wide collective redress mechanism. On the other hand, it should be 
highlighted that the Commission is concentrating too much on the American system, which 
significantly differs in terms of rationale, design, and stated goals. Indeed, utilising one or another 
American element does not inevitably lead to the perceived issue of “blackmail settlement”. This is 
further qualified by positive experiences in pro-active EU member states, which have experimented 
with US-oriented tools in order to facilitate collective actions in their jurisdictions. This article 
explores how insights from the EU countries and the US should influence the debate on EU-style 
collective antitrust redress, when the time arises to take the legally binding step in the field. 
 




Five years have passed since the European Commission adopted the reform on damages actions in 
June 2013. The reform sought to facilitate antitrust damages actions across the European Union. 
The most important milestone was reached in November 2014, when the EU adopted the Directive 
on antitrust damages actions.
1
 Its main objective is to ensure that victims can effectively exercise 
their right to claim full compensation. However, the achievement of full compensation is highly 
distorted for victims who suffered low value harm (such as consumers and purchasers). The 
Directive does not include provisions on collective redress; instead, the horizontal Recommendation 
on collective redress was adopted for this purpose.
2
 It is not a legally binding document, and as such 
cannot force member states to take action; it only urges it. However, the Recommendation still 
represents the latest and the most concrete EU proposal, under which the preparation of legislation 
has been made for a coherent European framework for antitrust collective redress. This document 
has two main goals. The first is one is to facilitate access to justice, and to enable compensation in 
mass harm situations. The second one is to prevent the same kind of litigation abuses that have 
                                                 
*
 This material was peer-reviewed and published by BRILL in Žygimantas Juška, ‘The Potential of Antitrust Collective 
Litigation in 2017: Beyond the Recommendation and the Directive’ (2017) 4(4) European Journal of Comparative Law 
and Governance 337. 
This Chapter is a revised version of the original published article. In order to address new developments, Chapter 5 
includes amendments, summarised in the Appendix to this Chapter. Few changes are not shown in the Appendix. First, 
the introduction and conclusion have been changed to maintain the common approach of the PhD thesis. As regards 
introduction, it includes additional sections: A. Research question and scope; B. Methodology and limitations; C. 
Overview of research material; D. Structure. With regard to the conclusion, it is amended to answer the research 
question of the Chapter. Second, few structural amendments are not shown in the Appendix. The words ‘article’ and 
‘paper’ have been changed with ‘Chapter’. In addition, the numbering of sections has been changed in accordance with 
the common structure of the thesis. To conclude, it should be stressed that the revised Chapter maintains the original 
journal standards: citation, style, punctuation and consistency.   
1
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349. 
2
 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for collective redress mechanisms in the 
Member States for injunctions against and claims on damages caused by violations of EU rights COM(2013) 3539/3. 
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occurred in class actions in the United States. On 25 January 2018, the European Commission 
finally assessed the practical implementation of the Recommendation.
3
 The outcome is that the 
Recommendation has had little real impact on the development of collective actions in the EU and 
that collective redress schemes are getting more and more divergent across the member states. An 
even more important factor is that antitrust collective claims have been brought in states which 
disregard some of the proposed principles of the Commission, and instead allow for US-oriented 
tools in some fashion.  
 
The evaluation of the 2013 Recommendation has been a basis for the new legislative package “New 
Deal for Consumers”, adopted on 11 April 2018. Another basis was the Volkswagen emissions 
scandal, which shown that it is problematic to enforce consumer rights across the EU. Therefore, 
collective redress mechanisms appear to be an attractive tool for allowing a better enforcement of 
consumer rights. As a result, the European Commission published two proposals for the directives 
in order to facilitate the opportunities for consumers to enforce their rights:  
 
 Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules4; and 





In light of these observations, this Chapter discusses both the 2013 Recommendation and the new 
proposals, and suggests possible amendments. 
 
A. Research question and scope 
 
What impact has the Recommendation on collective redress brought on the member states’ policy 
on collective redress, and what effect could its provisions have if the Recommendation ever takes a 
binding form? How do EU-style provisions on collective redress interact with US class actions?  
 
The following steps are taken to address this question. In the first place, Chapter 5 examines the 
European Commission's approach on collective redress by evaluating the criticisms surrounding it 
and comparing the EU compensation-oriented scheme with the US deterrence-based mechanism. 
This analysis gives a more insightful picture whether the Commission's approach, which is also 
strongly against the US system, is the most suitable for ensuring an effective right for victims to 
seek compensation. The assessment is deepened through scrutinising the experiences of the EU 
member states, which ignore some provisions of the Commission's approach, and instead allow US 
deterrence-oriented measures in order to achieve success in collective litigation.   
 
                                                 
3
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union law (2013/396/EU) COM(2018) 40 final. 
4
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 
April 1993, Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules COM(2018) 185/3.  
5
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on representative actions for the protection of 
the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC COM(2018) 184 final. 
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As regards the scope, Chapter 5 does not include the assessment of the Directive on damages 
actions; it only analyses the proposed provisions of the Recommendation on collective redress. To 
sum up, the assessment concentrates on providing an initial comparison between the EU and US 
collective action schemes: the former aimed at compensation (examining the Commission's 
approach and respective mechanisms in proactive member states), and the latter aimed at deterrence 
(examining the US-style deterrence-based measures). 
 
B. Methodology and limitations 
 
In this Chapter, the comparative research method primarily combines structural and analytical 
approaches. Structuralism, for its part, compares a set of components that distinguish the EU 
compensation-based collective actions from the US deterrence-oriented class actions. An analytical 
approach is used to isolate the US-style collective actions elements in the EU member states in 
order to assess the interplay between them and with the Commission's approach. 
 
The research limitation is that there is a lack of research objects in the EU context. The reality is 
that the few chosen examples reflect the most prominent antitrust collective actions that have been 
brought to national courts.
6
 Regardless of the practical shortcomings in the field, the available 
experiences are juxtaposed with US class actions, which have a long-lasting practice in antitrust 
litigation. Therefore, the selected comparative research leaves no other choice than to rely on own 
assumptions and common sense about antitrust collective actions. Despite the shortcomings, this 
analysis gives a better understanding about collective actions in the EU, and what impact US-style 
remedies may have.    
 
C. Overview of research material 
 
This research primarily analyses the European Commission’s Recommendation on collective 
redress. The general overview is provided by examining the most important policy documents on 
antitrust collective redress.
7
 Regarding the surrounding criticisms of the Commission’s approach, 
the useful works are of Hodges and Van den Bergh. Authors whose works are important for 
assessing the US mechanism include Davis and Lande, Crane, and Landers. When exploring the 
insights from EU member states, the writings of Biard and Kortmann are of particular importance as 




The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 provides an 
overview of the development of collective redress, ranging from the 2005 Green Paper to the 2013 
Recommendation. The study of the Commission’s proposed approach is outlined in section 3, 
underlying the surrounding controversies and the relationship with the US class action system. 
                                                 
6
 The period encompasses the time after two unsuccessful opt-in collective actions in France and the UK: Mobile Cartel 
collective litigation and Replica Football Shirts collective action respectively. Both cases faced significant obstacles in 
collecting victims: much less than 1% of victims joined the actions. 
7
 This includes, inter alia:  Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages; Communication on a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress COM(2013) 401/2; Public Consultation on a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress SEC (2011) 173; White Paper on Damages Actions COM (2008) 165; Green Paper on damages 
actions COM (2005) 672 final.  
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Section 4 gives an overview of the schemes of member states that disregard some principles of the 
Commission’s approach, and instead experiment with the US-style remedies to achieve success in 
collective litigation. Section 5 gives a perspective of the abusive litigation in the US and in the EU. 
 
5.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S APPROACH ON COLLECTIVE REDRESS: 
RECOMMENDATION, ITS REPORT AND PROPOSALS FOR NEW DIRECTIVES 
 
The Commission’s efforts to introduce an EU-wide private antitrust enforcement may be traced 
back to the 2005 Green Paper on damages actions.
8
 The main objective was to identify barriers to 
the further promotion of antitrust damage actions.
9
 Furthermore, collective redress actions were 
proposed as a tool for protecting consumers and purchasers with small claims. Despite the 
Commission proposing a number of options to facilitate damages claims, the efforts were highly 
criticised.
10
 Building on these initial efforts, the Commission published the 2008 White Paper on 
damages actions.
11
 In order to stimulate damage claims, the document included a broad range of 
suggestions: 1) the availability of full compensation (actual loss plus and the loss of profit); 2) the 
judge-controlled disclosure; 3) binding effect on NCA’s decisions; 4) single damages rather than 
multiple damages. In addition, the White Paper recognized a clear need for collective redress 
mechanisms, as the existing means for the aggregation of individual claims were often limited and 
the harm caused by competition infringement was typically scattered among a large number of 
injured parties.
12
 As a result, two type collective actions were suggested: i) representative actions; 
and ii) opt-in collective actions. 
 
In both papers, the European Commission failed to find a consensus for an EU-wide legislation on 
antitrust collective redress. This is mainly because member states were against a sector-specific 
measure in the field. However, these failures incentivised the Commission to carry out a public 
consultation in February 2011.
13
 This time the proposal supported a horizontal approach, which 
allows for all types of collective redress actions. In particular, it set out the core principles for a 
coherent European horizontal framework for collective redress in the subsequent Recommendation 
on collective redress.
14
 The main principles that the Commission expects the member states to abide 




                                                 
8
 European Commission, “Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, COM (2005) 672 final.  
9
 At this point, the Commission identified 6 main obstacles to creating a more effective system of antitrust damages 
actions. They relate to the following areas: (i) access to evidence (ii) damages (iii) defending consumer interests (iv) 
Effect of damages claims on the leniency programme (v) Defending consumer interests (possibility of collective 
actions) (vi) The passing-on defence and indirect purchaser's standing.  
10
 See, e.g. Editorial comments, “A little more action please! – The White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules” Common Market Law Review 45(3) (2008) 609-615; Office of Fair Trading, “Response to the 
European Commission's Green Paper, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules” (2006), available at, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/office_of_fair_trading.pdf. 
11
 European Commission, “White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules”, COM (2008) 165. 
12
 Ibid., sec 2.1.   
13
 European Commission, “Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress”, SEC 
(2011) 173 final. 
14
 Together with the Recommendation, it was issued the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Towards a 
European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”, COM(2013) 401/2. 
15
 The following discussion is based on the Recommendation, op.cit note 2; Communication op.cit note 14. 
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 Depending on the type of claim, collective redress can take two forms: injunctive relief 
(claims seeking to stop unlawful practice) and compensatory actions (claims seeking 
compensation for damage suffered). 
 An opt-in principle should be the only approach to aggregate victims in collective redress 
claims. Under this model, the group includes victims who express consent to join the action.  
 A clear distinction is made between public enforcement and compensatory damages actions: 
both instruments remain institutionally independent of each other. Public enforcement 
focuses on the punitive objective-function. This function is pursued through the imposition 
of fines. Compensatory collective redress actions should serve the objective of full 
compensation, i.e. the compensation model that sets the background for the Directive on 
damages actions.
16
 Therefore, punitive damages, multiple or other damages, which lead to 
overcompensation, should be prohibited in a European collective redress mechanism.  
 The Recommendation allows for both group actions and representative actions. The 
provisions on group actions are not widely discussed in the Recommendation. It can be 
argued that the Commission’s main objective is to facilitate representative actions. This 
representation model better achieves the interests of victims, because public authorities are 
bound by their organisational mission to represent them in their best interests.  Accordingly, 
legal standing can only be granted to entities designated in advance or by entities which 
have been certified on an ad hoc basis. 
 Member States should not permit contingency fees, as this risks creating an incentive to 
conduct abusive litigation. The Commission establishes strict safeguards on third party 
funding. The funders are to be scrutinised in order to guarantee that there are no conflicts of 
interest, and that they have sufficient funds to support the legal action. Finally, the ‘loser 
pays’ principle should be predominant for reimbursing legal costs to winners. 
 
The principles outlined in the Recommendation are non-binding, and states are only encouraged to 
follow them. The Recommendation represents the preliminary Commission’s position, according to 
which an initial action has been made for the preparation of legislation for a coherent European 
framework for collective redress. Logically, it should share the best practices that would incentivise 
member states to reconsider the available collective redress schemes and to incentivise their 
development in states that have not yet adopted them.  
 
On 26 January 2018, the European Commission assessed the practical implementation of the 
Recommendation by issuing the Report.
17
 It was found that compensatory collective actions are 
available in 19 EU member states, while 9 states still do not provide any possibility to claim 
compensation collectively.
18
 After the adoption of the Recommendation, a new legislation on 
compensatory collective redress has been adopted in 4 EU member states (Belgium, France, 
Lithuania, the United Kingdom), yet only two of them (Belgium and Lithuania) have followed the 
Recommendation's proposals to a large extent. Concerning all these factors, the Commission stated 
                                                 
16
 According to article 1 of the Directive, op.cit note 1, anyone who has suffered harm by antitrust infringement can 
effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation. The Directive reaffirms the EU acquis communautaire: White 
Paper, op.cit note 11 and the judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd. 
v. Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297and Joined Cases C-295/04 to 298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-6619.  
17
 Report, op.cit note 3.  
18
 Ibid., at  2. 
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that there has been a limited follow-up of the Recommendation.
19
 On this Report, the European 
Consumer Organisation has made 2 claims: one is that where collective redress is available, it is not 




Following this, on 11 April 2018, the European Commission published two proposals for the 
directives as part as of a Commission's legislative package “New Deal for Consumers”: one regards 
a better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules; another concerns 
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. Quite 
disappointingly, the Commission did not propose a Directive on antitrust damages. It is important to 
stress that the 2013 Recommendation was published together with the draft of the Directive on 
damages actions, showing a particular interest (at that time) to increase the chances for victims to 
claim damages for harm resulting from infringements of competition law. Therefore, it was 
reasonable to expect for a progress in antitrust.   
 
The Commission's proposals will be discussed by the European Parliament and the Council. 
Therefore, it remains unclear what the final version of the directives will be. At this point, the main 




1. Strengthening consumer rights online: more transparency in online market places and on 
search results on online platforms. 
2. The possibility of representative actions: a qualified entity, such as a consumer organisation, 
will be empowered to seek redress, such as compensation, replacement or repair, on behalf 
of a group of consumers that have been harmed by an illegal commercial practice.  
3. Penalties for violations of EU consumer law: national consumer authorities will have the 
power to impose maximum fine of at least 4% of the trader’s annual turnover, particularly 
on businesses functioning cross-border and on a wide scale.  
4. Tackling dual quality of consumer products: stricter penalties for illegal practices, individual 
remedies for misled consumers and collective redress mechanisms for traders who mislead 
consumers by marketing “dual quality” goods.  
 
It can be seen that these provisions are mostly relevant for strengthening EU consumer rights, but 
they do not seem to enhance private antitrust enforcement or antitrust collective actions. In the 
absence of amendments in antitrust, the 2013 Recommendation remains the proposal that best 
reflects Commission's approach on antitrust collective redress. Therefore, the analysis of the 2013 
Recommendation is the principal subject of the following discussion.  
 
5.3 A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S APPROACH  
 
Even if it may sound paradoxical, the failure of the Commission in convincing member states to 
follow the provisions of the Recommendation should be welcomed. This is notable because the 
                                                 
19
 Report, op.cit note 3, 20. 
20




 The following discussion is based on the European Commission, “A New Deal for Consumers: Commission 
Strengthens EU Consumer Rights and Enforcement” Press Release of 11 April 2018, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3041_en.htm>; Proposal for directives, op.cit note 4-5. 
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Commission’s proposed measures/safeguards are too robust for collective actions (especially in 
antitrust) to ever be brought to the courts. The strong safeguard mechanism is rather a reflection of 
the Commission’s careful approach, which seeks to avoid any relationship with the American 
system. However, the experiences in the EU member states have shown that antitrust collective 
actions have been brought in countries that disregard some Commission measures and instead 
experiment with US-oriented tools. All these points will be discussed below. 
 
5.3.1 The Surrounding Controversies 
 
The stated goal of the Recommendation is to provide better means of access to justice, and to enable 
compensation in mass harm situations. In order to achieve this goal, the Recommendation combines 
tools that are based on the careful approach. First, there is a predominance of the ‘loser-pays’ 
principle and an opt-in measure. Second, the Commission’s model prohibits contingency fees and 
punitive damages - also, third party funding is subject to strict limitations. Third, the representative 
entities need to meet strict requirements for bringing representative actions: a non-profit making 
character, a direct relationship between the activities of entity and the violation, and sufficient 
capacity in terms of financial and human resources.
22
 Together, these tools act as robust safeguards 
against abusive litigation. However, these safeguards simultaneously reduce the incentives of 
bringing compensatory collective actions to a minimum.
23
 In essence, a defeat in a case would 
entail having to compensate the other side’s costs, which may be significant. Moreover, opt-in 
schemes are accused of attracting a too low participation rate, which absolutely diminishes the 
financial viability of collective actions.
24
 Finally, the prohibition of contingency fees lessens the 
possibilities of reaping awards outweighing the risks of litigation. Under these conditions, few 
rational actors would have willingness or the capacity to bring costly antitrust collective actions. As 
such, the objective of compensating victims in mass harm situations is likely to fail to a large 
extent, as collective actions are unlikely to be brought. As such, a large majority of victims will 
remain uncompensated. 
 
Another concern is that the Recommendation fails to lay down clear requirements on how the EU 
policy should be formed. The proposed principles are poorly defined, and create legal uncertainty 
by including many exemptions.
25
 Table 1 below explains these exemptions.  
 
Table 1. The policy exemptions in the Commission’s Recommendation on collective redress 




Each collective redress action should be 
based on an opt-in measure. 
 
An opt-out measure may be duly ‘justified 
by reasons of sound administration of 
justice.’ 
 
                                                 
22
 Recommendation, op.cit note 2, para. 4. 
23
 Some commentators argue that the EU approach on collective redress faces the ‘Catch 22’ problem, under which 
safeguards are in fact working as barriers. See C. Hodges, “Collective Redress: A Breakthrough or a Damp Sqibb?” 
Journal of Consumer Policy 37(1) (2014), 67-89, at 83.  
24
 For the discussion on low participation rates, see R. Van den Bergh, “Private Enforcement of European Competition 
Law and the Persisting Collective Action Problem” Maastricht Journal 20(1) (2013), 12-34, at 21. For the discussion 
on the financial viability, see Which?. ‘Response to European Commission Consultation on Collective Redress’ (2011), 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/which_en.pdf>. 
25
 For a discussion, see also Hodges, op.cit note 23, at 78. 
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“Loser pays” principle The losing party should reimburse the other 
side’s legal costs. 
The “loser pays” principle should be 
subject to national legal provisions. 
 
Contingency fees Member states should not permit 
contingency fees in collective actions. 
 
Such fees may be allowed if they are 
regulated by national law. 
 
Private third-party funding 
It is prohibited to base funders’ 
compensation on the amount of the 
settlement, or on the compensation granted. 
 
Funding agreement can be regulated by a 
public authority. 
The court’s role A judge should manage the case effectively 
and detect abuses as early as possible. 
The judge should carry out the necessary 
examination by his or her own initiative. 
  
The issue is that the Commission urges member states to implement the proposed principles, yet 
there is a lot of space for interpretations. But the European Commission has already observed that a 
lack of clarity in the soft law may lead to further fragmentation in the national systems.
26
 As a proof 
of this, it can be observed that the development of collective redress mechanisms has resulted in a 
number of uncoordinated initiatives during 2013-2016. Collective redress schemes were introduced 
in Lithuania in 2015, with the possibility for attorneys to sign a contingency fee agreement.
27
 The 
UK amended its Consumer Rights Act in 2015, thereby allowing opt-out antitrust collective 
proceedings.
28
 To the same extent, opt-out actions are allowed in Belgium from 2014, yet this 
possibility is only available to Belgian residents.
29
 In 2014, opt-in collective actions were 
introduced in France, but some procedural measures do not fit in the EU context.
30
 Finally, none of 
the countries that allow for opt-out collective actions in some fashion (Denmark, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands) have changed their schemes into opt-in actions. 
 
Indeed, the discrepancies between the legal systems create an uneven playing field in the internal 
market as regards antitrust damages. As a result, undertakings that have violated articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU are facing different levels of risk of being exposed to private claims from all 
potential antitrust victims, including the ones with smaller claims (typically consumers and small 
businesses). Indeed, the infringers can be exposed to such a wide-ranging collective actions if they 
are established in a claimant-friendly state, which allows for aggregating claims on the basis of an 
opt-out. It consequently leads to a so-called ‘competitive advantage’ for undertakings that have 
breached competition rules.
31
 In that regard, the opportunity for victims to claim compensation 
depends on whether they are located in a state with favourable rules on collective litigation.  
                                                 
26
 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the White Paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules - Impact assessment, SEC (2008) 405, para. 147.  
27
 In order to allow group actions, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by introducing article 441
1
. Also article 
49(6) of the Code was withdrawn. Contingency fees are allowed under article 50 of the Law on Advocacy.  
28
 Major amendment is set out in Schedule 8, entitled “Private Actions in Competition Law”. See Consumer Rights Act 
2015, available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/contents/enacted>.   
29
 Act of 28 March 2014, Official Gazette on 29 April 2014, 35201.  
30
 Class action proceedings were introduced by Law No. 2014-344 of 17 March 2014. Consumer actions are governed 
by Consumer Code, arts 423-1. One of the exceptional measure is that collective actions are only possible when the 
court asserts the defendant's liability. Another is that the Court needs to rule on the admissibility of the action and on the 
defendant's liability in the same court decision. For further discussion, see C. Gateau and A. Diallo, “How Does the 
New French Class Actions Law fit in the EU Framework?” (2014). Hogan Lovells, available at 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5d60d9ff-261a-49fc-975c-363e1124c80e>. 
31
 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and 
of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, pp. 9-10. 
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Another issue is that an uneven playing field encourages “forum shopping” - plaintiffs choose the 
most favourable forum for bringing their claims. Indeed, “forum shopping” should be understood 
both from the negative and positive sides. As regards the negative perspective, victims with smaller 
claims lack the financial resources to choose a more favourable jurisdiction.
32
 Therefore, the 
European Commission considers that “forum shopping is a privilege for the happy few.”
33
 Both 
from negative and positive perspectives can be considered the possibility for defendants to select 
the most favourable forum for defending their claims. On the one hand, “forum shopping” may 
bring uncertainties for national courts on whether they have jurisdiction. In addition, it may lead to 
a flood of claims (including the claims that lack ground) to states with favourable rules, such as the 
Netherlands.
34
 On the other hand, it allows for defendants to choose a country that may solve the 
proceedings in the most efficient way, also allowing to save litigation costs. As such, the extended 
right to bring damages claims is likely to ensure that more meritorious as well as unmeritorious 
actions will reach the courts. Another viewpoint is that EU member states with effective collective 
redress schemes may encourage other states with underdeveloped laws to amend their systems in 
order to facilitate litigation opportunities in their respective forums. Nonetheless, no one can ensure 
that the competition between national systems and their various litigation landscapes will not make 
the playing field even more uneven.  
 
Indeed, the divergence across the EU makes the possible introduction of a coherent European 
framework for collective redress highly complicated. A legally binding instrument would require 
intervention in national laws that have already schemes in own fashion. Obviously, it would be very 
complicated to define balance between the different mechanisms of member states. But if the 
Commission decided to adopt a legally binding instrument, it would be advisable to adopt a sector-
specific antitrust Directive on collective redress rather than issue a horizontal instrument. Under a 
sectorial measure, minimum standards could be set that would prevent harsh intervention in national 
laws.
35
 Moreover, it would allow better adjustment to the unique nature of antitrust litigation, which 
requires compensating victims through different distribution chains. However, the provisions in the 
Directive should be set with extreme precision, because even a small lack of clarity may lead to 
uneven implementation. As the EU practice has shown, this issue may even occur due to the 




If the EU truly seeks to achieve success in compensating victims in mass harm situations, there is a 
need to reconsider its strict approach to the American system. The introduction of one or another 
US element would not necessarily lead to abusive litigation. On the contrary, there are arguments 
that some American elements may have positive effects in safeguarding against abuse.  
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5.3.2 A Relationship with US Class Actions 
 
Throughout history, US antitrust class actions have become one of the most, if not the most 
important tool for enforcing antitrust rules. Yet, this is mainly because the American system 
combines remedies that are aimed at achieving deterrence: an opt-out measure, contingency fees, 
treble damages, the one-way fee shifting (the absence of the ‘loser-pays’ principle), joint and 
several liability, and wide-ranging discovery rules. But the American system is considered to create 
incentives for abusive litigation. This phenomenon mainly occurs if unmeritorious collective actions 
are brought to the courts, and if these actions force law-abiding defendants (especially businesses) 
to settle in order to avoid reputational and financial damage.
37
 In the US context, this issue is called 
as a “blackmail settlement.”
38
 In order to prevent the perceived American problem, the European 
Commission warns against four tools: 
 
 An opt-out system, which may jeopardize the freedom of claimants to decide whether 
they want to litigate or not.  
 Third-party funding, which are seen as a potential factor driving frivolous actions. 
 Contingency fees, which may create a risk for incentives to abuse the litigation. 
 Punitive damages, which may lead to overcompensation of claimants. 
 
However, the Commission’s approach is one-sided: these measures are shown only from the 
negative perspective, while positive aspects are ignored. 
 
With regard to an opt-out approach, the counterclaim to the Commission’s position is the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’s decision in Eschig.
39
 The Court ruled that opt-out actions are 
potentially in line with legal traditions as long as victims can effortlessly opt-out. Therefore, the 
claimant’s freedom to litigate or not to litigate can be respected even in opt-out actions. 
 
Moreover, it should be stressed that contingency fees and third party funding may have positive 
effects in facilitating meritorious litigation when they are combined with the ‘loser pays’ rule. A 
lawyer or a funder (hereafter both regarded as “investors”) bringing unmeritorious claims should 
assume the risk of being hit with the other side’s costs, if the case is lost. These costs may be 
substantial in antitrust cases, which are typically complex, and hence the costs of legal 
representation may generate substantial expenses. For example, in Germany—one of the most 
plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions—antitrust damages actions can generate significant costs to the other 
side.
40
 Another point is that investors should consider the fact that bringing antitrust claims will 
require extensive evidences, but the EU discovery is subject to many conditions and limitations.
41
 
Furthermore, performing the proportionality test of disclosure is the responsibility of national 
courts, which are unpredictable in their execution. In addition, judges are responsible for the 
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screening of whether collective actions pass the test of commonality and suitability.
42
 Under such 
circumstances, investors are mainly interested in taking meritorious cases, which will generate 
strong evidences for passing the certification and for proving damages. In contrast, speculative 
claims are weak in their nature, as they lack merit.  
 
Punitive damages do not inherently lead to overcompensation of the claimant party. The European 
Commission does not specify how expensive antitrust collective actions can be. In reality, the 
litigation costs (administrative, expertise, etc.) can be so high that they consume a large portion of 
the recovery, thereby leaving small amounts to victims.
43
 Therefore, the award of punitive damages 
may be needed to counterbalance the enforcement costs of the compensation objective. But if the 
case generates overcompensation to claimants, the surplus can be distributed on a cy-pres basis, 
under which unclaimed funds are provided to non-profit beneficiaries.
44
 This compensation 
distribution model can be well illustrated through the Rover case in the UK.
45
 The European 
Commission detected price fixing by Rover and hence required to pay £1million in compensation to 
consumers.
46
 It proved impossible to define customers to whom the antitrust violation caused harm. 
Therefore, Which?—the UK consumer organisation—received the majority of money to spend on 
information projects: one regarded informing people about car safety and another regarded 




On the basis of these points, it can be argued that the Commission missed the opportunity to suggest 
a more forceful approach. This approach should be understood as crossing the borders of the 
Commission's compensation model, which combines a number of precautionary measures. If there 
was flexibility in utilising one or another American element, there would be more possibilities to 
seek a better means of compensation. However, the US system should not be understood as the best 
fit for the EU mechanism, as it much differs in terms of rationale, design, and stated goals. Instead, 
the Commission should take a closer look at member states, which do not fully rely on the proposals 
by the Recommendation, but where antitrust collective actions have been working in practice.  
 
5.4 EU MEMBER STATES’ EXPERIMENTS WITH FORCEFUL TOOLS 
 
So far, antitrust collective litigation has been viable in three EU member states: Portugal, the 
Netherlands and the UK. The main reason is that collective proceedings can be brought on an opt-
out basis. However, this Chapter only analyses the systems of the Netherlands and the UK, while 
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the Portuguese mechanism is disregarded. In the latter country, the first opt-out antitrust damages 
claim was filed in 2016.
48
 However, it seems to be an incidental tentative action. The claim has 
been filed by the Portuguese Competition Observatory, a non-profit association of academics from a 
number of universities. The collective action seems to be brought due to academics' professional 
curiosity to experiment with the first of this type of action. It is hard to imagine that a second 
lawsuit can be brought on the same basis in the absence of private funding tools, such as attorney’s 
contingency fees or third party funding.  
 
5.4.1 The Netherlands 
 
Collective actions are governed by article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC). This provision 
allows for foundations or associations (not an individual claimant) to seek a declaratory relief, but 
DCC does not establish a possibility for a representative entity to claim compensatory damages.
49
 
Therefore, injured persons need to bring claims individually in order to obtain monetary damages. 
Another option, which makes the Dutch jurisdiction unique in the EU, is the possibility of collective 
settlements. The Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Claims (WCAM) allows for the 
Amsterdam Appeal Court to declare a binding collective settlement on all of the allegedly injured 
persons, unless someone declares to opt out.
50
 Interestingly enough, collective settlements are 
different from collective actions. The WCAM is codified in sections 7:908-7:910 of the Dutch Civil 
Code and articles 1013-1018 of the Dutch Civil Procedure Code, and not in article 3:305a of the 
DCC. It is considered that a declaratory relief may incentivise the alleged infringer to enter into a 
settlement agreement with victims for compensating damages under the WCAM. As regards the 
scope, WCAM has often been used for international settlements.
51
 In addition to the availability of 
opt-out collective settlement, the Netherlands is exceptional for in its favourable rules on the ‘loser 
pays’ principle.
52
 Furthermore, the Netherlands is one of few countries (together with Austria, 
Germany and the UK) where third party financing is allowed in practice.
53
 This type of financing is 
primarily attributed to the assignment model, where a special vehicle assigns the claims. Only on 
this basis cartel damages claims have been brought in the Netherlands. 
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In September 2010, the antitrust collective claim was instituted by Claims Funding International 
(Equilib) on behalf of victims all over Europe against KLM, Air France and Martinair.
54
 Equilib 
filed a claim exceeding 400 million euros in relation to the Commission’s decision in the air cargo 
cartel.
55
 Notably, the case was brought on behalf of direct purchasers and indirect purchasers 
(including Phillips and Ericsson). In January 2015, Equilib brought a subsequent claim against 
British Airways and Lufthansa on the same factual and legal basis as in the first case.
56
 However, it 
should be understood that neither case is a typical collective damage claim. In practice, Equilib 
buys claims from victims and brings an antitrust damage claim as its own. This financing model is 
later discussed in this Chapter. So far, Equilib’s actions have not raised concerns regarding abusive 
litigation.  
 
However, it does not mean that the Dutch mass litigation model is free from abuses in other fields. 
The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) underlined the action where the claim 
foundation started a claim on behalf of almost 200,000 consumers against the Dutch State Lottery.
57
 
The alleged violation concerned misleading information about the chances of winning. ILR Report 
stresses that the foundation’s director has been accused of distributing millions of euros of 
consumers’ financial contributions to his own pocket. However, the Report has been criticised for 
neglecting important facts.
58
 More specifically, the Report disregards that the participants of the 
foundation successfully replaced the foundation’s board. Moreover, ILR remains silent on the fact 
that the case was successfully settled, which allowed around 2.5 million class members to 
successfully recover their financial claims. 
 
In the near future, the Dutch jurisdiction should become even more plaintiff-friendly for opt-out 
collective actions. In November 2016, the Ministry of Security and Justice submitted the Bill to the 
Dutch Parliament, aiming to make collective damages actions more effective.
59
 The principal 
purpose is to remove the limitation of the current collective litigation regime that does not allow a 
collective action for monetary damages. After many formal and informal consultations, the Bill has 
been amended in January 2018 to address the previous criticisms of the 2016 proposal. The 
amended law on collective litigation is expected to be enacted in due time. In its current form, the 
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 Collective action can be brought before any District Court in the Netherlands, but only if it 
has a sufficiently close relationship to the Dutch jurisdiction. 
 The opt-out aggregation model only applies to class members who are domiciled in the 
Netherlands, and the ones who are domiciled outside are allowed to join the action only by 
opting in. 
 The representative entity needs to meet the suitability criteria: a) not-for-profit; b) strong 
governance standards; c) sufficient financial means; d) it needs to prove that reasonable 
efforts were taken to settle the case. 
 The class should include claims that are sufficiently common as regards fact or law; 
 The class can be denied by the court if it is too small, or if the combined financial interests 
are too insignificant. 
 
Despite the draft having high potential, it has been criticized by some attorneys.
61
 This criticism 
should be received with great caution, as law firms typically defend the interests of their clients in 
all forums, including policy papers. Nevertheless, there is no reason why this criticism should not 
be taken into consideration in this Chapter. The first criticism tells that the pure opt-out model may 
lead to negative outcomes, as in the US, where class action settlements bring little or no financial 
benefits to class members. Instead, it should include an opt-in model or a hybrid of opt-in/opt-out. 
Second, the provision for a not-for-profit entity stating that a representative body should not make a 
profit “through the representative entity” leaves too much space for interpretation, allowing to make 
profit outside the representative body. This criticism is line with the above-mentioned ILR Report, 
which asserts that the Dutch third-party funding is unregulated and therefore vulnerable to abuse.
62
 
It is obvious that these criticisms have ground, but critics overlook two important factors. First, the 
potential EU problems regarding an opt-out model should not be juxtaposed with the US scheme. 
American class action claims are litigated intensively and at a high cost to litigants and taxpayers, 
because an opt-out scheme is combined with other elements: treble damages, broad discovery rules, 
contingency fees, the one-way-fee shifting, jury trials, and joint and several liability. Indeed, the 
absence of one or another tool may reduce the potential of abusive litigation. This point will be 
discussed later in this Chapter (see Section 5.5). Second, other Dutch commentators observed that 
the existing safeguards function well against litigation abuses.
63
 For example, the courts have 
started applying more rigorous standards for representative entities to obtain standing. Furthermore, 
there is no proof that the increasing number of Dutch collective actions is related with 
entrepreneurial parties. In addition, the threshold for representative bodies to obtain admissibility 
has been increased, as it requires including high standards of the governance, financial capacity, 
expertise, representativeness, and experience in the decision-making process. To conclude, it is 
probably correct to say that there is no safeguard(s) that would fully prevent abusive litigation. 
What is clear is that the Dutch jurisdiction is one of the best forums for testing the potential of 
abusive litigation in the EU context, and this possibility will even rise if the Dutch Parliament will 
agree on the legislative amendment regarding collective litigation. More importantly, this 
amendment would enhance the incentives for bringing collective actions to the courts. The second 
forum, in which opt-out collective actions are in place and have been tested in practice, is the UK’s 
collective action system.    
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5.4.2  The United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, opt-in and opt-out collective actions are allowed on behalf of groups of claimants. 
Previously only opt-in schemes were allowed, but this changed in 2015 when the new Consumer 
Rights Act was adopted. Its Schedule 8 included the amendments to the Competition Act 1998 to 
provide possibilities for opt-out collective proceedings in the context of competition law 
infringements. However, both opt-in and opt-out collective actions have been unsuccessful so far. 
 
The only one opt-in collective action was the Replica Football Shirts litigation
.64
 This case clearly 
showed the reluctance of consumers to join opt-in proceedings. The collective action was organised 
by Which?, a UK consumer association. Despite a broad awareness raising campaign, only 130 
consumers participated in the action, while the violation had potentially caused harm to 2 million 
consumers. After the failure, Which? claimed that they would participate in antitrust collective 
actions only if an opt-in measure was allowed.
65
   
 
Under the new Consumer Rights Act, the opt-out collective action mechanism enables claimants 
(such as, consumers or SMEs) to claim damages for the harm caused by the competition law 
violation. In that regard, a class representative is entitled to bring collective proceedings in the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) on behalf of victims who have not left (opted out of) the 




 The group certification model requires that claims raise common issues. 
 The suitability of the potential action needs to be demonstrated before it is allowed to 
proceed to the court.  
 The Act contains a number of limitations to prevent abusive litigation: i) the class 
representative has to meet strict conditions; ii) the 'loser pays' principle is predominant; iii) 
exemplary or punitive damages are not available; iv) contingency fees are not allowed. 
 Law firms and litigation funders are not allowed to act as group representatives. 
 Opt-out collective actions can only be brought by claimants domiciled in the UK, and 
foreign claimants are required to opt for the action.  
 
Other key amendments include the following: 
  
 An opt-out collective action mechanism allows for both follow-on and stand-alone claims. 
 The CAT is empowered to approve collective settlements. The representative body is not 
permitted to agree a settlement. 
 The CAT is permitted to cap claimants’ exposure to defendants’ costs.   
 
                                                 
64
 The consumer organisation Which? brought antitrust collective action on the basis of a cartel violation that fixed the 
price of football kits. A collective claim was based on the following decisions: OFT decision of 1 August 2003 No. 
CA98/06/2003; Allsports Limited, JJB Sports plc v. Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17; Umbro Holdings Ltd, 
Manchester United plc, Allsports Limited, JJB Sports plc v. Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 22; and JJB Sports plc v 
Office of Fair Trading [2006] Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1318. 
65
 Which?, “Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress” (2011) Consultation 
Response. 
66
 The following assessment is primarily based on the Consumer Rights Act 2018, Schedule 8 and the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, Rule 79. 
130 
 
Under the new possibility, two follow-on antitrust collective actions have been brought, albeit both 
have failed in the class certification stage.  
 
In May 2016, the first one was brought by the National Pensioners Convention’s general secretary, 
Ms. Dorothy Gibson (the group representative), against Pride Mobility Products Limited (the 
defendant).
67
 The follow-on collective proceedings were based on the decision of the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT), finding that Pride Mobility Products violated competition law through a form of 
resale price maintenance between 2010 and 2012.
68
 Around 30,000 victims were included in the 
class on an opt-out basis, alleging an overpayment for mobility scooters. Class members were 
entitled to compensation of around 7.7 million pounds, or around 200 pounds each. During the class 
certification hearing in December 2016, the CAT issued a decision that the proposed subclasses 
were not well associated.
69
 As a consequence, Gibson requested to reformulate her claim. In March 
2017, the CAT objected to the proposed class of purchasers.
70
 The Tribunal asserted that the class 
representative could only bring claims on behalf of consumers who bought scooters from the eight 
infringers found by the OFT, and not from other retailers whose prices were affected by Pride’s 
violations. Upon the request of Gibson, the CAT gave a second chance to file an amended 
application, yet with the condition that stronger economic evidence quantifying the alleged 
consumer losses would be provided. In May 2017, however, Dorothy Gibson ultimately withdrew 
her action against mobility scooters.
71
 One of the reasons for dropping the case could also be the 
issue related with funding. This case was not funded by the third-party litigation funders. Instead, 
lawyers were paid on the basis of a conditional fee agreement and the after-the-event insurance was 
used to cover experts' fees and adverse costs. 
72
 It does not change the fact that claimants still need 
to pay hourly fees to attorneys, which can become an insurmountable burden. As mentioned before, 
the Consumer Rights Act prohibits the use of contingency fee agreements in opt-out collective 
actions, which would shift the financial burden from plaintiffs to law firms. 
 
In September 2016, the second collective action was brought by Walter Merricks, a former 
Financial Services Ombudsman, in the case Merricks v MasterCard.
73
 A claim has been filed on 
behalf of 46 million British consumers (including indirect purchasers) against MasterCard, which 
imposed illegal charges from 1992 to 2007. The collective action was brought on behalf of victims 
who used Mastercard for purchasing goods or services in the UK within the violation period. The 
claim was based on a finding made by the European Commission in 2007.
74
 The value of the claim 
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was around 14 billion pounds, making it the largest legal claim in the UK’s history. The litigation 
funder (the Chicago-based company Gerchen Keller Capital) agreed to provide funding (up to 40 
million pounds) to finance the lawsuit. However, the CAT refused an application for an opt-out 
collective proceedings order in July 2017.
75
 The Tribunal found that the claims were adjudicated 
inappropriately for collective proceedings. More specifically, the methodology put forward was 
unsuitable for quantifying the aggregate award of damages for the whole class.
76
 In that regard, the 
CAT asserted that the claim lacks a ‘plausible way of reaching even a very rough-and-ready 
approximation of the loss suffered by each individual claimant.’
77
 In order to succeed, the claimants 
are required to use an effective methodology for estimating an aggregate value of individual 
damages claims and a ‘reasonable and practicable’ method for calculating individual loss.
78
 A very 
concerning factor is that the CAT may have reduced the optimism for bringing indirect purchasers’ 
actions, because a narrow interpretation relating to the methodology for estimating aggregate losses 
was provided.
79
 Despite the negative aspects, the positive point is that the Tribunal approved both 
the class representation and third-party funding.  
 
In both judgements, the CAT has proved to be strict when evaluating the suitability for class 
certification, regardless if the claim is big or small. In other words, the Tribunal is prepared to 
carefully look at the credibility of the methodology utilised to prove the commonality and feasibility 
of potential collective claims.
80
 In spite of failure, these cases should not be understood as the early 
death of collective actions in the UK. Instead, they should be seen as important guidance for future 
claimants on how opt-out collective actions should be structured to be able to meet the criteria for 
class certification. Claimants should focus on smaller and more homogenous groups, and, if not, it 
is better to prevent the bringing of such actions.
81
 Indeed, a smaller group will enable the class 
representative to deliver a better approximation of aggregated damages and individual losses. 
Another and more inspiring lesson is that the Tribunal is more lenient as regards the approval of the 
group representative and the flexibility for third-party funders to finance collective actions.  
 
5.4.3  Third Party Funding and Contingency Fees 
 
These cases show that mass claims (with the unique exception in Portugal) should be reinforced by 
third party funding and opt-out schemes. Another form of third party funding for financing antitrust 
collective claims has been the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle. Under this model, the operations 
are limited to the purchase or the assignment of claims (varying from several to dozens), thereby 
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taking the hassle of subsequent enforcement. As a consequence, the assignment of claims is limited 
to cases that individually generate significant damages, usually after the European Commission’s 
DG Competition’s decision in cartel cases. So far, the most prominent private litigator has been the 
Cartel Damage Claims SA (CDC), a company incorporated under Belgian law but with its main 
activities being performed in Germany. However, the future of the CDC (and other SPV) has 
become very unclear after the Düsseldorf District Court’s decision.
82
 In that case 36 damaged 
companies purchased the cartel-related claim to the CDC. The Court dismissed the claim because 
the CDC was found to have insufficient funds to cover the other side’s costs if the defendant won 
the case.
83
 This case shows what the ‘loser pays’ principle can act as an effective deterrent against 
abusive litigation, but it also can serve as a device for significantly reducing the investor’s 
possibilities to bring damages claims. However, some countries (as for example mentioned in the 
Netherlands) have more lenient rules on the ‘loser pays’ principle. Therefore, the magnitude of 
deterrence depends on a country-by-country basis. 
 
The major problem is that third party funding is quite unpopular or unavailable in EU states, except 
for the ones mentioned before. Another funding option for collective actions is contingency fee 
agreements, where fees (a percentage of the class recovery) are paid only if the case was won. 
However, contingency fees are prohibited in most states; legal standing is typically limited to public 
authorities.
84
 Few countries allow contingency fee agreements in the event of collective actions, but 
these agreements have not been utilised in case of antitrust collective litigation.
85
 Another option is 
conditional fee agreements, under which attorneys/litigators receive an hourly fee, but a success fee 
is also paid if the case won. However, this funding option is highly limited in collective actions, 
because claimants are still required to pay hourly legal fees for attorneys, which may be substantial. 
 
5.5 LITIGATION ABUSES: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE US AND THE EU 
 
The experiences and initiatives discussed above show that combining third-party litigation and opt-
out schemes does not attract the perceived issue of ‘blackmail settlement’. This is not surprising, 
given that the occurrence of this phenomenon in the EU context is highly unlikely. Even if 
contingency fees (accused of attracting ‘a “fishing expedition”’
86
) were combined with opt-out 
schemes, there is a low likelihood of plaintiffs being able to compel businesses to settle cases 
lacking merit. Still, there would be significant differences in the private antitrust enforcement 
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Permits an award of treble damages 
 
 
Allows the award of full compensation, 
which prevents the overcompensation of 
claimants 
 
Discovery Liberal party-initiated discovery 
 
The discovery is only possible when the 
court approves the proportionality of the 
request 
 
Cost allocation method One-way-fee shifting rule 
 






Joint and several 
 
Joint and several 
Final outcome Jury trials Court decision 
 






It can be seen that deterrence-based measures are particularly unique for the US mechanism, except 
for the joint and several liability. In the first place, federal antitrust laws allow automatic awards of 
treble damages to plaintiffs.
87
 Indeed, this measure can expose the defendant to significant potential 
costs.
88
 The extent of damages can be even more significant considering that defendants in class 
actions may also face joint and several liability for all damages caused by the violation, with no 
possibility to contribution from co-infringers.
89
 This means that even small players are potentially 
subject to significant damages. For example, assume the hypothetical situation that the class action 
has been brought against 10 co-violators, and as a result 9 of them settle. If the case is lost, the 
unsettled violator would face the combined treble damages for all defendants’ actions (potentially 3 
times the combined infringers’ damages) without a possibility of contribution from the other 9 
violators. This forces the wrongdoers to settle as early as possible to avoid the trebled liability for 
all the violators’ anti-competitive actions.
90
 To make plaintiffs’ claims even stronger, the liberal 
party-initiated discovery permits plaintiffs to propound broad discovery request that entail 
substantial expenses.
91
 Another unique measure is that the US antitrust law is based on the one-way 
fee shifting rule, according to which plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees, but this provision does 
not apply to defendants.
92
 In addition, antitrust class actions should end in jury trials, thereby 
conferring a component of “unpredictability.”
93
 When also combined with opt-out and contingency 
fees, plaintiffs may force defendants (in cases with favourable conditions) to even settle cases 
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lacking merit. Further assessment of the criticism of the US rules on class actions through empirical 
observation can be found in Chapter 3.     
 
Under the EU approach, only the concept of joint and several liability—embedded in Article 11 of 
the Directive on damages actions—can be considered a sort of deterrence-based measure; however, 
its forcefulness depends on what measures are combined. Under this provision, violators (with the 
exception of leniency applicants) are jointly and severally liable for all the loss caused by antitrust 
violation, until victims fully recover the harm. On this point, it should be stressed that the 
Commission’s approach on collective redress does not specify whether joint and several liability 
should be allowed in collective actions. However, given that Article 1 of the Directive allows for 
anyone who has suffered harm caused by antitrust infringement to claim compensation, it is most 
likely that this concept is also in line with antitrust collective actions. Some American measures 
listed in Table 2 are contrary to the EU legal traditions, at least in theory. As regards trebling of 
damages, it may lead to the unjust enrichment of claimants. Broad discovery rules may jeopardise 
the effectiveness of the leniency system. The ‘loser pays’ principle is one of the central safeguards 
against abusive litigation in collective actions. As regards jury trials, they are predominantly 
allowed in US antitrust class actions. It therefore remains questionable whether blackmailing would 
be possible in the absence of the all American elements listed in Table 2, and only if opt-out 
schemes, contingency fees and the concept of joint and several liability were combined. What is 
clear is that other crucial elements that cause blackmail are not included. First, one of the major 
issues is the wide discovery rules, which require a responding party to bear the costs of the other 
side’s requests. It therefore may generate massive costs for defendants (typically a corporation) as it 
holds a number of documents and items, while claimants have relatively small number of 
responsive discovery material.
94
 Also, there is a high risk of an unsuccessful outcome in the US 
context, because jury members are likely to view the defendant (usually a large corporation) 
negatively, regardless of whether it abides by the law or not. When this risk is combined with the 
possibility of trebling of damages, opt-out aggregation model and joint and several liability, 
defendants are incentivised to settle the case rather than risking going to final proceedings. 
Therefore, it can be observed that the potential of blackmail settlement is high when all measures of 
deterrence are pooled. But, after all, determining the potential of abusive litigation is very 
complicated, because the combination of opt-out schemes, contingency fees and the concept of joint 
and several liability has been untested in the EU context.  
 
What is clear is that two factors may reduce the incentives for wrongdoers to abuse the litigation. 
One factor is that the “loser pays” principle is reinforced by the lawyer’s disciplinary liability rules 
in the national context. For example, an attorney can be removed from the bar if he or she acts 
contrary to professional conduct.
95
 Another factor is that courts are closely involved in the 
proceedings, especially in the discovery, thereby allowing for the judge to decide whether 
disclosure requests are proportional or not.
96
 It also requires closer monitoring of group interests, 
especially in the certification stage. Nevertheless, it is clear that the phenomenon of abusive 
litigation may occur in different forms in the EU member states: first, each jurisdiction has 
introduced collective redress schemes in its own fashion; second, different safeguards have been 
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introduced in order to prevent litigation abuses. When the abovementioned provisions are 
combined, an even more important factor should be observed, in particular the possibility of 
litigation abuses appearing in different forms. Given the large financial interests at stake, group 
representatives (the lead plaintiff and the group advocate) may represent the group members 
inadequately in order to maximise their own benefits. The first possibility is that they will set 
disproportionally high contingency fees. The second one is that group members will not be properly 
informed about their rights to leave the group. The third option is that group representatives will 
make early settlements with defendants, generating low awards. The fourth one is that the 
undistributed awards of the group would be distributed in an abusive way.
97
 When compared to the 
‘blackmail settlement’, these abuses are more realistic in the EU context. Indeed, victims with small 
claims are not well aware of the case or its foundations. Typically, the group members give 
complete freedom to the group representatives, who can structure the case for their own benefit.  
 
To sum up, when shaping the future of collective litigation, EU legislators should pay particular 
attention to the member states’ schemes (even if they differ to some extent) rather than relying on 
the US system, which is different in its stated objectives and legal traditions. Then again, the 
introduction of certain American elements does not necessarily lead to the perceived American 
problems, as proved by experiences in the EU states. It is probably unrealistic that the European 
Commission will adopt a Directive for antitrust collective redress any time soon. An incremental 
step forward would be if the EU issued a sector-specific recommendation on compensatory 
collective actions in the field of antitrust, but this time including provisions (in some fashion) on 
opt-out schemes, contingency fees and third party funding. Hopefully, the European Commission 
will take positive actions in the following few years. Otherwise, national schemes will deviate too 
far from each other. The study commissioned by the European Parliament found significant 
divergences among member states in 2018, especially as regards: a) the scope of national collective 
redress schemes (horizontal versus sectoral approach); b) claims aggregation system (opt-in versus 
opt-out); c) standing (representative entities versus class members); d) financial issues (costs of 
proceedings, lawyers’ fees and the application of the “loser-pays” rule).
98
 Indeed, the existing 
divergences make the creation of a harmonised collective redress mechanism a complicated matter. 
Therefore, the study calls for an immediate European legislature to ensure access to justice and 
sound administration of justice.
99
 Furthermore, it should be recalled that the European Commission 
found that 9 member states still do not provide possibilities for collective claims. If individual 
actions were taken to introduce collective redress mechanism into national schemes, there is a high 
potential of divergences becoming even broader and deeper. In turn, creating a common approach 
for antitrust collective litigation (or any other sectoral field) will become very complex, if not 
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The research question of this Chapter was the following: 
 
What impact has the Recommendation on collective redress brought on the member states’ policy 
on collective redress, and what effect could its provisions have if the Recommendation ever takes a 
binding form? How do EU-style provisions on collective redress interact with US class actions? 
 
When addressing this question, it was found that the success of EU compensatory collective actions 
is directly related with the American style measures. The European Commission should decide soon 
whether antitrust collective redress should be regulated at the EU level. If a positive decision is 
taken, the suggestion would be to rely on the schemes of proactive member states, and hence to 
allow some flexibility in using US-style remedies. But the current Commission's approach on the 
basis of a careful approach should be denied, as it will have little or no impact on compensating 
victims. Following this basis, the following findings were made.  
 
1) The 2013 Recommendation has failed to incentivise member states to adopt or amend the 
existing collective redress schemes on the basis of the proposed principles 
 
The development of collective redress mechanisms has resulted in a number of uncoordinated 
initiatives, mainly disregarding the Commission's proposals to a greater or lesser degree. 
Furthermore, none of the countries that allow for opt-out collective actions have replaced their 
schemes with the opt-in aggregation model.  
 
2) If the Recommendation on collective redress ever takes a binding form, the incentives for 
bringing compensatory collective actions would be reduced to a minimum 
 
The proposed safeguards against abusive litigation are so robust that collective actions are highly 
unlikely to be brought. Furthermore, opt-in schemes attract a small number of participants, making 
collective actions unprofitable. In addition, rational actors are unlikely to be willing to invest in 
antitrust collective actions. 
 
3) The European Commission missed the opportunity to suggest a more forceful approach on 
collective redress  
 
Contrary to the European Commission's reasoning, the US class action mechanism should not be 
understood as only bringing negative impacts on antitrust litigation. The criticism rather depends on 
whether deterrence-based measures are included, and how many of them are combined. The 
American system includes various remedies aimed at ensuring deterrence: an opt-out measure, 
contingency fees, treble damages, the one-way fee shifting (the absence of the ‘loser-pays’ 
principle), joint and several liability, and broad discovery rules. However, the US mechanism 
should not be considered as the best fit for the EU model, as both have different goals. Instead, the 
European Commission should look more carefully at member states, which do not entirely follow 
the suggestions of the Recommendation, but where antitrust collective actions have been brought to 
courts. An increase in antitrust collective litigation can be found in the Netherlands and the UK. 
These states clearly demonstrate that an opt-out measure is the key element in ensuring 
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compensation in antitrust mass actions, yet it still has to be reinforced by additional incentives to 
sue, like third party funding. Therefore, these proactive states send a clear message to the EU 
legislators: compensatory collective actions are possible in the EU context, but only if there is a 
possibility to utilise one or another American element. 
 
In addition, it was determined that the American issue of “blackmail settlement” has a much lower 
potential in the EU context, even if opt-out schemes were combined with contingency fees and/or 
third-party funding. This is notable because “blackmail settlement” occurs due to a combination of 
American style remedies, including broad discovery rules, one-way-fee shifting and jury trials. 
Nevertheless, the European Commission should be aware of other types of litigation abuses. One of 
the main possibilities is that group representatives will represent group members inadequately. It 
means that they can structure the case in a way that they will obtain disproportionally high 
compensation at the expense of group members. Even though this behaviour is realistic, its 
possibility is diminished due to available safeguards (such as the “loser pays” principle and national 
ethics rules). In any case, no one can ensure that litigation abuses would not appear in some fashion 
in the EU states. Nonetheless, it is preferable to have workable collective redress schemes with a 
minimal possibility of abusive litigation than to have schemes without a future, as it is foreseen 































5.7 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS 
 
Page Description of amendment Explanation 
115 
The original title of the article is 
changed. 
The need to change arises from the fact that at the time when publishing the article, 
the 2013 Recommendation was under the review by the European Commission. 
During the revision of Chapter 5, the analysis of the Report of the 2013 
Recommendation, also other relevant points were added. Therefore, the primary title 
lost its rationale.   
115 
Amendment in Abstract of the Chapter. The need to change arises from the fact that at the time when publishing the article, 
the 2013 Recommendation was under the review by the European Commission and 
in 2018 its Report was published.  
116 
Discussion about the European 
Commission’s Report on the 2013 
Recommendation on collective redress 
and the legislative package “New Deal 
for Consumers”.  
This was not included in the published article, because the Report was published in 
January 2018, while the legislative package “New Deal for Consumers” in April 
2018. 
Additional references are added, numbered 3-5. 
118 
The amendment of the wording in the 
title of Section 5.2.   
This was needed, because the European Commission recently adopted policy 
documents, which were yet not available when the article was published: Report and 
proposals for directives. 
119-
120 
Discussion about the European 
Commission’s Report on the 2013 
Recommendation on collective redress. 
This was not included in the published article, because this policy document was 
adopted in January 2018.  
Additional references are added, numbered 17-21.  
125-
126 
The analysis of the Portuguese 
collective action system is shortened. 
The antitrust class action that has been brought in Portugal seems to rather be an 
exception than the rule. Therefore, the inclusion of the Portuguese system would be 
excessive in the context of the PhD research.  
126-
128 
Additional analysis on the collection 
action system in the Netherlands. 
The proposal for amending the Dutch Bill was proposed, aiming to facilitate 
collective actions. In addition, the 2018 Commission’s Report and the 2017 ILR 
Report were published. These amendments demands further thoughts.  
Various references are added.  
129-
131 
Additional analysis on the collective 
action system in the UK.   
The comparison between opt-out and opt-in antitrust collective litigation practices 
was lacking in the original published article. 
New developments occurred in the first opt-out antitrust collective actions: both 
cases were dismissed in the certification stage. 
Various references are added.    
133 
The amendment in Table 2.  The point on "claims' aggregation model" is added to make a comparative analysis 
more insightful between the EU and the US.  
133 
Additional discussion about the joint 
and several liability in the context of 
the American system.  
It gives a broader picture about the impact of deterrence-based measures on abusive 
litigation.  
Additional references are added, numbered 89-90. 
134 
Discussion about the joint and several 
liability in the EU Directive on 
damages actions. 
It gives a broader picture about the role of the joint and several liability on collective 
actions in the EU context.  
135 
Amendment regarding the potential 
developments in antitrust collective 
redress.   
The changes are needed because of the latest European Commission's publications: 
1) the Report of the 2013 Recommendation; 2) the proposals for the directives on 
consumer protection. Moreover, a study was published by the European Parliament 
in October 2018, which overviews the divergences in EU member states. 
















































6 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTITRUST COLLECTIVE LITIGATION IN 






Policy preferences in the US shape private antitrust remedies in the form of deterrence; any 
compensation failures can be justified as long as the deterrent function is successful. In contrast, 
EU private antitrust enforcement seeks to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm from a 
violation of competition law can effectively exercise their right to claim full compensation; 
deterrence can be seen as a mere side effect. This paper will demonstrate that full compensation is 
unfeasible in practice, because compensating direct purchasers and indirect purchasers will 
inevitably fail to a greater or lesser degree. Second, it will show that the EU’s compensation-based 
mechanism, with a specific emphasis on full compensation, has more of a need for deterrence-based 
tools than the deterrence-focused mechanism of the US.  
 





Traditionally, the enforcement of the competition law system of the European Union has been the 
exclusive competence of the EU’s public enforcer - the European Commission. However, after the 
adoption of Council Regulation 1/2003, the national competition authorities (NCAs) and national 
courts were empowered to enforce EU antitrust rules alongside the Commission.
1
 Time has shown 
that member states have successfully enforced EU competition rules in the national context.
2
 
Therefore, public enforcement has reached a point of stability and maturity over the last decade. In 
contrast, private enforcement is underdeveloped in compensating consumers and SME’s, especially 
if they are indirect purchasers. Due to the ineffective right to claim damages, victims are losing 
billions of euros per year.
3
 However, it is true that several direct purchaser actions have been 
brought in the EU member states, yet the disputes have mainly been between large corporations.  
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December 2012. For the further discussion, see Wils 2013, pp. 295-296. 
3
 Renda et al. (2008), p. 11. 
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The ineffectiveness of the private antitrust enforcement regime has created more incentives for the 
European Commission to enhance damages actions. The search for an appropriate system of private 
antitrust enforcement has culminated in the adoption of the Directive on antitrust damages actions
4
 
and the Recommendation on collective redress mechanisms.
5
 Although the Recommendation takes 
the form of a horizontal framework (across all legal fields), its relevance for competition law is 
particularly highlighted by the fact that it was adopted simultaneously with the Proposal for a 
Directive on damages actions. For the purposes of this study, the latter package, consisting of the 
Directive and the Recommendation, is called the EU private antitrust reform.   
 
The reform is focused on the objective of compensation, while deterrence can be seen as only a side 
effect. The Directive requires all EU member states to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm 
due to an infringement of competition law can effectively exercise their right to claim full 
compensation.
6
 This means that each financial victim down the supply chain, including the end 
consumer, is entitled to actual loss, loss of profit plus interest. This Chapter will discuss to what 
extent the EU private antitrust reform is capable of achieving the objectives of full compensation.  
 
The EU's compensation approach stands in contrast with that of the United States, where antitrust 
policy preferences shape private remedies in the form of deterrence. Indeed, the availability of 
deterrence-oriented remedies incentivized the development of the so-called "private attorney 
general", i.e. a lawyer who enforces the laws so aggressively that private remedies have become a 




A. Research question and scope 
 
To what extent can the EU private antitrust reform achieve the objective of full compensation? 
What is the impact of antitrust collective litigation on full compensation, and what is the role (if 
any) of US-style deterrence-based measures in this respect?  
 
The following steps are taken to address this question. First, Chapter 6 gives a general overview 
about the private antitrust enforcement schemes on both sides of the Atlantic: the EU's 
compensation-oriented one and the US deterrence-based one. Second, it examines to what extent 
the key provisions of the EU private antitrust reform are capable of achieving the objectives of full 
compensation. More specifically, Chapter 6 discusses the impact of the indirect purchasers' rule and 
how the EU private antitrust reform interacts with public enforcement. Third, it scrutinises the 
potential impact of US deterrence-based measures in the EU compensation-oriented system.  
 
As regards the scope, Chapter 6 is the most important in exploring the background and extent of the 
principle of full compensation. For this reason, a specific emphasis is given to the Directive on 
damages actions, and especially as regards its objectives and functions. To that extent, the 
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Recommendation of collective redress is considered representing the European Commission's 
approach on antitrust collective actions, and it is examined accordingly in the context of full 
compensation. To sum up, the Chapter's main objective is to examine the impact of damages 
actions, and collective actions especially, on full compensation. As regards deterrence, it is 
discussed only as regards the means of fulfilling full compensation.  
 
B. Methodology and limitations 
 
In this Chapter, the comparative research study primarily combines structural and analytical 
approaches. As regards the structural approach, it compares a set of components that characterise 
the EU’s compensation-based and the US deterrence-oriented private antitrust enforcement 
schemes. The analytical approach is twofold. First, it is used to separate the main elements of the 
EU private antitrust reform, and to evaluate their potential to contribute for achieving full 
compensation. Second, it is applied to isolate the respective private antitrust elements within the 
compared EU and US systems, with the main focus on collective/class actions. The latter study is 
helpful for understanding the potential impact of the US-style elements in the EU context, if any. 
Contrary to other chapters, this paper neither includes a deeper evaluation of the available empirical 
data nor a deeper assessment of the case law in the field. It mainly conducts the EU-US comparative 
study based on concepts, provisions and principles. 
 
At first glance, two limitations can be observed. First, the chosen approach may only provide a 
conceptual or preliminary understanding of the EU-US comparative analysis. Second, comparing 
the concepts and provisions between the EU and the US is highly complicated, because both 
systems are inherently distinct: the US being deterrence-oriented (and more forceful) and the EU 
being compensation-based (and more careful). In the context of these limitations, it should also be 
taken into consideration that this Chapter is a part of the overall framework of the PhD dissertation. 
Therefore, the conclusions made in this Chapter are based on the findings in other chapters, which 
combine a variety of case-law and empirical studies. However, as discussed throughout the 
dissertation, the main research limitation is that there is a lack of practical examples of collective 
actions in the EU context and that the US system provides insufficient empirical data about the 
effectiveness of antitrust class actions. In order to mitigate these limitations as much as possible, 
different research techniques are combined in the dissertation.   
 
C. Overview of research material 
 
The main emphasis is on the extent of principle of full compensation, and how this principle has 
evolved. Therefore, a particular focus is given to the EU’s policy documents, including inter alia 
the Directive on damages actions and the 2005 Green Paper and the 2008 White Paper on damages 
actions. As regards collective redress, the most important are the Recommendation on collective 
redress and the Communication "Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective 
Redress". The analysis has been as well based on by reflections of Hodges, Kuijpers and Peyer. For 
a comparative analysis with the US system, the works of Crane are of particular importance, 
especially as regards the views on the progression of compensation-oriented schemes and on the 
importance of deterrence-based remedies in the EU system. While the Crane’s study concentrates 
on the 2008 White Paper, this Chapter expands his study in the context of the EU private antitrust 
reform. The author of this dissertation had an advantage of having a direct contact with prof. Crane 
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(one of the most prominent American scholars in private antitrust enforcement), who was his 
supervisor during the research stay at the University of Michigan. Crane’s critical approach on the 
US private antitrust enforcement has been heavily criticised by other American scholars, such as 
Lande and Davis. However, the criticism of Lande and Davis is not discussed in this Chapter, as its 
emphasis is on the EU’s compensation-based mechanism. These contrasting views are carefully 




This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the basic definitions and 
objectives of enforcement models in EU competition law, with a particular emphasis on private 
enforcement. Section 3 describes the antitrust policy preferences under private remedies in the US 
and in the EU. Section 4 assesses how the key provisions of the EU private antitrust reform interact 
with the principle of full compensation. Section 5 analyses the impact of deterrence-based remedies 
in the EU compensatory collective actions.  
 
6.2 THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
6.2.1 A General Background of the Enforcement of EU Competition Law 
 
The main competition rules of the EU are set out in articles 101 and 102 in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
8
 Article 101 prohibits agreements or concerted 
practices between two or more undertakings which have the objective of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition within the internal market. Article 102 prohibits the abuse of a dominant 
position by one or more undertakings in a particular market within the EU, insofar as it distorts 
trade between member states. In general, the enforcement of competition law primarily seeks to 
remedy anti-competitive situations. This is to be achieved by pursuing the following three 
objectives through two models of enforcement: public and private enforcement.  
 
1. To identify the violation and to clarify the surrounding legal situation. 
 
This objective has been pursued mainly through public enforcement, which operates within a two-
tiered system: the European Commission's DG Competition at the EU level, and the NCAs at the 
national levels. Private enforcers are motivated by private gains and hence mainly pick up low-risk 
cases, while competition authorities have better investigatory tools and are able to coordinate their 
activities with other public authorities.  
 
2. To punish the perpetrator and to deter from breaching the law in the future.  
 
The deterrent function is pursued through the imposition of competition fines, which punish the 
infringer (in other words, specific deterrence). It also deters other persons from engaging in, or 
continuing, behaviour that is contrary to the competition rules (in other words, general deterrence).
9
 
                                                 
8
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13. 
9
 For the discussion on both types of deterrence, see European Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines 
imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C 210/2, para. 4. 
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According to the EU, public enforcement is considered to have sufficient means for achieving 
deterrence.
10
 In this respect, it must be borne in mind that the EU competition law exclusively 
focuses on imposing fines on infringing businesses, but member states are given space to introduce 
other types of penalties.
11
 In order to combat cartels, some EU member states have incorporated 
criminal sanctions on individuals (such as imprisonment or criminal fines) in their antitrust 
enforcement schemes.
12
 However, these sanctions have very rarely been imposed in practice.
13
 
Therefore, public authorities in the EU jurisdictions have failed in setting an example for criminal 
penalties being effectively utilized in public enforcement. 
 
3. To achieve corrective justice when the infringement has taken place. 
 
This goal can be pursued if two conditions are met.
14
 First, corrective justice is achieved if the 
monetary remedy deprives from any benefit the wrongdoer gained from illegal conduct. This 
measure may be used when public enforcers impose a sub-optimal fine. As such, the enforcement 
may be reinforced by imposing additional fines on the wrongdoer in order to fully remedy the anti-
competitive situation. Second, corrective justice is achieved when victims are compensated for the 
harm suffered. According to the Directive on damages actions, the objective of compensation is 
fulfilled when victims effectively exercise the right to claim and to obtain full compensation for the 
harm suffered. However, this objective should not lead to overcompensation of the claimants, 
whether by means of punitive, multiple or other kind of damages.
15
 For this reason, the enforcement 
of the first condition may not comply with the principle of full compensation, as additional fines 
(besides damages on fully compensating victims) may be required to ensure corrective justice. As a 
consequence, only the second condition will be further discussed in this Chapter.   
 
The achievement of full compensation is primarily realized through private enforcement. Antitrust 
victims may bring a claim for damages or for injunctive relief.
16
 However, claims for damages are 
more attractive, as financial benefits are expected. In contrast, injunctions only aim to cease the 
violations of victims’ rights granted by EU law. The antitrust claim may be brought on a stand-
alone basis or on a follow-on basis. The former action is popular in the United Kingdom, while the 




To sum up, the EU seeks to create an effective system of private enforcement that "complements, 
but does not replace or jeopardise, public enforcement."
18
 However, it is true that effective private 
enforcement, allowing for a multitude of victims to obtain compensation, can also serve a 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, Italianer (2013).  
11
 Regulation 1/2003 did not harmonise sanctions for antitrust violations. This is probably because the EU seeks to 
comply with article 83(2) of the TFEU, which preserves the sovereignty of the EU member states in criminal matters. 
For the discussion on the issue, see Günsberg (2015), pp. 55-59. 
12
 For the study, see Jones and Harrison (2014); Whelan (2012). 
13
 See, for example, Jones and Harrison, supra note 12; Slotboom (2013).  
14
 For the additional discussion, see Wils (2009), p. 3. 
15
 Directive, supra note 4, Art. 3. 
16
 The injunctions, for example, are allowed under the Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers interests [2009] OJ L 110. 
17
 The exception of a stand-alone case in a civil law country can be found in the Lithuanian jurisdiction. See AB flyLAL-
Lithuanian Airlines v. Air Baltic Corporation A/S and Airport Riga, Decision of the Court of Appeals of Lithuania of 31 
December 2008, civil case No. 2-949/2008. For the discussion on stand-alone actions in the UK, see Kuijpers et al. 
(2017), pp. 56-58 
18





 The basic idea is that if more victims are compensated (especially if these 
claims would not otherwise be litigated), there are broader possibilities to force the wrongdoers to 
internalize the negative effects of the damage caused. This includes not only the amount of damages 
(awarded, or settled), but also attorneys and experts fees, and administrative expenses. Therefore, 
successful compensatory actions may deter potential wrongdoers from two perspectives: first, 
because of the aggregate value of damages; second, because of the combination of case-related 
costs. Until now, however, private enforcement has had little effect on compensation, and the 
impact on deterrence is likely absent. This is for at least two reasons. First, the actions for damages 
have been mainly brought in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.
20
 Second, the cartel damages 
claims have been mostly brought by corporations, meaning that ordinary consumers have been 




In conclusion, it should be stressed that the principal aim of this paper is to analyse the role of 
private enforcement, and collective actions especially, in fulfilling the objective of full 
compensation. Deterrence is analysed only as regards the means of achieving full compensation. 
Furthermore, the discussion on clarifying the terms of antitrust violations is disregarded in this 
Chapter.  
 
6.2.2 The Evolution of Private Antitrust Remedies 
 
Traditionally, the enforcement of EU competition law has mostly been carried out by the European 
Commission. The situation changed dramatically when the enforcement of competition law was 
amended by the Regulation 1/2003. The key measures included, inter alia, the following: (a) 
stimulating national courts’ activity in the enforcement of EU competition law; (b) decentralizing 
the enforcement of EU competition rules, and (c) strengthening the possibility for individuals to 
seek redress before national courts. Thus, the aim of facilitating private enforcement was on the 
EU’s agenda. At the same time as the EU legislators were taking the aforementioned steps, the 
objective to improve antitrust damages actions was reinforced by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) ruling in Courage v. Crehan.
22
 The Court held that private antitrust actions 
contribute to the effective enforcement of competition law, and hence victims should be able to 




Following the CJEU decision, the Commission aimed at identifying key barriers to the further 
promotion of antitrust damage actions in its policy proposals in the Green Paper
24
 and the White 
Paper.
25
 Both papers recognized the need for collective redress mechanisms in the field of antitrust. 
While the Green Paper did not specify the types of collective actions, the White Paper suggested a 
combination of two complementary mechanisms of collective redress: representative actions and 
                                                 
19
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress" 
COM (2013) 401/2.  
20
 For the discussion on these jurisdictions, see Kuijpers et. Al., supra note 17. 
21
 BarentKrans (2015). In 2015, there were 65 pending cartel damages claims in Europe, but one was brought outside 
the EU (in Belarus). It seems that no end-consumer/citizen collective claims have been brought. 
22
 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297.  
23
 Ibid, paras. 26-28. 
24
 Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules COM (2005) 672 final. 
25
 White Paper, supra note 18. 
146 
 
opt-in collective actions. Although both papers identified problems that needed to be addressed, 
only in 2013 the European Commission eventually conclude its long-awaited package on antitrust 
damages claims. The most important step was taken in November 2014, when the EU adopted the 
Directive on damages actions. It is designed to remove obstacles to compensation for victims of 
infringements of EU competition law, and to balance interests between public and private 
enforcement. Member states were required to implement the provisions of the Directive in their 
national legal systems by the end of 2016. However, countries struggled to implement the Directive 
into national laws: only 5 countries managed to do it in time.
26
 The Directive should be strongly 
criticized for not including provisions on collective redress actions. These actions are the main, if 
not the only tool for small-stakes actions to be heard in courts, as pursuing them individually is 
financially unfeasible. In order to facilitate the situation, the Recommendation on collective redress 
was published. However, the Recommendation is not very helpful, since it is a non-binding 
document and does not incentivise member states to take actions. Another viewpoint is that the 
Recommendation takes a horizontal approach, and as such, its content applies to all areas of law. 
Given that the Recommendation was adopted together with the draft on the Directive, it shows a 
particular desire for more extensive private litigation within the area of competition law. Yet, 
ultimately, the reality is that no measures on collective redress were included in the Directive on 
competition damages.  
 
Although DG Competition was in favour of antitrust collective litigation, it was not included in the 
Directive for at least three reasons.
27
 First, the European Commission sought to introduce a 
legislative instrument before the end of the mandate in 2015; only an uncontroversial proposal 
could pass in the European Council. The inclusion of collective redress actions, being inherently 
controversial due to the so-called American problems of abusive litigation, could jeopardize the 
very adoption of the Directive. Second, the principal aim was to clarify terms on the leniency 
program, especially after the CJEU decision in Pfleiderer.
28
 It was considered that the availability 
of collective actions could raise uncertainties for leniency applicants, and they would refrain from 
coming forward if there was even a minimal possibility of being exposed to private claims from all 
victims. Third, DG Competition primarily aimed to address the technical issues on damages claims, 
such as limitation periods, joint and several liability, etc. Therefore, a political decision was taken to 
not include collective claims, which could distort the negotiation process on technical issues. 
 
In light of these reasons, only the Recommendation was proposed, for which a four-year trial period 
was given. The need for further legislative measures in the field of collective redress will be 
decided on the basis of member states’ experiences. 
 
6.3 POLICY PREFERENCES UNDER ANTITRUST PRIVATE ACTIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
6.3.1 The Deterrence-Oriented Approach in the United States 
                                                 
26
 European Commission (2016) Directive on antitrust damages actions.  
27
 The discussion on "three reasons" is based on the analysis of Hodges (2014), pp. 74-75.  
28
 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161.    
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The US Supreme Court has ruled that antitrust private actions serve two objectives: compensation 
and deterrence.
29
 But, in case of a conflict between these objectives, the Supreme Court seems to 
give prevalence to deterrence over compensation.
30
 The prevailing goal of deterrence is even more 
visible in class actions, which aggregate private actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. According to the economic rationale, identifying different kinds of victims and 
compensating them may be financially unfeasible.
31
 Generally, the case costs (administrative, 
expertise and etc.) are substantial, hence individuals (especially consumers) obtain small individual 
awards.
32
 As such, the positive effect for the individual class member is minimal. Therefore, in the 
context of economic efficiency, the real and only goal of class action lawsuits, and especially of 
small-value claims, is to facilitate deterrence.
33
 In fact, when small stakes claims which typically 
otherwise would not be prosecuted are aggregated, the wrongdoer is forced to better internalize the 
costs caused by illegal conduct. Therefore, the significantly increased number of damages claims 
sets the example that class actions can be utilized in antitrust enforcement, thereby enhancing 
deterrence to some extent. Indeed, class action lawsuits are mainly reinforced through a 
combination of five measures aimed at enhancing deterrence:  
 
 Automatic treble damages; 
 Wide-ranging discovery rules; 
 An opt-out measure; 
 One-way fee shifting (the absence of the "loser pays" principle); 
 Lawyers being allowed to accept antitrust cases on a contingency fee basis. 
 
Together, these measures create sufficient incentives for lawyers to enforce the antitrust laws as 
private attorney generals. If there was no kit of deterrence-based tools, lawyers would probably not 
bring antitrust cases not only because they are difficult to detect and convict, but also considering 
that the total costs can be extremely high due the complexity of antitrust violations.    
 
As regards compensation, the US experience demonstrates that class members receive low 
proportional awards.
34
 Even though victims remain highly undercompensated, the plaintiff bar 
receives significant compensation, which potentially overpays the class counsel.
35
 It should be also 
observed that defendants are eager to settle cases as soon as possible: the discovery proceedings 
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 See, for example, Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575-76 (1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov.’t of 
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may generate very high costs.
36
 If the case is prolonged, the discovery expenses increase 
proportionally. For the class counsel, it is also worth to settle cases, as his or her compensation is 
based on the contingency fee agreement, which is calculated as a percentage of the class net 
recovery. However, the group is in any case large (both in number and financially capacity) due to 
an opt-out measure, which binds all potential victims, unless someone decides to opt out.  
 
Indeed, the objective of compensating victims is programmed to fail, because most cases are settled 
for awards lower than actual damages.
37
 When case costs (administrative fees, expert fees and 
contingency fees) are deducted from the settlement award, it is determined that class members will 
receive low individual compensation. However, compensation is not the only objective in a 
deterrence-oriented system, such as in the United States. The failure of compensation can be 
justified if the class action device facilitates deterrence.
38
 The basic logic is that it is better to 
prevent the wrongdoers from engaging in anticompetitive conduct rather than to attempt to restore 
all the damages caused by antitrust violations. But if an infringement has taken place, the class 
actions lawsuits become in essence the only option for most victims to receive compensation.
39
 To 
sum up, compensation is an integral component of class actions, but it only serves a subsidiary 
function to deterrence. For further discussion on the US mechanism, see Chapter 3. 
 
6.3.2 The Principle of Full Compensation in the European Union 
 
The policy preferences in EU competition law do not shape the private remedies in the form of 
deterrence. The primary objective is that of compensating victims of antitrust infringements, while 
deterrence can be seen as a mere side effect. For this purpose, the EU established the principle of 
full compensation for private enforcement, summarized in Table 1. 
 
The beginning of the development of the principle of full compensation can be considered to be the 
CJEU decision in the Crehan case.
40
 The CJEU expressly established that the full effectiveness of 
Article 101 TFEU would be put at risk if it was not open to any individual to claim damages for the 
loss caused.
41
 Later, in the Manfredi judgement, the CJEU provided further elaboration that each 
injured person must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss, but also for loss of profit 
plus interest.
42
 In accordance with the CJEU judgments, the subsequent 2008 White Paper 
established the principle of full compensation that allows to claim damages for the real value of the 
loss suffered, taken together: i) the actual loss, (ii) loss of profit, and (iii) the right to interest.
43
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Table 1. A study of the principle of full compensation of damages 
Principle of Full Compensation of Damages 
 Main provisions 
The relationship with full compensation 
principle 
Crehan judgement The right to claim damages to any individual. 




Any individual must be able to seek 
compensation not only for actual loss (damnum 
emergens) but also for loss of profit (lucrum 
cessans) plus interest. 
 
The CJEU extension of the compensation 
objective including the expected loss (loss of 
profit and interest) 
White Paper (2008) 
Full compensation covers the real value of the 
loss suffered: (i) the actual loss, (ii) loss of 
profit, and (iii) the right to interest. 
 
Confirmation of the full compensation principle 
in the non-binding document of the European 
Commission 
Directive on damages actions 
(2014) 
Any natural or legal person should be able to 
claim and to obtain full compensation for the 
harm caused by an infringement. Full 
compensation shall therefore cover the right to 
compensation for actual loss and for loss of 
profit, plus the payment of interest. 
 
Confirmation of the full compensation principle 
in the legally binding document of the 
European Union  
Recommendation on collective 
redress (2013) 
Collective actions facilitate access to justice 
and enable compensation to individual 
claimants in mass harm situations. 
The primary objective is facilitate access to 
justice and to enable compensation in mass 
harm situations. There is no particular 
emphasis on full compensation. 
 
The Directive reaffirms the EU acquis communautaire by providing that anyone has a right to claim 
full compensation for the harm caused by antitrust infringements.
44
 It also seeks to avoid 
overcompensation by rejecting any form of damage multipliers, such as the US treble damages.
45
 
The principle of full compensation is reinforced by two additional provisions:  
  
 Both direct and indirect purchasers are entitled to claim full compensation;46 
 The injured party may claim compensation from any of the jointly and severally liable 




Compared to the Directive, the Recommendation aims at facilitating access to compensatory justice 
for individual claimants, while there is no particular emphasis on full compensation.
48
 A logical 
implication of this would seem to be that there is no intention to regulate the competition law on a 
sectorial basis, since the Recommendation takes a horizontal approach (across a range of sectors). 
Thus, there is no reason why the principle of full compensation and avoidance of overcompensation 
should not guide the proceedings of antitrust collective actions.  
 
                                                 
44
 Directive, supra note 4, Art. 1.  
45
 Ibid, Art. 3(3). 
46
 Ibid, Arts. 12 and 14.    
47
 Ibid, Art. 11(1). 
48
 However, para 30 of the Recommendation mentions the right to full compensation, but in the context of contingency 
fees. It remains unclear how this provision would interact with the principle of full compensation enshrined in the 
Directive on damages actions.  
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Any damages actions reform that seeks to ensure the right to full compensation, also commits to 
implement a scheme that allows for victims to exercise that right at all distribution levels. A 
primarily compensation-oriented system frames a procedural framework that implicitly 
acknowledges the progression of successive determinants.
49
 First, by promising full compensation 
the EU reform accepts that each financial victim of the antitrust infringement can claim 
compensation for the harm suffered. Therefore, it means that standing should be granted to direct 
purchasers and to indirect purchasers all the way down the distribution chain. In addition, the 
indirect purchasers can rely on a rebuttable evidential presumption that cartel overcharges are at 
least partially passed on to them. Therefore, exercising the right of indirect purchasers would 
require chasing the "harm downstream to the ultimately injured parties" (usually totalling in 
thousands or even millions indirect purchasers) who usually suffer dispersed and low-value 
damages.
50
 To complicate matters further, the right to seek full compensation encompasses the real 
value of the loss suffered, including the actual loss, lost profits and interest. All things considered, 
the EU has introduced a mechanism that demands a very effective compensation scheme, since 
every victim is entitled to full compensation. This objective sounds laudable, but in reality the 
implementation of full compensation requires the implementation of at least the following elements, 
illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The determinants of an effective enforcement of the principle of full compensation 
An effective implementation of full compensation 
Full involvement of victims 
 
The availability of effective collective redress schemes 
 
The potential ground for representatives to represent victims 
 
Discovery rules enable the disclosure of incriminating evidence 
 
First, the effectiveness of compensation depends on if victims actively engage in private litigation. 
However, the further down the distribution chain victims are, the more remote they are from the 
violation and the less incentives they have to litigate. Therefore, the main alternative for collecting 
scattered individual losses is the availability of effective collective redress schemes. But identifying, 
collecting and compensating antitrust victims can be very burdensome, especially if they are located 
far down the supply chain. It is also true that collective actions would never be heard if there was no 
sufficient ground for group representatives to take complex and expensive antitrust cases. Indeed, 
the potential award should outweigh the risks involved. In addition, regardless of how distant 
victims are from the infringement, the discovery rules should enable receiving incriminating 
evidence. Otherwise, establishing, proving and quantifying damages may be an insurmountable 
task. Considering these factors, it will be further examined whether the proposed measures in the 
damages actions reform (in the Directive and in the Recommendation) are likely to achieve the 
objective of full compensation or not.  
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6.4 THE FULFILMENT OF FULL COMPENSATION UNDER THE EU PRIVATE 
ANTITRUST REFORM 
 
6.4.1 An Overview of the Directive 
 
When designing a system of private antitrust enforcement, policy makers had to strike a delicate 
balance between public and private enforcement. Yet, in spite of the proclaimed goal to facilitate 
damages claims, the new Directive first and foremost seeks to preserve the effectiveness of public 
enforcement, and leniency programs in particular. Despite the strong focus on public enforcement, 
some provisions are of particular relevance to consumer actions, such as granting standing to 
indirect purchasers. The main features of the Directive are therefore analyzed through the lens of 
full compensation.  
 
A. Access to evidence 
 
With the Pfleiderer judgement, the CJEU introduced a great dose of concern for potential leniency 
applicants. Most importantly, the Court refused to ensure the protection of leniency submissions. 
Considering the absence of EU rules on disclosure, the national courts were entitled, in each case, to 
carry out the balancing test for granting access to leniency documents.
51
 Hence, it became difficult 
to predict how national courts would treat each request for access to leniency material.    
 
With a view to remedy an unpredictable Pfleiderer’s case-by-case test, EU legislators introduced 
two limitations in the Directive: (1) leniency statements and settlement submissions have absolute 
protection from disclosure (the so-called black-listed documents); (2) information prepared 
specifically for the regulatory investigation until the competition authority has closed its 
proceedings, as well as withdrawn settlement submissions, are granted temporary protection from 
disclosure (the so-called grey-listed documents).
52
 Other documents falling outside the scope of 
these two categories should be subject to disclosure at any time (the so-called white-listed 
documents). One of the most important provisions is that the courts are enabled to order disclosure 
at their discretion. An important facilitation for plaintiffs is that defendants and third parties can be 
forced to grant access to documents to the other side. However, national courts are required to limit 
the disclosure of evidence in consideration with the following points
53
: (1) the plaintiff has pleaded 
facts and evidence justifying the request to disclose evidence; (2) the plaintiff’s request is 
accompanied by a "reasoned justification" to support the plausibility of the suit; (3) the requested 
evidence should be defined as precisely and narrowly as possible, and national courts must confirm 
the proportionality of the disclosure. To sum up, the court shall perform a balancing test on a case-
by-case basis, and hence shall decide whether the requested documents fall under the white list 
category and whether the request is proportional. 
 
At first sight, relatively wide disclosure rules may increase the probability of incriminating evidence 
about the real harm caused to the victim being revealed, even if leniency statements and settlement 
submissions are not part of disclosure. For example, by allowing the disclosure of more direct 
evidence (such as prices, sales volumes, profit margins or costs), the Directive allows a better 
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estimation of how the alleged infringement affects a particular market situation, and how the harm 
can be quantified.
54
 Hence, it may solve the information asymmetry between plaintiffs (such as end 
consumers) and defendants (such as large corporations), who hold a monopoly regarding the 
evidence of violation.  
 
B. Joint and several liability 
 
Article 11 of Directive introduces the concept that infringers are jointly and severally liable for the 
entire harm caused by the joint infringement. Under this provision, each victim has the right to 
claim full compensation from any of the co-infringers until the harm is fully recovered. The court is 
responsible for determining the magnitude of liability, based on the extent of the harm caused by 
co-infringers. As regards immunity recipients, a conditional limitation of joint and several liability 
applies to immunity recipients, once again to avoid the negative and unpredictable effects on the 
leniency program.
55
 In principle, they will be jointly and severally liable to their own purchasers 
(direct and indirect) only. However, the leniency recipients may be held liable if injured purchasers 
cannot obtain full compensation from the co-infringers.
56
 It can be acknowledged that the Directive 
seeks to ensure the entire co-cartelists responsibility for the infringement, yet the civil liability for 
damages should be the least severe for the immunity recipient.  
 
C. Indirect purchasers 
  
The new rules on standing are the most important improvement for consumer actions. In accordance 
with the principle of full compensation, article 15 of the Directive extends standing to both direct 
and indirect purchasers. Indirect purchasers are natural or legal persons who acquired products or 
services (which are subject to competition law violations) not directly from a wrongdoer, but from a 
direct purchaser or a successive purchaser.
57
 This is a class category that usually includes 
downstream consumers and SMEs, who are indirectly affected by competition infringement; 
particularly when antitrust overcharges are passed down to them in the supply chain. However, it is 
true that consumers and SMEs can both acquire cartelized products as direct and indirect 
purchasers. Arguably, the expansion of standing is in conformity with the Courage and Manfredi 
decisions that grant standing to every (direct and indirect) victim of anti-competitive behaviour. 
This approach differs from that in the United States at the federal level. The US Supreme Court 
rejected the pass on defence in the landmark Hanover Shoe decision.
58
 From an economic rationale, 
it is considered that direct purchasers are best suited, and hence most likely, to bring antitrust 
claims.
59
 Almost a decade after Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court ultimately denied standing to 
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indirect purchasers to bring antitrust claims.
60
 Conversely, indirect purchasers may recover damages 




With regard to the EU, the standing to indirect purchasers is reinforced through the inclusion of a 
rebuttable presumption. Accordingly, the indirect purchaser shall be considered to have proven that 
(at least some of) the overcharge levied on a direct purchaser will have been passed on him or her, 




 The defendant has breached competition rules; 
 The violation has resulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser; 
 The indirect purchaser purchased the goods or services concerned.  
 
If all factors are demonstrated to a credible extent, the court needs to approve the presumption of 
passing-on. In contrast, most EU countries have to date required proof of the overcharges in claims 
of indirect purchasers.
63
 Therefore, the EU facilitation is very helpful for indirect purchasers, who 
are typically remote from the defendant, and for whom the substantiation of overcharge is 
particularly burdensome.  
 
In order to avoid overcompensation for purchasers, the Directive accepts the availability of the 
passing-on defence.
64
 The defendant can invoke this type of defence against a damages claim if the 
claimant passed the overcharge on to the next level of the distribution chain, either fully or partially. 
The defendants are imposed the burden of proving the passing-on "credibly to the satisfaction of the 
court."
65
 To facilitate the defendant’s burden of proof, the defendants are able to request reasonable 
disclosure from the claimant or from third parties. It is clear that the defendants usually lack 
information and access to information on the relationship between a direct purchaser and a 
subsequent purchaser, including information on the price of the resale.  
 
D. The existence of harm 
 
Article 17 of the Directive establishes a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm. The alleged 
violator bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. In simple terms, a final decision by the 
Commission, national competition authorities or by a review court should be established as 
irrefutable evidence of harm that can be used for the purposes of a follow-on damages claim. 
However, even though the requirement to prove harm is removed, a claimant is still required to 
prove causation, loss and the quantum of damages. In addition, the Directive empowers the courts 
to estimate the quantum of harm based on reasonably available evidence, provided it is "practically 
impossible or excessively difficult" for the claimant to estimate the amount of harm suffered based 
on the available material.
66
 For this purpose, the Commission issued the Practical Guide on how to 
quantify damages.
67
 Yet, such estimates are based on complex, unpredictable econometric models. 
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In addition, the final decisions taken by the competition authorities or courts of one member state 
will constitute at least prima facie evidence before civil courts in other EU countries.
68
 However, 
this type of finding has already been recognized in many EU jurisdictions, even before the adoption 
of the Directive.   
 
6.4.2 The Commission’s Model of the Recommendation 
 
The main principles of the collective redress mechanisms that the Commission expects the member 
states to adopt include the following: 
   
 As a general rule, collective redress claims should be pursued on an opt-in basis, requesting 
the express consent of victims. Any exception to this rule should be "duly justified by 
reasons of sound administration of justice."
69
  
 The systems of collective redress should cover both injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress actions. 
 A coherent collective redress scheme should be ensured by procedural safeguards in order to 
avoid the development of abusive litigation, such as in the US class action system.
70
 
According to the Recommendation, these safeguards must cover, inter alia:  
i) Contingency fees should not be permitted. But, if a Member State allows for such a 
reimbursement model, it should be subject to appropriate national regulation
71
;   
ii) Punitive damages must be prohibited in collective redress claims;  
iii) The "loser pays" principle is a central safeguard against abusive litigation; 
iv) There must be limitations on third party funding. The funders should be free from conflicts 
of interest, and they should have sufficient funds to support the legal action.  
 
In terms of standing, the European Commission recommends two types of collective redress 
mechanisms:     
 
 Group actions brought jointly by natural and legal persons who claim to have suffered harm; 
 Representative actions. 
 
Group actions are very poorly defined in the Recommendation, only stating that "the issue of 
standing [in group actions] is more straightforward than in the context of representative actions."
72
 
Indeed, the key policy emphasis is on representative actions brought by representative entities, 
which should be limited to ad hoc certified entities or representative entities designated in advance. 
The Commission's approach sets stringent requirements for ad hoc or general certification, such as a 
non-profit character, a direct relationship between the violation and the activities of the 
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It is expected that the proposed principles of the Recommendation will facilitate access to justice, as 
well as facilitating compensation in mass harm situations. Given that the Recommendation is the 
most concrete step in the field of collective redress, the following discussion produces a study on to 
what extent the proposed measures in the Recommendation (in combination with the Directive) 
fulfil the objective of full compensation that is embedded in EU private antitrust reform.  
 
6.4.3 The Assessment of the EU Private Antitrust Reform: A Study of Full Compensation 
 
It is a very challenging task to combine the effectiveness of public enforcement and private 
enforcement on the one hand, and of giving standing to direct and indirect purchasers on the other, 
especially if there is an intention to ensure the victim’s effective right to full compensation. While 
trying to achieve a lot in one swoop, the reform is in fact most likely to fail in providing full 
compensation, both for direct and indirect purchasers.  
  
First, the EU has expressed the concern that private actions might actually undermine the 
effectiveness of the leniency programme, a crucial tool in exposing long term cartel violations and 
in bringing them to an end.
74
 Thus, there is a need to secure public enforcement by ordering 
protection from disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions. Yet, in order to 
qualify for the leniency, the applicant has to provide the incriminating evidence of the alleged 
cartel, as well as a corporate statement that incriminates the receiver of the potential leniency.
75
 
Therefore, the inherently incriminating evidence will always be kept in the Commission’s leniency 
file, and will not be available to victims. In fact, the inaccessibility of incriminating evidence 
reduces the incentives to bring follow-on damages claims, as other types of evidence (prices, profit 
margins or costs) are unlikely to characterise cartels as well as leniency material. Even though the 
Directive approves two rebuttable presumptions—one being that cartels cause harm and the other 
being that overcharges are passed on to indirect purchasers—it does not alleviate the burden to 
prove the harm suffered. Indeed, there are considerable difficulties in showing that, for example, 
indirect purchasers have indeed purchased goods that were the object of the competition law 
infringement.   
 
The possibilities to bring stand-alone actions raise even more doubts. These actions are 
discouraging because they require a high standard of proof that the harm has actually occurred, 
without being able to rely on the findings of public enforcers. But, when compared with follow-on 
claims, the conviction rate is lower, and thus the likelihood of receiving damages is also lower.
76
 
Moreover, overcharges calculations and the disclosure come at high costs, especially when there is 
no prior public enforcement. The logical solution would be to reinforce private actions by forceful 
measures with regard to standing and funding so as to incentivize claimants to invest time and 
money in stand-alone claims. However, currently the only facilitation is that the Directive allows 
for the court to decide whether relevant evidence should be disclosed or not.
77
 Indeed, the Directive 
enhances legal certainty for stand-alone actions that potential evidence may be disclosed through 
court orders. But it is highly unlikely that such facilitation will increase the incentives to litigate 
cumbersome stand-alone claims.  
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By not actually facilitating stand-alone actions, the Directive significantly diminishes the objective 
of full compensation, which is to provide compensation to any injured party. To explain this, it 
should be stressed that competition authorities usually take cases that have high rates of conviction. 
For example, at least 60% of cartel infringements were uncovered due to the leniency programme.
78
 
Under this model, investigatory tools are generally not used to reveal cartels; whistle-blowers come 
forward on a voluntary basis. The subsequent issue is that the detection rate of cartels is only up to 
33% in the EU.
79
 Consequently, a large majority of cases are bound to be undetected, and therefore 
victims will remain uncompensated, as private enforcers are unlikely to bring stand-alone actions.  
 
Second, the reform has extended the standing to direct and indirect purchasers (including consumers 
and SMEs). Despite of the compensation of any injured party sounding laudable in theory, the 
reform is controversial because neither direct purchasers nor indirect purchasers (and especially not 
end consumers) can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation.   
 
The favourable treatment of end purchasers raises many obstacles to the achievement of the 
compensation goal in direct purchaser cases. The acceptance of the passing-on defence may reduce 
the amount of damages that can be claimed by direct purchasers. If a pass-on presumption has been 
confirmed, the direct purchaser would receive the reduced damages based on the amount passed on 
to subsequent purchasers.
80
 It is even possible that a direct purchaser may pass on all or part of an 
overcharge to downstream consumers, but in reality "a direct purchaser has absorbed an overcharge 
in part or full"; this situation is contrary to the economic rationale.
81
 There is also a concern that the 
successful application of the passing-on defence is not in line with the application of the principle of 
full compensation, which awards compensation not only for the actual loss but also for loss of profit 
plus interest. A scenario is possible in which direct purchasers are not entitled for actual loss on the 
basis of the harm being passed on to indirect purchasers, but they would succeed in claiming 
damages for loss of profits, for example when the increased costs reduce revenues compared to 
what they would have obtained in a non-infringement scenario (in other words, counterfactual loss 
of profits).
82
 To sum up, the passing-on defence may decrease the willingness of direct purchasers 
to claim damages, where indirect purchasers are as well largely harmed by antitrust violations. As 
will be shown later, some actions were brought by direct purchasers in the EU member states, even 
before the adoption of the Directive on damages actions. In these cases, the passing-on defence does 
not seem to be a popular defendant's tool. First reason may be that the concerned antitrust violations 
mainly harmed direct purchasers. Second reason may be that the passing-on was not possible in 
some states prior to the adoption the Directive. Moreover, unpopularity of indirect purchasers' 
claims may be related to the fact that victims may be simply unaware about the violation. 
 
When the availability of indirect purchaser claims is combined with the passing-on defence, it 
makes it very difficult to define how much of the cartel overcharge is actually passed down through 
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each distribution level (both for direct and indirect customers).
83
 Further down the distribution 
chain, more complex factual and economic analysis is typically required in order to quantify the 
overcharge. It can be acknowledged that the number of victims increases proportionally down the 
distribution chain.
84
 End consumers usually stand at the very end of the distribution chain, and the 
harm they suffer is of scattered and low impact. Unsurprisingly, these victims have the weakest 
interest in bringing damages claims, because they possess little information about the nature and 
extent of the harm and, most importantly, the cost-benefit of the claim is negative. Therefore, there 
is a high possibility that antitrust infringers will avoid responsibility for the harm caused when the 
overcharge was passed down the distribution chain.  
 
Most likely, the only way to reach each victim (including end purchasers) and therefore to stand 
firmly against the wrongdoers is the possibility of aggregating suits and pursuing them together 
through collective actions. Despite being the vital amendment in any form of antitrust damages 
reform, the issue was only dealt with in the non-binding Recommendation. Yet, the problem is not 
that the effectiveness is considerably limited by the non-binding nature. The real issue is that the 
current European Commission's approach inherently limits the facilitation of access to justice to any 
injured victim as long as the collective redress scheme is framed under the proposed principles of 
the Recommendation. There are at least four reasons why the objective of fully compensating 
victims with small stakes is destined to fail if the proposed principles of the Recommendation will 
ever take a legally binding form: 
 
 The ineffectiveness of an opt-in principle 
 
First, the national experiments in France
85
 and the UK
86
 reveal the inefficacy of opt-in collective 
actions in attracting a sufficient number of victims to make an action economically feasible.
87
 
Despite an extensive media campaign in both countries, only a few hundred victims joined the 
action, while the violations had potentially caused harm to millions of consumers.
88
 These failures 
can be easily explained. The potential awards were so low (the individual harm was on average €60 
in France and £20 in the UK) that victims simply did not care about possibilities to join the action. 
Furthermore, many of them appeared to be unaware that they were harmed by the alleged cartel.  
 
Second, the US experience shows the lack of responsiveness of class members when affirmative 
steps are required, even when they are entitled to an award. As mentioned before, only up to 20% of 
class members in the US file claims to receive payments when settlement distribution requires class 
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members to file claim forms. At its core, an opt-in measure is much more dissuasive than claim 
forms, because there is no guarantee of any recovery at all (the probability of success is much less 
than 100%). Furthermore victims can be required to pay membership fees in order to opt into the 
action. 
 
 The interrelated problems of standing and funding 
 
One of the most attractive designations to bring representative actions is a non-profit consumer 
organisation or other public body (for example, the Ombudsman or a trade union), as these entities 
are incentivised by their organisational mission to represent consumers in line with their best 
interests (at least in theory).
89
 However, in reality there is a lack of rational actors who would have 
the capacity to bring risky, complex and costly collective competition actions under conditions of 
eligibility. For example, consumer organisations in many EU states have limited or no public 
funding, and if they are financed then it is only on an annual basis, preventing them from acting for 
instance in the form of a court action.
90
 An even more concerning factor is that consumer 
organisations are struggling for survival in some countries, and consequently have a small number 
of paid staff.
91
 In fact, the idea that these entities would be able to fulfil the EU Recommendation’s 
requirements for designated representative entities, i.e. to have sufficient financial resources, human 








, where specified wealthy 
consumer organisations are entitled to bring a claim on behalf of consumers in relation to damages 
for breach of antitrust law. However, the above-mentioned opt-in actions raised a general issue of 
funding that was not cured simply through organisational standing. In case of representation by a 
group member, the issue of funding is even more evident: group members are unlikely to have more 
capacity in terms of funding and resources. This suggests that another important determinant for 
compensating victims is the incentive for potential intermediaries to bring claims on behalf of these 
victims. If a solution was found, the objective of compensation would be better achieved; the logic 
is simply that the more actions are brought, the more victims are compensated. 
 
 No involvement of private litigators 
 
The US experience suggests that the most important consideration from the standpoint of a plaintiff, 
and more specifically a class counsel, is whether the expected awards outweigh the expected risks 
of bringing complex antitrust actions. In the US, this objective is achieved because the private 
antitrust mechanism combines six deterrence-based tools: an opt-out measure, contingency fees, 
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treble damages, one-way fee shifting (the absence of the "loser pays" rule), joint and several 
liability, as well as wide-ranging discovery. The biggest difference from the EU is that the 
American deterrence-oriented system urges active involvement of private litigators through the 
scheme of the private attorney general. In the EU context, however, a more active role of private 
litigators is limited by the careful approach to respecting the different legal systems and traditions 
of the member states, and also to preventing any possibilities of overcompensation. Therefore, the 
EU rejects the contingency fee agreements, while third-party funders are subject to the strict 
eligibility test.
95
 Also, opt-out schemes and multiple damages are seen contrary to the EU’s and its 
member states’ legal traditions. In such circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that rational actors 
would have sufficient incentives to serve as class representatives or bring complex competition law 
collective action without expectation of significant awards. 
 
 Collective actions are so costly that they consume a large portion of the award 
 
The last issue is that full compensation is rather unrealistic for claimants who participate in the 
action, due to the organisation of the group demanding large organisational costs, including both 
administrative costs and case-management costs.
96
 In order to inform the affected parties of the 
litigation, and to thus attract them to join the action, opt-in collective actions require expensive 
awareness-raising campaigns through mass media and other information channels. These problems 
are well illustrated by the Mobile Cartel opt-in collective action in France. The litigation costs were 
around 0,5 million euros, while the total value of the claim was 0,8 million euros (12,530 
consumers joined the action with an average claim of 60 euros).
97
 Much less than 1% of consumers 
joined the action, but the litigation demanded the hiring of 21 employees, and 2,000 hours were 
consumed to prepare the action.
98
 In cases where opt-out schemes are used in practice, all victims 
become parties in the action and thus the group is already organized. Therefore, the organisational 
costs should be lower than in opt-in actions. However, as the US experience has shown, identifying 
the potential class members, processing the litigation and distributing the damages also causes 
significant costs.
99
 To sum up, the total costs for bringing collective damages actions remain 
significant regardless of the type of representative action preferred by policy makers (an opt-in 
and/or an opt-out), because of the complexity of legal and economic assessments and a high burden 




The antitrust damages reform’s objective of fully compensating victims of all types fails to a large 
extent, for at least three reasons:  
 
1. Public enforcement remains the predominant tool in antitrust enforcement 
 
The principal aim of the Directive on damages actions is to preserve strong public enforcement. The 
main emphasis is on protecting leniency documents in follow-on private actions, where victims can 
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free-ride on the efforts of competition authorities. Yet, the protection of leniency documents 
diminishes the motivation to bring follow-on actions, as inherently incriminating evidence is 
protected. Other documents are unlikely to describe the violation as well as leniency materials.  
 
2. There are no sufficient incentives to bring stand-alone actions  
 
The only facilitation of stand-alone actions is the court ordering disclosure, which is also dependant 
on the judge’s willingness to disclose the relevant documents. However, the provisions on effective 
funding tools and favourable rules for standing are disregarded in the Directive. In absence of these 
tools, the chances that stand-alone claims will be brought to courts are rather incidental. In fact, by 
not actually facilitating stand-alone actions, the Directive simultaneously prevents private 
enforcement from curing the public enforcement’s shortcoming of low detection rates.  
 
3. Victims and their representatives are discouraged from bringing collective actions  
 
The reform fails to maintain a balance between the claims of direct and indirect purchasers. The 
special treatment of the indirect purchaser makes litigation cumbersome for direct purchasers, as the 
defendants can invoke the passing-on defence. A rebuttable pass-on presumption may create a 
situation where an overcharge levied on direct purchasers will have been passed to their own 
downstream consumers, but in essence a direct purchaser has absorbed an overcharge. Ironically, 
despite the new right for indirect purchasers to seek compensation before national courts, it remains 
worthless if member states would follow the proposed principles of the Recommendation. 
Essentially, the proposed opt-in measure limits the access to justice to any injured party. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of rational actors who would serve as class representatives by taking on 
the risks of complex antitrust actions. This is especially true given that there are no tools for 
enabling sufficient compensation, which could outweigh the risks. 
 
Despite the objective of compensating indirect purchasers being predetermined to fail, there is high 
potential for direct purchasers (particularly big businesses) bringing more damages actions. In 2015, 
a year before the Directive on damages actions was implemented in the member states, there were 
64 pending cartel damages claims in 10 EU member states.
100
 However, a large majority of actions 
have been brought by large corporations that purchased directly from the violators. There is also an 
increased possibility for arbitration in antitrust damages claims. The Directive enables parties to 
secure damages through consensual dispute resolution mechanisms, such as out-of-court settlements 
and arbitration.
101
 However, it should be stressed that arbitration will be subject to conditions in 
damages claims.
102
 Also, arbitration in collective actions seems highly complex, and potentially 
impossible in most cases, as not all group members will be necessary in contractual relations, or 




Given that damages claims were unavailable in many EU states, and that the Directive has only 
recently been incorporated into national laws (or will be soon), cartel damages claims (and 
potentially arbitration cases) should become a trend across the member states. The most alarming 
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factor is that indirect purchasers (SMEs and consumers) or direct purchasers with small claims will 
continue to struggle to receive damages, since forceful collective redress schemes were not included 
in the Directive. In turn, it will create incentives for "forum shopping" by choosing the jurisdictions 
that allow for opt-out collective actions (such as, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK). However, 
litigating in other fora requires significant costs, which vulnerable victims lack. As a result, a large 
majority of victims will remain uncompensated. 
 
6.5 THE IMPACT OF DETERRENCE-BASED TOOLS ON THE EU COMPENSATORY 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
 
As already discussed, American class actions are primarily designed to serve the objective of 
deterrence. This does not eliminate the importance of compensation, but it remains a mere 
secondary tool after deterrence. In marked contrast with the United States, and regardless of the 
complexity of detecting victims and compensating them, the EU system primarily focuses on 
ensuring full compensation for the damage actually incurred. In an effort to appropriately assess the 
rationale of full compensation, the following discussion will examine the importance of deterrence-




6.5.1 The Need for Damage Multipliers 
 
In the United States, the automatic treble damages are the key deterrent to potential infringers.
105
 In 
addition to deterrence, treble damages are also expected to provide "ample" compensation to 
antitrust victims.
106
 However, trebling has no fairness criteria of fully compensating victims, rather 
it seeks to provide "rough justice" to sufferers.
107
 Furthermore, the American experience offers the 
lesson that treble damages actions are typically settled, and hence the award generates amounts 
closer to actual damages rather than treble damages.
108
 When the high administrative costs are 
deducted from this award, basic economic logic essentially demonstrates why antitrust class actions 
provide very low proportional compensation to an insignificant number of victims. But, as 
mentioned before, the compensation failure can be justified if the deterrent function is successful.  
 
The European Commission's approach is much more precise than the US one. It has the explicit aim 
of providing actual compensation and the expected loss (lost profits and interest). Nonetheless, the 
Commission's proposal is in a deadlock situation: it seeks to ensure full compensation to all victims, 
but this goal is likely to fail. After all, there is no way to bypass the compensation failure, as in the 
US. To make matters even more complex, opt-in claims are very costly, since the group needs to be 
organized (as shown in the Mobile Cartel litigation). Suppose a scenario where victims are awarded 
full damages: in reality they would not receive them, because the case related costs would consume 
a large portion of the recovery. In case of settlement, the compensation failure is even more 
inevitable, because full damages would never be awarded. In order to solve the ineffectiveness in 
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fully compensating victims, the Commission's scheme requires additional financial reinforcement to 
cover the costs related to the enforcement of the compensation goal (full damages + case related 
costs). One solution, if not the only one, would be to allow a damage multiplier in the EU context. It 
would ensure the award of full damages even after deducting the case related costs. We can 
therefore acknowledge that while the damage multiplier is considered to have the potential to lead 
to overcompensation, in reality it is not bound to do so. It really varies from case to case, and 
depends on the size of the multiplier to be applied. In summary, while trebling is primarily aimed at 
ensuring the deterrence standards in the United States, some sort of damage multipliers are required 
to ensure the essential requirements when enforcing the objective of compensation in the European 
Union. 
 
6.5.2 The Need for Broad Discovery Rules 
 
The objective of ensuring full compensation all the way down the supply chain is also not in 
accordance with the limited discovery rules. First, they prohibit the disclosure of leniency 
statements and settlement submissions. Second, they are also potentially limited due to the court 
ordering disclosure. Such a restrictive model is of particular relevance for vulnerable victims. The 
first category contains direct purchasers, where each has only suffered harm. The second category 
includes indirect purchasers, who are spread out among different distribution chains. The specific 
feature of indirect purchasers is that the further down the distribution chain they are, the less facts 
and evidence have to prove that the discovery requests are proportionate under article 5 of the 
Directive.  
 
It seems rather unrealistic that rational representatives would bring stand-alone cases on behalf of 
vulnerable victims when the main and potentially only facilitator is the court ordering disclosure. In 
these cases, a wide disclosure is especially important for the certification stage.
109
 However, 
collective actions seem too risky without fully knowing whether the judge will disclose the relevant 
material or not - indeed, proving proportionality is a complex task. Another worrying factor is that 
the infringer has a monopoly on possessing the violating material.
110
 Therefore, the wrongdoer can 
structure the disclosure in a way that prevents incriminating evidence from ever being disclosed. 
Moreover, claimants may not be able to specify the evidence they need to support their case. When 
compared to public enforcers, private enforcers have far less investigation tools. But even follow-on 
actions do not seem very attractive under the current model. The problem is that white-listed 
documents are unlikely to characterise cartels as well as black-listed documents. And, in turn, there 
is no guarantee that they will contain evidence allowing to quantify the harm and to identify the full 
extent of the violation. This uncertainty acts as one of the major factors dissuading representatives 
from bringing collective claims on behalf of vulnerable victims.     
 
In the context of the American system, cases of both categories are more attractive for legal 
representatives. Contrary to the EU, the US system allows for liberal party-initiated discovery.
111
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 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26. For a discussion, see also Duns et al. (2016), p. 403.  
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Therefore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows flexibility in requesting the disclosure of 
depositions via oral and written depositions (Rule 28–32), written interrogatories (Rule 33), 
electronically stored information (Rule 34), and requests for admission (Rule 36). The American 
system is also unique, because even leniency applicants must provide "satisfactory cooperation" to 
the plaintiffs in their damages claims in order to enjoy de-trebling.
112
 The combination of these 
factors allows for the representatives to structure claims better. In turn, it becomes much easier to 
pass the certification stage and to prove damages. 
 
To sum up, the US system, which bars indirect purchaser claims (at least at the federal level), has 
less need for broader discovery rules, since direct purchasers have more insight to the defendant’s 
illegal practices (e.g. the quantum of harm caused by that infringement) than do indirect 
purchasers.
113
 Paradoxically, the American system has wide-ranging discovery rules in place, while 
the EU discovery is much more limited. 
 
6.5.3 The Need for Opt-out Schemes and Forceful Funding Tools 
 
Antitrust violations (such as price-fixing cartels) often generate a low value harm that is widespread 
geographically, and in some cases spread far down the distribution chain as well. One reason for 
this is that antitrust infringements last for several years
114
, meaning that the market structure may 
change significantly during the violation period. Another reason is that antitrust damages can be 
spread in different directions, as antitrust harm can be passed on down the supply chain.
115
 As a 
result, collecting victims under an opt-in model, which requires convincing them to join the 
collective action, is simply unfeasible. First, these victims are not interested in investing time and 
effort in joining the claim, because the expected award is financially small by its very nature. 
Second, the violation may be so distant that detecting victims and compensating them can become a 
very complex, if not impossible task.
116
 Third, victims may be unaware of the violation, which can 
date back several years or more. In addition, one concern for legal representatives is that the "loser 
pays" principle is predominant, which can expose claimants to substantial adverse costs when the 
claim is lost. When combined with insufficient funding tools, it becomes clear why opt-in collective 
actions have been extremely unpopular in the EU member states that do allow such a claim 
aggregation model. In contrast, the availability of opt-out actions has proved to be the main factor 
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Mobility Products Limited and Merricks v MasterCard. 
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It should also be stressed that these collective actions have been reinforced by third party funding, 
with the unique exception of Portugal.
120
 It shows that the efficiency of collective actions is directly 
related to the availability of opt-out schemes and forceful funding tools. In the US, class actions are 
mainly funded with contingency agreements for legal fees.
121
 When these fees are combined with 
treble damages and an opt-out aggregation model, class counsel is ensured to obtain compensation 
that outweighs the costs involved in antitrust collective litigation (if the case is successful). Under 
such a scheme, private attorneys are incentivized to invest in all types of cases. Even the claims of 
indirect purchasers may be of particular interest, as an overcharge is likely to affect a large group of 
victims, which are spread out down the supply chain. After trebling of the damages, the financial 
value of the class may be substantial, meaning that lawyer’s compensation is also likely to be 
significant due to the contingency fee agreement. In the EU context, most states prohibit this 
reimbursement model in collective actions. In the few countries where contingency fee agreements 
are allowed in collective litigation, they have not been utilized in antitrust practice.
122
 This is 
notable, because only opt-in schemes are allowed. In conclusion, the experiences in the EU member 
states clearly demonstrate that effective compensatory collective actions are dependent on the 




The EU's principle of full compensation, in which the indirect purchaser rule is enshrined, demands 
an effective collective redress mechanism in order to achieve the objectives of compensation. 
Despite the grand compensation goal, the EU is inclined to rely on a careful but powerless approach 
to achieve full compensation. The truth is that effectiveness in compensating victims can be only 
achieved by allowing a far reaching collective redress mechanism, including for example US-style 
deterrence-based measures. Even if American measures are highly controversial, they appear to be 
the only way to effectively contribute to achieving full compensation: to reach and effectively 
compensate any victim who suffered harm for infringements of competition law.   
 
On this point, it needs to be clarified that the EU private antitrust enforcement is not exceptional for 
seeking to ensure the victim’s right to full compensation. The principle of full compensation has 
been also embedded in the European Tort law
123
, the European Contract Law
124
 and in some 
legislative measures of the EU.
125
 Furthermore, the European Convention on Human Rights 
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(ECHR) enshrines the right to compensation to the standard of "just satisfaction".
126
 According to 
some commentators, this compensation rule employs the so called "Hull"-formula, which demands 
the fulfilment of high standards: compensation needs to be adequate, effective, prompt and provide 
full compensation.
127
 Despite of the possibility of seeking full compensation in different fields, the 
EU private antitrust enforcement is exceptional for encompassing not only the full award (actual 
loss plus expected loss), but also the availability of the claims of indirect purchasers. Indeed, this 
type of litigation is exceptional in competition law, yet it demands extensive enforcement powers. 
Does this show that the EU is overambitious in the field of antitrust? The answer is both yes and no. 
It is obvious that providing full compensation to indirect purchasers may be very complicated, or 
impossible in some cases, especially when indirect purchasers are very remote from the violation. 
EU legislators could take the easy road by preventing indirect purchasers from seeking full 
compensation, and empower only direct purchasers. However, it is also true that setting the 
threshold at such a broad level allows for a better development of full compensation. Even if 
reaching and compensating victims will be impossible in some cases, the potential of indirect 
purchaser’s claims will always bring new thoughts, perspectives and ideas to the litigation 
landscape; both in competition law and in other types of litigation. In addition, the right of 
vulnerable victims to claim compensation will be respected, even if it cannot be exercised in all 




The research question of this Chapter was the following: 
 
To what extent can the EU private antitrust reform achieve the objective of full compensation? 
What is the impact of antitrust collective litigation on full compensation, and what is the role (if 
any) of US-style deterrence-based measures in this respect?   
 
When addressing this question, it was found that the EU reform on facilitating private antitrust 
claims is driven by the objective of ensuring full compensation to every economic victim of 
anticompetitive behaviour. This objective requires the implementation of a very effective 
compensation scheme: both direct and indirect purchasers should be entitled to obtain full award for 
the harm caused, including the actual damages, loss of profit and interest. On this basis, the 
following findings were made.  
 
1) The EU’s private antitrust reform is bound to fall short of its stated goal of fully 
compensating every victim.   
 
The reform is framed such that neither direct purchasers nor indirect purchasers can effectively 
exercise their right to claim and obtain full compensation. The standing for indirect purchasers 
undermines the incentives for direct purchasers, because defendants are allowed to invoke the 
passing-on defence. Despite the new right for indirect purchasers to seek compensation, their right 
is not effectively facilitated: there are no provisions regarding collective actions in the Directive. In 
this regard, the Recommendation does not seem very helpful: it is a non-binding document and the 
                                                 
126
 ECHR, Art. 41.  
127
 Geler-Noch and Kirchner (2012), p. 25 (citing Peters (2003), p. 193). 
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proposed measures significantly diminish the chances for antitrust collective actions to ever be 
brought. As a result, the chances for indirect purchasers (and for victims with small claims) to 
obtain recovery depends on if they are situated in a country with favourable rules regarding 
collective redress schemes, more particularly if opt-out schemes and forceful funding tools are 
allowed.  
 
2) The EU’s private antitrust reform will have no impact on remedying the public 
enforcement’s shortcomings.  
 
The exclusive element of the EU private antitrust reform is that it is principally aimed at preserving 
strong public enforcement. By granting absolute protection to leniency statements and settlement 
submissions, the incentive to bring follow-on claims on behalf of victims, especially with small 
claims, is significantly diminished. As regards stand-alone actions, they are highly unlikely to be 
brought, as the EU reform does not facilitate these actions: claimants lack discovery tools and 
effective approach on funding and standing. Therefore, by not actually facilitating stand-alone and 
follow-on actions, the EU simultaneously prevents private enforcement not only from effectively 
compensating victims, but also from remedying the public enforcement’s shortcomings. The 
contribution by forceful and effective private enforcement would allow increasing the detection 
rates and the cost of violation to wrongdoers. 
 
3) The achievement of the EU's principle of full compensation demands an effective collective 
redress mechanism. However, the effectiveness can only be achieved by allowing far 
reaching tools, such as the ones found in the US deterrence-based mechanism. 
 
This Chapter analysed the rationale of full compensation in comparison with deterrence-based 
remedies. It was found that the achievement of full compensation inevitably demands overstepping 
the bounds of the European Commission's careful approach. First, multiple damages are necessary 
to ensure full compensation standards (including actual loss and expected loss) and to compensate 
for the high case-related costs in opt-in actions. Second, broader discovery rules are vital for 
ensuring success in certifying collective actions. Third, reaching all types of victims requires a 
combination of opt-out schemes and forceful funding tools. In conclusion, it should be asserted that 
the achievement of the EU’s compensation objective (to fully compensate any victim) demands 
deterrence-based remedies more than the US deterrence-oriented system, which forbids indirect 
purchasers' actions and hence has less demanding goals for achieving the standards of 
compensation. Despite this, the European Commission is inclined to rely on a careful and 













6.7 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS 
 
Page Description of amendment Explanation 
145 
Clarification on the costs of violation.  Amendment clarifies that the cost of violation for wrongdoers includes not only the 
amount of damages, but also case-related costs.  
156 
Additional statistics on leniency. Wils study gives a broader view to the estimation by Carmeliet. 
Additional reference is added, numbered 78. 
156 
Explanation on the passing-on defence. Further clarification on the relationship between the passing-on defence and indirect 
purchasers' right to claim damages provide a better understanding why passing-on 
defence has been not popular so far. 
164 
Amendment of the Synopsis (first 
paragraph).  
The role of collective redress mechanism on full compensation and on indirect 


































7 A MORE FORCEFUL COLLECTIVE REDRESS SCHEMES IN EU 






The damages actions reform of the European Union is predetermined to fail in achieving its stated 
goal of full compensation. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Directive on damages 
actions fails to maintain a balance between the claims of direct and indirect purchasers. Second, 
the EU approach is not designed to collect a large group of antitrust victims, who have suffered 
only a low value harm (e.g. end consumers). The only way to achieve compensation effectiveness is 
to overstep the bounds of the EU compensatory regime, which is based on the cautious approach. In 
such circumstances, this Chapter will explore three forceful scenarios of collective redress that 
include different type of deterrence-based remedies. The principal aim is to assess the chances of 
these scenarios in achieving full compensation. After assessing them, the best possible mechanism 
for compensating victims will be designed. In turn, it will allow the evaluation of to what extent 
such a scheme can ensure the achievement of full compensation. 
 




In June 2013, the European Commission introduced the reform on antitrust damages actions 
(hereinafter ‘EU private antitrust reform’). The most gratifying thing about the reform is that the 
European Union eventually adopted the Directive on damages actions in November 2014.
1
 
Therefore, the EU member states had been required to implement the provisions of the Directive in 
their national laws by the end of 2016. In reality, however, the states have struggled in 
implementing this Directive: only five countries had adopted the legislation in time.
2
 But the most 
disappointing attribute of the reform is that the Directive includes no provisions on collective 
litigation. Instead, the Commission adopted the non-binding Recommendation on collective 
redress.
3
 Although the Recommendation takes the form of a horizontal framework, the importance 
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for antitrust litigation is particularly emphasized by the fact that it was adopted together with the 
proposal for a Damages Directive (2013). 
 
The major goal of the Directive is that any victim who has suffered harm caused by antitrust 
infringement should effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation.
4
 This objective is very 
ambitious, as it requires enabling each financial victim (direct and indirect purchasers) to obtain full 
compensation (actual loss plus expectation loss). By emphasizing full compensation, the EU 
extends this principle both to private and collective actions. 
 
This policy is contrary to the approach in the United States, where the objective of deterrence is 
primarily served by private antitrust enforcement and especially small-value class actions. Although 
the US legal system differs significantly in terms of rationale, the EU models collective actions with 
the aim to prevent the perceived litigation abuses of US class actions. It is believed that careful tools 
(such as the opt-in measure and the absence of private funding possibilities) would achieve the 
objective of full compensation. However, when realizing the compensation-based mechanism, it 
will be shown that measures of deterrence are vital for ensuring full compensation. In light of these 
provisions, this Chapter will explore three ambitious scenarios of collective redress that include 
different type of deterrence-based remedies. The principal aim is to assess their abilities to achieve 
the objective of compensation, and the potential effect on deterrence. The discussion will take a 
closer look at the scenario of collective redress that would best facilitate the compensation 
objective, but would not overstep the limits of full compensation.   
 
A. Research question and scope 
 
To what extent can the best possible collective redress mechanism in EU competition law, 
combining the deterrence-based tools, achieve the objective of full compensation, and what is its 
eventual side effect (if any) on deterrence?  
 
The following steps are taken to address this question. In the first place, Chapter 7 shows that EU-
style collective actions are ineffective in contributing to achieving full compensation. Therefore, it 
examines three forceful (hypothetical) scenarios that contain different measures of deterrence. Its 
main purpose is to evaluate their potential effectiveness for facilitating the objective of 
compensation, and to assess whether there would be a side-effect on deterrence. After assessing 
them, Chapter 7 designs the best possible mechanism within the lines of full compensation and legal 
traditions (at least in some member states). Subsequently, this mechanism is analysed from two 
perspectives: one considers the effectiveness in achieving full compensation; another regards the 
possibility of facilitated deterrence through an enhanced compensatory mechanism. 
 
As regards the scope, Chapter 7 concludes the PhD dissertation. Therefore, the findings in 
preceding chapters are combined and further elaborated in order to answer the thesis' research 
question. In addition to discussing an impact of different collective actions on compensation and 
deterrence, it takes into account the potential of blackmail settlement and other litigation abuses that 
may occur in the EU due to more forceful collective redress schemes. However, this is a secondary 
objective and it is only discussed as much as necessary for dealing with the primary objective.  
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B. Methodology and limitations 
 
In this Chapter, the comparative research method primarily combines functional and analytical 
approaches. Following the findings in previous chapters, this Chapter relies on the premise that the 
compensation problem in antitrust cases is similar across the EU member states. The Directive on 
damages actions is unlikely to cure this problem, especially for victims who suffered low value 
harm. The availability of collective redress schemes would also not mean that the compensation 
objective would be significantly enhanced. Even in the most pro-active member state—the UK—
opt-out antitrust collective actions have brought no effects on compensating victims, as they failed 
to pass the certification stage. Considering the failure of compensation, this Chapter looks at 
potential ways to remedy the issue of compensation. In that regard, the functional approach focuses 
not only on the solutions already found by the EU member states, but also on potential ones. Indeed, 
this hypothetical consideration demands complementing the functional approach with the analytical 
one. The latter approach, for its part, explores the extent and boundaries of full compensation, and 
defines how separate measures could fit in this context, with a particular focus on double damages 
and wide-ranging discovery. To that extent, the available data is analysed and applied for 
conducting estimations.  
 
However, there are few limitations. First, there are no other studies (at least to the author’s 
knowledge) that would explore the best possible collective redress mechanism for antitrust actions. 
Therefore, there is a lack of background to justify the proposed model or to contrast with opposing 
views. In case of pioneering, the advantage is that there is more space for own interpretations. It 
also leaves no choice but to rely on personal assumptions and common sense. Second, there is a 
lack of data about the costs in opt-in and opt-out antitrust collective actions in the EU context. 
Therefore, the study relies on only one opt-in case (Mobile cartel) where tangible data about the 
litigation expenses was provided. Indeed, there is no possibility to draw definite conclusions from 
this case alone; it only gives a preliminary benchmark for evaluating the potential effect of damage 
multipliers on the objective of compensation. In conclusion, it should be recalled that Chapter 7 is 
the last in the dissertation, meaning that it is based on the outcomes of other chapters, which 
combine different research materials, techniques and methods.  
 
C. Overview of research material 
 
Most of the material used in Chapter 7 has already been used in other chapters, but this time it is 
applied to a different and often broader context. For instance, the available data on litigation 
statistics and on the contingency fees is used to estimate the scope of damages multipliers (double 
and treble damages) and to calculate the compensation value of opt-out collective actions. Quite in 
contrast with other chapters, the findings about the effectiveness of US class actions are used for 
assessing the potential impact of EU-style compensatory collective actions—combining different 
measures of deterrence—on compensating victims and deterring the wrongdoers. Following this 
background, the best possible collective redress mechanism is designed, and its effectiveness is 






The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the main reasons of the 
determined failure of the compensation goal in antitrust collective litigation. Section 3 presents 
three forceful scenarios that overstep the limits of the EU proposal. It further discusses the 
justification of each of them and their impact on compensation and deterrence. Section 4 aims to 
design the best possible compensation mechanism that is within the borders of the implementation 
of full compensation, as well as being within legal traditions (at least in some member states). This 
section ends with a discussion on how this mechanism interacts with full compensation. Section 5 
discusses the potential legislative measure of the EU approach on collective redress. 
 
7.2 THE PREDETERMINED FAILURE OF THE COMPENSATION GOAL 
 
By shaping the policy preferences in private actions, the Directive on damages actions established 
the principle of full compensation. It means that victims shall have the right to compensation for 
actual loss and for loss of profit, plus the payment of interest. In fact, the perception of full 
compensation obliges to compensate any natural or legal person down the supply chain (including 
the end consumer) who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law. It means 
that both direct and indirect purchasers are entitled to full compensation. The Recommendation, 
however, has no particular aim to ensure the effective exercise of the victim’s right to full 
compensation. Rather, it seeks to facilitate access to justice, stop illegal practices, and enable 
victims to obtain compensation in mass harm situations.
5
 But it seems clear that the principle of full 
compensation would be applicable in antitrust collective actions, because all victims are entitled to 
exercise the right to claim full compensation. Despite the grand compensation goal, the 
compensatory effectiveness is significantly diminished by three important aspects. 
 
First, the Directive orders the robust protection of public enforcement. It contains a complete 
protection from disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions, i.e., the directly 
incriminating evidence.
6
 Such a protection reduces the incentives to bring follow-on damages 
actions. An even more disappointing fact is that stand-alone actions are not enhanced at all. The 
Directive only introduces a court-ordered scheme that requires national courts to order the 
disclosure only when the claimant presents a reasoned justification.
7
 This is in contrast with the 




Second, the Directive fails to keep a balance between the claims of direct and indirect purchasers. In 
fact, the special treatment of indirect purchasers is a welcome step. However, the availability for the 
defendants to invoke the passing-on defence against a damages claim creates many uncertainties 
and complexities for direct purchasers. If the defendant proves that the overcharge was passed down 
the distribution chain, the direct purchasers suffer the decreased damages award, which equals the 
amount that has been passed on.
9
 Yet, it is highly unlikely that the downstream harm would ever be 
litigated; the further down victims are down the supply chain, the less interest to litigate they have. 
In addition, the passing-on defence causes crucial difficulties for quantifying the exact amount of 
damages passed down the distribution chain. 
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Third, even though the Directive facilitates indirect purchasers’ claims, the new opportunity is 
considerably restricted if collective redress schemes were designed following the proposed 
principles of the Recommendation. Regardless of whether the claims are brought by direct or 
indirect purchasers, it is unclear who will have the financial means and capacity to organize and 
lead the group under an opt-in basis. This is especially true in end consumer actions where victims 
have the least motivation to go to court, because they normally suffer a spread-out harm of low 
value.
10
 In such circumstances, it is important to inform victims (such as consumers) about the 
proposed litigation and thus convince them to join the action. However, this information campaign 
may require significant costs while only few victims may adhere to the action; after all, consumers 
are typically apathetic towards litigation if only a small award is expected. Furthermore, consumers 
cannot easily opt in to an action, because they are unaware that they are being, or have been, 
harmed by antitrust infringements, or they cannot prove their legal interest (for example, the 
consumer did not save the proof of the purchase). Therefore, organizing the group may be too risky 
considering the low expected compensation. The problems in collecting victims for opt-in collective 
actions are well illustrated through the examples in France (Mobile cartel case)
11
 and the UK 
(Replica Football Shirts).
12
 In spite of broad media campaigns in both states, only a few hundred of 
victims joined the actions, while the infringements had potentially caused harm to millions of 
consumers.
13
 These examples have become a source of concern for an opt-in measure not being the 
right solution for the antitrust collective litigation. This is probably one of the main reasons for opt-
in collective antitrust actions having been extremely unpopular in the EU member states afterwards. 
 
7.3 THE FULFILMENT OF THE COMPENSATION GOAL UNDER MORE FORCEFUL 
SCENARIOS OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
 
The EU’s desire to ensure access to justice and full compensation to antitrust victims collides with 
another desire - to prevent abusive litigation.
14
 According to the European Commission, this 
phenomenon can be found in the American system, which contains the ‘toxic cocktail’: contingency 
fees, punitive damages, opt-out schemes, and wide-ranging discovery.
15
 It should be added that the 
‘loser pays’ principle – the most widely adopted allocation method for legal costs in the EU 
member states – has been rejected in the American system. Instead, the US introduced a plaintiff-
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friendly one-way-fee shifting rule.
16
 These measures are aimed at enhancing the objective of 
deterrence through private attorneys (the so-called ‘private attorney general’). The combination of 
these measures ensures the viability of antitrust collective litigation. First of all, attorneys are 
allowed to act as private litigators through contingency fees, which allow for the lawyer to receive a 
percentage of the recovery. When this compensation model is combined with treble damages and an 
opt-out measure, private attorneys are given the chance to reap significant awards.
17
 While it may 
already seem a good mix, the American deterrence-built mechanism is further reinforced by the 
liberal party-initiated disclosure scheme and the one-way fee-shifting rule. Despite that, the 
American private antitrust system does not (completely) achieve its intended goals. First, a large 
majority of cartels remain undetected.
18
 Second, a large number of private actions, and more 
specifically class actions, fail: a rather small number of victims receive only very small 
compensation proportionally.
19
 Another issue is that the private attorney general mechanism may 
create possibilities of abuse of litigation by way of pressuring the defendants to settle cases lacking 
merit. 
 
However, there is no evidence that the introduction of one or two American elements of deterrence 
(not the entire combination) would inherently attract frivolous litigation in the EU context. The 
American mechanism is composed of six interrelated elements: the absence of one may 
significantly reduce the possibilities to abuse the litigation. First, a liberal party-initiated discovery 
means that the claimant is entitled to request a broad range of the discovery material, which 
typically causes extremely high costs for the defendant. In contrast, the plaintiffs (a class) have a 
relatively small number of responsive materials.
20
 Second, the one-way fee shifting means that 
defendants have no right to obtain attorney’s fees, while the plaintiff is entitled to not only treble 
damages, but also to attorney’s fees as part of his costs of claim.
21
 Third, it is obvious that punitive 
damages or opt-out schemes are indispensable elements for blackmailing defendants, as both 
generate substantial financial value of claims. Fourth, the availability of joint and several liability 
may push the violators to settle cases even lacking merit, as the unsettled violator may be liable for 
the combined trebled damages of all violators. Fifth, the availability of contingency fees 
exacerbates the blackmail as well. Attorneys are incentivized to settle, because their compensation 
is determined to be large (due to the large number of victims in the class). Last but not least is the 
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fact that private antitrust actions should be ended in jury trials. It is obvious that final decisions are 
always unpredictable. Indeed, ordinary citizens, even before the trial, may have a predetermined 
negative view about a large corporation that potentially caused harm to consumers. When these 
measures are combined, they raise many incentives for the defendant to settle even unmeritorious 
claims rather than go to trial with unpredictable jury trials: a loss may cause significant and 
potentially irreparable damage, both reputational and financial. 
 
Given that the EU’s compensation objective fails to a large extent, this Chapter will explore forceful 
scenarios and assess their effectiveness for facilitating the objective of compensation, and their side 
effect on deterrence. These scenarios are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The potential scenarios of antitrust collective litigation 




Multiple damages and opt-in scheme 
 




Wide-ranging discovery (only in indirect 
purchasers’ claims) and opt-in scheme 
Contingency fees (third party funding as an 
additional remedy) 
 
Scenario 3 Opt-out scheme 
Contingency fees (third party funding as an 
additional remedy) 
 
At the outset, some important clarifications should be made. Each scenario combines two 
deterrence-based measures. This approach has been chosen because it gives a better perspective for 
assessing the impact of separate measures on compensation. One measure alone, regardless of what 
it is, may have little influence on compensation, but when combined with other measures, it may 
bring a lot of positive effect. The combination of three measures may hinder the assessment of 
separate measures, as what effect each measure brings on compensation will be unknown. With 
regard to each scenario individually, the following clarifications should be made. In Scenario 1, the 
proposal of multiple damages is within the limits of full compensation. In opt-in actions, multiple 
damages are necessary to recompense high organization costs and to ensure full compensation 
standards (actual loss plus expected loss). To the same extent, the proposed wide discovery rules in 
Scenario 2 are vital for the attainment of full compensation in indirect purchaser cases. The 
objective of full compensation requires the ‘courts [to] chase the harm downstream to the ultimately 
injured party.’
22
 Further down the distribution chain, plaintiffs have less evidence to prove the harm 
suffered. Therefore, only ensured access to directly incriminating evidence could facilitate the 
chances of proving damages in follow-on cartel actions. Finally, an opt-out measure proposed in 
Scenario 3 is in accordance with the group formation model in some EU member states. So far, 
these actions have not attracted abusive litigation. 
 
From Table 1, it can be seen that contingency fees and third party litigation are proposed in all 
scenarios. It is of crucial importance to include private litigators in collective redress schemes, since 
public standing cannot be considered a tool for facilitating the objective of compensation. In most 
EU member states public authorities (e.g., consumer organizations) do not have sufficient financial 
capacity, human resources or legal expertise to represent the multitude of victims in antitrust 
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 In a few other countries consumer organizations are financially strong (for 
example, in Germany, France and in the UK), but they may keep from taking such antitrust 
collective actions that are not predetermined to succeed. The loss might significantly diminish the 
reputation of consumer organizations, knowing they had represented the group of consumers. To 
the same extent, the public authority can be restrained to bring the claim on behalf of certain group 
of victims if their loss is not directly related to the activities of that entity. On the other hand, 
attorneys have the ability to represent numerous victims in all types of legal matters. Moreover, 
private firms are much more experienced in litigation and thus they can even find ways to deal with 
cases that might be seen unattractive for public authorities. From a quantitative perspective, there 
are a large number of attorneys who may seek representation in collective antitrust litigation. But in 
order to attract lawyers to engage in group litigation, they should be allowed to obtain awards that 
outweigh the risks. One of the best options is to allow for attorneys to sign a contingency fee 
agreement with clients, yet this reimbursement model has to be reinforced by other tools. As the 
examples in Lithuania and Poland have shown, the introduction of contingency fees alone cannot 
increase the number of antitrust collective actions.
24
 Another option is the availability of a 
conditional fee agreement, which is allowed in England and Wales. The lawyer takes the risks, but 
if the case is won, he or she can obtain a success fee in addition to the initial legal fee based on 
hourly billing. This reimbursement model was utilized in the above-mentioned Replica Football 
Shirts case, where the success fee was raised to 100%.
25
 But this model is problematic in most EU 
member states, because financially poor representative organizations would be required to pay 
hourly legal fees to attorneys. Therefore, contingency fees are prioritized over conditional fees in 
the following discussion. 
 
With regard to third party litigation, it may serve an auxiliary function in compensating victims. 
This is mainly because there are far fewer third party litigators compared to law firms. An even 
more important factor is that this type of litigation funding is uncommon in the EU context. So far 
the most popular financing of antitrust class actions has been on the basis of the Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPVs).
26
 Under this model, investors purchase several claims with significant damages 
and then all litigation rights are transferred to SPV. But it is clear that the popularity of third party 
funding would increase if one of the scenarios was introduced. Regardless of the potential of third-
party funding, the main emphasis in the following discussion is on contingency fees. These fees 
arguably have more possibilities of attracting a more active involvement of private parties. As 
proved in the US, this tool ensures that small-stakes collective actions are heard in courts. 
 
However, it is true that all schemes are subject to criticism. One could argue that representation by a 
group lawyer, especially when contingency fees are combined with another deterrence-oriented 
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remedy (especially an opt-out measure), may lead to abusive litigation by entrepreneurial lawyers. 
But the reality is that none of the scenarios are close to the American system, in which six 
deterrence-based remedies are combined. Notably, the measures of deterrence (two in each scheme) 
are proposed in a more lenient form than their American counterparts. Furthermore, the ‘loser pays’ 
principle is proposed as a common safeguard against litigation abuses of the representatives. But 
this measure is an insufficient prerequisite in itself to prevent frivolous actions, especially in 
countries where the other sides’ costs are not high (such as the Netherlands). The safeguard 
mechanism is reinforced by national ethical rules, which essentially act as tools to enforce fair 
behaviour among lawyers.
27
 In order to mitigate the risks, additional safeguards can be introduced. 
The first one is a public tender system for legal services.
28
 Another safeguard option is to qualify an 
ad hoc body that would be empowered to monitor the activities of the group lawyer and the group 




These justifications seem not to be in line with the survey commissioned by the U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform (ILR).
30
 The survey, coordinated by Sidley Austin LLP in Brussels, was 
conducted in 10 EU member states (encompassing all the largest economies) to assess the trends 
and issues of all types of collective actions across the EU. The report released in March 2017 found 
that the development of collective redress schemes across the EU member states include the 
removal or reduction of traditional safeguards against abusive litigation, thereby increasing the 
potential of litigation abuses in the EU context. More specifically, the following concerns have been 
observed. First, member states lack effective screening mechanisms to assess the suitability and 
eligibility of the representative entity. For instance, there are no qualification requirements to 
represent victims in the Netherlands. ILR points to the case where a foundation started an action on 
behalf of almost 200,000 consumers against the Dutch State Lottery.
31
 The Report underlines that 
the director of the foundation had allegedly distributed millions of euros of consumers’ financial 
contribution for personal gain. Second, member states are becoming more lenient in allowing 
lawyers to work on a contingency fee basis. Third, especially in the Netherlands and the UK have 
seen third-party litigation funding becoming a prominent element of the litigation landscape in 
member states. ILR underlines that where third party funding is available, ‘it operates with 
shadows, without mandatory disclosure rules’ and litigation funders ‘appear to have structural 
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relationships with law firms.’
32
 In the UK, for example, the code of conduct for funders is drafted 
by the same funders. Furthermore, the funders are acting without any effective oversight 
mechanism. Fourth, the ‘loser pays’ principle is not as effective as envisaged. In collective actions, 
the ‘loser pays’ principle often applies only to court costs, and not to the actual costs of the action. 
In addition, third party funders are often immune from the adverse costs of the other side.
33
 Fifth, 
experimenting with opt-out collective actions increases the chances of abuse.   
 
Despite being one of the most, if not the most comprehensive studies in assessing the potential of 
abusive litigation in the EU-style collective actions, there are some reasons to criticise the report.  
 
First, in some parts the report picks up the cases and facts that are the most subject to criticism, but 
remains silent about contrasting facts that may deny that criticism. For example, Dutch 
commentators criticised the ILR report for overlooking crucial facts about the above-mentioned 
Dutch State Lottery case.
34
 The foundation’s board was successfully replaced by the participants of 
the foundation. Moreover, the case was successfully settled, despite difficulty in establishing 
causation and damages. The settlement allowed for 2.5 million class members to obtain damages. 
Biard and others pointed out that the Lottery case should be compared with the WCAM settlements, 
where the Amsterdam Court of Appeal positively evaluated the soundness of a collective settlement 




Second, the ILR criticism regarding the weakness of the existing safeguards against litigation 
abuses does not seem to be very well grounded. Biard and others claim that safeguards function 
well, especially as regards the admissibility of representative organizations. More specifically, that 
1) courts have become much stricter when screening the suitability of representative entities; 2) the 
threshold for representative bodies to obtain admissibility has been raised significantly. 
Furthermore, the report harshly criticizes third party funding for operating in the shadows but bases 
its claim on the fact that it is largely unregulated in the EU member states. This situation does not 
inherently attract abusive litigation.   
 
Third,  ILR claims that the report encompasses 10 jurisdictions, but at least one third is not included 
in discussing the most important components of collective actions that are common across the 
jurisdictions: the standards for the representative entity (chapter 1), the ‘loser pays’ principle 
(chapter 3), the court’s admissibility standards (chapter 5). Without a full assessment, ILR’s report 
can be accused of cherry-picking.  
 
Fourth, the report relates the EU’s abusive litigation with the perceived issues in the US system, but 
disregards the fact that the latter is a deterrence-based system, combining six deterrence-based 
measures: the absence of one (for example, an opt-out measure or contingency fees) may 
significantly lower the chances for abusive litigation. It should also be taken into account that some 
US measures are not in line with the EU legal traditions, such as the one-way-fee shifting, broad 
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discovery rules or treble damages. It is also important to stress that an opt-out damages distribution 
model—one of the most criticized measures by collective actions' critics—has been under a heavy 
scrutiny in the Netherlands, including a public registration scheme.
36
 So far, the system has not 
attracted criticism regarding abusive actions; if there is a possibility, it is rather incidental. 
 
However, it does not mean that the ILR’s concerns are groundless. It is obvious that contingency 
fees or third-party funding allow representatives to gain profit. Therefore, there are more incentives 
for framing the cases for their own benefit, potentially even leading to abusive litigation. The 
proposed scenarios have even more potential for litigation abuses, as they combine few measures of 
concern. In fact, it is hard to predict the outcome when the proposed combinations have not been 
tested in the EU’s collective redress schemes. For this reason, Chapter 7 does not intend to show 
that one of the schemes should be introduced at the EU level. Instead, the principal aim is to assess 
the chances of these scenarios in achieving full compensation. In addition, there is a discussion on 
the potential of facilitated compensatory actions to contribute to public enforcement through an 
increased effect of deterrence. 
 
7.3.1 First scenario: Multiple Damages Combined with Contingency Fees and Third Party 
Funding 
 
Determining multiple damages is not a revolutionary proposal at the EU level. In 2005, the 
European Commission proposed double damages for horizontal cartels in the Green Paper on 
damages actions.
37
 However, after criticism that the EU was importing US litigation culture 
(especially from the business sector), the double damages were no longer included in the 2008 
White Paper.
38
 Following the same approach, the Directive on damages actions rejected punitive, 
multiple, or other kind of damages.
39
 Accordingly, antitrust collective schemes should be formed 
under the same provisions.  
 
A. The potential justification for the first scenario 
 
Under this scenario, group formation is based on an opt-in remedy. This type of action entails 
significant costs, since the group needs to be organized. One of the major reasons why the group 
organization entails substantial expenses is that the typical adherence to the group is subject to 
formal requirements that exacerbate the financial costs. Furthermore, opt-in collective actions 
demand expensive awareness-raising campaigns in order to attract the affected parties to join the 
action. If the case is won, full compensation is unattainable in practice because the high 
organization and case management costs have already consumed the large portion of the award. 
This leads to a paradoxical outcome. The objective of full compensation demands the insurance of 
full compensation standards (actual loss and expectation loss), meaning that there is no space for 
undercompensating a victim. However, the action is predetermined to generate the award, which is 
much lower than the actual loss. Therefore, it clearly emerges that damage multipliers are needed to 
fill this gap of under-enforcement. 
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The same conclusion can be drawn from the above-mentioned Mobile Cartel case. So far, it has 
been one of few cases that have been brought on an opt-in basis. Most importantly, it has been the 
only case where tangible data about the opt-in collective antitrust litigation has been disclosed for 
public access. In that case, the French Competition Authority (NCA) imposed a record fine of 534 
million euros on three mobile operators (Orange France, SFR, and Bouygues Telecom), alleging a 
price-fixing conspiracy. As a consequence, the consumer association UFC Que Chosir brought a 










534 million euros 
 
Number of consumers opted in 
12,530 out of ≈20 million (much less than 1%) 
 
Value of the claim 
0,8 million euros (roughly EUR 60 per consumer participating in the claim) 
 
Case management expenses 2,000 hours to prepare the action. The costs were 0,5 million euros 
 
The case attracted only 12,530 consumers (much less than 1% of the total amount) to join the 
action, while the violation had a potentially negative impact on 20 million consumers. In spite of the 
small number of victims, the litigation involved 21 employees, 2,000 hours were needed to prepare 
the action, and it required issuing three cubic meters of documents.
41
 As a consequence, the case 
management costs (0.5 million euros) consumed the majority of the potential recovery (0.8 million 
euros). On this point, it should be noted that the case was dismissed by the Paris Court of Appeal on 
the grounds that UFC Que Chosir ‘solicited consumer mandates via the internet.’
42
 If the case was 
won, the damages would need to be distributed, thereby demanding extra costs. After all, if there 
would be some surplus, the class members would receive very low awards proportionally. Hence, 
this case proves that the achievement of full compensation calls for some form of the damage 
multiplier. 
 
However, there is no possibility to draw definite conclusions about the opt-in litigation costs in the 
entire antitrust landscape from this case alone. Primarily, the Mobile cartel case is representative in 
high-profile cartel actions, where representatives typically face similar issues when organizing the 
group. In addition, plaintiffs are facing a comparable burden of quantification and causation. But 
other types of infringements, such as abuse of dominance, cannot be directly compared with cartels. 
Cartel actions are typically more covert, and may thus require more costs and efforts to litigate 
them. In spite of the differences, all antitrust infringements share common features. First, the 
infringer usually targets the most vulnerable victims, such as ordinary consumers, who have fewer 
capabilities (financial and legal) to bring a claim than large entities do. In these violations, the 
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individual harm is typically low (for example, when consumers were buying an overpriced 
product), so the costs of the individual law-enforcement outweigh the expected benefits.
43
 Second, 
the antitrust violation causes harm to a multitude of victims, which are often spread out in different 
distribution chains. In such circumstances, the Mobile cartel case can only be considered a 
preliminary benchmark for assessing the potential impact of damage multipliers on the 
compensation goal. 
 
This scenario seems to be in line with EU law, but subject to some conditions. First, multiple 
damages are not per se prohibited under Article 3 of the Directive on damages actions: “[f]ull 
compensation under this Directive shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of 
punitive, multiple or other types of damages”. Also, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) asserted that the imposition of specific damages, such as exemplary or punitive damages, in 
response to harm caused by antitrust violations would not be contrary to the EU law if the principle 
of equivalence is respected.
44
 Second, contingency fees are also not against EU legal traditions. 
According to paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Recommendation on collective redress, the Member 
States should not permit contingency fees which lead to unnecessary litigation, yet they can be 
allowed if they respect the principle of full compensation. Third, third-party funding can be allowed 
under paragraph 15 of the Recommendation, yet if there is no conflict of interest, the third party has 
sufficient financial resources to meet its commitments and the claimant party has sufficient 
resources to meet adverse costs. As regards practical enforcement, this scenario may lead to a 
problem of over-compensation. Indeed, it is hard to set standards for preventing multiple damages 
and contingency fees from breaching the principle of full compensation, for example by 
overcompensating victims or representatives of collective actions. Each collective action should be 
seen as an opportunity for maximising profit, especially when led by natural or legal persons. In 
case of third-party funding, typically a private institution is involved that seeks to prioritise its profit 
rather than providing effective compensation to class members.      
 
B. The effectiveness of compensation and deterrence 
 
It is very hard to define the balanced magnitude of a damage multiplier that would fully 
compensate, but not overcompensate, group members. Yet, given that the EU has already evaluated 
the possibilities for double damages, the effectiveness of doubling will be assessed first. The major 
question is whether double damages can ensure full compensation to victims who opted into the 
action. To start with, it should present the range of contingency fees that may be applicable in the 
EU context. In the US antitrust collective actions, contingency fees range between 15% and 33% 
(on average).
45
 This proportion also seems realistic in the EU, given that a larger percentage than 
33% may breach the rules of attorney’s fear conduct, and a lower percentage than 15% may be 
economically unfeasible for private litigators. If the upper threshold is applied in the context of the 
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Mobile cartel, the potential compensation of the group counsel (in an optimal scenario) would be 
around 0.5 million euros.
46
 If this amount is deducted from the total award, damages doubling can 
both overcompensate and undercompensate group members. In this respect, three observations 
should be made. 
 
First, if we suppose the ideal scenario when the court awarded damages requested (0.8 million 
euros), the total award after doubling would be 1.6 million euros. After the deduction of a 
contingency fee (around 0.5 million euros), the consumer fund would amount to 1.1 million euros. 
It therefore means that the ultimate recovery would exceed the damages for 0.3 million euros (1.1 
million euros – 0.8 million euros). But, once the case is won, the distribution of damages requires 
additional administrative costs, which should not be high in opt-in collective litigation. Group 
members had already joined the group, and therefore their identities are clear when damages need to 
be distributed. Given this understanding, there is a chance that there will be some surplus of award 
when the entire case costs are deducted from the recovery. Therefore, there is a possibility of 
overcompensation. However, it should be acknowledged that the award of full damages is very 
optimistic and only possible in incidental cases. Second, a more realistic possibility is that the court 
will grant lower compensation than claimed. Under this approach, class members are unlikely to 
obtain full damages. Third, antitrust actions are likely to be settled. In that case, the full 
compensation is determined to fail, since defendants would aim at settling cases for lower than 
actual awards. Otherwise, the settlement is not so attractive. 
 
After discussing three possible outcomes, it can be argued that the prospect of complete 
compensation is possible only in occasional cases. Another question is whether double damages 
induce more active involvement of representatives and group members when combined with 
contingency fees. The increased participation of private actors would mean more actions brought 
and in turn more victims compensated. 
 
A potential 33% contingency fee (when full damages are awarded) may generate the group 
counsel’s award of around 0.5 million euros, i.e., the same as litigation expenses of the UFC Que 
Chosir. In fact, it is too risky to engage in a contingency fee agreement, knowing that the litigation 
costs may equal the expected award. There would be no business in this case. Therefore, the 
combination of contingency fees and double damages would not significantly increase the lawyers’ 
incentives to invest in collective litigation. With regard to group members, double damages are not 
capable of attracting many more victims to join the action. Given that antitrust violations normally 
generate harm of low value, the incentive to join the action is not much increased if a victim, for 
example, can potentially receive 70% instead of 30% of the loss.
47
 In particular, as a result of very 
low opt-in rates, the deterrence effect remains minimal or absent in this scenario. Most importantly, 
the magnitude of a likely penalty will be negligible if only few victims join the action. To conclude, 
this scenario has the ability to provide high proportional compensation to group members, but the 
size of the group is doomed to be very small. Due to the small size of the group, this scenario is not 
designed to deter infringers. 
 
                                                 
46
 The estimation was made under the following equation: 1.6 (million euros) × 0.33 = 0.528 (million euros). 
47
 For example, the individual harm was on average 60 euros in the Mobile Cartel and 20 pounds in the Replica 
Football Shirts. As a consequence, there is no big difference in incentive to join the action when the potential damages 
receivers consider whether they may receive 18 or 42 euros, or if they may receive 6 or 14 pounds. 
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In conclusion, the potential of treble damages for achieving the objectives of compensation and 
deterrence should be noted. When applying the same data as in the Mobile cartel, a potential for 
overpayment can be foreseen if the case leads to a final court decision (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The potential scenario of treble damages 
 Award  
(≈million euros) 
A 33% contingency fee 
(≈million euros) 




The potential of 
overpayment  
Full award 2,4 0.8 0.8 0.8 Yes 
Partial 
award 
2.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 Yes 
2.0 0.7 0.8 0.5 Yes 
1.8 0.6 0.8 0.4 Yes 
1.6 0.5 0.8 0.3 Very high  
1.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 Minimal  
1.2 0.4 0.8 0 No 
1 0.3   0.8< No surplus No 
Settlement  0,8<   0.3<   0.8< No surplus No 
  
It can be seen that with an increase or decrease of the award, the payment to the class counsel and 
the potential surplus increase or decrease proportionally. On this point, it should be stressed that the 
additional costs for distributing damages in won cases are not included in Table 2, yet these 
expenses should not be high in case of opt-in (since victims are already identified). As a 
consequence, the overpayment is realistic when at least 60% (1.4 million out of 2.4 million) of full 
award is granted. In case of settlement, the overpayment is improbable. Furthermore, Table 2 shows 
that even in case of trebling the counsel’s potential award, it is not high enough to attract more 
active participation. After the deduction of litigation costs, the profit can potentially be 100,000 to 
300,000 euros (in the best scenario).
48
 It does not seem a very lucrative investment, because the 
expected profit hardly outweighs the risks. However, again, the Mobile cartel case provides only a 
preliminary benchmark for assessing treble damages in compensating victims and deterring 
wrongdoers. But the preliminary assessment suggests that treble damages have a high probability 
for overcompensation. For this reason, this Chapter will no longer consider trebling in the EU 
context. 
 
7.3.2 Second Scenario: Broader Discovery Rules in Indirect Purchasers’ Actions Combined with 
Contingency Fees 
 
The CJEU previously brought uncertainty when striking a balance between the leniency programme 
and the private antitrust actions. In the Pfleiderer decision, the Court asserted that it was for the 
national courts to carry out a balancing test for the disclosure of leniency documents on a case-by-
case basis.
49
 This ruling became a source of concern for whistle-blowers, because it was difficult to 
foresee how the national courts would treat the requests for disclosure. In order to protect the 
informers and the ones who had settled, the Directive on damages actions introduced the following 
limitations.
50
 First, it has restricted access to leniency statements and settlement submissions 
(‘black-listed’ documents). Second, the information prepared by a natural or legal person 
specifically for competition authority proceedings and settlement submissions that have been 
withdrawn, can only be disclosed after a competition authority has closed its proceedings (‘grey-
listed’ documents). Third, other evidence or relevant categories of evidence can be disclosed at any 
time, but a claimant should make a reasoned justification supporting the plausibility of his or her 
                                                 
48
 This amount is calculated when case-related costs are deducted from the recovery. 
49
 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161, para. 32. 
50
 Directive, supra note 1, Art. 6. 
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claim. It is true that claimants are provided with some access to evidence in actions for damages. 
Nevertheless, the multi-layered safeguard policy raises doubts whether the incriminating material 
will be disclosed. An even worse factor is that national courts are granted the power to assess the 
proportionality of disclosure requests and whether confidential information is duly protected.
51
 In 
fact, the access to evidence depends on how national courts will conduct a disclosure test, which 
needs to be performed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
A. The potential justification for the second scenario 
 
Facilitated access to leniency materials could be justified in antitrust collective actions when 
indirect purchasers face crucial evidence-gathering problems. It is clear that the further down the 
distribution chain victims are, the less evidence they have in order to prove the loss suffered. It is 
thus obvious that end consumers are a good target for antitrust offenders, because these victims are 
the least aware about the nature and extent of the harm. Therefore, access to leniency statements 
would significantly facilitate the chances of proving damages in consumer anti-cartel actions. 
Another argument in favour of better access to leniency statements stems from the fact that cartel 
meetings are typically covert, and proof of unlawful agreements may be destroyed.
52
 Also, the 
infringers are well aware about the violation, so they can impose additional enforcement costs on 
potential claimants so as to dissuade them from taking any actions.
53
 If broader discovery rules are 
not allowed in consumer actions (specifically, if they are indirect purchasers), representatives would 
lack interest in antitrust collective litigation, particularly if only opt-in actions are allowed. As a 
consequence, infringers will avoid the responsibility for the harm caused when claimants are 
consumers who stand at lower distribution levels. 
 
The decision on whether to grant access to leniency materials or not could be made by national 
judges on a case-by-case basis. However, this type of disclosure may bring uncertainty about when 
and in what circumstances leniency materials will actually be disclosed, while simultaneously 
jeopardizing the functioning of leniency programme. For example, there is a risk that direct 
purchasers will free-ride on the efforts of indirect purchasers. In fact, the outcome of such 
disclosure is unpredictable. Further discussion on this matter is beyond the scope of this Chapter. 
Rather, the principal aim is to assess whether and to what extent a more forceful disclosure measure 
would compensate indirect purchasers and subsequently deter wrongdoers. 
 
However, this scenario does not seem to be justified from an EU law perspective. Access to 
leniency materials, even in case of indirect purchasers, is against Article 6 of the Directive on 
damages actions - they are included in a black-list of disclosure. It does not seem that the Directive 
gives any exceptions to this provision. As a consequence, access to leniency documents is not 
included when defining the best possible scenario for antitrust collective redress in Section 7.4. 
Nevertheless, for a general discussion it is important to assess the potential of broader discovery 
rules in indirect purchasers’ actions for contributing to the objectives of compensation and 
deterrence. It is not unlikely that one day a strict approach regarding black-list documents may 
change, if damages actions continue producing much lower benefits to victims than expected. 
                                                 
51
 Ibid., Art. 5(3). 
52
 Industrial Bags Case (COMP/38354) Commission Decision of 30 November 2005, OJ L 282/41, paras. 140, 794. 
53
 S. Peyer, ‘Cartel Members Only-Revisiting Private Antitrust Policy in Europe’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, 2011, p. 627, at 645. 
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B. The effectiveness of compensation and deterrence 
 
In the absence of the damage multiplier, indirect purchasers cannot be fully compensated for harm 
suffered. Therefore, the main question is whether the combination of broad discovery rules and 
contingency fees can incentivize attorneys to bring more damages claims and to attract more 
victims to join the action than in a traditional opt-in claim. 
 
To begin with, the disguised information, which is kept in leniency statements, provides 
fundamental insights for quantifying the harm caused by a rise in prices (‘overcharge’ and ‘volume 
effect’).
54
 In turn, it constitutes a useful basis for defining the affected group, and therefore 
increases the chances to pass the certification test. If the group is certified, the availability of 
incriminating evidence (such as internal documents regarding agreed price increases and their 
implementation in practice) raises the chances of proving damages. It may therefore cause a shift of 
balance between the parties: on the one hand, a defendant – usually a large corporation – holding a 
key disguised material; and, on the other hand, plaintiffs – a group of consumers – who are 
normally distant from direct evidences. But will the access to leniency statements attract lawyers to 
invest in opt-in cases? 
 
It is obvious that the investment is less risky when the incriminating evidence is available to 
plaintiffs. First, is easier to pass the certification test. Second, it is easier to prove the loss closer to 
full damages. Despite having a lot of potential to facilitate damages actions, a crucial issue is that 
facilitated access to evidence is unlikely to much increase the amount of victims when compared 
with a standard opt-in case. The facilitated discovery rules do not motivate consumers to participate 
in the action, because the potential compensation remains similar to that of a standard opt-in case. 
In addition, wide discovery rules do not ease the administrative burdens or formal necessities for 
individual consumers when they intend to adhere the action. For example, even if a consumer lost 
the proof of purchase of the overcharged product (such as, a purchase check), he or she is still 
required to ‘include all essential documents’ in order to join the group.
55
 In such circumstances, it is 
hard to imagine that rational actors will take the risk to act as representatives (especially investing 
in an information campaign) when the size of the group is determined to be small. The one, if not 
only, advantage of broader access is that indirect purchasers who have more extensive evidences of 
harm can prove damages more easily. However, the award of full compensation is highly distorted 
due to the need to compensate litigation costs in costly opt-in actions. Adding to the fact that the 
expected size of the group is small, the facilitation of the compensation objective is negligible in 
this scenario. This in turn does not deter wrongdoers. Like in the first scenario, the magnitude of the 
liability is rather anecdotal. To sum up, facilitated access to leniency documents increases the 
probability of success at the pre-trial and trial stages. However, there is little prospect that the group 
will be larger than in a typical opt-in action. Therefore, under this scenario, the expected effects 
would be minimal on full compensation, and most likely absent on deterrence. 
 
 
                                                 
54
 For further discussion on the overcharge and the volume effect, see Practical Guide on Quantifying harm in actions 
for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches 
of Arts. 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, SWD(2013) 205, C(2013) 3440. 
55
 Leskinen, 2010, p. 10. 
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7.3.3 Third Scenario: Opt-out Schemes Combined with Contingency Fees 
 
The previous scenarios indicate that an opt-in group formation combined with more forceful 
measures (double damages or broad discovery rules) can only marginally improve compensation. 
Despite the new opportunities, the reality is that very low participation rates are expected. 
Therefore, both scenarios fail to accomplish the stated goal of compensation. Following the basic 
logic, a very small number of victims receiving compensation (even if damages are close to full 
compensation) could not outbalance the fact that a large majority of victims receive nothing. 
Therefore, the size of the group is the principal factor in evaluating the implementation of the 
compensation goal. In fact, the success depends on whether a private antitrust model has a versatile 
tool for aggregating claims of different kinds. So far, the most effective device in gathering victims 
is an opt-out mechanism. This tool raises participation rates to maximum: the claim is brought on 
behalf of a defined set of victims unless someone declares to opt out.
 56
 There is no requirement to 
involve all victims, but claimants typically try to define the group as widely as possible, i.e., as 
close as possible to the optimal level. Such an aggregation remedy may result in millions of victims, 
thereby generating a great aggregate financial value. As a result, lawyers have much interest in 
investing in antitrust collective actions (even if they are of small-stakes), especially if contingency 
fee agreements are allowed. 
 
A. The potential justification for the third scenario 
 
The major concern is that an opt-out vehicle may be in violation of Article 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which allows for the 
parties to freely dispose their claims. However, an opt-out mechanism does not seem to be 
inherently against EU law. The CJEU ruling in Eschig seemingly supports opt-out actions as long as 
victims can be adequately informed about their opt-out rights and can effortlessly withdraw from 
the group proceedings.
57
 The underlying rationale is that an effective information mechanism may 
ensure that a claimant’s free choice to litigate or not. This basis is probably one of the reasons why 
the Recommendation on collective redress allows exceptions to an opt-in principle when they can 
be “duly justified by reasons of sound administration of justice” (paragraph 21). The potential 
practical enforcement problems of this Scenario are illustrated below through the US example, as 
well in Chapter 3 (especially in sections 3.3-3.4). It should be also stressed that this Scenario, 
combining an opt-out model with contingency fees, has a potential of distorting the compensation 
principle when representatives are overpaid and victims under-compensated. Chapter 3 (especially 
sections 3.3.1-3.3.2) analyses this issue deeper.   
 
Opt-out collective actions have already been tested in Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK.  There 
are no reports of representatives in these cases engaging in any type of abusive litigation. For 
further discussion on these experiences, see Chapter 5 (especially Section 5.4). 
 
                                                 
56
 The US practice shows that opt-out rates are less than 0.2%. See T. Eisenberg & G Miller, ‘The Role of Opt-outs and 
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues’, New York University Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 04-004, 2004, p. 14, at 25, available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=528146> accessed 10 August 2018.   
57
 Case C-199/08 Erhard Eschig v.UNIQA Sachversicherung AG [2009] ECR 1-8295, para. 64. For further discussion, 
see D.-P.L. Tzakas, ‘Effective Collective Redress in Antitrust and Consumer Protection Matters: A Panacea or a 
Chimera?’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 2011, p. 1125, at 1137. 
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B. The effectiveness of compensation and deterrence 
 
There is no doubt that an opt-out remedy is the most effective in collecting victims, as claims are 
brought on behalf of all potential victims. However, this does not mean that opt-out actions are very 
effective in compensating victims. The US experience indicates that around 35% – 90% of 
consumers receive some kind of compensation in automatic distribution settlements.
58
 Under this 
procedure, monetary awards are automatically distributed to class members who do not express 
willingness to withdraw from the action. But for the ones who receive recovery, the actual 
compensation is proportionally very low. Even in the most optimistic recovery scenario, automatic 
distribution settlements can only generate up to 70% compensation of the victim’s actual harm.
59
 
Another type of distribution is where class members are required to submit a valid claim form in 
order to obtain compensation (a so-called ‘claims made’ settlement). Under this model, only 
between 1% and 15% of class members receive compensation, and in some cases the proportion can 
be even lower than 1%.
60
 Although the number of class members receiving compensation is 
disappointingly small, the actual recovery rate is close or equals to 100%. This is notably because 
class members are only entitled to compensation if they submit a valid claim form proving their 
harm. After all, it does not change the fact that the large majority of victims receive no 
compensation. 
 
Despite the failures, this scenario is the most effective in compensating victims. First, an opt-out 
remedy generates a significant aggregate financial value. Therefore, private actors are given the 
chance to reap substantial compensation. As a result, many more cases are going to be heard in 
courts in comparison with other scenarios. Second, the automatic inclusion mechanism ensures that 
a large number of victims will receive some form of compensation in automatic damages 
distribution cases. Even though many victims remain undercompensated, the final compensation 
value is greater compared to other scenarios where few class members obtain higher individual 
recoveries. In the following discussion, a comparison will be made of the potential value of 
compensation in each scenario (Table 4), using the illustrative example of the case where 1 million 
victims suffered the mean harm of 50 euros. 
 
Table 4. The analysis of the potential compensation value 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Expected participation rate 
≤ 1% < 1% 35% (compensation rate) 
 
The potential number of victims involved 
in the action 
≤ 10,000  
(1% of victims) 
< 5,000 
(0,5% of victims) 
350,000 
(35% of victims) 
 
The value of the claim 
≤ 1,000,000 (€) < 500,000 (€) ≈ 17,500,000 (€) 
 
Individual recovery rate 
Up to 100% Up to 60% Up to 40% 
 
The total compensation value of the claim ≤ 800,000 (€) < 350,000 (€) ≈ 7,000,000 (€) 
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 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Gilbert, 2015; Pace & Rubenstein, 200819; Deborah Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas: 
Pursuing Public Goals For Private Gains, 1st edn, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2000. 
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 Fitzpatrick and Gilbert, 2015, p. 787 (table 3). However, this study is primarily useful in cases relating to the disputes 
of overdraft bank fees. In contrast to antitrust cases, there is a comfortable electronic system that directly identifies 
victims.  
60
 For the range between 1% and 15%, see Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2015, supra note 19; Pace & 




For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that all calculations are based on the highest possible 
threshold, i.e. taking into account the most optimistic rates for participation and recovery. This 
approach allows for the evaluation of the achievement of compensation and deterrence under the 
most positive expectations. Following this approach, Scenario 1 is regarded to have a potential to 
aggregate a group consisting of 1% of victims (10,000). Yet, when considering the failures in 
France and the UK, a 1% rate would be very high for an opt-in antitrust collective action. But this 
proportion is possible when doubling of damages is combined with contingency fees. In that case, 
both victims and lawyers have more incentives to participate in the action: the former enjoy double 
compensation, while the latter enjoy double reimbursement. In contrast, Scenario 2 is less 
interesting to both sides, since there is no promise of higher awards than in ordinary opt-in claim. If 
an upper threshold is applied, a 0.5% participation rate seems feasible. 
 
The estimations of recovery rates (the proportion of the damages delivered to group members in the 
light of damages suffered) are unpredictable, as it is unclear how many victims would actually join 
the action. The ultimate individual compensation directly depends on what the aggregate value of 
the claim would be.
61
 However, the proposed rates in scenarios 1 and 2 (up to 100% and 60% 
respectively) seem realistic when compared to the magnitude of the potential award.
62
 When the 
potential participation rates are taken into account, none of the scenarios would be worth more than 
1 million euros. 
 
With regard to Scenario 3, the representative compensation rates (when class members receive 
some kind of compensation) can be drawn from the US jurisdiction. As mentioned before, the 
compensation rates in consumer cases range between 35% and 90%, but the most relevant data for 
the antitrust case would be 35%.
63
 It would therefore mean that around 350,000 victims are 
expected to receive some kind of compensation under the Scenario 3. But, again relying on the US 
results, these victims could only expect up to 40% recovery rate of their loss.
64
 As a result, the total 
(optimistic) compensation value could potentially be around 7 million euros. 
 
Admittedly, this study reflects only a hypothetical scenario. In fact, the rates (participation, 
compensation, and recovery) fluctuate from case to case. However, this does not change the key 
factor that the compensation value in Scenario 3 is always considerably higher than in other 
                                                 
61
 The size of the group determines the case-related costs and contingency fees. Therefore, it directly affects how much 
money will be deducted from the total award. The larger the group, the more possibilities for larger individual 
compensation.  
62
 In Scenario 1, the potential of 100% compensation can be drawn from the discussion in Section 1.2. In Scenario 2, 
this data can be found when, for instance, analysing the following scenario. If 0.3% of victims (3000) join the action, 
the actual value of the claim would be 150,000 euros. When a 30% contingency fee was deducted from the award, the 
leftover would be 100,000 euros. When this amount is distributed to class members, each recovery could be potentially 
around 30 euros (around ≈60% of the recovery). 
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 See Pace & Rubenstein, 2008. Authors argue that “the smallest distribution rates tended to have class sizes of several 
hundred thousand class members.” And indeed antitrust cases fell under this category, because typical antitrust violation 
lasts for years. It is estimated that the average duration of a cartel is 5.7 years. See F. Smuda, ‘Cartel Overcharges and 
the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law’, Centre for European Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 12-050, 
2012, pp. 19-21, available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118566> (last accessed 10 August 
2018). 
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 There is a lack of data on this issue. The only relevant study is Fitzpatrick & Gilbert, 2015. However, it estimated the 
recovery rates for small-stakes class actions relating to the disputes of bank overdraft. It is highly unlikely that these 
optimistic rates would be applicable in case of antitrust. 
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scenarios. This fact would not change significantly even if the case-related costs would be higher in 
an opt-out litigation, or if the participation rates would be higher (e.g., 2% or 3%) in other 
scenarios. The difference between the compensation values is simply too large. 
 
These results also demonstrate that Scenario 3 scores the best marks in deterring infringers. If the 
case is successful, the aggregate value of multiple claims (even if the individual harm is low) can 
total millions of euros. This in turn forces defendants to internalize more of the negative effects 
caused to victims. Because of a larger group, the defendant also needs to invest more resources 
(both financial and human) to defend the case. Therefore, the combined benefits of Scenario 3 have 
more potential of adding a side effect on deterrence. Another important factor is that a large 
majority, if not all, of the decisions by DG Competition in consumer cases will be followed up with 
collective damages claims. The European Commission typically engages in high-profile cases 
where the violation negatively affects a wide range of victims, often across the EU member states. 
Therefore, there is a large incentive for private actors to sign a contingency fee agreement, which, 
in case of success, would lead to a significant award. At the national level, there is no guarantee that 
all the NCA’s fining decisions will be followed by actions of private litigators. For example, 
regional cases or cases in small countries may produce low combined financial loss. Therefore, in 
the absence of damage multipliers, the risks may be too high for utilizing contingency fees in lower 
profile cases. This undercuts the deterrence objective. 
 
To conclude, this scenario is the best suited to facilitate compensation. Even though the 
achievement of full compensation for individual victims is significantly diminished, a very large 
portion of victims can expect some form of compensation. In addition, rational infringers have to 
consider the increased probability of being punished by private parties in follow-on actions. 
Nevertheless, deterrence is diminished in lower magnitude cases. After all, in comparison with 
other scenarios, this scenario facilitates the deterrence in best terms. 
 
7.4 THE BEST POSSIBLE COMPENSATORY MECHANISM OF ANTITRUST 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: CHECKS AND BALANCES 
 
The results show that the case for full compensation is weak in all scenarios. It is predetermined that 
either very few victims will receive compensation, or that many victims will obtain very low 
proportional recovery. It can be argued that the compensation largely fails as a goal in these 
scenarios, because the principle of full compensation demands reaching very high standards of 
implementation. If the EU is inclined to shape private antitrust enforcement under full 
compensation, there is no other choice than to combine the above-discussed scenarios. As a result, 
the following analysis will design the best possible mechanism that is within the limits of full 
compensation and the legal traditions (at least in some member states). However, there is no 
intention to raise a debate about whether or not it would attract the litigation abuses announced in 
US class actions. As mentioned before, the principal aim is to assess Proposal’s effectiveness in 
compensating victims, and if there is any impact on deterrence.  
 
7.4.1 The Design of the Best Possible Compensation Mechanism 
 
When designing this model, two major components should be combined. First, each victim should 
be empowered to claim and obtain full compensation (actual harm, loss of profit, and interest). 
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Second, the aggregation device should be capable of reaching both direct and indirect purchasers, 
regardless of how distant they are from the violation. In order to ensure both components, the 
collective action mechanism should be an aggregate of three indispensable elements: contingency 
fees, opt-out schemes, and double damages. Furthermore, the scheme should secure that sufficient 
measures are introduced for incentivizing stand-alone actions. These measures are interrelated and 
complement each other towards the achievement of the best possible compensation. The scheme 
(hereinafter ‘Proposal’) is illustrated in Chart 1. 
 
Chart 1. The best possible compensation scheme (Proposal) 
 
Contrary to Scenario 2, the Proposal welcomes the protection of leniency statements. The EU 
leniency policy has proved to be successful in fighting cartels.
65
 It would be highly unjustifiable if 
the leniency programme would be put at risk when the incriminating material can potentially be 
disclosed under the current disclosure mechanism. It allows access to explanatory evidence, such as 
prices, sales volumes, profit margins, or costs.
66
 In turn, it facilitates quantification of overcharges 
caused by antitrust infringements. 
 
Another viewpoint is that the Proposal should provide more basis for stand-alone actions. In their 
present form, stand-alone claims are only facilitated by the general rules on disclosure.
67
 A crucial 
issue is that national courts are required to limit the disclosure by performing the proportionality 
test on a case-by-case basis, i.e., the court-ordered disclosure. In fact, no one can predict how a 
national court will treat requests for access. In order to increase the motivation to bring stand-alone 
actions, the EU should consider the disclosure more directly as a party-initiated scheme in the US.
68
 
Within the respective legal frameworks of member states, the claimant should be granted disclosure 
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 See, e.g., A. Stephan, ECJ Ruling in Pfleiderer Heightens Concerns about Encouraging Private Enforcement’, 
Competition Policy Blog, 2011, available at: <https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/06/23/ecj-ruling-in-
pfleiderer-heightens-concerns-about-encouraging-private-enforcement/> (last accessed 10 August 2018) (noting that 
around two thirds of European cartel violations are uncovered after the leniency). On this issue it is further discussed by 
the same author in ‘Four key challenges to the Successful Criminalization of Cartel Laws’, Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2014, p. 333. 
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 In many cases, this type of documents will be under the category of ‘white-listed’ documents (Directive, supra note 1, 
Art. 6). 
67
 Directive, supra note 1, Arts. 5(2)-(5). 
68
 See, e.g., Crane, 2010, pp. 700-701. 
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to all evidence available that can help quantifying the harm in stand-alone damages actions. The 
court in this respect should only observe the exchange of documents, and should only interact in 
exceptional circumstances; for example, when the claimant undermines the proportionality of 
disclosure measures. However, such disclosure may raise difficulties for the courts to determine the 
balance between feasible and unfeasible disclosure requests. As a safeguard against frivolous access 
to evidence, the set of material that is accessible to claimants can be defined. The availability of this 
list would ensure the extent of disclosure even before the claimant starts an action. 
 
7.4.2 The Best Possible Compensation v. Full Compensation: A Study 
 
The Proposal discussed above should score many points in compensating victims. Thus, the major 
question needs to be answered: to what extent can the best possible collective redress mechanism 
fulfil the objective of full compensation? 
 
To begin with, it should be emphasized that many victims would be able to obtain compensation 
under the proposed model. But the objective of compensation should provide not only some form of 
award, rather it has to deliver full compensation to direct and indirect purchasers. However, for 
various reasons, the achievement of full compensation is determined to fail to a large extent, even 
under the principles of the most feasible collective antitrust redress scheme. 
 
First, an opt-out remedy is imperfect in reaching indirect purchasers. But the primary fault is not of 
an aggregation mechanism, rather it is the fault of the highly complex nature of competition law 
infringements. The antitrust overcharge can cause widespread harm at different levels of 
distribution, making the identification of victims a very complicated task. A good example is the 
Canadian case Sun-Rype Products Ltd v Archer Daniels Midland Company.
69
 On the basis of an 
infringement, it was obvious that an overcharge was passed to indirect purchasers, but it was 
impossible to determine the direct relationship between indirect purchasers (end consumers) and 
overcharged products.
70
 Furthermore, class members may fail to obtain a compensation award due 
to the complex recovery procedure. For example, the US favours a multifaceted approach 
(sometimes even requiring notarization
71
) in order to prevent frivolous litigation. 
 
Second, many collective actions are likely to be settled when the certification stage is passed.
72
 
Indeed, the settlement agreement is attractive for the participants of collective actions. Defendants 
often find it prudent to settle a class action rather than continue costly legal proceedings with 
unpredictable jury trial: a loss might put a defendant out of business. The class counsel, who is 
acting under the contingency fee agreement, is always happy to settle rather than continue very long 
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and complex collective actions. In the end, the attorney receives a percentage of the recovery, which 
is typically high, given that the size of the group is large under an opt-out action. The judge has no 
reason not to end a complex antitrust case (often requiring economic assessments) when both 
parties agree on terms. As mentioned in Scenario 1, a doubling of damages is highly unlikely in 
settlements; the awards should be lower than actual damages. Although the aggregation mechanism 
is not jeopardized, the award of full compensation to individual victims is strongly diminished. One 
solution would be to cap the settlement awards for amounts higher than the actual damages. 
However, the issue is that defendants might refrain from settling at all. Likewise, it may lead to 
dissuasive effects for the plaintiff side, given that there would be no intention to bring antitrust 
actions, which typically last for many years. In that case, the group lawyer should assess the risks of 
losing the long-lasting case: the money invested, compensating the other side’s costs, and receiving 
no compensation from group members. 
 
Third, the Proposal is insufficient to increase the rate of stand-alone actions to the extent that it 
would fill the gap of under-enforcement of public enforcers. In fact, lawyers are rational actors who 
deal with cases that have a high chance of success. The combination of measures in the Proposal 
does not motivate private litigators to take actions against cartel violations. Even if the disclosure is 
facilitated in stand-alone actions, cartel violations remain covert, thereby requiring comprehensive 
investigative tools. On this point, it ought to be stressed that US class actions are still more forceful 
than the Proposal. First, the ‘loser pays’ principle is abandoned in the US mechanism and instead 
one-way fee shifting is allowed. Second, the predictability of jury trials creates a strong ground for 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers to blackmail the defendants. Regardless, it is of utmost importance to note 
that only up to 33% of cartel violations are detected in the United States.
73
 It is hard to imagine that 
the Proposal would under any circumstances have more impact on detection than its counterpart in 
the United States. 
 
To sum up, it must be borne in mind that the best possible mechanism in the EU context has been 
presented. Despite its mixture, the achievement of full compensation is predetermined to fail. This 
is because violations of competition law are so complex and disguised that there is no rational 
decision to identify all victims: both direct and indirect purchasers. In addition, victims, who are 
detected and automatically involved in the group, are unlikely to be fully compensated due to high 
litigation costs, the low worth of settlements, and costly distribution of damages. It demonstrates 
that regardless of what the EU collective redress scheme is, the failure of full compensation to 
antitrust victims seems predetermined. Yet, the extent of the failure is very different. On the one 
hand, if collective redress schemes are designed following the Proposal, many victims, but not all, 
can expect compensation (albeit not full compensation). On the other hand, if a collective redress 
mechanism was framed following the proposed principles of the Recommendation, its failure would 
be absolute: very few (if any) actions would be brought on behalf of antitrust victims. Therefore, 
most (if not all) victims would remain uncompensated. With regard to deterrence, the Proposal 
would ensure some sort of discouragement to potential wrongdoers. This is due to the increased 
magnitude of the liability and the ensured follow-on litigation. However, the full effectiveness of 
deterrence is diminished, because stand-alone actions would be rare. Therefore, rational wrongdoers 
would first consider how effective public enforcement is, while private enforcement would be a 
secondary measure in the sequence of deterrence. 
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7.5 THE POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE MEASURE IN THE FUTURE 
 
Despite all its failures, antitrust collective litigation should not be denied under any circumstances. 
It is an indispensable element to any reform of damages actions. In order to start an era of antitrust 
collective litigation across the EU, legislators should follow two guiding principles. 
 
First, collective redress schemes should be foremost framed at defending the rights of vulnerable 
victims: indirect purchasers with small damages and indirect purchasers. If there was no effective 
collective redress mechanism, these claims would probably never be brought to the courts, as 
individual litigation is unprofitable financially. On the contrary, the current EU approach is useful 
primarily for large corporations, which were harmed as direct purchasers. Ironically, these 





Second, EU legislators should admit that the current careful approach to collective redress is likely 
to fail to a large extent in ensuring full compensation in competition law. If this failure was 
recognized, the next step for the EU would be to attempt incorporating forceful measures for 
making collective actions viable across the union. Indeed, the member states’ experiences with opt-
out actions might serve as an inspiration to the EU, demonstrating that forceful aggregation tools 
are possible and necessary in the EU context. Moreover, the availability of forceful funding tools in 
member states (third party funding and contingency fees) can be considered encouraging.
75
 In 
addition, as shown before, multiple damages do not inherently lead to overcompensation of victims. 
 
Considering all the criticism surrounding the policy on collective redress, it should be considered a 
big success if the EU adopted a sector-specific recommendation (a non-binding instrument) on 
antitrust collective litigation, yet this time proposing more forceful tools than the ones proposed in 
the Recommendation in 2013. The following measures may be proposed: 
 
 Flexibility/encouragement for opt-out schemes; 
 Flexibility/encouragement for multiple damages; 
 Flexibility/encouragement for private funding (third party litigation and contingency fees); 
 Encouragement for stand-alone actions. 
 
It is telling that this approach would encourage member states to take more forceful actions in the 
field, while the most reluctant countries would be given the possibility to simply opt out. It will 
show whether member states with unworkable collective redress schemes are willing to follow the 
experiences of proactive member states, especially opt-out schemes and forceful funding tools. If 
there was an EU-wide interest, there would be a possibility to consider the possibilities for adopting 
a binding instrument, such as a Directive, in the nearest future. If this test was negative, it would 
mean that collective litigation should remain the domain of national jurisdictions. 
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The research question of this Chapter was the following: 
 
To what extent can the best possible collective redress mechanism in EU competition law, 
combining the deterrence-based tools, achieve the objective of full compensation, and what is its 
eventual side effect (if any) on deterrence?  
 
When addressing this question, it was found that the European Commission is overambitious in 
trying to achieve full compensation in antitrust damages claims with a careful approach on 
collective redress. On this basis, the following findings were made.  
 
1) The failure of the EU's full compensation goal demands overstepping the bounds of the 
compensatory policy  
 
Considering the EU experience and standpoints, the grand compensation goal is to a large extent 
determined to fail. First, the Directive on damages actions preserves the strong protection of public 
enforcement, while at the same time limiting damages actions. Second, the measures proposed in 
the Recommendation on collective redress are not designed to collect a large group of antitrust 
victims, and there are no rational players who could serve as group representatives. Considering 
these weaknesses of the aggregation tool, most victims with small damages (both direct and indirect 
purchasers) are doomed to receive no compensation. And for the ones who obtain an award, the 
amount is much lower than full compensation. Looking at the perspectives of antitrust collective 
actions, the only way to achieve compensation effectiveness is to overstep the bounds of the 
compensatory mechanism by allowing more forceful measures for antitrust collective actions. At 
first glance, it may seem to be an undesirable approach, but this Chapter has shown that there are 
grounds for more forceful scenarios. 
 
2) The best possible antitrust collective redress mechanism has much potential, but with closer 
examination still fails to achieve full compensation 
 
The best possible mechanism (Proposal) should include two indispensable elements: opt-out 
schemes and double damages. The first measure is the most effective in gathering victims, while the 
second one is necessary to compensate the costs of complex antitrust collective actions. Another 
measure of equal importance is contingency fee agreements. This financing model creates a 
sufficient basis for lawyer’s investment in small-stakes collective actions regardless of the 
magnitude of the case, particularly when combined with opt-out schemes and double damages. At 
first sight, it may seem like a purely deterrence-oriented proposal. However, it is designed to 
exercise the effective right to compensation with the support from deterrence-based measures.  
 
Despite its potential, the possible introduction of the Proposal would not suffice to achieve full 
compensation. This is because of the unique nature of competition law violations, which generate a 
widespread overcharge. Furthermore, many collective actions are doomed to be certified for low 
awards, meaning that group members are determined to receive less than full compensation. Finally, 
the proposed framework is unable to remedy low detection rates, even though it includes a 
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combination of deterrence-based measures. This is notably because stand-alone actions would 
remain dissuasive, as detecting violations and proving damages would remain highly complex. 
 
3) Despite the determined failure in fully compensating victims, antitrust collective actions 
should not be denied under any circumstances 
 
Antitrust collective litigation is an indispensable element of antitrust enforcement. If not for 
collective actions, a large majority of victims, especially direct purchasers with small losses and 
indirect purchasers, would remain uncompensated. Indeed, if higher effectiveness is achieved in 
compensating victims, collective actions may contribute to deterrence. In order to pursue antitrust 
collective litigation in practice, the European Commission should change its careful approach. 
Instead, it should allow flexibility in utilizing forceful tools: opt-out schemes, contingency fees, and 
third-party funding. Member states’ positive experiences with opt-out schemes and the possibility 
of contingency fees in some states may serve as an inspiration. At present, it would be a great 
success if political consent was achieved for a more forceful sector-specific recommendation on 
antitrust collective actions. This approach would allow for testing the member states’ willingness to 
rely on a more forceful approach. If they are not interested, they could simply opt out. But if they 
are interested, there will be a chance to consider the adoption of a binding instrument, such as a 





























7.7 APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF AMENDMENTS 
 
Page Description of amendment Explanation 
174 
Additional debate about the joint and 
several liability in the US system. 
This element of the American system was overlooked in the published article.  
177-
179 
Additional discussion on the abusive 
litigation in the EU context.  
ILR Report, issued in March 2017, was overlooked in the original article. It is the 
most comprehensive study about abusive litigation in the EU context.  
Additional references are added, numbered 30-36.  
181 
Discussion on the possibility for 
introducing the first scenario from the 
EU law perspective and what practical 
enforcement problems this scenario 
would face. 
It gives a more insightful picture about the possibility of introducing multiple 
damages and contingency fees in the EU context. 
 
184 
Discussion on the possibility for 
introducing second scenario from the 
EU law perspective.   
It gives a more insightful picture about the possibility of allowing leniency 
documents for disclosure in the EU context.  
186 
Discussion on the possibility for 
introducing third scenario from the EU 
law perspective what practical 
enforcement problems this scenario 
would face.  
It gives a more insightful picture about the possibility of introducing opt-out 
schemes in the EU context. 
 
189 
Additional clarification on wrongdoers’ 
harm internalization for anticompetitive 
actions. 


















































8 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH 
 
This PhD dissertation has evolved together with the implementation aspects of the EU’s private 
antitrust reform. Work on the thesis was started in July 2013, a month after the adoption of the 
Commission's package on private antitrust enforcement, comprising the Draft Directive on damages 
actions and the horizontal Recommendation on collective redress. At the end of the PhD research, 
with delay, but the European Commission finally assessed the practical implementation of the 
Recommendation by issuing the Report. In addition, the European Commission issued two 
proposals for directives on consumer protection.  
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to assist in the development of an appropriate approach of 
antitrust collective redress for better achievement of full compensation. As regards the Directive, it 
has become a benchmark for assessing the collective redress mechanism and for proposing possible 
developments in the field, as being so far the only binding instrument in the EU private antitrust 
reform. Through analysing the rationale of full compensation, it has been shown that collective 
redress schemes are vital for accomplishing the EU’s reform compensation goal.   
 
8.2 GENERAL FINDINGS  
 
Chapter 2 presented the existing obstacles and shortcomings in antitrust enforcement. With regard 
to public enforcement, it was found that the deterrent effect of the European Commission's antitrust 
fines and leniency policy is insufficient. As regards private enforcement, it was determined that 
private parties face significant obstacles when bringing antitrust damages actions. A collective 
redress mechanism was suggested as an attractive solution to facilitate the objectives of 
compensation and deterrence. By examining the failures in France and the UK, it was found that 
opt-in collective actions are practically unworkable in antitrust collective litigation. Regardless, the 
Recommendation has proposed an opt-in principle as the primary approach to collective redress. 
When combined with other careful measures (the ‘loser pays’ principle, limited funding 
possibilities and strict standing rules), the European Commission's approach on collective redress 
significantly diminishes the possibilities for antitrust collective actions to ever be brought. 
Consequently, opt-out collective actions appeared to be the main solution to achieve effectiveness 
in compensating antitrust victims.  
 
Chapter 3 assessed the controversies underlying the understanding of class actions in the United 
States: both in compensating class members and deterring wrongdoers. The debate over 
compensation focused on three major controversies: (1) the effectiveness of victims’ compensation, 
(2) the size of attorneys’ remuneration, and (3) the efficiency of cy pres distributions. As regards the 
first controversy, it was found that antitrust class actions provide low proportional compensation to 
a small number of victims. This is because identifying class members, administrating the case and 
distributing damages entails substantial costs, meaning that case-related costs typically consume a 
large proportion of the recovery. With regard to the second controversy, it was determined that class 
counsels reap disproportionately high rewards. As to the third one, a high potential for abusive cy 
pres distributions was detected in antitrust cases. Given that the analysis confirmed the criticisms 
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regarding each controversy, it can be concluded that US class actions largely fail to accomplish the 
goal of compensation.  
 
The failure of compensating victims does not negatively affect the compensation for the antitrust 
plaintiff bar. Attorneys commonly obtain compensation based on the aggregate value of the entire 
class, regardless of how many victims actually received damages. The compensation of class 
counsel is ensured by a set of deterrence-based remedies: contingency fees, opt-out schemes and 
treble damages. Furthermore, the additional measures—the one-way-fee-shifting rule, the joint and 
several liability, and broad discovery rules—ensure a plaintiff-friendly climate for the private 
attorney general. The combination of these measures incentivises attorneys to enforce antitrust rules 
aggressively, and thus to enhance deterrence through bringing a high number of class actions.  
 
In order to assess the impact of class actions on deterrence, the theory of optimal deterrence was 
applied. It clearly emerges that optimal deterrence should be a function of three equal components 
acting together: corporate fines, damages claims and personal fines. However, under the current 
mechanism, the class action device (in the form of damages actions) serves only a secondary 
function when compared to the other elements. Due to the lack of investigatory tools, the private 
attorney general mechanism has a low impact on the probability of detection. Moreover, the 
conviction rate is significantly diminished for at least two reasons: first, judges utilise very strict 
standards of class certification; second, most antitrust class actions are settled, and for amounts 
closer to actual damages rather than treble damages. Therefore, class action lawsuits have a small 
impact on ensuring optimal deterrence.  
 
Chapter 4 elaborates on a background for comparing class actions between the EU and the US. The 
specific focus was on the role of attorneys in achieving the objectives of compensation. Starting 
with a comparative analysis between Lithuania and Poland on the one side, and the United Stated 
on the other, it was discovered that lawyers are vital for the facilitation of the compensation 
objective. The logic behind is that attorneys have more capacity and willingness to bring complex 
antitrust actions than public authorities, which lack the financial capacity to bring collective actions, 
or are restrained by their organisational objectives. Lithuania and Poland were chosen for a 
discussion, because both countries have granted a relatively active role to a group lawyer in 
comparison with the few other EU states where attorneys are allowed to participate in collective 
actions. Moreover, Lithuania and Poland permit contingency fees seemingly with the least 
limitations among these countries. 
 
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the schemes of pro-active EU member states where collective 
actions have been brought to courts. These countries ignore some principles of the European 
Commission's approach, and instead utilise some US-style provisions in order to achieve 
effectiveness in compensating victims. It was found that an opt-out aggregation model is crucial for 
ensuring an effective victim’s right to compensation, yet this litigation model needs to be combined 
with tools of deterrence, like third party funding and/or contingency fees. In addition, it was found 
that the occurrence of the American issue of ‘blackmail settlement’ is limited in the EU context, 
even if contingency fees, the joint and several liability, and opt-out schemes were combined. This 
phenomenon occurs in the US because these measures are reinforced by the liberal party-initiated 
discovery, the one-way fee shifting rule and treble damages. When the defendant considers the risk 
of class actions ending in jury trials, plaintiffs are empowered to pressure defendants to settle cases 
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lacking merit. But the EU should be aware that there is always likelihood that group representatives 
will represent group members inadequately. This may occur when representatives structure a case in 
a way that allows reaping disproportionally high compensation for the expense of group members.  
 
Chapter 6 further analysed whether and to what extent private enforcement, and collective actions 
more specifically, can contribute to achieving the objectives of full compensation in the European 
Union. Consequently, three major observations have been drawn from this principle. First, 
achieving the objective of full compensation requires following the harm downstream to the 
ultimately injured parties (usually numbering in the thousands or even millions of victims) who 
suffered low value harm. This inevitably demands a collective redress mechanism with far-reaching 
tools, since downstream victims have little to no incentives to join the action. Second, multiple 
damages are necessary to ensure the compensation standards (actual loss and expectation loss) and 
to recompense high administrative costs in collective actions. Third, indirect purchasers need 
broader discovery rules than direct purchasers, since downstream purchasers have less awareness 
about the infringer’s anti-competitive practices. To that extent, collecting claims of indirect 
purchasers and those of small-harm victims is only possible if an opt-out measure and forceful 
funding tools are allowed. Following these observations, the claim has been made that the 
achievement of full compensation in the EU system (to compensate any victim down the 
distribution chain) demands deterrence-based remedies more than the US deterrence-oriented 
system, which bars actions by indirect purchasers and thus has a lower threshold for compensating 
victims. Otherwise, the EU's grand compensation goal is determined to fail to a large extent.  
 
On this ground, Chapter 7 explored three ambitious scenarios, each combing two deterrence-based 
measures. Each scenario was claimed to have a ground; either it is within the borders of full 
compensation, or in line with legal traditions (at least in some member states). The principal aim of 
Chapter 7 was to assess the chances of these scenarios in achieving compensation, and the potential 
effect on deterrence. The first scenario combines double damages and contingency fees. The second 
one encompasses both broad discovery rules and contingency fees. The third one unites opt-out 
schemes and contingency fees. It was discovered that the case for full compensation is weak in all 
scenarios. It is determined that either very few victims would receive compensation, or that many 
victims would obtain a very low proportional award. The third scenario, with an opt-out measure, 
would succeed the most in compensating victims and bringing a side effect on deterrence.  
   
8.3 SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
 
 The EU's public enforcement of competition law fails in ensuring effective deterrence  
 
Without doubt, public enforcement has improved the level of enforcement during the last years: the 
leniency policy has substantially increased the number of cartel decisions, and fines imposed by the 
European Commission have reached record high levels. Despite this success, public enforcement 
has not achieved effective deterrence. According to optimistic estimations, only up to 30% cartels 
are revealed in the EU. The latter calculations are however not very reliable for two reasons: the 
data is based on some, mainly older studies, and in general there is a lack of estimations about the 
rates of cartel detection. Despite the lack of conclusive data about detection rates, the shortcomings 
of public enforcement were confirmed by other indicators. First, recidivism remains an issue in 
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antitrust violations. Second, many cartels (both small and large) have been detected in recent years, 
proposing that public enforcement fails to effectively deter infringers.   
 
 The new Directive on damages actions does not fulfil the objective of full compensation  
 
In spite of its grand goal of achieving full compensation, the Directive imposes limitations on 
discovery in order to protect the public enforcement's leniency policy. By ordering protection from 
disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions (i.e. inherently incriminating 
evidence), and providing no alternatives, the Directive raises crucial evidence gathering problems 
when claimants bring follow-on cartel cases. Certain facilitation can be considered the introduction 
of two rebuttable presumptions: one being that cartels cause harm and the other being that 
overcharges are passed on to indirect purchasers. However, this improvement is more theoretical 
than practical, as it does not ease the burden of proving the harm suffered. Proving damages is of 
particular concern for victims who are situated more remotely from a violation, such as indirect 
purchasers. Even more disappointing is that the Directive has brought little improvement for stand-
alone actions. Certain facilitation can be regarded the provision for courts to decide on a disclosure. 
However, this measure is likely to have no impact on increasing the incentives for claimants to 
bring cumbersome stand-alone actions. Therefore, by not actually facilitating follow-on and stand-
alone actions, the EU not only reduces the compensatory effectiveness of damages actions, but also 
brings no real contribution to solving the shortcomings of public enforcement. A better involvement 
of private actors may increase the detection rate of competition law infringements and would 
increase the cost of violation to infringers when damages were awarded to victims.  
 
Another issue is that the EU’s private antitrust reform fails to maintain a balance between the claims 
of direct purchasers and indirect purchasers. Standing for indirect purchasers may reduce the 
motivation for direct purchasers to sue, as the defendants can invoke the passing-on defence. At the 
same time, the right for indirect purchasers to seek compensation is significantly distorted, as the 
Directive does not include provisions on collective redress actions. The most concerning aspect is 
that the most vulnerable victims (direct purchasers who suffered low harm and indirect purchasers 
who incurred loss down the supply chain) will refrain from bringing damages actions, as there is no 
real facilitation for these actions. The chances for these claims to be brought depend on whether or 
not victims are based in a member state with workable rules on antitrust collective litigation. 
Indeed, the EU reform cannot be considered successful if vulnerable victims are not granted access 
to compensatory justice across the EU, leading to actual compensation awards. Under the current 
provisions, the reform is primarily helpful for large companies, which have already been quite 
active in suing for damages even before the adoption of the Directive. The difference is that these 
actions are likely to become common throughout the EU.  
 
 The Recommendation on collective redress has brought little impacts in EU member states, 
and the proposed principles diminish the compensatory effectiveness  
 
The Report of the 2013 Recommendation has shown that only two EU member states (Belgium and 
Lithuania) have followed the Recommendation's proposals to a large extent, while two other 
countries (France and the UK) have disregarded many provisions of the Recommendation. A 
concerning factor is that 9 states still do not have collective redress mechanism in place. Ironic as it 
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sounds, the failure to implement the Recommendation should actually be welcomed. If EU 
countries followed the Commission's guidance, the compensatory effectiveness would be 
significantly diminished. The proposed measures would prevent rational actors from bringing 
collective actions to courts. Another concerning factor is that a number of uncoordinated 
developments have taken place in member states during the last years. Consequently, a potential 
adoption of the EU's Directive on antitrust collective actions has become problematic.  
 
 The US class action mechanism is appealing, but with closer scrutiny fails to deliver sufficient 
results 
 
The US antitrust mechanism has relied heavily on class actions as means of ensuring compensation 
and deterrence. The major advantage is that this device enables the negative expected value claims 
to be heard in courts. If not class actions, these claims would be financially illogical for litigating 
individually, as the expected litigation costs outweigh the expected awards. Although this device 
seems sensible, the reality is that antitrust class actions provide low proportional compensation to a 
small number of victims. In spite of class members remaining highly undercompensated, the private 
attorney general usually obtains disproportionately high compensation. As regards deterrence, class 
action lawsuits only serve a secondary function in deterring wrongdoers. This is because the class 
action system lacks tools for detecting cartels, and because the probability of conviction is 
significantly diminished due to strict class certification standards, and also because of the 
determined settlement generating low awards.     
 
 Full compensation is unrealistic in the private enforcement of EU competition law 
 
The objective of fully compensating every victim is unrealistic for the following reasons. First, 
administrating and litigating the case and later distributing damages consume a substantial amount 
of damages awards, thereby leaving low awards to group members. Second, antitrust violation 
causes a widespread harm, often spread through different distribution chains. Therefore, detecting 
and compensating victims of all types, especially indirect purchasers, is highly difficult, if not 
impossible at times.   
 
 Collective actions can facilitate full compensation, but it depends on how they are designed 
and incorporated in the antitrust enforcement mechanism 
 
The success of a collective redress mechanism depends on what provisions are chosen. At the same 
time, more forceful measures may attract litigation abuses. The following results were found by 
comparing different provisions of collective actions.  
 
1. Aggregation model of victims: opt-in vs. opt-out. Opt-in collective actions largely fail in 
collecting victims. The experiences in EU member states have shown that much less than 
1% of victims join the action. On a positive point, opt-in actions respect the victim's choice 
to be part of collective litigation or not. Opt-out collective actions are the most effective in 
collecting victims, both direct and indirect purchasers. Despite the criticism that these 
actions may infringe the party disposition principle, an effective information mechanism 
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may be sufficient to respect claimant’s freedom to litigate or not. It allows informing victims 
about their rights to opt out.  
 
2. Type of damages: single damages vs. damage multipliers. The European Union considers 
single damages to be in line with the principle of full compensation, which prohibits any 
overcompensation. However, the EU does not take into account that the case related costs 
consume a large portion of the recovery, meaning that single damages inherently 
undercompensate victims. Double damages were proposed as a solution, because treble 
damages have a high probability for overcompensation.  
 
3. Representation model: representative (public) organisations vs. attorneys. The European 
Commission considers representative actions brought by public authorities as the most 
appropriate tool for collective redress. However, public authorities are often understaffed 
and lacking financial resources to take the lead in collective litigation, and they may be 
restrained by their organisational mission. Law firms have more resources and experience in 
litigation and from a quantitative perspective there is a large number of attorneys who could 
potentially bring collective actions. 
 
4. Financing model: hourly fees vs. contingency fees. An antitrust litigation in the EU 
predominantly uses hourly fees. The European Commission regards contingency fees as 
having a high potential for litigation abuses and for infringing the principle of full 
compensation. However, contingency fees are one of the main tools that may ensure 
lawyers' interest in collective litigation. By providing a possibility to receive substantial 
award in case of successful litigation, this financing model may outweigh the underlying 
risks related to complex litigation. This is surely a risk of contingency fees attracting 
abusive litigation, but national ethical rules, a public tender system for legal services and an 
ad hoc monitoring body may prevent, or at least diminish the risks related to such litigation.  
 
5. Level of disclosure: no access to leniency and settlements submissions vs. access to such 
documents. The Directive on damages actions prohibits the disclosure of leniency 
statements and settlement submissions. This material provides inherently incriminating 
evidence, meaning that its protection diminishes claimants' motivation to bring follow-on 
actions. Despite that, it would be highly unjustifiable if leniency statements were allowed 
for disclosure. First, the well-functioning leniency programme would be put at risk, while 
the facilitation of compensation to victims would be minimal, at best. Second, the 
incriminating material can potentially be disclosed under the current system, as it allows 











8.4 THE ANSWER TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This thesis has sought to answer the following research question:  
 
Can collective redress actions contribute to achieving the objective of full compensation as stated in 
the EU Directive on antitrust damages actions? If so, which mechanism(s) would be the most 
effective from a theoretical and practical perspective to facilitate full compensation, and can these 
mechanism(s), as a side effect, contribute to deterrence?  
 
Three studies were performed to answer this question. The first examined the effectiveness of 
available EU-style collective action mechanisms to contribute to achieving full compensation. 
Because of their failure to achieve this objective, the second study designed more forceful antitrust 
collective redress mechanisms and assessed their impact on full compensation. The third study 
scrutinised the potential of collective redress actions to contribute to deterrence through an 
increased effect of detection and liability. 
 
With regard to the first point, the thesis encompassed two levels of research: 1) the European 
Commission's approach on collective redress; 2) collective action mechanisms in the EU member 
states. It was found that the Commission's approach on collective redress is based on a too careful 
approach, which imposes too many obstacles for compensatory collective actions to ever be 
brought. As regards the EU member states, the primary emphasis has been on the Netherlands and 
the UK - the most pro-active countries where antitrust collective actions have the highest potential. 
However, the actions brought have had little impact on compensating victims, especially the 
vulnerable ones. In the Netherlands, antitrust collective actions have been brought mainly on the 
basis of the SPV model, which aggregates large claims of corporations. Nevertheless, collective 
actions—especially for victims who suffered low value harm—should become the norm after the 
planned amendments, aiming to introduce measures for compensatory opt-out collective actions. In 
the UK, first two opt-out antitrust collective actions have failed in the certification stage. Analysis 
of two other countries—Lithuania and Poland—has revealed that contingency fees alone have so far 
had no effect on the increase in antitrust collective litigation. In general, the experiences in member 
states have shown that antitrust collective litigation has a future in states that allow an opt-out 
model, but the latter needs to be reinforced by other forceful tools of deterrence. To sum up, 
collective redress actions can contribute to achieving the objective of full compensation, but only if 
deterrence-based measures were allowed in the EU context.  
 
Considering the failure of EU-style collective actions to achieve the objective of compensation, the 
second study designed three hypothetical scenarios and examined their impact on compensation. 
The first combined double damages and contingency fees. The second combined broad discovery 
rules and contingency fees. The third combined opt-out schemes and contingency fees. The results 
showed that the contribution to full compensation is low in all scenarios – either a small number of 
victims would obtain compensation, or many victims would receive compensation, but low 
proportionally. If the EU is inclined to shape private antitrust enforcement under the principle of 
full compensation (or at least closer to that level), the above-discussed scenarios should be 
combined. For this reason, the best possible EU's style collective redress mechanism (Proposal) was 
designed to assess its potential effectiveness for compensating victims, especially the vulnerable 
ones. In theory, the Proposal could contain four deterrence-based measures: contingency fees, opt-
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out schemes, double damages and a party-initiated disclosure scheme (but only for stand-alone 
actions). At first glance, the Proposal seemed to have a lot of potential, but deeper analysis showed 
that its contribution to full compensation would not be as big as expected. First, rational claimants 
would continue to focus on lower-risk follow-on actions, as the Proposal gives little incentive to 
bring stand-alone actions. Second, the Proposal does not solve the issue related with a widespread 
antitrust overcharge that often makes detecting and compensating all types of victims highly 
complex. Third, most Proposal's collective actions would be settled, and typically for an award 
lower than single damages. When case costs were deducted from this award, victims would receive 
low compensation proportionally. However, the problem of effectively compensating victims is not 
related with the Proposal itself. The real issue is that the required high standards for achieving full 
compensation mostly makes attaining that goal in practice very difficult, if not impossible at times. 
Lessons from US antitrust class actions exacerbate this concern. The American system—being 
much more forceful than the Proposal—fails to effectively compensate victims. The assessment has 
shown that antitrust class actions provide low proportional compensation to a small number of 
victims. 
 
As for the last study, it was asserted that available EU-style collective actions have brought no 
impact on deterrence, because there is a lack of collective actions. With regard to the Proposal, it 
has the potential of contributing to deterrence, but only to a small extent. As regards the probability 
of detection, the impact would only be marginal, as stand-alone actions would be rare. With regard 
to the magnitude of liability, its extent would be undercut due to low settlement awards and low 
rates of certification. To sum up, collective redress schemes (in any form possible) are determined 
to have little impact on deterrence at best, regardless of how forceful they are.    
 
To conclude, the Proposal looks feasible in theory, but its actual implementation is unrealistic in 
practice. Only a more lenient approach, for example combining opt-out schemes and forceful 
funding tools (third-party funding and/or contingency fees), could be realistically expected in the 
EU context for better achievement of full compensation. The reasons are discussed in the last 
section of the dissertation. 
 
8.5 WHAT SHOULD THE FUTURE OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION BE? 
 
The essential question that needs to be answered is the following: which collective redress 
mechanism is more preferable in the EU - a more careful one that prevents negative outcomes, but 
leaves little chance for antitrust collective actions to ever be brought; or a more risky one that brings 
some benefits to compensating victims, but also has potential for litigation issues?  
 
The latter option should be preferable for the following reasons.  
 
Despite the determined failure to effectively compensate victims, collective actions should not 
under any circumstances be denied in the private enforcement of EU competition law. Arguably, the 
most important factor in assessing the effectiveness of private enforcement is how effectively 
vulnerable victims (such as, direct purchasers with small claims and indirect purchasers) can 
exercise their right to claim and obtain compensation. Typically, vulnerable victims generate a large 
majority of victims in antitrust violation. Wrongdoers target these victims, because they suffer low 
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value harm, making individual litigation irrational and financially illogical. Therefore, in the 
absence of collective redress schemes, violators will evade responsibility for the harm caused to 
vulnerable victims, as these actors are unlikely to bring claims to courts.   
 
Another point is that a collective redress mechanism should contain wide-ranging tools in order to 
reach and compensate any type of victims. This goal can only be achieved by in some fashion 
combining forceful measures of deterrence. A counterclaim would undoubtedly arise, saying that 
this combination would allow for entrepreneurial lawyers to obtain disproportionately high 
compensation and it would attract abusive litigation. Moreover, critics would say that this proposal 
is futile, because it is determined that only a small number of victims would receive compensation, 
which is as well proportionally low. Another criticism would be based on the experiences in the US 
system, namely that very forceful antitrust class actions largely fail in effectively compensating 
victims. So, why to introduce less forceful collective actions in the EU, which would be even less 
effective in compensating victims? Indeed, these criticisms are a good basis for discussing the 
future of collective redress, but they overlook important factors about EU-style collective actions. 
First, the perceived issues of US class actions would not necessarily occur in the EU, if 
compensatory collective actions would be supported with some measures of deterrence. Second, a 
wide-ranging collective redress mechanism, even if not fully effective, would bring some benefits 
to group members. One of the reasons is that new technologies (such as online and electronic 
databases) give more efficiency in identifying victims and distributing damages. Another reason is 
that not every competition law violation generates a harm that cannot be identified, even if it is 
widespread. Furthermore, there have been positive examples of class members receiving rational 
compensation in the US, despite large litigation costs. Still, these observations do not justify the 
necessity to introduce a wide-ranging collective redress mechanism at the EU level. There is 
another viewpoint that this litigation model would be the only way for respecting the right of 
vulnerable victims to claim and obtain compensation, even if it cannot be effectively exercised in all 
cases. In the absence of a wide-ranging collective redress mechanism, the EU’s private antitrust 
enforcement will always be blamed for not facilitating the right to claim damages for victims, who 
need that right the most. Finally, given that vulnerable victims form the majority of victims in 
antitrust violation, a wide-ranging collective redress mechanism appears to be the main way of an 
actual implementation of full compensation.  
 
Nevertheless, is it realistic to introduce a wide-ranging collective redress mechanism at the EU 
level? One option would be a Directive on antitrust collective actions. In order to succeed, the 
following factors should be taken into consideration:   
 
a. Having difficult discussions with member states and stakeholders about the inclusion of 
highly criticised American measures in a legally binding document: contingency fees, 
multiple damages and opt-out schemes;  
b. Modifying tort and civil procedure rules in EU member states; 
c. Bearing in mind that collective actions under no circumstances will achieve full 
compensation; 
d. Waiting for some time until the effects of the new Directive on damages actions will be 
known; 
e. Considering the fact that the development of collective redress schemes has already resulted 
in a number of uncoordinated actions in EU member states. 
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Indeed, all these factors make the introduction of a Directive on antitrust collective litigation highly 
unlikely in the next few years. This is also because the European Commission recently adopted two 
proposals for the directives on consumer protection. Therefore, it seems quite unrealistic that the 
Commission will take the same step in antitrust any time soon. Under these circumstances, the 
Proposal seems even more unrealistic, as only a more lenient proposal could pass the EU’s 
legislative procedure.      
 
Another, more realistic but as well complicated option is a Recommendation for collective redress 
in antitrust sector, but this time giving more space for the right elements: opt-out schemes, the 
availability of double damages, contingency fees, third party funding and a party-initiated 
disclosure scheme for stand-alone actions. This would be possible only if the European Commission 
admits that its current approach on collective redress is determined to have no impact on full 
compensation. As a consequence, it would be more space for considering more forceful, but more 
risky measures. Inspiration may be found in the pro-active EU member states where collective 
actions have been brought to courts or in the ones that have a higher potential for being so. It 
follows from the above that a potential Commission's Recommendation could propose the 
following principles:  
 
 Flexibility/encouragement for opt-out schemes when the court decides; 
 Flexibility/encouragement for private funding tools (third party funding, contingency fees); 
 Allowing for double damages when they serve the compensatory objectives; 
 Encouraging stand-alone cartel actions with the help of broader discovery rules. 
 
In general, a Recommendation is an instrument of EU soft law. According to Article 288 of the 
TFEU, it “shall have no binding force”. In European competition law, soft law instruments have 
been used to interpret hard law provisions, such as Article 102 of the TFEU, as well as to model 
certain tools, such as the leniency policy or the de minimis rule. The suggestion is that a new 
Recommendation on collective redress would serve as a tool for interpreting the Directive on 
damages actions (hard law) and for modelling effective compensatory damages claims. Primary 
emphasis should be put on the following provisions of the Directive:  
 
 Article 3: Right to full compensation 
 Article 11: Joint and several liability 
 Articles 12-15: The passing-on of overcharges 
 
These provisions are crucial for defining the scope and complexity of the principle of full 
compensation, i.e. the main goal of the Directive on damages actions. Most importantly, a 
Recommendation should give an explanation about the potential impact of forceful measures of 
collective actions on full compensation on the basis of the pro-active EU member states and the US. 
The increased risks of abusive litigation should be explained as well. On the other hand, the 
potential safeguards to prevent, or to diminish abusive litigation should be presented. It is also 
important to show that collective actions have been brought in EU member states that disregard 
some proposals of the European Commission’s primary approach. Finally, the American system 
should be presented not only from a negative perspective, as has been done by the European 
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Commission so far. In this case, a Recommendation would present an actual picture of collective 
redress: its potential if it was more forceful and its potential problems if it was riskier.  
 
This type of soft law instrument would urge member states to take more forceful steps in the field, 
while the ones not interested would be given the chance to simply opt out. Given that the primary 
Recommendation has failed to a large extent—both in choosing the right litigation tool and in 
encouraging states to take action—the second proposal would arguably be more compatible with 
the latest developments in member states, where more risky measures have been introduced. If a 
new Recommendation was successful in incentivising member states to follow these principles, it 
would set the scene for a following legislative instrument on antitrust collective litigation, either a 
Directive on antitrust collective actions or amending the Directive on damages actions. If not, it 
would be a proof that antitrust collective litigation should remain the domain of national 
jurisdictions. From a practical perspective, EU member states may be interested in introducing an 
opt-out mechanism, third-party funding and contingency fees into their national schemes, because 
these measures have shown a potential in few other states. At the same time, double damages and 
broader discovery rules seem to be one step too far. Obviously, without these tools the role of 
collective redress actions would be diminished, but the other measures would still have the ability to 
contribute to the achievement of full compensation.  
 
To conclude, the European Commission needs to decide soon whether antitrust collective redress 
actions will be regulated at the EU level or not. Otherwise, national collective redress schemes will 
deviate too far from each other. For an explanation, see Chapter 5 (Section 5.5). As a result, any 


















































The central objective of the European Union’s competition law is to prevent the distortion of 
competition in its internal market. In that context, the enforcement of competition law is pursued 
through public enforcement, which is principally aimed at deterrence, as well as private 
enforcement, primarily aimed at compensation. With regard to public enforcement, its principal 
purpose is to punish and deter antitrust violations, cartels especially. Despite extensive efforts, the 
objective of deterring wrongdoers is not as effective as perceived. As regards private enforcement, 
the objective of effectively compensating victims has not been reached; claims have been brought 
by large corporations (acting as direct purchasers) and typically in the most favourable forums, such 
as Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In order to remedy this underdevelopment, 
the EU adopted the Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, which enshrines the 
objective of fully compensating all types of victims, including indirect purchasers. By emphasising 
full compensation, the EU demonstrates that it views deterring a violator of competition law only as 
a welcome side effect of damages claims. However, the achievement of full compensation is 
significantly limited for victims who have suffered small harm, since the Directive does not include 
provisions on collective redress actions. Instead, the European Commission published the horizontal 
Recommendation for collective redress schemes. This is not a legally binding document, and as 
such has had little impact on member states’ incentives to introduce the proposed principles in their 
national jurisdictions. The fact that the Commission's approach on collective redress avoids any 
connection with the class action mechanism of the United States is of great significance, as the 
latter is accused of raising incentives for abusive litigation. Therefore, robust safeguards are 
proposed in order to prevent litigation abuses, yet they simultaneously serve as barriers for bringing 
collective actions for compensation. Nevertheless, it is clear that effective collective redress 
schemes are vital in contributing to achieving full compensation in private enforcement of EU 
competition law.  
 
This PhD dissertation is based on ‘a collection of separate scientific treatises’ under article 13 of the 
Leiden University PhD Regulations. The dissertation consists of 6 chapters, which were published 
in peer-reviewed legal journals. The research question of the dissertation is the following: 
 
Can collective redress actions contribute to achieving the objective of full compensation as stated in 
the EU Directive on antitrust damages actions? If so, which mechanism(s) would be the most 
effective from a theoretical and practical perspective to facilitate full compensation, and can these 
mechanism(s), as a side effect, contribute to deterrence? 
 
The answer to this question demands an analysis of different collective actions and their 
effectiveness for achieving full compensation. Additional objective is to assess the potential of these 
actions to contribute to deterrence through an increased impact on detection and liability.   
 
Chapter 1 is General Introduction, while Chapter 8 is General Conclusion. 
 
Chapter 2 gives a general introduction to the existing obstacles and shortcomings in the 
enforcement of competition law. With regard to public enforcement, the impact of the EU leniency 
policy and administrative (public) fines on deterrence is discussed. As regards private enforcement, 
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this Chapter scrutinises the major obstacles that victims face when bringing antitrust damages 
actions. Given the possible attractiveness of opt-out collective actions, Chapter 2 provides 
arguments why this litigation model can be seen as a potential tool to solve, or at least diminish, the 
shortcomings of public and private enforcement. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the class action system in the United States. This research offers a 
comprehensive study of the effectiveness of class actions in fulfilling the objectives of 
compensation and deterrence. It explores the predominant controversies in the United States by 
assessing the views of critics and proponents of class actions. The debate over compensation 
focuses on how effective class actions are for compensating class members, and whether 
contingency fees overpay class counsel. As to deterrence, the theory of optimal deterrence is used to 
assess the impact of class actions on deterring wrongdoers.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses contingency fees’ impact on the effectiveness of compensation in antitrust 
collective actions. By providing a comparative analysis between Lithuania and Poland on the one 
hand, and the United States on the other, the Chapter discusses the importance of incentivising 
attorneys to invest in collective litigation. Additionally, it discusses the potential of contingency 
fees to attract litigation abuses, and whether Lithuania and Poland are prepared to prevent these 
abuses, or at least limit their likelihood. 
 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the principles outlined in the Recommendation on collective 
redress. It presents the surrounding controversies as regards its non-binding approach and the 
proposed safeguards. The focus is also on the mechanisms of the pro-active EU member states that 
ignore some principles of the European Commission's approach, and instead have introduced some 
US-style measures in order to achieve effectiveness in collective litigation. This allows for the 
exploration of how insights from the EU member states and the US should influence the 
development of a common collective antitrust redress in the EU.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the rationale of the principle of full compensation. This includes an 
examination of the extent of this principle, and especially what the effect the indirect purchaser rule 
has on full compensation. It also examines whether the provisions embedded in the EU private 
antitrust reform (in the Directive and in the Recommendation) are likely to achieve the objective of 
full compensation or not. The Chapter also investigates the importance of the American-style 
deterrence-based measures in EU compensatory collective actions. This Chapter is important for 
understanding the particular requirements for achieving full compensation.  
 
Chapter 7 aims to design the best possible collective redress mechanism (Proposal) that stays within 
the borders of the achievement of full compensation, in addition to keeping with legal traditions (at 
least of some member states). This Chapter explores the potential impact of the Proposal on full 
compensation, and whether it would bring additional effects on deterrence. The Chapter ends with a 
proposal on how the potential legislative measure on collective redress should be framed, if the EU 


























































SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Volledige schadeloosstelling voor inbreuken op het EU-mededingingsrecht: de rol van collectieve 
vorderingen 
 
Het EU-mededingingsrecht heeft als hoofddoelstelling het voorkomen van concurrentievervalsing 
binnen de interne markt. De handhaving van de mededingingsregels kan zowel publiek- als 
privaatrechtelijk plaatsvinden. De publiekrechtelijke handhaving beoogt het bestraffen en 
voorkomen van inbreuken op het mededingingsrecht, in het bijzonder kartelvorming, en is 
voornamelijk gericht op ontmoediging. Uitgebreide inspanningen ten spijt, is deze handhaving 
echter niet zo ontmoedigend als vaak wordt aangenomen. De privaatrechtelijke handhaving is in de 
eerste plaats gericht op herstel. De schadeloosstelling van benadeelden blijft echter vaak uit, met 
uitzondering van schadevorderingen ingesteld door grote bedrijven in de meest gunstige fora, zoals 
Duitsland, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Om deze tekortkoming te verhelpen, heeft de EU 
richtlijn 2014/104/EU aangenomen inzake schadevorderingen wegens inbreuken op het 
mededingingsrecht. Het doel van deze richtlijn is het garanderen van de daadwerkelijke uitoefening 
van het EU-recht op schadevergoeding voor alle benadeelde partijen (zowel de directe als de 
indirecte afnemer). Door de nadruk te leggen op volledige vergoeding voor alle geleden schade, 
maakt de EU duidelijk dat ontmoediging slechts een bijwerking is van schadevorderingen, zij het 
een gunstige bijwerking. Volledige vergoeding van slachtoffers die een geringe schade hebben 
geleden, wordt echter aanzienlijk bemoeilijkt doordat de richtlijn geen bepalingen bevat inzake 
collectieve schadevorderingen. In plaats daarvan heeft de Europese Commissie de horizontale 
Aanbeveling inzake collectieve vorderingen tot schadevergoeding gepubliceerd. Het gaat hier niet 
om een juridisch bindend document en het heeft om die reden weinig invloed gehad op de lidstaten 
om de voorgestelde beginselen in de nationale rechtsordes op te nemen. Het feit dat de Commissie 
elke gelijkenis met het ‘class action’ mechanisme van de Verenigde Staten uit de weg gaat, is 
bovendien veelzeggend. Dat mechanisme zou aanzetten tot misbruik van procesrecht. Om dergelijk 
misbruik te voorkomen, werd voorgesteld om in aanzienlijke waarborgen te voorzien. Deze 
waarborgen zijn echter meteen ook drempels voor het inleiden van collectieve schadevorderingen. 
Wat er ook van zij, het is duidelijk dat doeltreffende regelingen voor collectief-verhaalmechanismes 
van vitaal belang zijn om bij te dragen tot volledig herstel bij de private handhaving van het 
mededingingsrecht van de EU. 
 
Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op ‘een bundeling van afzonderlijke wetenschappelijke 
verhandelingen’ onder artikel 13 van het Promotiereglement van de Universiteit Leiden. Het 
proefschrift bestaat uit 6 hoofdstukken die zijn gepubliceerd in peer-reviewed juridische 
tijdschriften. De onderzoeksvraag van het proefschrift luidt als volgt: 
 
Kunnen collectieve schadevorderingen bijdragen aan het doel van volledige schadeloosstelling 
zoals vastgesteld in de richtlijn inzake schadevorderingen wegens inbreuken op het 
mededingingsrecht? Zo ja, welke mechanismes zouden volledig herstel vanuit een theoretisch en 
praktisch oogpunt het beste vergemakkelijken? En kunnen deze mechanismes, als bijwerking, 




Om tot een antwoord op deze vraag te komen, is een analyse nodig van verschillende collectieve 
vorderingen en van de mate waarin ze volledig herstel daadwerkelijk verwezenlijken. Het is 
bovendien nodig om te beoordelen in hoeverre deze vorderingen kunnen bijdragen aan het doel van 
ontmoediging door een verhoogde impact op opsporing en aansprakelijkheid. 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een algemene inleiding, terwijl in hoofdstuk 8 een algemene conclusie staat te 
lezen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert de bestaande obstakels en tekortkomingen in de handhaving van het 
mededingingsrecht. Met betrekking tot publiekrechtelijke handhaving worden de ontmoedigende 
gevolgen van het clementiebeleid en de administratieve (openbare) boetes van de EU besproken. 
Wat privaatrechtelijke handhaving betreft, wordt in dit hoofdstuk ingegaan op de belangrijkste 
obstakels waar slachtoffers mee te maken krijgen bij het instellen van schadevorderingen wegens 
inbreuken op het mededingingsrecht. Gezien de mogelijke aantrekkelijkheid van collectieve 
vorderingen met een opt-outsysteem, geeft hoofdstuk 2 weer waarom dit procesmodel kan worden 
gezien als een mogelijk hulpmiddel om de bestaande tekortkomingen van publiek- en 
privaatrechtelijke handhaving op te lossen althans te verminderen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat verder in op het collectief-verhaalmechanisme van de Verenigde Staten. Het biedt 
een uitgebreid onderzoek naar de effectiviteit van collectieve vorderingen voor het bereiken van de 
doelstellingen van herstel en ontmoediging. Het verkent de overheersende controverses in de 
Verenigde Staten door de opvattingen van zowel voorstanders als tegenstanders van collectieve 
vorderingen te beoordelen. Het debat over herstel focust op de effectiviteit van collectieve 
vorderingen met betrekking tot de schadevergoeding van eisers en de vraag of resultaatafhankelijke 
vergoedingen leiden tot overbetaling van advocaten. Wat ontmoediging betreft, wordt de theorie 
van de optimale ontmoediging gebruikt ter beoordeling van de impact van collectieve vorderingen 
op de ontmoediging van het plegen inbreuken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt de impact van resultaatafhankelijke vergoedingen op de effectiviteit van 
herstel in collectieve schadevorderingen wegens inbreuken op het mededingingsrecht. Door middel 
van een vergelijkende analyse tussen Litouwen en Polen enerzijds en de Verenigde Staten 
anderzijds, bespreekt het hoofdstuk het belang van het stimuleren van advocaten om te investeren in 
collectieve geschillen. Daarnaast bespreekt het hoofdstuk het risico van resultaatafhankelijke 
vergoedingen om misbruik van procesrecht te stimuleren, en of Litouwen en Polen bereid zijn om 
dit soort misbruik te voorkomen althans om de kans op dergelijk misbruik te verminderen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een overzicht van de principes die zijn uiteengezet in de Aanbeveling inzake 
collectieve schadevorderingen. Het geeft de controverse weer omtrent de keuze voor een niet-
bindende aanpak en de waarborgen die werden voorgesteld. De focus ligt ook op de mechanismes 
geïntroduceerd in proactieve lidstaten die een aantal principes van de Europese Commissie naast 
zich neer hebben gelegd en zich hebben laten inspireren door het Amerikaanse recht teneinde 
effectiviteit in hun collectieve procedures te verwezenlijken. Dit maakt het mogelijk om na te gaan 
hoe inzichten van de EU-lidstaten en de VS de ontwikkeling van een gemeenschappelijk collectief-





Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt de grondgedachte van het principe van volledig herstel. Dit omvat een 
onderzoek naar de reikwijdte van dit principe, en met name naar het effect van de indirecte-
afnemerregeling op volledig herstel. Het onderzoekt ook of de bepalingen die zijn aangenomen in 
het kader van de hervorming van het private mededingingsrecht van de EU (van de richtlijn en de 
aanbeveling) het bereiken van de doelstelling van volledige vergoeding voor alle geleden schade al 
dan niet waarschijnlijk maken. Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt ook het belang van de op Amerikaanse 
leest geschoeide maatregelen die gericht zijn op ontmoediging voor collectieve schadevorderingen 
in de EU. Dit hoofdstuk is belangrijk voor een goed begrip van de specifieke vereisten voor het 
verwezenlijken van volledig herstel. 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 heeft tot doel een zo goed mogelijk (voorstel voor een) collectief verhaalmechanisme 
te ontwerpen dat volledig herstel moet verwezenlijken en bovendien de juridische tradities, althans 
van sommige lidstaten, eerbiedigt. Aangezien de Europese Commissie ten laatste in 2019 
richtsnoeren moet opstellen met betrekking tot de vraag of collectief verhaal al dan niet op het 
niveau van de EU zal worden geregeld, onderzoekt dit hoofdstuk de mogelijke impact van het 
voorstel op volledig herstel en of het bijkomende gevolgen zou hebben met betrekking tot 
ontmoediging. Het hoofdstuk sluit af met een voorstel over hoe de wetgevende maatregel inzake 
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